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Abstract
TRAUMATIC FAMILIARITY: FICTIONS AND THEORIES OF COMMUNITY IN THE
EIGHTEENTH CENTURY
by
Andrew Dicus

Adviser: Professor Nancy Yousef
This dissertation addresses a crisis of modern collective identity by employing a dialectic of
philosophical and literary “realisms.” While both philosophical and novelistic discourses are
premised on twin gestures (aspiration for correspondence between representation and reality),
they arrive at radically different claims about how rational, self-governing individuals constitute
– and are constituted by – “legitimate” social bodies. By foregrounding the internal complexity
and empirical immersion of “real” individuals negotiating “realistic” social encounters,
eighteenth-century novelists engage in a sustained critique of emerging concepts of “legitimate”
community. Penetrating even the most basic foundations of social knowledge, such as the
capacity to distinguish between “familiar” and “stranger,” for example, they expose an unsettling
porosity that fundamentally undermines critical assumptions of stable, legitimate social
organization, such as consent, the “natural” primacy of the family, and “natural sociability.”
Thus the novel, as the following chapters argue, a popular literary form derogatorily associated
(in direct contrast to works of political philosophy) with women, the young, and the “idle,”
facilitates critical engagement with historically privileged discourses about social and political
legitimacy.
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Introduction: Modes of Legitimacy in Modern Collective Identification

“She had time and opportunity to see the fallacy, alike in authors and in the world, of judging
solely by theory.” Frances Burney, The Wanderer

In the first two years of the eighteenth century, two political pamphlets appeared in the streets of
London that, although written by the same author – the novelist, journalist, and spy Daniel Defoe
– addressed some of the organizing problems of legitimacy from two very different perspectives.
In the first, The Succession to the Crown of England, Considered, Defoe muses about how
properly to incentivize a definitive search into the disputed legitimacy of the Duke of
Monmouth. In it, he not only speculated that “there can be no harm done in examining into the
truth of the thing,” but he proposed more decisively that “If it were but Voted, That whoever
could offer any Proof of the Legitimacy of the late Duke of Monmouth, should be heard, and a
Committee appointed to inquire into it,” noting that “if nothing appeared, nothing would follow,
and there would be an End of it” (29). This argument does more than to accede to a continuity
between biological and political legitimacy, as if settling something about the parentage of the
Duke amounts to settling something about England’s legitimate governance. His tone in stoking
a fraught and obscure schema of political viability is grounded in a signal confidence that there
can be a single and objective resolution to the question of the individual’s legitimacy in the first
place, as if it lies embedded somewhere in a static and uncontroversial nature, waiting to be
discovered and extracted. While such a “truth,” he suggests, might be cryptic and obscure, it
exists, and its realization does not conflict with the laws of empirical observation.
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While this first pamphlet located political legitimacy in the body of its rulers, his second,
The Original Power of the Collective Body, a response to the rigidly royalist politician and
missionary Sir Humphrey Mackworth, took up the principles of governance familiar to readers of
social contract theory. Arguing that “The Good of the People Governed is the…Reason and
Original of Governours,” Defoe’s second pamphlet added that “the Governed,” which he called
“the first Fountain,” constitutes the “Original and Cause of all Constitutions.” Developing this
naturalistic analogy, he continued, “it cannot be suppos’d this Original Fountain should give up
all its Waters, but that it reserves a Power of supplying the Streams: Nor has the Streams any
power to turn back upon the Fountain, and invert its own Original. All such Motions are
Excentrick and Unnatural” (11 – 12).
The aquatic analogy of Defoe’s second pamphlet reverts to a similar confidence in the
objective conditions that characterized his first. The legitimacy of the social body, like that of the
biological body, follows from a specific and empirically knowable source, doing so, moreover,
according to “motions” that are both “natural” and naturally conspicuous. However, the
confidence in The Original Power’s fountain metaphor is derived from terms and conditions that,
unlike those of the Duke’s obscure parentage, are in a sense already self evident. They do not
require the institutional scrutiny and verification of public committees. Defoe’s implicit claims
about the intrinsic and natural “motions” of legitimate power need no defense because they are
obvious to all at first blush. While both pamphlets thus place the principles and conditions of
legitimacy in a stable and observable nature, they conceive of access to that nature in different
ways.
My interest in these pamphlets, and in reading them together, lies in the rationalist
premise to which both definitions of legitimacy appeal. Not only do these passages provide a
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moment of tension in a gradual, modernizing transition from emphasis in embodied legitimacy to
institutional legitimacy, they also provide insight into the fact that beneath every question about
the political conditions of legitimacy lies an epistemological question about how such conditions
are determined in the first place. And while there has never been a paucity of intrepid books,
tracts, and treatises broaching the former of these two questions, the latter has been
symptomatically neglected, as if all that is needed to work it out is to assemble responsible
committees and to sponsor appropriate hearings on its behalf. (Indeed, the confidence in Defoe’s
formulation obscures the fact that whatever it means to “inquire into” a given proof is not a
sufficient resolution but, in fact, precisely the question he needs to resolve.)
This negligence has persisted in part, I argue, because the very necessity of resolving the
epistemological question of legitimacy presupposes an inherent simplicity. By necessity, in other
words, it presents itself as incredibly easy to resolve. It must do so, in fact, in order to sustain the
premises of equality and liberty that validate modern political ideologies. After all, if resolving
the epistemological question of legitimacy required specialized experiences or exceptional
knowledge, then it loses the very immunity to abuse, exploitation, and manipulation that defines
it as legitimacy: consider the frequency with which revolutionary discourses reference truths that
are “self evident.”1 Despite this necessary presupposition, however, the question harbors a
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I allude obviously to the U. S. Declaration, but this kind of expression is easy to find elsewhere.
Robespierre, for example, keeps his readers and audience constantly in mind of “the very
obviousness of the principles” he develops, strictly limiting his arguments to “obvious
principles,” “fact[s] generally recognized,” and “[c]ommon sense.” He argues for example that
institutions can mitigate abuses by “means that are as simple as they are infallible; it is claimed
they present an insoluble problem, even to genius; I maintain that at least they present no
difficulty to common sense and good faith” (49 – 52); and, elsewhere, “We have been told that
genius would be needed to go deeply into this question [whether or not the king could be tried in
court]; I maintain that only good faith is required. It is less a question of enlightenment than of
avoiding voluntary blindness” (63). The “general will,” which Robespierre embraces, is general
precisely because it requires no specialization, qualifying knowledge, or particular experience.
3

persistent elusiveness that is, ultimately, a damning source of controversy and instability. The
danger of such instability is compounded by the fact that it, in this particular form (that of the
social body that is only possibly legitimate), leaches from claims about social organization into
claims about knowledge itself. As the question of the legitimacy of specific social and political
organizations and practices gives way to questions about the nature and mediation of knowledge,
skepticism emerges, jeopardizing the central and necessary premises of modern political theory.
Consider what might possibly have counted as “proof” of the Duke of Monmouth’s
legitimacy. The readiest answer, the black box, is interesting precisely because it begs every
question it stands to resolve.2 It points simultaneously, first, to the urgent need for, and the
tantalizing possibility of, some stable, objective, empirical evidence of the individual’s status as
both a determinant and beneficiary of legitimate social organization, without which the parasitic
specters of personal interest and corruption necessarily arise; second, to the stakes of arriving at a
medium of such evidence that, being somehow immune to those same parasitic specters, makes
consent to its terms not only plausible (to whom? under what conditions?) but logically
necessary (to all, under all conditions); and, third, to the likelihood that any such medium can
only ever be a fantasy. Available to its discoverers’ careful scrutiny and empirical standards, the
black box represents the promise of uncontroversial resolution. Circulating at the same time as a
figment of gossip and political intrigue, it devolves into the self-referencing joke that any such
promise must necessarily become. The image of the black box (having a suspiciously vague
provenance, circulating in mysterious obscurity, and turning up with such improbable
Its power lies in its universality: its obviousness to and construction by all people in all stations,
purified of parasitic self-interest and ambition.
2
The black box reputedly contained a marriage certificate between Charles II and Lucy Walter.
The existence of such a box was, itself, an open question (publicly disputed in fact by Gilbert
Gerrard, the supposed steward of the black box), used to gain leverage both for and against the
causes surrounding the Monmouth Rebellion.
4

suddenness and convenience that even an author who supported Monmouth’s claim to the throne
famously called it “mere romance”) becomes a popular and heavily ridiculed symbol of political
cynicism and party opportunism.3 Ultimately, determining the individual’s legitimacy (his or her
actual or necessary place within a specific social or political organization) turns out to be feasible
less through the logical necessity that Defoe’s first pamphlet requires than through its delegitimizing negative: accident.
Accordingly, accident has an important role to play in how questions about legitimacy are
framed and addressed in the eighteenth century. In fact, I will be arguing that accident’s
centrality in literary texts reveals how far these questions extended beyond traditionally
“political” and “philosophical” discourses. Ferguson’s allusion to the implausible contingency
surrounding the black box’s appearance evokes an idiosyncrasy of genre – namely, a defining
convention of literary fiction – that actually has broad significance, I will be arguing, for the
development of how political and philosophical conversations are framed. While Ferguson uses
the term “mere romance” explicitly to discredit the viability of the black box as a medium of
empirical evidence, literary tropes and conventions will play an important role precisely because
they call to mind the epistemological and narrative conditions of plausibility, conditions that
political theory largely takes for granted (I will return to this presently).4 For example, the
conveniently implausible and fortuitous disclosure of an individual’s birth or family ties is a
trope that features heavily in the “mere romance” of eighteenth-century novels, pointing directly
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Robert Ferguson, “A Letter to a Person of Honour, concerning the Black Box” (a pamphlet
originally published in London, anonymously, in 1680), 1. Ferguson sees the black box as a
“Fable” (1), created to discredit the claim to legitimate marriage by associating it with a cloud of
romantic implausibility and intrigue.
4
Indeed, the problematic currents between “self-evidence” and “plausibility,” as conditions of
legitimacy (or rational autonomy at all), become conspicuous in the interdisciplinary contact
performed here.
5

to some of the same epistemological and institutional questions at issue in the black box debate.
This trope will be central to my analysis in what follows.
Accident is less the object of this dissertation, however, than an entryway into the broader
and more fundamental epistemological problems that threaten to undermine modern political
theory. These broader problems come into focus upon further examination of Defoe’s pamphlets,
this time with an eye more to their differences than to their similarities. After all, given the
monumental difficulties of the “black box” question (how is the individual’s legitimacy to be
determined?), how does one account for the epistemological confidence, in Defoe’s second
formulation, about the “people” that constitutes “the Governed,” the spring from which the
legitimacy of any government supposedly issues? How is one to understand his confidence about
the nature of this “Fountain,” or the motions according to which it “naturally” flows? Defoe’s
formulation of the conditions of constitutional legitimacy takes completely for granted that
which his first pamphlet had just put into question, the knowability of the individual. In other
words, while his second pamphlet suggests that the legitimacy of governmental power is clearly
and conveniently legible in that which is natural and intrinsic to the people, his first regards
precisely what is natural and intrinsic to people as locked into an obscurity that, while not
impossible to discover, might require decades and committees and institutions to clear away.
Moreover, since the subject looking into the legitimacy of this or that specific social body is
often herself a constituent-member of that body, the epistemological difficulties she is
confronted with are compounded by their necessary inward turn. If I identify as a member of
family X, defined in part by my position and functions relative to that family, and I then discover
(as characters in eighteenth-century novels frequently do) that family X is actually an aggregate
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– reflecting not natural but rather arbitrary or accidental assemblage – then a radical and
troubling alienation from self and other ensues.
This alienation is one of several problems, all loosely related to a construct that I will call
“collectivity” or “collective identity,” that the following chapters will address. They will argue
that representations of collective identification in the eighteenth century were a means to critical
engagement with privileged discourses about social and political legitimacy, and that their
central place in “realistic” works of prose fiction places the novel (a popular literary form
derogatorily associated, in direct contrast to works of political philosophy, with women, the
young, and the “idle”) at the center of such debates. By broadening the intellectual context of
these philosophical conversations, the concept of social and political legitimacy occupies a space
where questions of epistemology (questions that otherwise call to mind the solitary Descartes or
Locke, sequestered in dim rooms with chunks of wax or slips of paper) and questions of social
organization (that hardly give the solitary individual a second thought) intersect.
After all, collective identification has the effect of animating legitimizing logics in
dramatic ways, putting into action the rationales that, otherwise only in theory, distinguish the
legitimate from the illegitimate. It concretizes the abstractions that authorize various perspectives
on “legitimacy.” Ernesto Laclau has described one iteration of this concretization in his analysis
of populism, writing that the inscription of “any democratic demand…within an equivalential
claim” (a claim by which a wide variety of particular and local concerns come to be associated
with a single whole, the “people”) “undoubtedly gives the demand a corporeality which it would
not otherwise have” (88; This corporeality is not just discursive, he later adds, but something that
“is also sedimented in practices and institutions” [106]). Moreover, through such corporeality,
the archive of empirical data by which “legitimacy” is calculated is altered or amended: it is thus,
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after all, that protests and riots motivated by rising food prices in the eighteenth century
constitute, in E. P. Thompson’s classic formulation, a “moral economy,” a part of the calculus by
which food production, circulation, and pricing can be regulated with disinterested “legitimacy.”
Meanwhile such legitimizing perspectives, whether “patriarchal,” “imperial,” “populist”
or otherwise, reify and reproduce themselves in the postures of universalism and logical
necessity that they assume. The presumed epistemological simplicity and self-evidence of this or
that social body’s claim to legitimacy extends that claim indefinitely. The “people,” returning to
Laclau, “aspires to be conceived as the only legitimate totality” (81) namely because the claims
they have given voice to ostensibly address contradictions or gaps in the official, legal, and
institutional logics of legitimacy – logics that, in turn, already conceive of themselves as
sufficient (disinterested, universal).5 The subject of enlightenment collectivity thus straddles a
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Laclau describes the people’s claim to totality on similar terms, emphasizing a “just” and
“ideal” society, where I emphasize its rational necessity and universalism (though, as his use of
“false totality” suggests, his sense of idealism is grounded in the sense of rationalism I am
using): “the populus as given – as the ensamble of social relations as they actually are – reveals
itself as a false totality, as a partiality which is a source of oppression. On the other hand, the
plebs, whose partial demands are inscribed in the horizon of a fully fledged totality – a just
society which exists only ideally – can aspire to constitute a truly universal populus which the
actually existing situation negates. It is because the two visions of the populus are strictly
incommensurable that a certain particularity, the plebs, can identify itself with the populus
conceived as an ideal totality” (94). Moreover, Laclau sees the “constitution of popular
identities” (94) playing an important role in the emergence of this idealized totality, but he is
mostly interested in the ways that popular identity holds in tension the particularity of
“democratic demands” and the “wider universality” that allows for the incorporation of those
particular demands (indeed, this helps him to account for [mis]attributions of irrationalism,
unreason, and vagueness to populist movements). I am after, so to speak, a universality that is
wider still: the enlightenment, even Kantian, pretense of “legitimacy” that becomes active only
when it recognizes no difference whatsoever between the particular and the universal. When
there is a tension as Laclau describes it, it is only because the subject has failed to conceive of
things properly, rationally, categorically. This is as much as to say that, while Laclau attempts to
define populism – a construct historically interchanged with illegitimacy, often explicitly
because it is interchanged with unreason – in a way that gives it a basis in legitimacy, I am
attempting to analyze (but not, I should note, to endorse) the prior or foundational notion of
legitimacy to which social movements and practices appealed in the eighteenth century, and
8

wide conceptual gap between the specific claims that his or her identifications concretize and the
standards of universalism that ostensibly authorize their concretization in the first place. To this
extent, collective identification approximates the “strangely complementary structure” that
Nancy Yousef associates with intimacy, in which “[s]kepticism…generates an excessive anxiety
about the accuracy and reliability of our apprehension of things” while sympathy “presumes an
improbable confidence about our intimacy with other persons” (7). Through collective
identification, one understands one’s self as “like,” in some essential and necessary way, those
with whom he or she identifies (as, for example, fellow constituents of the “first fountain”), even
if the terms of that likeness remain obscure. The individual makes a claim about oneself that
presupposes claims – countless claims – about the social body to which he or she belongs, and
that extends to the other individuals who also belong to – who are also the “first fountain” of –
that body. This presupposition constitutes a big epistemological leap, one that needs further
exploration.
Collective identity thus announces and then tries to resolve a double anxiety, one about
the status of persons and one about the status as things. Through collective identity, persons
emerge as potential objects of the “recognition” that legitimacy requires – recognition that others
may, on the other hand, refuse to reciprocate. Meanwhile, the ostensibly objective but
nevertheless abstract social or political entity – what one might call the “imagined community” –
emerges as a stabilizing universalism that appeals to the person pursuing recognition. The entity

which, I think, remains largely in tact. After all, individuals caught in this or that populist sway
generally do not describe themselves as “populists” – this is a term that is usually imposed from
the outside, sometimes derogatorily. They think of themselves, rather, as holding more
“legitimate,” in a prior or foundational sense, concerns and ideas. Consider for example populist
movements that posit a “return” to the “principles” of founding documents in the U.S., and that
claim a more reasonable and more developed grasp of market logics, governmental principles,
even human nature.
9

provides the person the basis for his or her legitimizing recognition; the person provides the
entity a medium through which its legitimizing logic or rationale becomes operative. In other
words, the cryptic, thingly “Englishness” of the English becomes legible empirically when one
of its constituents comes forward, claims it, embodies it.6 Like the Duke of Monmouth, or one of
his supporters making claims about authenticity and “pretenders” (note that these claims are
framed in essentially epistemological terms), he gives substance to the content of Englishness,
granting Englishness the empirical medium through which its legitimacy can be (returning to
Defoe’s vocabulary) “inquired into” and “proven.” By associating himself with the abstractions
that give “Englishness” its potency, he also appropriates its defining legitimacy, understanding
himself and his actions by its terms, while at the same time bringing its premises and organizing
logics forward into view. At the moment of collective identification, when he is “recognized,”
the individual becomes the subject and object of legitimacy.

6

I am here intentionally conflating multiple notions of “legitimacy,” such as that of one’s birth
and that of a given cause or belief. Indeed, in the early eighteenth century both notions of
legitimacy begin to converge in revealing ways. Defoe mocks the “true-born Englishman,” for
example, attacking xenophobic attitudes that ground claims about one’s superior ability to
discern true political interest in prior claims about national provenance, countering the political
assertions of William III’s dissidents by reducing the “true-born Englishman” to a “vain illnatured thing” originating from an “amphibious ill-born mob” (4). (Similarly, claims that one
can discern the legitimacy of the Duke of Monmouth’s birth function to signal a corresponding
superiority, and a disinterested authenticity, of broader political judgment.) Despite Defoe’s
efforts, by the end of the eighteenth century this convergence is only more fully established. In
Smollett’s pro-government periodical called “The Briton,” for example (bringing both notions of
legitimacy into play, and in fact collapsing one into the other), an editorial argues that the
“BRITON means, by steering a middle course between” the two poles of the 1790s rights
controversy, “to render harmless the poison of either; to inform his countrymen of their real
situation, to direct their attention to the excellencies of the constitution under which they live; at
the same time to point out its defects with truth and candour, and to recommend to them the
wiseset and most temperate measured to be pursued in obtaining its amendment” (4). Striking is
the presumption that the countrymen need to be informed “of their real situation” or of the
“constitution under which they live,” as well as the extent to which the Briton’s status – as The
Briton – ratifies these epistemological observations.
10

From a narrative perspective, the reconciliation of subjective agency and objective
validity suggested by collective identification is revealing precisely in its riskiness. Persons who
claim that they, their properties, and their actions reflect a particular “legitimacy” open
themselves to controversy, ultimately problematizing, like the black box, the very notion of
legitimacy they had hoped to stabilize. Rather than giving substance to legitimacy – or (to put it
in the social and intersubjective terms suggested by collective identification) rather than making
legitimacy familiar to their fellows – they in fact risk becoming strange, objects of chance in a
“mere romance.” They risk appropriating too much of the contested provenance and not enough
of the “natural” and “intrinsic motions” of validity that make such identifications appealing in
the first place. They risk estranging the very obviousness, the self-evidence, of the terms of
legitimacy, undermining the legitimizing premises that, through identification, they had sought to
substantiate. I am contending not only, therefore, that a full account of legitimacy must also,
against implausible odds, account for its own epistemological foundations, but that this
contention was central to, if submerged within, broad, popular debates about legitimacy during
the eighteenth century.
Questions of epistemology do receive attention in more recent discussions of political
theory, although they are often relegated to supporting roles, secondary to the political conditions
of legitimacy. John Rawls’s formulation of a “well-ordered society,” for example, in which
“everyone accepts and knows that others accept the same principles of justice,” and in which
“the basic social institutions generally satisfy and are generally known to satisfy these
principles,” seems to place as much pressure on the “principles” (the work’s primary object) as
on how they can be known (4). Similarly, Robert Nozik draws his analysis of political legitimacy
from a Locke-derived State of Nature that poses as many epistemological as moral challenges:
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wronged individuals “will overestimate the amount of harm or damage they have suffered,” for
example, and they have an interest in establishing conditions according to which such abuses are
not only settled, but according to which “both parties know” they are settled (11).
But even political theories that do recognize the interdependencies of the epistemological
and institutional challenges of legitimacy tend to take social and political knowledge for granted,
as if knowledge will follow necessarily from the proper conditions of legitimate government
once they are established. Jean Starobinski persuasively links Rousseau’s anxiety about
mediation to the failures of bourgeois society, for example, but this analysis has lead to
overdetermined interpretations of Rousseau’s political optimism, as if the English breakfast
scene in Julie might actually represent the transparent, unmediated openness that its protagonist
improbably claims. Likewise, Marshall Berman, calling for a “politics of authenticity,” takes for
granted not only that the proper political arrangements will bear the fruits of authenticity, but that
anything like the “authenticity” of other minds can be recognized and determined at all. In either
case, the implicit causal mechanisms that link authenticity or transparency to institutional
conditions need further elaboration.
The approach that is best suited for such an elaboration, as I have already begun to argue,
is one that is thoroughly interdisciplinary. The epigraph to this introduction comes from Frances
Burney’s fourth and last novel, The Wanderer, a narrative set against the backdrop of the French
Revolution, and one that is rich with references to political theory, “new systems,” and Burkean
conservatism. As the protagonist, fleeing mysterious pursuers and an oppressive past, takes
shelter in rural England, she discovers the inadequate abstraction of influential – and, she
believes, strictly theoretical – idealizations of country life. Implicitly aimed at Rousseau and his
adherents, Burney writes of individuals “born and bred in a capital; who first revel in its
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dissipations and vanities, next, sicken of its tumults and disappointments, write or exclaim for
ever, how happy is the country peasant’s lot” (700). The Wanderer recognizes that “theoretical”
accounts reflect the prepossessions of their authors, and that narrative provides an important
supplement to theory, balancing its conclusions by resolving its distance from the lived
experiences of individuals – individuals, indeed, including women, laborers, and colonized
subjects, who are dispossessed by such theoretical accounts. Authors of theory “reflect not,” she
continues, that to substantiate their idealizations of country life “the peasant must be so much
more philosophic than the rest of mankind, as to see and feel only his advantages, while he is
blind and insensible to his hardships” (700). Theoretical or philosophical discourses, she argues,
ultimately reflect and promote the needs of its privileged developers, those who enjoy the
material advantages of education and leisure. Moreover, those needs, precisely because they are
couched in theoretical discourses, pretend to universality. It is not the peasant (or the woman
novelist) that, speaking as if in objective registers, describes political or social legitimacy
through universalist claims about country life, but “the writer, who has never tried it, and the
man of the world who, however murmuring at his own, would not change with it” (700).
Despite Burney’s misgivings, some of the defining models of modern social and political
legitimacy were, above all, interdisciplinary, developed in a context in which stories and
abstractions, contrary to the genres and disciplines that would eventually come to distinguish
them, were still relatively fluid. (I will be arguing for the theoretical significance of Rousseau as
a novelist, for example.) Indeed, central to my argument is that the narrative element of social
contract texts needs greater and more serious attention, as do the theoretical investments of
fictional and narrative texts. Scholarship on social contract theory generally takes for granted that
narratives about civil society emerging from the state of nature are, and are merely, hypothetical.
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Any introductory course on the works of Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, Samuel Pufendorf, or
Jean-Jacques Rousseau is likely to begin with the assertion that the imagined histories, despite
their prominence in these authors’ respective works, can be quietly set aside. The state of nature
is simply instrumental, a fictional construct serving only to set up and expound privileged
theoretical descriptions of empirically legitimate social and political organization.
I emphasize, on the contrary, the significance of the fact that seventeenth- and eighteenthcentury political philosophy, premised precisely on the aspiration for correspondence between
representation and “reality,” is co-emergent with that other ostensibly realistic discourse
(Burney’s domain), the novel. This dissertation thus advances a dialectic of literary and
philosophical “realisms.” While both traditions attempt to situate human life in “realistic”
contours, they both advance radically different arguments about how rational, self-governing
individuals constitute, and are constituted by, legitimate social and political organization.
Questions of social organization and social legitimacy give shape to an important point of
contact between literary and philosophical writings of the period, in which the abstract
formulations of “legitimate” social organization confront the empirical social experiences
featured in novelistic “realism.” My focus on the forms and rational dynamics of community
thus situates my work within a recent, broader turn to the intersections of literature and
philosophy (Frances Ferguson, Helen Thompson, Nancy Yousef, Jonathan Kramnick, and Karen
Bloom Gevirtz, for example), even as it advances investigations of the historical conditions and
complexities of social organization in the eighteenth century (including a growing body of
scholarship expanding upon and challenging Linda Colley’s monograph on nationalism and
eighteenth-century Britain, as well as a vast and rich body of work reevaluating notions of social
association and dissociation under British imperialism: Srinivas Aravamudan, Humberto Garcia,
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Suvir Kaul, and Roxann Wheeler, among many others). Through the concept of “collective
identity,” this dissertation exposes connections between, and explores implications of, both of
these critical lines, giving clearer definition to the concept of “legitimacy” and to the problems
that arise as it shifts (a “shift” that is never tidy or complete) from a description of individual
bodies and their parentage to a description of interconnected social bodies and their governing
principles.

“Traumatic familiarity” refers obliquely to the persistence of illegitimacy. That is to say
that it refers to the persistence of the inability to determine legitimate from illegitimate social
organization – a problem that is especially troubling when one realizes that one is oneself a
defining constituent of that organization. A sudden awareness of a mistaken principle of social
knowledge or political legitimacy (always conceivable, even likely) indexes, in this case, a
related awareness of (an ostensibly much less conceivable) deficiency in self-knowledge. As
Raymond Geuss describes it, the “modern subject” is “an autonomous individual who has
liberated himself from all merely traditional bonds and has independently assumed responsibility
for the organization of his own life.” Geuss acknowledges the temptation in this context “to
conceive the optimal organization of life as a form of rational self-legislation.” But the ostensibly
“clear and generalizable rules” that organize self-legislation (63), when they extend out (as they
necessarily do) into the social and political spaces that the individual shares with others, become
matters of debate. When they turn out to be wrong, insufficient, or elusive (as to Defoe’s
committees and proofs), they take on the troubling suggestion of an ungovernable and
unknowable self. Traumatic familiarity refers to the circuits that bind the confidence and stability
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of self-knowledge to the instabilities and abstractions of social knowledge, especially where
knowledge and its production through rational autonomy creates and culminates in “legitimacy.”
This dissertation project began with a fascination with the strange insistence eighteenthcentury British novelists had with making familiars strange. As chapter three will show at length,
readers of eighteenth-century novels were constantly encountering literary characters who, when
confronted with sisters, brothers, sexual partners, parents, or friends, collapse momentarily into
distraction and terror. Like Robinson Crusoe discovering the human footprint on the beach, these
characters are faced with the opportunity to rediscover themselves as specifically determined
members of a shared existence, having shared experiences, living in a shared space and off of
shared resources. They are faced with the opportunity to identify collectively, to think of
themselves as members of a community. They are faced with the suggestion that their prior
collective identifications and notions of community had been wrong, somehow misguided or
contaminated with manipulation, interest, or error. Like Robinson Crusoe, these characters –
despite and indeed often because of the conspicuous familiarity of the encountered other –
temporarily reject this opportunity or this suggestion in spectacular, even gothic fashion. They
faint and scream; they lose touch, as Crusoe does, with reality; they slip into the margins of
madness or death.
What do these moments of traumatic familiarity tell us about community, especially as it
was being developed in the eighteenth century, an intellectual context that strives, as I have
suggested above, to legitimize community in rationally necessary ways?
Before addressing the question of what this dissertation might aspire to say about
community, a brief methodological note will be useful here to establish what it will not attempt
to say. It will be obvious already that, while the title of this dissertation is suggestive of a project
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that is primarily historical or political in nature, its principle objective is more properly
epistemological.7 In sum, the epistemological problem can be expressed by a deceptively
straightforward articulation of what I have been calling “legitimate” community: the
reconciliation of the autonomous individual with its necessary immersion in social relationality.
With the emergence of modern political thought, and especially in its most durable
conceptualizations of legitimacy (including but not limited to seventeenth- and eighteenthcentury formulations of the social contract), the individual’s autonomy and relationality are to be
considered not only as compatible, but as the essential condition of each other. Accounting for
legitimacy thus entails explaining how an individual can and must be at once fully autonomous
and fully relational – that is, at once sovereign and subject (to interdependency, obligation,
hierarchy, etc). My engagement with community is primarily, thus, an analysis of its
development in conceptual and imaginative discourses.
This is not to say that any analysis of community should ever (or could ever) be at all
ahistorical or apolitical. Indeed, this project assumes that something of a community’s
“legitimacy” is presupposed in the “legitimate” actions of its agents. Thus, it follows that the
actions that organize and control social spaces and social relations – such as enclosure, for
example – and the conceptual “legitimacy” of the social body that gives such actions context, are
mutually implicit. While therefore I do not offer a sustained and explicit critique of practices
such as enclosure, I do assume that such a critique must take up, not only the economic and
social practices that are disrupted, constructed, or transformed by it, but also the concept of
7

This project of course proceeds with the awareness, moreover, that such terms are not mutually
exclusive. That epistemologies can be political, for example, has been an operating assumption
of a great deal of political theory, such as Wendy Brown’s analysis of neoliberalism and the
dissemination of a pervasive (economic but also social and political), normative, and ostensibly
legitimizing “economic” or “market rationality.” “Neo-Liberalism and the End of Liberal
Democracy,” pg 4.
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legitimate community that supplies its rationale. Indeed (to follow these implications to a useful
if somewhat trite example), the legitimacy of a particular social organization has had the
tendency to erase, counter-intuitively, the otherwise conspicuous illegitimacy of certain of its
organizing practices: the rhetoric and figure of “exceptionalism” makes this striking tendency
legible in twenty-first-century registers. A state that is “exceptional” in its logic, in its rationale
and legitimacy, may take, ignore, or excuse the “exceptional” measures it takes in sustaining
itself. Rather than contradicting or negating one another, one logic (the logic of extreme
measures, as of draconian surveillance and inequitable energy consumption, for example), is
absorbed or obviated by another (the logic of social and political legitimacy, whose operative
calculus is thus seen magically to negate or excuse the aforementioned measures). Both logics, of
course, are historical products, and each has serious political implications. My project aims
neither to critique nor to narrate those products and implications, however, but to understand
their emergence in modern thought as necessary and interdependent phenomena in the
increasingly secular, increasingly global world of the eighteenth century, especially from the
perspective of the writers whose theories have proven so durable – writers whose claims about
“legitimacy,” that is, have been so convincing for so many. It might be argued that this
dissertation is to that extent purblind. These remarks do not constitute a defense of purblind
scholarship, but a rejection of the accusation, rather, as itself purblind, as committed to a story as
it is being only half-told.
To show all my cards, I value the historicist commitment that has only deepened and
enriched scholarly insight into conceptual developments, such as social contract, consent, and
natural sociability, which have in turn shaped and informed social practices and political
institutions. But I also believe that literary scholarship has more to offer than recent scholarship
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might suggest. I find an opportunity, recently expressed by Jonathan Kramnick, to embrace the
unique mandate of literary scholarship, and to think about “[w]hat grounds eighteenth-century
literary studies as an intellectual practice” (“Recent Studies” 683). Specifically, I embrace the
opportunity to work out what distinguishes ours from others’ disciplines, and if I agree with
Kramnick’s suggestion that “historicism ha[s] perhaps run its course,” it is not because I am
dismissive of historicist methodology, but because I want to explore the concept of eighteenthcentury community through some of the discipline’s “eclectic heterogeneity” (683). One can
reflect seriously and responsibly, after all, on the abstract articulation of concepts such as
“legitimacy,” “consent,” and “natural law” without neglecting the extent to which such concepts
were constructed under, and reflective of, particular historical conditions. The rest of this section,
and all of the next, is where I will address most substantially and directly some of the historical
questions, contexts, and objections that might arise (though, again, I will be historicizing
throughout as well).
It is important to note, first of all, that this dissertation consists primarily of close
consideration of philosophical and literary representations produced during, and in reaction to,
the historical period we sometimes call the “Enlightenment.”8 It investigates explicit
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I have no strong feelings about how “Enlightenment” should be defined (I will capitalize it
when it appears as a noun). For my purposes, I will be referring to it in its most generic sense, as
it was typically defined in the eighteenth century in all of its various iterations (the “age of
reason,” the “empire of light and reason,” etc). And while I see value to emphasizing, as Clifford
Siskin and William Warner have done, the historical conditions and technologies, such as
technologies of mediation, that made Enlightenment possible, I think, again, the historicist
perspective has overemphasized those conditions and technologies at the expense of the
conceptual content that historical actors generally meant when they actually talked about
Enlightenment. I appreciate the conviction with which Siskin and Warner name their book,
proffering a decisive answer to the question Kant addressed, somewhat less decisively, over two
centuries ago. But, in addition to noting some of the important objections already made (Dan
Edelstein, for example, notes that “the Jesuits had a far more sophisticated system of global
correspondence: does this mean they were more enlightened?” adding that many of the
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formulations of community in a historical context according to which collective action and
responsibility were decreasingly authorized by religion, on the one hand, but not yet legitimized
by “nationalism” on the other. In this way, I seek to understand the binding dynamics of
individuality and collectivity when there was no apparent, legitimate recourse to such larger
organizing narratives as “religion” and the “nation”: to take seriously, in other words,
Rousseau’s objection to Grotius in The Social Contract that, before examining the establishment
of legitimate sovereign forms, “we ought to scrutinize” how “a people” is possible and operative
in the first place (59). By doing so, I hope to draw attention to some of the problems and
contradictions of political collectivity that have persisted in spite of the inauguration in the
nineteenth century of “new” forms of class and national consciousness. Indeed, one of the ways I
have conceptualized this project from the outset is as a study of “imagining community.”
Accordingly, a fuller account of the inadequacies and contradictions of nationalism can be
achieved by considering more closely and carefully the conceptual problems that it sees itself
addressing or resolving in earlier, eighteenth-century thought.
Of course, much of the work on collective identity in the eighteenth century already
tracks changing attitudes and arguments about national identity, as well as how global political

technologies of mediation that existed in the eighteenth-century were not unique to that century,
and arguing ultimately that “[t]o locate the singularity of the Enlightenment, we must also
consider what was mediated, not just how it was” [11]), I want to register what I see as the
reductive nature of the argument. I see no reason after all why the book could not have been
called This is Mediation (a book I would probably have read, and would certainly have profited
from), nor do I see how reducing Enlightenment to “a moment in the history of mediation” (1)
makes any more sense than reducing, say, industrialization, or perhaps even early capitalism, to
“a moment in the history of metallurgy.” After all (to draw upon the basic premises of Siskin’s
and Warner’s thesis), industrialization would not have been possible without metallurgy, and
material advances in metallurgy in turn facilitate further industrial expansion of the uses and
methodologies of metallurgy. But to contend that, therefore, industrialization is “a moment in the
history of metallurgy” leaves out or deflates so many of its important social, economic,
ideological, and political dimensions to constitute a sufficient account.
20

organization (such as imperialism) changes to reflect these attitudes and arguments. A great deal
of scholarship on eighteenth-century British collectivity, for example, attempts to extend,
reassert, or redefine nationalism in order to make the case for or against its status as a nation.
Linda Colley writes explicitly about Britain as a national specimen in Britons: Forging the
Nation 1707 – 1837 (1992), arguing that Great Britain’s Protestantism, trade practices, and
animosity with the French cohere England, Wales, and Scotland into one national body. Setting
the tone, in many ways, for scholarship about political collectivity in the eighteenth century,
Colley provides a very close reading of historical data, rereading standard models of how critics
think the English conceptualized themselves. As more evidence has been made available, critics
have variously modified, challenged, and reinforced Colley’s history, directly and indirectly.
This body of literature is vast, but important recent contributions include Tony Claydon and Ian
McBride (1998), Brendan Bradshaw and Peter Roberts (1998), Colin Kidd (1999), and Lisa
Cody (2005). But these books are histories, and they draw productive conclusions about
collectivity by tracking how maps were made, churches were attended, books were published,
babies were weaned, and so forth. In addition to the limitations of historicism mentioned above,
the potential teleology of this kind of history – reading the documents and processes of the
period as somehow inevitably nationalistic or proto-nationalistic – carries the threat of
considering (and sometimes dismissing) evidence that does not fit the model of Andersonian
nationalism as aberrations, rather than as valid (or no less valid, rather), alternative expressions
of legitimate, imagined community.
There have been a number of studies more explicitly invested in different concepts of
collectivity as imagined and represented by eighteenth-century writers and artists, usually with a
strong focus on individual philosophers and writers. J.G.A. Pocock’s work has been exemplary

21

at reconciling conceptual discourses with material historiography. Barbarism and Religion:
Narratives of Civil Government (2001), for example, examines how Gibbon and some of his
contemporaries represented political bodies within the framework of what Pocock calls “the
Enlightened Narrative” (I will return to Pocock below). I have also profited from intellectual
histories in a similar vein, including especially those of J. B. Schneewind and Charles Taylor.
Other broader and multi-author surveys include Pheng Cheah’s Spectral Nationality: Passages of
Freedom from Kant to Postcolonial Literatures of Liberation (2003), an excellent book that
examines the development of organicism in metaphors of the state. Spectral Nationality
approaches more nearly the kind of analysis I attempt here, but it is interested in enlightenment
philosophy primarily as it relates to literature of subsequent periods, and it draws upon genre
distinctions which, while necessary for its purposes, were still basically fluid for writers and
readers in the eighteenth century. A more rigorous interrogation of the concepts of community –
as imagined and represented during the eighteenth century in both philosophical and literary
texts – is needed in order to provide a fuller understanding of the kinds of collectivity
experienced during the period, and for insight into the extent to which early American and
French nationalism corrected, appropriated, modified, and rejected these concepts. One approach
to this problem, as suggested above, is by parsing a collection of recurring moments during the
period – such as that of what I call traumatic familiarity – that throw the contemporary problems
of imagining community in the context of enlightenment into relief.

The secular implications of that enlightenment context are important. The sense that
community is being conceptualized without recourse to traditional religious or organizing
national models leaves one with the impression that community during the eighteenth century is
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being thought of on its own terms: community “as such.” The extent to which it makes any sense
to speak of a community “as such” (rather than to speak of this or that specific community, or of
historically contingent forms of community, like the nation or the family), has of course shifted
over time. Aristotle, and his early contentions about the zoon politikon (human beings as political
animals, creatures who achieve their promise and their nature when they enter into political
structures), has been instrumental in shaping some of the secularizing discourses about
community and humanism that eighteenth-century thinkers variously adopted or rejected.
J.G.A. Pocock writes about the spread of civic humanism in the early sixteenth century,
for example, as an attempt to reconcile Christian ideas of temporality (which subordinates the
finite and thus potentially meaningless business of political events and particularity to divine
infinity and an eschatological temporal view that, moreover, ultimately privileges contemplation
over action) with Aristotelian notions of virtue: the political means and contexts in which human
nature is realized and human promise is achieved. Pocock argues for the significance of civic
humanism in providing stability and meaning in the face of fortuna (and, later, in the face of
corruption), the unpredictability and instability of secular events, writing that with civic
humanism
it was possible…for the individual to feel that only as a citizen, as political animal
involved in a vivere civile with his fellows, could he fulfill his nature, achieve virtue, and
find his world rational; while at the same time it might be that his conceptual means of
understanding the particular and controlling the temporal, on which his ability to function
as a citizen depended, had not increased to a degree commensurate with the new demands
made upon them. (Machiavellian Moment 114)
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Pocock’s conception of humanism, fully developed in early-sixteenth-century Florence by
Machiavelli and his contemporaries and later revived/revised by revolutionary England and
America, provided new vocabularies for what might otherwise be called legitimacy (a key word
for Pocock, in fact, throughout his study), since its spread “offered…a means of associating the
particular virtues of men composing the political society in such a way that they would not be
corrupted by their particularity but would become parts of a common pursuit of universal good,”
adding that “it offered powerful incentives to consideration both of what types and categories of
men, displaying what characteristic virtues and limitations, made up the political society, and of
the means by which it was proposed to associate them in a common pursuit” (115). Pocock
writes about republics in particular, as theorized by Machiavelli in the Discorsi, as “a drastic
experiment in secularization,” arguing that Machiavelli established “that civic virtue and the
vivere civile may…develop entirely in the dimension of contingency, without the intervention of
timeless agencies” (including superhuman legislators such as Lycurgus and Moses, to whom I
will return in chapter one). Pocock adds that while timelessness or universality remains, for
Machiavelli, a fundamental goal of human beings as political animals, “there are circumstances
in which citizens move toward this goal through the efforts of their own time-bound selves,”
citing as an example Rome, “where the goal was achieved…by the disorderly and chancegoverned actions of particular men in the dimension of contingency and fortune” (190).
The secular principle of social organization Machiavelli associates with the achievement
of Roman order by “time-bound” and “contingent” citizens is translated by the seventeenth
century into a notion of individual rights, developed perhaps most influentially by the Dutch
jurist Hugo Grotius, whose arguments about rights as “faculties” and “aptitudes” that “attach to a
person” pave the way for the enlightenment liberal theories of Hobbes and Locke. In his treatise

24

On the Law of War and Peace (1625), Grotius marries the rational individual to the concept of
legitimate social organization through a rigorous theorization of natural law. While the principles
of natural law date at least as far back as the stoics and the subsequent development of jus
gentium (intended to mitigate the legal confusion and complexity of inter-territorial dealings
during Roman expansion by deferring, not to technical or regional written legal codes, but to the
presumed and shared rational capacities of any and all “civilized” people to recognize and
negotiate the self-evident terms of fair exchange),9 Grotius modernizes its conceptualization in
Christian Europe not only through increased emphasis on the individual and individual rights,
but on basing the normative, moral principles of natural law on rational or logical necessity, a
standard to which even God may be judged, and of which God cannot change: an objective
measure that is truly legitimate. “What we have been saying,” he famously writes, “would have a
degree of validity even if we should concede that which cannot be conceded without the utmost
wickedness: that there is no God, or that the affairs of men are of no concern to Him” (4).10
A similar posture is taken by proponents of Deism, whose primary tenets, in a sense
subordinating religious knowledge to rational thought (thus cleansing it of its dangerous
corruptions, superstition and popery), are taken even further by John Locke, who insists that
religious thought matures not through divine revelation, nor with innate principles, but as the
necessary result and the objectively valid produce of empirical investigation. The complex
relationship Pocock traces in Machiavelli’s writings, linking the universal to the particular, is

9

See J. B. Schneewind, especially chapter two, “Natural Law: from Intellectualism to
Voluntarism.”
10
On secular thought in Grotius, and how that secularism has played out in subsequent and
contemporary theories of international law (internationalism and the “free seas” constitute the
most appropriate context for the study of Grotius’s legal theory), see Hilaire McCoubrey,
“Natural Law, Religion and the Development of International Law,” and John Haskell, “Hugo
Grotius in the Contemporary Memory of International Law.”
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stretched to its limits by Locke’s empiricism, where particular, finite, and temporal phenomena
alone offer sufficient and necessary passage to legitimate understanding of the universal, infinite,
and transcendent nature of God.11 Consider for example the inadequacy and superficiality of
Robinson Crusoe’s many lapses into religious enthusiasm (usually during moments of intense
fear, such as during the “terrible Storm” in which a ship he is on, “deep loaden…wallowed in the
sea” [54, 55]). These moments serve to highlight the legitimacy of his final turn to Christian
theology based, not on fear and dependence, but on rational autonomy and empirical observation.
Indeed, it is precisely while looking at a sea “very calm and smooth” that Crusoe begins to
wonder “What is this Earth and Sea of which I have seen so much, whence is it produc’d, and
what am I,” concluding through rational exercise that “Sure we are all made by some secret
Power, who form’d the Earth and the Sea,” reasoning (it “follow’d most naturally,” he insists)
that “ It is God that has made it all,” and that “He guides and governs them all, and all Things
that concern them” (124). The abstraction and contemplative priorities characteristic of medieval
philosophy have given way in the popular Lockean tradition to notions of objective truth that are
available to the active, empirical mind in its engagement with the contingent and the material. In
such a context, social phenomena (once the matter of fortuna: unstable and finite, and thus best
ignored or “suffered”) are given new meaning and urgency as well. Social legitimacy, it is
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Locke argues for example that “the same truths may be discovered, and conveyed down from
revelation, which are discoverable to us by reason, and by those ideas we naturally may have,”
adding that “God might, by revelation, discover the truth of any proposition in Euclid; as well as
men, by the natural use of their faculties, come to make the discovery themselves. In all things of
this kind, there is little need or use of revelation, God having furnished us with natural, and
sureer means to arrive at the knowledge of them. For whatsoever truth we come to the clear
discovery of, from the knowledge and contemplation of our own ideas, will always be certainer
to us, than those which are conveyed to us by traditional revelation.” Chapter XVIII, § 4, pg
609.
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suggested, might constitute an objective truth (or a cluster of objective truths) made accessible to
the individual through empirical phenomena: namely, the experience of others in social spaces.
A useful (but, it should be stressed, easy to oversimplify) way in which to characterize
such emergent secularizing tendencies is with the familiar paradigm shift from (mostly) vertical
to (mostly) horizontal descriptions of human relations, in which one’s physical, material, and
moral status begins to say much less about his or her relationship with God than about his or her
interrelations with other people. Yet it is possible of course to accept only a qualified form of
such a schematic shift. Indeed, Pocock writes about the emergence of England, as a product of
civic consciousness, as “a means of conceptualizing, in a complex and particular time-frame, a
public realm, at once secular and godly, in which the individual, at once saint and Englishman, is
to act” (337). The birth of English civic consciousness is directed by an understanding of history
that entails both the religious and the contingent. This was true not only of England as a public
space, but also of English identity in an international context. In her study of racial identification
in the eighteenth-century Atlantic world, Roxann Wheeler argues that Christianity and clothing
are not incidental but in fact central to British identification, especially in an international
context: much more than, for example, skin color. But what is meant by “Christianity,” even by
the colonial actors Wheeler describes, is itself now subject to “horizontal” description.
Indeed, one of the best-known examples of what might be called the material reification
of principles of social organization in the eighteenth century, the Gordon Riots of 1780, appears
explicitly religious in nature. The impetus, after all, was the Papists Act of 1778, which rolled
back anti-Catholic Penal Laws instituted in 1698 (effectively barring Catholics from substantial
participation in public life). But as much as the Gordon Riots help us to see how central religion
continued to be in English and British identification, they also help us to understand how
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overdetermined Christianity was, pointing as much to religious beliefs and institutions as to
secular assumptions and practices. In The Crowd in History, George Rudé demonstrates that the
Gordon Riots were motivated more by political and class-based concerns than religious ones,
citing “social justice” and “settling accounts with the rich” as the rioters’ organizing motive.12
Nicholas Rogers agrees, arguing that if anti-Catholicism was a “necessary cause” of the riots, it
was “hardly a sufficient one” (155). (It would almost be stating the obvious to add that
Catholicism stood for much more than its theology, and that its associations with the French, the
Spanish, and the Irish signify a host of volatile political and territorial hostilities.)
Besides, the turn to what I have called “horizontal” social engagement, as well as its
implications for collective identification, constitutes a (if not the) defining interest for
eighteenth-century novelists. It is thus that so much depends, for Sterne’s titular narrator of The
Life and Opinions of Tristram Shandy, Gentleman (1759), on the winding of a clock: as potent a
symbol of temporal and contingent human agency as any. The act of winding a clock accounts
for Tristram Shandy’s existence and character, whose narrative is the narrative of complex
interpersonal contacts between an uncle, a male wet nurse, his parents, and so many others, and
that extends well into a past and into distant places that are not properly his own – that he never
experiences first-hand. So complex are the social intersections that account for his “life and
opinions” that he cannot decide with any real confidence what must be included or what may be
left out. The interest in social interdependency as an explanatory mode of self-narrative and self12

“Overtly,” Rudé writes, “the rioters proclaimed their hostility to Roman Catholics without
distinction; but, as it turned out, the Catholics whose houses were attacked were not those living
in the most densely populated Catholic districts…but in the more fashionable residential areas of
the West; and it was not the Catholic craftsmen or wage earners – men similar to themselves –
that entangled the rioters’ attention, but gentlemen, manufacturers, merchants, and publicians.”
Rudé finds that class-based concerns constitute a common motivator in many of the eighteenthcentury “riots” that were only ostensibly motivated by secondary issues, such as, in the case of
the Gordon Riots, religion (62).
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understanding can be traced back to the self-proclaimed pioneers of the eighteenth-century
novel: writers like Aphra Behn, Eliza Haywood, and Daniel Defoe. In other words, theories of
community “as such” have always been central to the organizing logic of novelistic realism. As
the role of fiction in developing, challenging, and circulating such theories has changed, so have
the theories themselves.

Twentieth- and twenty-first-century scholarship on community as such has generally
focused on a cluster of writers responding, initially, to the immense body of work by the
fascinating and prolific writer and theorist, Georges Bataille. Jean-Luc Nancy’s La Communauté
Désoeuvrée (1983, reprinted and expanded in 1986) is the first and perhaps best-known attempt
to articulate and critique the notion of community animating Bataille’s social and aesthetic
criticism, followed shortly by Maurice Blanchot’s brief but dense La Communauté Inavouable
(also 1983). Nancy places the origins of modern community in the eighteenth century, calling
Rousseau “the first thinker of community,” insofar as Rousseau was the first to register a
theoretical nostalgia, looking back from the perspective of “a society producing, of necessity, the
solitary figure,” to a lost or broken community, “a matter of a lost age in which community was
woven of tight, harmonious, and infrangible bonds and in which above all it played back to itself
[through] organic communion with its own essence” (9). (Nostalgia is suggestive of narrative
time, of course, but Rousseau is not given serious consideration as a narrator.) Such nostalgia,
Nancy argues, is fundamentally erroneous, though it is an error that constitutes a defining feature
of occidental experience. To avoid this, Nancy abandons the notion of community as a shared –
and then lost – substance in common, and adopts instead a notion of community as a kind of
medium, in which subjects, through a dialectic of interiority and exteriority, constitute one
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another through mutual and reciprocal “exposure.”13 Nancy’s sense of community, as one critic
explains, “is a matter of exposure to others who are similarly exposed, a sharing of exposure in
which the borders of the individual are neither clearly drawn nor completely effaced” since “[i]f
the borders were clearly drawn, there would be no exposure, and thus no community; if the
borders were completely effaced, there would be a common substance in which all were
immersed” (May 33 – 34).14
Blanchot takes up Nancy’s critique of community-as-nostalgia, an aspirational longing
for a positive, lost substance (what we might call the object of Gemeinschaft), adding that
community should not “dissolve its constituent members into a heightened unity which would
suppress itself at the same time that it would annul itself as community” (since such a unity, he
argues, would only “expose itself to the same objections arising from the simple consideration of
the single individual, locked in his immanence”). Nor, he argues, should community be reduced
to “the simple putting in common, inside the limits it would propose for itself, of a shared will to
be several, albeit to do nothing” (8, 7). For Blanchot, the form of exposure that establishes true
community arises in proximity to another’s death, since death elides human “immanence,” the
“origin of the sickest totalitarianism” (2).
As the importance of death in Blanchot’s theory of community suggests, it is not
recognition that human beings seek from one another, but rather contestation: “[I]n order to exist
13

Elsewhere, Nancy expands, writing about the relationship between “meaning” and Being,
arguing that “Being cannot be anything but being-with-one-another, circulating in the with of this
singularity plural coexistence” (Being Singular Plural 3), adding that this “between…has neither
a consistency nor continuity of its own. It does not lead from one to another; it constitutes no
connective tissue, no cement, no bridge. Perhaps it is not even fair to speak of a ‘connection’ to
its subject; it is neither connected nor unconnected; it falls short of both; even better, it is that
which is at the heart of a connection” (5).
14
Both May, in describing a “common substance,” and myself, by describing it as a medium,
revert to talking about community as a kind of substance, but it is not a substance that is claimed
or possessed, or that is somehow added to individuals.
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[the being] goes toward the other, which contests and at times negates it, so as to start being only
in that privation that makes it conscious…of the impossibility of being itself, of subsisting as its
ipse or, if you will, as itself as a separate individual” (6). What can be described either negatively
as a negation or positively as an overcoming of individuality occurs, Blanchot argues, when one
is present during the other’s death, since “this is the only separation that can open me, in its very
impossibility, to the Openness of a community” (9). The “exposure” of proximity to the other’s
death, in other words, obviates unresolved problems relating to the interpersonal dynamics of a
“community” of individual subjects. Both Nancy and Blanchot, therefore, abandon the
prioritization of the autonomous and possessive individual whose emergence marks at once the
inauguration of modernity and the impossibility of true community, calling the individual, in
fact, “merely the residue of the experience of the dissolution of community” (Nancy 3).
While Nancy and Blanchot read the long history of western collectivity as an unending
elegy for lost community, Roberto Esposito turns to the etymology of the word “community”
itself. Through an etymological investigation of community’s organizing principles, Esposito
recovers the centrality of obligation through transfer or voidance, as in the giving of a gift. Such
a notion of obligation does not, as one who shares Nancy’s or Blanchot’s critical perspective
might fear, affirm the proprietary basis of modern individuals but, in fact, “expropriates them of
their initial property (in part or completely), of the most proper property, namely, their very
subjectivity.” Esposito argues moreover that modern political philosophy “unconsciously
presuppose[s]” the very possessive individual that community, etymologically, opposes itself to
(7).15
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I will return to “possessive individualism,” as developed at length by C. B. Macpherson, in
chapter 2.
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In fact, Esposito associates modernity directly with the etymological opposite of
community, immunity (immunity, in a word, to the very voidance and obligation that constitutes
community). Immunity, he argues, because it implements the individuating and proprietary
borders between subjects (ostensibly protecting them, for example, from the Hobbesian violence
that characterizes bare living-together – Esposito, like Blanchot, associates community with
death), provides a better explanatory model of modernity than secularization, legitimation, and
rationalism (12).16 Esposito thus shares Nancy’s and Blanchot’s rejection of community as a
substance that its members have or share, that is added to, possessed by, or that enhances some
prior or foundational subject.
Indeed, in his analysis of democracy and rogue states, Jacques Derrida associates this
foundational subject with its political forms so intimately that its decline into illegitimacy (state
violence, imperial excess and abuse, etc) seems practically inevitable. “[D]o we really need
etymology,” he asks, “when simple analysis would show the possibility of power and possession
in the mere positioning of the self as oneself [soi-même], in the mere self-positioning of the self
as properly oneself?” (12). Nevertheless, like Esposito, he also turns to etymology, investigating
the implications of “ipse” and “ipseity,” “the one-self that gives itself its own law, of autofinality,
autotely, self-relation as being in view of the self, beginning by the self and with the end of self
in view.” He associates the ontological closure of ipseity with its agency, “some ‘I can,’ or at the
very least the power that gives itself its own law, its force of law, its self-representation,” which
manifests as a counterproductive force in the context of collective identity as “the sovereign and
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Through social contract, Esposito argues, community is not established or stabilized, but
sacrificed: “It is sacrificed in the sacrifice not only of the enemy but also of every single member
of community, since every member finds in his own being the originary figure of the first enemy.
Sacrifice responds to this origin, to the fear that the origin provokes: infinitely reactivating it in a
circle from which we still have not emerged” (34).
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reappropriating gathering of self in the simultaneity of an assemblage or assembly, being
together, or ‘living together,’ as we say.” This “I can,” Derrida argues, reifies something very
similar to the possessive “immunity” Esposito describes, functioning at the center, in the very
engine, of modern democracy. 17
Derrida thus returns us to the question of the relationship between the individual and the
social or political body – a question that, Nancy had argued, had its roots in the eighteenth
century – but he does so in specifically twentieth-century registers. For Derrida, collectivity is a
question of force: ipseity implies a convergence of might and right expressed, in one iteration at
least, by the wolf, who “represents the sovereign force that gives law and gives itself the right
to…, who reasons about and declares what is right, who gives reasons for why he is right, and
who wins out over the reasons of the lamb.”18 The juxtaposition of “reason” and violence is of
course a standard and undoubtedly important critique of enlightenment thought, as old at least as
Max Horkheimer’s and Theodor Adorno’s seminal Dialectic of Enlightenment, which asserts the

17

Derrida proceeds to a direct critique of Nancy’s concept of community (which, for Derrida, is
still essentially a democratic one). He calls Nancys community a “sharing as spacing” (44)
reiterating the emphasis on community as a medium and adding that such a medium produces a
dialectic of equality (which “tends to introduce measure and calculation (and thus
conditionality)”) and freedom (which “is by essence unconditional, indivisible, heterogeneous to
calculation and to measure”) [48]. Rather than dealing in subjects, Derrida writes that Nancy’s
reformulation of community and its emphasis on “spacing” allows him to deal in “singularities”
defined by exposure (a tidy foil to immunity). Exposure enables a dialectic of interior and
exterior that arises from (the calculations of measurable) equality and generates (the necessary
immeasurability of) freedom. “But,” Derrida writes, “by effacing the difference of singularity
through calculation, by no longer counting on it, measure risks putting an end to singularity
itself, to its quality or its nonquantifiable intensity.” Thus, he continues, “[t]he whole question of
‘democracy’ might be configured around this transcendental force: how far is democracy to be
extended, the people of democracy, and the ‘each ‘one’’ of democracy?” (52, 54).
18
Derrida, 70. The wolf as an expression of sovereign power is expressed and expanded in his
series of lectures on “the beast and the sovereign,” which takes an interest in the ontological
proximity of beasts and sovereigns, both outside or above the law, suspending the law and yet
giving the law, “devouring.” Significantly, Robinson Crusoe becomes central to his analysis of
sovereignty, law, and autonomy, which I will return to in chapter two.
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patriarchal tendency for violent appropriation that defines the possessive individual (he makes
the “in-itself” a “for-him,” for example).
It should be noted, however, that Dialectic was first produced in the 1940s, and that it
suffers, despite the durability of its arguments, from many of the scholarly limitations of its time.
Its archive, for example, is incomplete (it would have benefitted from much of the historicist
interest in “recovery” that has dominated eighteenth- and nineteenth-century scholarship for the
past two decades), and as such its argument actually reproduces some of the very problems it
ostensibly identifies and critiques. It makes claims about “enlightenment” thought that work only
insofar as its operative definition of “enlightenment thinker” ignores the many women, feminist,
anti-slavery, leveling, and atheistic writers who were explicitly (sometimes pejoratively)
associated with, or who explicitly identified with, the “Enlightenment,” the “age of reason,” the
“empire of light and reason,” etc. It makes a claim about “Enlightenment” that excludes, or that
denigrates as secondary or derivative, much of the work that is central to its historical and
conceptual development: that of James Beattie, Mary Astell, John Laurens, Catharine Trotter
Cockburn, Ottobah Cuguano, Granville Sharp, Mary Wollstonecraft, Olaudah Equiano, William
Godwin, and many others. All of this is not of course to suggest that critiques of enlightenment
reason, arguments that associate rationalism with Christian violence and Eurocentric patriarchy,
can be done away with. There are of course potential (and sometimes obvious) linkages, even in
enlightenment-era feminist and abolitionist texts, that make these writers complicit in the
empirical and imperial forms attributed to writers like Hobbes, Locke, and Hume. But the
ideological diversity of writers associated with enlightenment thought attests to its complexity
beyond the reductive characterization supplied by Horkheimer and Adorno.
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The theorizations of community that come out of the Nancy-Blanchot dialogue are
important and useful, and I am sympathetic with the historical and critical exigencies that
motivate them. But they describe neither the experiences of the seventeenth- and eighteenthcentury writers whose philosophical, political, and literary works give rise to the modern forms
of community that have proven so durable, nor (to return to the Burney epigraph with which I
began this introduction) of the non-theorist who, when confronted with the question of
community, takes recourse to notions like consent or sentiment – notions that preserve the very
individuality Nancy’s and Blanchot’s theories reject. Moreover, to reiterate my own
prioritization of the epistemological problems with community, I am after something that is in
some ways (or, rather, that presents itself as) prior to social organization; something called
“legitimacy” that authorizes or ratifies the social or political body. My object is a set of
epistemological problems that social organization – liberal or otherwise – already presupposes or
takes for granted. The nature of “brotherhood” or “fellow” or “friend” or “countryman” is less a
concern in these pages than the vast but generally unspoken body of foreknowledge that such
terms encompass. How does one translate an experience of an other into a claim, or complex of
claims, about brotherhood or fellowship in the first place? What must one do in order to convert
an encounter with an other into a collective identification? And, having done this, how does one
know it has been done completely or correctly? While “correctly” can be interchanged with a
variety of other terms (“rationally” or “ethically” for example, themselves interchangeable), the
agency I am gesturing toward here amounts to a restatement of the question of legitimacy, to a
theorization of how the conversion of stranger to countryman can be done “legitimately.”
Indeed, attending more closely to these epistemological questions makes legible the
possibility that the possessive individual is overstated. Its autonomy, its freedom, its self-
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sufficiency are not reaffirmed but called into question by traumatic familiarity. Legitimacy, when
it is approached as an epistemological problem by the rationally autonomous individual, enacts a
radical estrangement that is never resolved and that only disappears when the legitimacy of
community “as such” disappears into the ostensible, historical legitimacy of this or that national
body. I am therefore not arguing to “recover” the subject or the autonomous individual – nor am
I agreeing to leave it behind. Rather, I am tracking an unresolved storyline in its development in
order to make clearer the stakes, and the specific challenges, of reconciling the individual and the
common.
I would finally add that I am not convinced that the lack or loss Nancy’s nostalgia
describes is the same privation of community that the eighteenth century actually attempted to
address, since the construction of community in enlightenment thought is actually quite novel. It
is not (at least, it is not only) a yearning for a recovery of a lost thing, but a (sometimes radical)
reconceptualization, a break from, for example, religious or feudal social forms that selfconsciously attempts to revise the possibilities for reconciling individual and social bodies.
Social contract theory makes the novelty of modern collective identity explicit, pointing, yes, to
the deep past, but also emphatically, even flamboyantly, to a past that is fictional, and whose
fictionality is conspicuously foregrounded. If Rousseau is notable because he was the first to
register a theoretical nostalgia for a lost community, he is also notable for devising a community
that was not only, in many ways and for many readers, counterintuitive, but so much so as to be
dangerous: dangerous in its rejection of original sin, in its revolutionary impulses, in its very
novelty. It is a strange sort of nostalgia that simultaneously longs for a specific past and is
surprised by it, is off-put by its novelty. Again, a full understanding of the “legitimacy”
presupposed by social contract theory requires that we take seriously its origins in a pronounced
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fictionality and a sustained historicity, either one or the other of which is generally ignored or
dismissed. It is this ignoring or dismissing that the interdisciplinarity of this project seeks to
address.

Before concluding this already too-long introduction with a brief overview of chapters, I
want very quickly to consider one conversation from contemporary theory that has been
important in shaping my approach to collective identity in the eighteenth century: the problem of
“other minds.” It should be noted first of all that, at first glance, other minds did not present a
problem to eighteenth-century writers at all, in the same way that legitimacy did not present a
problem to Defoe in his “first fountain” metaphor. In its rational priorities and (perhaps
inevitable) slide toward Kantian ethics and the categorical imperative, eighteenth-century moral
and political thought was premised on the confidence that, on all relevant, governing points, the
content of individuals operating in good faith and with uncompromised, disinterested rational
faculties (a base line, in fact, that might be called common sense, and that culminated in the selfevidence of revolutionary reform described above) could easily be disclosed or discovered. If
even God could be approached through empirical investigation and rational exercise, as Locke
and Crusoe insisted, then certainly the mind of the other, when it was not corrupted with luxury,
selfish desire, madness, or any of the other contaminants of the state of nature, was entirely
accessible. Rousseau’s project, after all, was one of clearing away the corrupting influences of
Bourgeois society, rediscovering the transparency with which the foundations of legitimate
social organization and the general will could not fail to take hold.
And yet obscurities emerge, and not only does the unknowability of other minds persist,
it extends inward to the self as attempts at legitimate collective identification posit the alignment
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of self and other. The troubling inward turn of the “other minds” problem is thus, in fact, a
common feature of literary and philosophical representations. In his formulation of the uncanny,
for example (a formulation that draws heavily on many of the themes – familiarity and terror
especially – that I associate with collective identification),19 Freud writes that E. T. A. Hoffman
is “the unrivaled master of conjuring up the uncanny” in part because of his ability to narrate the
transfer of “mental processes from the one person to the other…so that the one possesses
knowledge, feeling and experience in common with the other, identifies himself with another
person, so that his self becomes confounded, or the foreign self is substituted for his own,” thus
“doubling, dividing and interchanging the self” (9). While identifying with the other is
optimistically suggestive of overcoming some of the strangeness of the other, of translating his
or her foreignness into familiarity, it also entails the recognition that the other is fundamentally
unapproachable, that something of the other’s strangeness is insurmountably strange: in effect,
the appropriation of some of its strangeness into the self. And while Hoffman may represent the
master of the uncanny in some respects, the persistent dread of the unapproachability of the other
– the obscurity in which he or she is irretrievably locked, and the ensuing consequences of that
obscurity for the self – features so heavily in fictions of the eighteenth century that an entire
subgenre, plots about incest and its (almost always fortuitous) last-minute circumvention, has
developed to redefine tragic hamartia by its terms. When Moll Flanders finally calls from
obscurity the provenance of her husband, she learns something that has long been true about
herself (that she is incestuous) alongside a deeper truth: that she has always been, to at least that
extent, a stranger to herself. She learns of her own unknowability, and of the impossibility,
19

He writes about experiencing the uncanny, for example, if one were to encounter the number
62 “several times in a single day,” as on a cabin room and “cloakroom ticket” (10 – 11), adding
his own experience of being lost in the equivalent of a red-light district in Italy when, anxiously
trying to extract himself, he finds himself encountering the same landmarks again and again.
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precisely because of that unknowability, of occupying a stable place within legitimate social
arrangements, of sorting her legitimate from illegitimate desires and practices. Something of the
other’s familiarity is purchased (and never fully) only at the expense of the familiarity of the self.
Stanley Cavell comes to a similar point about community in his study of Wittgensteinian
notions of “criteria” and “grammar,” analyzing the strange extent to which one’s common
expressions apparently rely upon standards for judgment that are at once irreducibly public and
irreducibly subjective. “Wittgenstein’s appeal to criteria is meant,” he writes, “exactly to call to
consciousness the astonishing fact of the astonishing extent to which we do agree in judgment;
eliciting criteria goes to show therefore that our judgments are public, that is, shared” (31). And
yet, despite these agreements and the almost intuitive obviousness of their criteria, the uncanny
question of agency entailed by Wittgenstein’s notion of grammar emerges: “If I am supposed to
have been party to the criteria we have established, how can I fail to know what these are; and
why do I not recognize the fact that I have been engaged in so extraordinary an enterprise?” (18).
The most important question of modern political theory, indeed, will be the question
Cavell formulates here, that of consent. It will also present itself, in keeping with what I have
been suggesting above, as the easiest to resolve. What can be complicated about determining the
consent of an individual or a group? I think, in fact, that it is an incredibly difficult question to
resolve, especially when framed in its epistemological complexity. To even ask the question – to
see the question arise inevitably out of the assumptions that minds make about other minds in a
social or political context that assumes the inevitability of shared interests or common “criteria”
– estranges not only the terms according to which consent is achieved and expressed
intersubjectively, but the terms according to which it is arrived at by the autonomous individual
in the first place. Narrative fiction, again, make this estrangement clear where political theory
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takes it for granted: in what sense, as Toni Bowers asks, does Pamela “consent” to Mr. B? In
what her “consent” consists is unclear, but it is immediately apparent that it is vastly more
complex and problematic than the straightforward matter of two individuals accepting the
mutually beneficial and universally valid terms of legitimacy suggested by writers like Locke or
Pufendorf.
For Cavell, the criteria, as well as the taking-for-granted that they are (and how they
come to be) shared, constitute what he otherwise calls the ordinary. When we teach children a
word, for example, he argues that, “We initiate them, into the relevant forms of life held in
language and gathered around the objects and persons of our world” (178), asking them in a
sense to assent to, to hold in common, the terms of our world, terms that we take for granted as
ordinary. We ask them to share our sense of the familiarity, in other words, that situates us and
that grounds our senses of self and other. But we also, in asking this, conjure the possibility that
they might refuse. Or, more seriously, we confront the fact that, whether they assent or not, the
very need for them to do so defamiliarizes the self-evidence of “our world.” “We begin to feel,
or ought to,” Cavell writes, “terrified that maybe language (and understanding, and knowledge)
rests upon very shaky foundations – a thin net over an abyss” (178).
This is a version of the terror that readers encounter, I argue, when Robinson Crusoe sees
the footprint, when Evelina sees her father, when Lady Betty sees her brother. Like the babysitter
in the urban legend who is told the unthinkable, that the disturbing phone calls came from within
the house – that she and her charge are not, have never been, alone – these characters are
confronted with the terrifying obscurity, the irresolvable distance, that dissociates them from any
confidence that they know themselves, the terms of their social embeddedness, their functions
and realities as social beings. They are confronted with the distance that dissociates them from

40

what, constituting the very foundation of their subjectivities,20 they had taken for granted: that
families, nations, parties, and every other ostensibly natural or rationally stable social body are
anything more than figments, imagined communities that cannot hold. When they are looked at
directly, as when they are cracked or fractured by accident (when one realizes by chance, as
Evelina’s father does, that the woman that one had taken as one’s natural daughter, that one had
raised as one’s own, is actually a stranger), they vanish into nothing, slipping into darkness like
Eurydice (a myth on which I have modeled my entire approach to the problem of legitimacy – I
will return to it, briefly, in chapter one).
Thinking about other minds foregrounds of course the kinds of work that minds do. It not
only situates the individual within his or her relationality to others, but it provides a foothold for
discussing the different ways that relationality can be thought and described. While legitimacy
requires rational thought above all, community always seems to begin and end with the
imagination. This was particularly true in the eighteenth century, when alignment with the logic
of community “as such” seemed like a plausible social and political objective. Given that, what
are we to make of the eighteenth-century insistence that 1) all communities, even “natural” ones
like the family, are imagined; 2) enlightenment thought positions itself in hostile opposition to
the imagination; and 3) communities, at least when they are legitimate, satisfy the realist
priorities of enlightenment thought? The concept of nationalism, in part because it circumvents
the open questions of the legitimacy of community “as such,” makes the tensions I am
formulating here conspicuous: nationalism and its legitimacy are products of the Enlightenment;
the Enlightenment is hostile to the imagination; a nation is an “imagined community.” This
dissertation seeks to account for these tensions and their development in the eighteenth century.
20

I have in mind here Charles Taylor’s assertion that, in modernity, “a self only exists among
other selves,” and that any notion of self that is not socially embedded is unthinkable (35).
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Chapter one, “Solitude ‘In the Midst of the World’: the Very Strange and Surprising
Adventures of Robinson Crusoe,” begins with an examination of the surprising duality of
Robinson Crusoe. Throughout the eighteenth century (and indeed into the twentieth), Crusoe is a
literary trope that comes to stand, in some contexts, for perfect isolation even while, in others, he
represents total social dependence and embeddedness. In what looks like a logical contradiction,
Crusoe embodies the difficulty of reconciling the independence of rational autonomy with the
necessarily social context in which rationalism arises. In order to analyze this peculiar
embodiment, I turn to the work of Rousseau, in which Crusoe has a special prominence. By
reading the literary trope of Robinson Crusoe through the narrative and theoretical expositions of
Rousseau, a problem of modern political theory begins to emerge – a problem, I argue, that is
innate to social contract theory, and to which Rousseau responds by complementing theoretical
with novelistic discourses. Taking narrative and fictional discourses more seriously than prior
political theorists in his tradition, Rousseau brings out internal contradictions undermining the
defining sources of legitimacy that underwrite the social contract.
Namely: social contract theory is based on distinguishing the state of nature from that of
civilization, which is privileged over the state of nature and which gives form to the
enlightenment telos of social and political order. Rousseau invests this defining binary of
political theory with great emphasis by associating each state with its own epistemology. In the
state of nature, individuals are irreducibly physical, possessed of “purely physical” (and thus
limited) relationality. Civilization after the social contract, in sharp contrast, is defined by “moral
relationality.” While all prior descriptions of social contract implicitly share some basic form of
this epistemological division, Rousseau – by complementing the mostly theoretical discourses of

42

The Social Contract with narrative, novelistic discourses, not only in Robinson Crusoe but also
in his own Emile and Julie – discovers a barrier to the necessary transition from the first (natural)
state to the (civilized) other. “Moral relationality” can only be the product of the social contract;
the social contract can only be the product of moral relationality. With this, Rousseau discovers a
new way to frame the problem of legitimacy that social contract theory seeks to resolve, even
while throwing light on a new one that, he shows, social contract theory creates.
Chapter two, “Traumatic Familiarity: The Search for Legitimacy with ‘Some Man,’ the
Savage, and Robinson Crusoe,” concerns itself with the narrative and fictional aspects of social
contract theory, especially as developed by Hobbes, Locke, and Pufendorf – earlier writers to
whom Rousseau is responding when he foregrounds narrative and fictional conventions in his
own work. What do we gain, for example, by looking for a “protagonist” in classical social
contract theory?
One answer is that the concept of social experience reveals itself to be central to
questions of legitimacy. By thinking about social contract as a narrative, we are left with a clear,
historical delineation between the legitimate and the illegitimate. Illegitimate social organization
occurs in the state of nature (we might, borrowing again some vocabulary from Rousseau, call
the random assemblages of people in the state of nature “aggregates”); legitimate social
organization (that of “associations”) occurs after the social contract. Social experience is
important to this delineation because, as we find when we take these texts up as narratives, it
troubles the very distinctions that they ratify, distinctions that substantiate the “legitimacy” that
they advance. By foregrounding the narrative features of social contract theory, we see the extent
to which it is premised on the idea that any individual in a state of nature who encounters another
will necessarily have two mutually explicit reactions: terror of the other (he or she is a source of
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threat to self and belongings, which attests to the need for social contract) and comfort in the
other (he or she is a source of comfort and security, which reveals the promise of social contract).
Social contract requires both of these experiences, experiences that are not only at cross currents
with one another, but which would seem presuppose the legitimacy – the moral relationality –
that social contract ostensibly creates.
Chapter three, “Learning the Lessons of Evelina’s Familiarity: The Footprint, Traumatic
Familiarity, and a Metaphysics of Legitimacy,” provides an extended analysis of what I call
traumatic familiarity. Characters encountering familiars in eighteenth-century novels frequently
collapse into distraction and terror, punctuating the extent to which social relationality is at once
critically important and totally elusive. The fact that so many plots are resolved or complicated
by accident or chance revealing that one’s sister is not really her sister, that one’s son is not
really his son, or that one’s wife is actually his mother, shows a broad cultural anxiety about the
unstable circuits that link the rational individual with the social and political bodies that define
him or her. Exploring traumatic familiarity provides access to social constructs, like “father,” and
the extent to which these constructs can be embodied with anything like “legitimacy.”
Chapter four, “An Embarrassment of Legitimacies: Collectives and Counter-Collectives
in Samuel Richardson’s Clarissa,” moves from the study of the relationship between the
individual body and the social body to a study of the individual in the context of multiple social
and political “legitimacies.” This chapter looks at individual agency and responsibility in the
context of smaller social groups that exist among and against one another, examining how
emerging accounts of legitimacy respond to questions of difference and foreignness. Samuel
Richardson’s Clarissa is the chapter’s primary frame. In this novel, the protagonist poses a threat
to the novel’s primary community, the family, from within it: one of its members, her brother, is
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threatened by a body foreign to that community, a body that attracts Clarissa, in part, because of
its foreignness. Her desire for Lovelace and her brother's spite both work to destabilize the
otherwise highly ordered and structured (read: “legitimate”) family.
Richardson represents Clarissa’s threat as operating like a contagious disease. She is
gradually forbidden to speak to her relations, since her father fears Clarissa will be persuasive
and will disrupt the logic and affective structure by which the kinship community sustains itself.
The order of this community thus sustains and exerts itself precisely by drawing one of its
members further and further to its periphery. Though she is part of why the family constitutes a
whole, its preservation as a whole requires, paradoxically, her exile from it. Her status as a
member of the community is thus complicated, conditioned by her exclusion from it, while the
family's status as a community requires her participation in, and identification with, it.
Chapter five, “Clods, Rocks, Rude Masses, and Mighty Wholes: The Political Philosophy
of Mary Wollstonecraft,” concludes the dissertation with a discussion of a more extreme
banishment: Mary Wollstonecraft’s simultaneous association with, and dissociation from, the
Scandinavians in her Short Residence letters. By basing her political theory on the principles of
materialism, Wollstonecraft begins to abandon the objective premise of social legitimacy and to
embrace a temporal model, moving away from the legitimate/illegitimate binary of social
contract theory and toward a “universal history” narrative of social change. Ostensibly, her
political theory enforces claims of continuity between divergent societies and individuals; most
criticism supports this view only by understating Wollstonecraft’s apparent contempt for
Scandinavians. In practice however, there are two movements of her Short Residence: political
theory that insists that all individuals make up one “mighty whole” and personal narrative that
reveals the impossible distance between its protagonist and the unenlightened “brutes” that
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surround her. While Wollstonecraft (like Rousseau, both a philosopher and a novelist) continues
to use social experience and “realism” to confront the shortcomings of social contract, she too
falls short of providing an alternative that is fully rational, equal, free – and thus “legitimate.”
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Interlude
After Trauma: Sensing Legitimacy and the Comfort of Familiarity in Daniel Deronda

It does not seem very controversial to argue that, within nationalism – a sense of community
characterized by Benedict Anderson as “a deep, horizontal comradeship,” or a “fraternity” for
which “many millions of people” are willing to die – social experience matters deeply (7). At the
same time, it is important in Anderson’s classic formulation that the mechanisms of this
fraternity guarantee a sense of comradeship across a broad range of individuals whether they
have actually met or not (explaining not only the intense affective investment into memorials of
Unknown Soldiers, for example, but the deep symbolic significance of such memorials in the
culture of modern nationalism more generally). Interpersonal contact in this context presupposes
a loaded and highly invested set of experiences – experiences, as we will see, that carry a
peculiar epistemological significance. Indeed, post-romantic literary representations sometimes
insist that this quality can be sensed, as if objectively available (however obliquely) to either
party. Indeed, the mysterious quality of interpersonal familiarity in the context of shared
narrative is often a testament to how “real” (if not “stable”) it is. One may not “know” his or her
place within a broad, shared narrative, but he can sense it, as if intuitively, nevertheless.
Consider, briefly, Daniel Deronda. The titular character suspects from childhood that he
is not Sir Hugo’s son and that his own identity, or at least its knowable contours and provenance,
elude him. He comes to discover his identity through contact with two others, his mother and
Mordecai, but in a way that privileges the affective and visceral intuition of contact over the
formality of more traditionally “objective” knowledge. When he finally meets his mother on her
deathbed, there is a striking juxtaposition of Deronda’s desire for a climactic filial bond and his
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sense of an irreconcilability so pronounced that, to him, “[h]er worn beauty had a strangeness in
it as if she were not quite a human mother, but a Melusina, who had ties with some world which
is independent of ours” (518). There is a cold formality to their meeting, “something like a
greeting between royalties,” and a vague foreignness to her speech and address, all punctuating a
reconciliation that, to Deronda, seemed less real than his countless imagined meetings with her.
Her inhuman otherworldliness, we soon learn, emerges from the fact that she has
carefully and deliberately severed him from the narratives that, he senses, ought to have
organized his life and experiences. She has extracted herself, not only from connection to her
son, but from the collective identity to which they both ‘actually’ belong, and thus from the
mechanisms of Andersonian fraternity. He learns, most significantly, that he is of Jewish
parentage, and the essentially formal self-education that contact with his mother represents
radically changes his position in, and attitudes toward, an interpersonal world: he departs from
her feeling like “an older man” who had “gone through a tragic experience which must for ever
solemnize his life and deepen the significance of the acts by which he bound himself to others”
(554). She mediates this knowledge to him, but (ashamed of her own “true” identity and wanting
something “better” for her son) she does not share in it with him; it does not organize her own
experiences and priorities, so her otherworldliness must remain unresolved: she is, in some
important and persistent sense, deeply unfamiliar to her own son.
By sharp contrast, Deronda’s experience of Mordecai is marked by an uncanny and
highly compelling sense of connection, which becomes a principle theme in the novel. Deronda
encounters Mordecai in a bookshop and is inexplicably impressed by something profound or
significant about him. For all the enthusiastic rhetoric surrounding Deronda’s first impression
(his figure is “somewhat startling in its unusualness,” we are told), it is easy to forget that
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Mordecai is actually rather unremarkable: he is “doing nothing more remarkable than reading the
yesterday’s Times,” he has a “typical Jewish face,” and is “familiar and unexciting enough to the
inhabitants of this street” (319). Yet within an exchange of only a few lines Mordecai asks
Deronda perhaps the novel’s most generative question: “You are perhaps of our race?”
Deronda’s ignorant denial is immediately associated with mutual embarrassment and
disappointment, which however does not discourage an eventual engagement in friendship and
mutual interest. Unlike his mother, Deronda invests himself heavily in shared narratives, not
creating but correcting loose ends, first reconciling Mordecai to his estranged sister, and then
eventually marrying her. In contrast to the inhuman foreignness evoked by meeting his own
mother, Deronda’s encounter with this stranger is steeped in an uncanny proto-recognition of a
“race” that (he will soon discover) is his own, a politics that he will share and develop, and even
a family that he will join. He senses a connection with Mordecai, and that connection becomes
reified; the reification, moreover, enabled by his encounter with his mother, is subordinated,
almost as a formality, to the more essential and privileged visceral connection that he had already
sensed.
While this is not the place to argue that Daniel Deronda pursues or does not pursue
something like a national argument, I am interested in how recognition and social experience
work in the novel, written during, and concerned with, the emergence and prominence of
historical forms of collective identity, including nationalism.21 Collective identity is an explicit
concern for George Eliot, and understanding how it works in the novel accentuates the
21

More specifically, critics have been interested in defining the extent to which Daniel Deronda posits
something like Jewish identity as either an extension or as a reversal of an either lesser-defined or more
“universal” identity or preoccupation, bringing “imagined community” in its historical forms to the fore.
See Kwame Anthony Appiah’s “Introduction: Making Conversation,” xi – xxi; Thomas Albrecht, “‘The
Balance of Separateness and Communication’: Cosmopolitan Ethics in George Eliot’s Daniel Deronda”;
Amanda Anderson, “George Eliot and the Jewish Question”; Michael Ragussis, Figures of Conversion:
"The Jewish Question" and English National Identity; among many others.
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significance of social experience. Deronda’s privileged contact with Mordecai, despite its
ostensible poverty of content, implicates something unknown but very real nevertheless. His
encounters with his mother and with Mordecai are distinguished by the entailments of
community, whether formally disclosed or undisclosed, through these experiences. It is not just
that Deronda’s community with his mother (formally legitimate, if legitimate at all, only to the
extent that it is made knowable) remains lacking and unresolved, and that his social experience at
this point is therefore unsatisfying. This dissatisfaction, I argue, reveals to Deronda the lacking,
unresolved nature of his community with his mother, reveals to him a sense of illegitimacy, and
is suggestive of the absence of the kind of fraternity expressed in Andersonian nationalism. If
Locke is right that “all princes and rulers of independent governments…are in a state of nature,”
it does not seem insignificant that Eliot describes Deronda’s encounter with his mother as
“something like a greeting between royalties.” Outside, or in the conscious rejection of, such
collective narratives and historical forms as race or nation, interpersonal encounters (and this
becomes especially pronounced here, since Deronda’s meeting with his mother is literally
intended to reestablish or recover legitimacy) come nevertheless to approximate encounters in a
state of nature, a state of illegitimacy.
Ultimately, there is something deeply comforting about the socio-political premises of
Daniel Deronda: Mordecai’s mysterious draw speaks to the legitimacy of Deronda’s place in the
world, which he has only to uncover from the obscurity of the past. It makes that legitimacy
available to him as a prior, ontologically stable entity. I would even use the term “familiar” to
characterize Deronda’s experience of Mordecai, even though Mordecai is a stranger, since it
describes an experience approaching fraternity (in an Andersonian sense or otherwise) in the
novel.
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Indeed, as I have just noted, Deronda’s unwitting denial of his Jewish identity to
Mordecai is conspicuously associated with shame: “Deronda coloured deeply, not liking the
grasp, and then answered with a slight shake of the head, ‘No’” (320). I am reminded of Eve
Sedgwick’s description in Touching Feeling, of glancing at the downtown Manhattan skyline,
looking for “the familiar sight of the pre-September 11 twin towers,” negotiating an expectation
of recognition and familiarity, yet feeling, in her disappointment, that “shame was what I would
feel” (35). Deronda’s shame is an index to a sensed or expected familiarity, a recognition that
does not reciprocate, that becomes strange and that, in becoming strange, reveals how stable the
undisclosed basis of recognition had seemed to be.
And there is the emphasis in Deronda’s desperate interjection when his mother reveals
his parentage – “Then I am a Jew?”22 – an emphasis that marks less a revelation than an
affirmation, and reveals a system of collective identities which need not be fully disclosed in
order to be sensed as real and legitimate. True, without the formal disclosure of his parentage
Deronda would not likely have been able to marry Mirah or to be taken seriously as a proponent
of Mordecai’s political principles. It is not my argument that post-romantic, historicallydetermined collective identification does away with the narrative and rational foundations of
legitimacy (they obviously hold an important place – Deronda meets Mordecai and first engages
his interest while attempting to purchase a book of Jewish history, after all). But I want to
underline the extent to which, even without such disclosure, collectivity is “real” and becomes
available, through a kind of social experience I approximate with familiarity, for example, to the
subject. Legitimacy as it comes to be constructed in the nineteenth century is not constructed by,
dependent upon, or determined by Deronda’s rational acknowledgements or consent. It is there
whether he “knows” it or not, hailing him and patiently awaiting his return.
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1: “Solitude ‘In the Midst of the World’: the Very Strange and Surprising Adventures of
Robinson Crusoe”
“People think they come together in the theatre, and it is there that they are isolated” (16 – 17)
Rousseau, Letter to D’Alembert
Early in his lengthy, mawkish poem “The Weeping Bard; or Genius in Distress” (1787 – 88),
Robert Alves makes what initially appears to be a fairly standard reference to Daniel Defoe’s
Robinson Crusoe, exploiting the protagonist’s legacy as a model of the modern solitary
individual. Addressing “chief dear Crusoe,” whose story he had read as a child, Alves writes:
How must thou pine, left all alone,
With nought but sea and sky around thee thrown,
Pent up in desart-ile forlorn,
Th’ eternal murmur of whose angry deep,
All waste and wild far off for many a mile,
Forbids all intercourse with dear mankind! (60 – 61)23
Alves knows his readers will recognize in Crusoe a standard of sentimental, if not romantic,
isolation, suggesting by analogy the “weary web of woes” and “sorrow-chequer’d gloom” of the
poet’s own youth, which it is the business of his third canto to relate. The following stanza is
clearly meant to extend the analogy of Crusoe’s radical isolation, but its opening lines do as
much to reverse as to develop this theme:
Are we not all such exiles here below?
Banish’d a while from heaven our native shore! (61)

23

Robert Alves, Edinburgh, A Poem in Two Parts. Also, the Weeping Bard: a Poem, in Sixteen
Cantos (Edinburgh: Printed for the Author): 60 – 61.
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While the former stanza is written as an apostrophe, it is qualified by the pensively speculative
“how must thou pine,” thus performing even as it portrays the impossibility of “intercourse with
dear mankind” embodied by Crusoe on his island. In the latter stanza, however, Alves seems to
revoke the status of the reference, shifting from “how must thou” to “are we not all,” not only
registering a problem that is fundamentally social – the “world” in its fallen state – but doing so
with a level of measured certainty, and in the communal form of the first-person-plural. The
trope of Crusoe as it appears in the first stanza should seem fundamentally at odds with the
analogy in the second. To be sure, a certain kind of alienation is expressed in both cases, but it is
sustained only by ignoring the distinction between alienation of society (as from God) and
alienation from society: the very distinction, of course, that the trope of “chief dear Crusoe”
enacts in the first place. For Alves, Crusoe is evocative of total social isolation as well as its
opposite, a profoundly shared, social experience.
Other references to Crusoe suggest the same, or a very similar, contradictory legacy.
While for obvious reasons the vast majority of allusions to Crusoe throughout the eighteenthand early nineteenth-centuries conjure the human being in social isolation, important exceptions
insist on the possibility of Crusoe standing for specific kinds of social embeddedness and
negotiation. I am not referring to allusions that simply hold one kind of experience (that of
isolation) up against another (sociability), usually in order to privilege the latter as morally or
practically superior. Of course, Robinson Crusoe has often been used in this way; James Beattie,
for example, argues that Crusoe “fixes in the mind a lively idea of the horrors of solitude, and,
consequently, of the sweets of social life, and of the blessings we derive from conversation, and
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mutual aid” (311).24 Rather, the Robinson Crusoe trope holds interest for me precisely when it
authorizes expressions and analogies of explicit social engagement and determinacy: not
isolation in contrast to sociability but isolation qua sociability. The sociable Crusoe, I will be
arguing, is not a sloppy bit of mixed metaphor, but a wholly new and different trope, a
symptomatic exposure of a pervasive sense that something has gone wrong in the ways that
various theories have linked the concept of legitimate collectivity with the concept of the
autonomous individual. Specifically, it opens onto a difficulty in conceiving of the complete
moral, political, and economic autonomy of the subject presupposed by modern theories of social
and political legitimacy – autonomy so perfect as to be expressed by the solitary figure, the
master of self and environment, purged of outside contingencies. The sociable Crusoe therefore
dramatizes some version of the central problems that motivate Hannah Arendt’s search for
Kant’s “nonwritten political philosophy” (19), a philosophy that, more than any other, would
have married “the insight that men are dependent on their fellow men not only because of their
having a body and physical needs but precisely for their mental faculties” with the moral and
rational autonomy of “the self in its independence of others” (14, 19). To frame this difficulty in
Arendt’s terms, the individual’s independence (the rational autonomy that isolation signifies) is
the paradoxical condition of the legitimacy of his or her dependence, and this is the condition
that the sociable Crusoe expresses.
This difficulty (which, not incidentally, can only be exposed through narrative) is
therefore one of assigning ontological priority either to any coherent notion of legitimate social
24

This frequently reproduced quotation comes from his Dissertations Moral and Critical, 1783.
See also his Essays on Poetry and Music, as they Affect the Mind, in which he claims that there is
no “tale better contrived for communicating to the reader a lively idea of…the sweets of social
life” (205), or A Father’s instructions, by Percival Thomas, which argues that Crusoe “above
all…enables us to perceive, in their full extent, the intellectual, moral, and religious aid we
derive from society” (324).
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organization or to the liberal subject who is its constituent-member. While political theorists,
especially those in the social contract tradition, take some version of this prioritization for
granted,25 narrative treatments (both from within and beyond that tradition) problematize it,
developing an autonomous subject that is at once the source and the product of social legitimacy.
By describing a socially embedded character as an isolate, the terms of his or her sociability
(which might include a wide range of positions, from dependence on others to the oppression of
others) are suppressed, revealing the difficulty of reconciling the autonomous individual with her
compliment, social legitimacy.
Frances Burney’s The Wanderer: or, Female Difficulties, for example, concludes by
calling Juliet, the novel’s protagonist, “a being who had been cast upon herself; a female
Robinson Crusoe, as unaided and unprotected, though in the midst of the world, as that
imaginary hero in his uninhabited island” (873). Indeed, the comparison at first seems almost
self-evident, recalling unproblematically the “wanderer’s” castaway, vaguely foreign status. It
recalls Juliet’s resourcefulness, of course, but also her sense of unforgiving isolation “in the
midst of the world,” a polite (if often petty) society that, until the denouement, she believes will
not and perhaps cannot absorb her. And yet it is this same polite society that (indeed, almost to
an oppressive extent) engages with her, teases her, converses with her, learns from her, conducts
business with her, visits her, employs her, travels with her, dines with her, courts her, puts her on

25

I will develop this idea further in the following two chapters. It should suffice to note here that
the social contract represents an overcoming of the limitations of the state of nature, that its
power lies in the fact that it is not arbitrary but a reflection of rational deliberation and
intentionality. The rational subject and the social contract cannot thus be said to appear
simultaneously and spontaneously, as if sprung from the ground, but through a process that
entails human, and “humanizing,” agency. For Kant’s part, the prioritization is expectedly more
complex. In his Critique of Judgment, for example, he writes that “To be self-sufficient, hence
not to need society, yet without being unsociable, i.e., fleeing it, is something that comes close to
the sublime, just like any superiority over needs” (157).
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stage, and generally draws her into social and economic exchanges despite her frequent
misgivings. It is an eminently social novel that, nevertheless, very much seems to be a novel
about isolation from society; one scarcely notices how counterintuitive the allusion to Crusoe is,
the emblematic conclusion of a novel precisely about “intercourse with dear mankind” (even
though limits – always socially imposed – give shape and tension to those negotiations).
This counterintuitive image of the Crusoe, resourceful in solitude “in the midst of the
world,” proves surprisingly durable. It returns, for example, in the person of Hank Morgan, the
Yankee of Mark Twain’s A Connecticut Yankee in King Arthur’s Court. After being knocked
unconscious in a brawl, Morgan, a worker in an arms factory, awakens in the deep past, where he
is brought to King Arthur’s court. Distressed by the lack of technology and amenities, as well as
by the fatuity of his new society, he writes, “I saw that I was just another Robinson Crusoe cast
away on an uninhabited island, with no society but some more or less tame animals” (100).
While Morgan is vexed by his perceived isolation from society, he is also “troubled,” in the very
next paragraph, by “the immense interest which people took in” him, complaining that “the
whole nation wanted a look at” him. Hank Morgan, like Juliet, thus draws upon the total
isolation of Robinson Crusoe in order to describe his social embeddedness, while simultaneously
suppressing the unsatisfying ties that constitute that embeddedness.
Meanwhile, specific types of social dependence and social intimacy appear to be
especially susceptible to approximation with Crusoe. In some contexts, references to Crusoe and
his island signal, not isolation from shared experiences, but precisely the extent to which
experiences can be held in common. The protagonist of George Sand’s Nanon, for example,
reconciled with Emilien and his former servant Dumont, settle in the rustic and pastoral Berry,
near an abandoned granite quarry. While they largely – but not entirely – dissociate themselves
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from anything like polite society, their experience is explicitly social, and their intimacy and
friendship contribute much to the pleasure of their idyllic life. Significantly, the nostalgic tone of
this scene contrasts sharply with the distress of Nanon’s actual solitude several pages earlier.
Nevertheless, she insists, “au milieu de l’anarchie des campagnes et du dépeuplement force, nous
étions là un peu comme Robinson dans son île” [we lived in this place in the midst of general
anarchy and depopulation much like Robinson Crusoe on his island]. At one point, reinforcing
the allusion, they find the footprint of a child on the bank of a river: “nous nous regardâmes,
Émilien et moi, et la meme pensée nous vint” [we looked into each other’s faces, and the same
thought came to Emilien and myself] (147). So far from a trope of total isolation, Crusoe
becomes fundamentally suggestive of the two characters’ social intimacy: “Nous avions lu
Robinson ensemble avec délices” [We had read Robinson together with delight], she writes.
“Nous nous étions rêvé, nous aussi, une île á nous deux” [We had dreamed of a desert island for
ourselves alone] (146 – 147). Sand’s island allusion does not acknowledge that the romance of
solitaires (the tradition Nanon celebrates here) is often, if not “civil” in the Habermasian sense,
explicitly social, nor does she appear interested in the extent to which her own narrative
contributes to the construction of literary conventions of Romantic, social intimacy.
Similarly, though with very different effect, George Eliot alludes to the island trope to
describe the intimacy of a social relationship. In Felix Holt, Mr. Lyon falls in love with the
grieved, vagrant widow Annette Ledru, whom he takes, with her child, under his care. They
eventually marry, and, Eliot writes, “It was clear that Annette,” a mother and a new wife,
“regarded her life as…an existence on a remote island where she had been saved from wreck”
(85). Her affections for Lyons – but not for her child – soon cool, and in three years she is dead.
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In both Nanon and Felix Holt, it is the social relationship itself, and not the actual solitude that
precedes it, that evokes the trope of Robinson Crusoe.
Perhaps even more than that of romantic or sexual intimacy, the context of education
appears to have been especially receptive to analogy with the sociable Crusoe. The author and
educator Stephanie Felicite Genlis’s New Method of Instruction for Children from Five to Ten
Years Old, for example, contains a lengthy narrative of a “little society” – four children, their
wealthy parents, their tutor, an apprentice, and the patriarch’s “mason’s son…dressed as a
savage” – who reenact / reimagine the events of Robinson Crusoe, which one of the party “was
at that time reading” (128, 123). This imaginative and dramatic exercise, Genlis insists, is a
useful, and essentially social, pleasure. A more subtle (but more telling) treatment can be found
in Maria Edgeworth’s Belinda, in which Rachel, whom Clarence renames Virginia, is raised,
educated, and then courted in what Clarence insists is a condition of social isolation. He regards
her as a “child of nature,” rather than of society, and tests her rustic simplicity by offering her “a
pair of diamond earrings and a moss rosebud.” Of course, she rejects the earrings, confirming his
fantasy. They are valueless to her, and “consequently as useless…as guineas were to Robinson
Crusoe on his desert island” (371 – 372).
In fact, however, her upbringing was tightly controlled, and her “desert island” values are
the product of her grandmother’s jealous scrutiny: not “naturally” occurring, but heavily
mediated and carefully shaped. To be sure, she does not share his social background, and is not
to that extent a member of his community, unless he makes her so. After all, he knows the value
of diamonds (and so does the reader), even if he disdains them, and even if he values Virginia for
rejecting them. He has pierced ears himself, though he is pleased that the concept horrifies
Virginia’s simplicity. His “testing” her therefore involves a great deal of artifice: the “right”
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answers actually only serve to confirm the great distance that he has already imagined between
himself (familiar with society) and her (isolated from society). This distance, which he partially
discovers and partially constructs, is crucial, as it helps to explain his eagerness to discard
Virginia’s Grandmother’s dying wish, “Never, never come after her, when I am dead and gone!”
(366). Perhaps, if Crusoe is at all relevant here, the roles must be reversed. He changes her name
as Crusoe changes Friday’s, as a gesture of taking possession. Just as, from Crusoe’s point of
view, the trace of Friday’s socially-determined past and values-system can be regarded as invalid
(unchristian) and insignificant (savage) – and thus dismissed as never legitimately extant in the
first place – “Virginia” is represented as a complete social isolate, not because she ever actually
was one, but so that she can become more fully and more “legitimately” his.
Edgeworth, Twain, Burney, Alves, and many others contribute to the afterlife of
Robinson Crusoe in similarly surprising and counterintuitive ways. He remains an acknowledged
shorthand for solitude, isolation, and absolute independence, and yet he comes to function, in
that same capacity, as an apparently unproblematic analogue for the socially active and
interdependent individual. What is surprising is how true these countervailing allusions ring:
most of these Crusoe analogies pass by any first reading rather unproblematically. The authors’
renderings of social engagement are built upon the premise of an apparently self-evident – but,
in fact, demonstrably contrived – social isolation. More specifically, these writers draw upon
Crusoe in order to characterize moments during which claims of radical social dissociation
constitute a form of identification that is nevertheless, fundamentally, socially determined. That
is, in such cases, “Robinson Crusoe” is a form of collective identity – but it is one whose duality
says as much about the (perhaps inescapably) antilogous structure of legitimate collective
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identification itself as about the specific social body in question. There are two interrelated
points that can be made about the underlying premises of enlightenment collectivity at this point.
The Crusoian construction of collectivity foregrounds, first of all, the subjective nature of
collective identification. To identify with a collective body implies a claim that there is such a
thing as a collective body – one that has priorities, values, and other privileged modes of social
and material organization that, moreover (taking for granted for a moment the identifier’s interest
in legitimacy), align its terms with nature (in the case of families) or right reason (in the case of
the state or political party) rather than, say, corrupting ambition, arbitrary fortuna, or purblind
self interest. Choosing the rosebud over the diamond ostensibly represents legitimately
uncorrupted valulation, so aligning one’s self with an individual – or, more potently, with a
political party, family, nation, class, etc. – who rejects the emblematic diamonds selfreferentially affirms the uncorrupted valuation of both parties. Collective identification puts into
effect the claim, moreover, that such priorities are not only knowable (and legitimate to the
extent that they are knowably “correct”), but also objectively distinct from those of other social
bodies organized according to contrary values. Such distinctions authorize, in other words, “a
widely shared sense of legitimacy” that Charles Taylor associates with “modern social
imaginaries,” constructs that organize modern collectivity according to principles of “mutual
respect and service” (23, 13). While, in contrast to pre-modern descriptions of social life, modern
social imaginaries are not direct reflections of hierarchical, Platonic organization with a basis in
objective and cosmic reality, Taylor argues that it “would be a mistake” to “think that our
modern notions of moral order lack altogether an ontic component” (10). Legitimate collectivity
suggests that ontologically stable and prior modes of mutuality – modes derived from Grotius
and Locke according to which respect for “life, liberty,” and “sustenance of self and family” is
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advanced – are recognizable, recognized, and appropriated by the individual (or taken for
granted by the individual whose tacit consent to social and political arrangements presupposes
their recognition and appropriation in some prior moment of contract).
But the claims I associate with the social Crusoe call attention to the role that the
identifying individual must play in constructing the social body, and thus to the performative role
that he or she plays in determining the otherwise seemingly (and seemingly prior) sovereign,
self-referentially objective, or logically closed legitimization of its values. The “ontic
component” of a given community thus goes no further than its appropriation or rejection: two
actions which, however, already presuppose an “ontic component.” This performativity is
apparent in Frances Burney’s The Wanderer. Juliet is, in every practical sense, a member of the
novel’s community. Moreover, the economic and social interactions that bind her to the novel’s
many other characters clearly constitute a kind of broad, if sometimes reluctant, consent. Of
course, Juliet does not like her position in the novel’s society, but it is nevertheless a clear and
demonstrably social position. Describing her as a complete social isolate effectively undermines
any sense that the novel contains an objective community grounded upon consent, sociality,
political discourse, sexual courtship, economic activity, shared discourses of taste (all of which
describe her interactions with her society), as well as the many other aspects that make the
novel’s “world” knowable as a coherent whole.
In some obvious ways, the Wanderer’s suppression of objective community is highly
problematic. It allows her to hold consent and dissociation in suspension, for example,
selectively and preferentially conferring to her counterparts any sense that they hold anything in
common (any sense, that is, that the novel’s various communities are constituted, not by arbitrary
preference, but by consensual social activity, shared values, and by financial and political
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interdependence). She is “in the midst” of the world, but not of it; she is separable from it, even
though she, as an active constituent engaged in its economic and social doings, constitutes it. The
countervailing implications of Juliet’s associations and dissociations are especially pronounced
in her attitudes about class. Her insistence on respecting laborers, for example, is undermined by
the distance she constantly places between herself and the novel’s rustic caricatures (or, at best,
in the begrudging acceptance that her economic dependence bears some similarity to theirs), as
well as by the unlikely association she desperately tries to secure between herself and the
wealthy, entitled Aurora.26 At the same time, and precisely because the gesture is an
undermining one, it allows for the possibility of social and political change. It is in this sense that
the novel’s society opens itself up to potential reform, which helps to make sense of Burney’s
association, in the novel’s vaguely optimistic conclusion, of the female Robinson Crusoe with
“female difficulties,” the novel’s subtitle. By challenging the “ontic component” of the social or
political world – the “real” foundations that she refuses to reify by refusing to identify in will
with the social body to which she already belongs in practice – Juliet makes it available to
revision.
The second and more general problem with collective identification as a product of
enlightenment thought is the stubborn possibility that the “world,” the “nation,” and even the
family, is therefore always and irreconcilably other, and that the reciprocal legitimizing
relationship between the individual body (as legitimate member or possible member) and the
social or political body (as a real, legitimate entity) is weak. Solitude “in the midst of the world,”
26

“In fact,” it will be objected, “Juliet has much more in common with Aurora.” But the “in fact”
of this objection is precisely what I want to challenge. What constitutes belonging to Aurora’s
community “in fact?” According to what criteria is her connection to Aurora more substantial
than her connection to those whose financial instability and dependence she shares, those with
whom she interacts more frequently, those with whom the novel’s other wealthy characters
constantly associate her?
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a construction whose contradictions are rarely conspicuous, reveals a categorical instability in
the status of those social relations and interdependencies it seeks to reinforce through association
or to erase through dissociation. In the examples above, imagining isolation is imagining
community, and it is worth looking at the kinds of critical intervention such an imagining might
constitute. What does the trope of the social isolate and its persistence tell us about the premises
of sociality and collectivity operative during the Enlightenment? About the premises that
enlightenment collectivity strives to suppress or reject? I will attempt to address these questions
by turning to the Crusoian moment in one of its most extended treatments.
Although in problematic ways, Belinda and Nanon explicitly recall this text as one that,
perhaps more than any other, articulates the odd duality of Robinson Crusoe. Clarence discovers
Virginia, after all, upon abandoning pre-revolutionary France, disgusted by “the Parisian belles,”
“full of vanity, affectation, and artifice.” He has read Rousseau, and, in imitation of Emile, he
scours the countryside for a “Sophia,” eager to embark upon “the romantic project of educating a
wife for himself” (362). Indeed, the social isolate receives its best-known, most rigorous, and
perhaps clearest articulation in Rousseau’s Emile, where Crusoe is the model upon which Emile
ostensibly explores his “island” as a merely physical being, but by which his social intimacy
with, and dependence upon, his preceptor is suppressed.
THE AUTHORITY OF SOLITUDE: EMILE
Claims of social isolation play a key role in Emile. Indeed, isolation is the very condition
of Emile’s privileged education, entailing an existence that is, initially, “purely physical,” rather
than moral and social. Rousseau insists that, in the first and foundational stages of his education,
Emile “gets his lessons from nature and not from men,” and that he “instructs himself so much
the better because he sees nowhere the intention to instruct him.” Emile learns not through
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lectures, precepts, or reading, but by experiencing the necessary and direct consequences of his
actions, suffering if he breaks his windows, for example, not from reprimands or slaps, but from
the cold of night: “[P]unishment as punishment must never be inflicted on children,” he writes,
“but it should always happen to them as a natural consequence of their bad action” (101).
By learning through natural rather than social consequences, Emile judges and “reasons
in everything immediately related to him” (119). To illustrate this immediacy and the values it
imparts, Rousseau provides the example of a philosopher, who, “relegated to a desert island with
instruments and books, sure of spending the rest of his days there…will hardly trouble himself
any longer about the systems of the world,” and “will perhaps not open a single book in his life.”
Rather, he will occupy himself with becoming acquainted with “the last nook and cranny of his
island,” limiting himself – as Emile should, from the earliest and most formative points in his
education – to “the kinds of knowledge” for which he has “natural taste” and to which “instinct
leads us to seek.” The philosopher thus comes to distinguish “between the inclinations which
come from nature and those which come from opinion” (167). The student, responding
exclusively to “natural” and immediate concerns, and isolated from “opinion” and recognizable
intentionality, forges a relationship to his environment that is merely physical, and not (yet)
moral. Emile is “still almost only a physical being,” Rousseau writes, and he has “only natural
and purely physical knowledge,” entailing “the essential relations of man to things but nothing of
the moral relations of man to man” (187, 207). This merely physical existence is the necessary
foundation of the transparent, virtuous, and moral life of the fully developed, social adult citizen.
Thus, Robinson Crusoe is the one book that “to my taste, provides the most felicitous
treatise on natural education.” Rousseau famously writes that Robinson Crusoe
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will alone compose [Emile’s] whole library, and it will always hold a distinguished place
there. It will be the text for which all our discussions on the natural sciences will serve
only as a commentary. It will serve as a test of the condition of our judgment during our
progress; and so long as our taste is not spoiled, its reading will always please us. (184)
Crusoe holds significance for the tutor precisely because, although he is “alone, deprived of the
assistance of his kind and the instruments of all the arts,” he is self-sufficient, providing for all of
his basic needs by his own labor, always with reference to the voice of nature alone, and never,
in any meaningful way, to the voice of opinion. (This reading of Crusoe is of course its own kind
of fantasy, since Crusoe’s survival marshals various resources made available by the ship and
Crusoe’s past. Suvir Kaul notes, for example, that Crusoe’s life “by no means recapitulates a pretechnological existence,” adding that “his survival within, and then his mastery over, nature
derive from his experience and knowledge as an English participant in trans-Atlantic trade and
plantation” [71]). “This is how we realize the desert island which served me at first as a
comparison,” writes Rousseau.
This state, I agree, is not that of social man; very likely it is not going to be that of Emile.
But it is on the basis of this very state that he ought to appraise all the others. The surest
means of raising oneself above prejudices and ordering one’s judgments about the true
relations of things is to put oneself in the place of an isolated man… (184 – 185)
This claim powerfully articulates Emile’s central premise, suggesting not only that “the true
relations of things” can only manifest themselves in the natural course of interacting immediately
with the world in social isolation, but also that they will, perhaps necessarily, falter in obscurity
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when mediated by others.27 The unique promise of Emile’s education rests in an epistemology
uncontaminated by any social mediation. At its purely physical stage, he “does not yet have a
sufficient sense of his relations with his species to be able to judge of others by himself”; thus
“the true relations of things” – or any legitimate judgment about them – bears no trace of socially
determined, or even socially aware, relations and judgments. He “knows no human being other
than himself alone, and he is even far from knowing himself” (187). He embodies the principle
that one must initially judge of the relations of things with no moral concept of self and others.
And yet, as critics are quick to note, Emile’s experiences are explicitly social. Frederick
Neuhouser writes for example that, “at least in a broad sense,” Emile’s education is social in that
“it depends on an enduring, substantive relationship between two individuals” (160, although I
find nothing particularly “broad” about this use of the term “social”). Crusoe is a trope that
organizes, after all, “our discussions,” “our judgment,” and “our progress.” Like Nanon and
Emilien, Rousseau and Emile read Crusoe as an intimate form of social pleasure. Indeed, the
course of Emile’s early education, for all of its emphasis on purely physical epistemology, is
characterized as a social project, that of exploring a shared island: Emile muses that “All those
people so proud of their talents in Paris would not know how to do anything on our island”
(188), adding that he is ready for moral instruction when “we have visited the whole island”
(192, all emphasis added).
Indeed, Rousseau immediately follows the image of the philosopher “relegated to a desert
island with instruments and books” with another that, like that of Robert Alves, conflates total
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The claim also suggests that it is possible to “put oneself in the place of an isolated man” in the
first place, and that it is useful to put oneself into a state that is “very likely not going to” come to
literal fruition – a peculiar reversion to the unlikely that, indeed, seems rather contrary to the
natural immediacy privileged by Emile’s early education (the clearest indication yet that the
privileged, “purely physical” state is being endorsed from outside of that state).
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isolation with total human community: “[t]he island of humankind,” he tellingly insists, “is the
earth” (167). (What, in the context of such a conflation, can putting “oneself in the place of an
isolated man” mean? In what sense does isolation maintain its defining content?) While Emile’s
education puts him into an explicitly social relationship, the narrator insists that he “has only
natural and purely physical knowledge,” that he “is alone in human society,” and that “he counts
on himself alone.” Moreover, he privileges this isolated status as conferring upon his pupil,
“more than [upon] anyone else…the right to count on himself, for…he has no errors, or only
those that are inevitable for us. He has no vices, or only those against which no man can
guarantee himself” (207, 208). Beginning Emile’s next, moral phase of education, the preceptor
perplexingly insists that “my Emile has until now looked only at himself” (235). To account for
the claims by which Emile’s education is privileged, to understand its promise (and thus, in large
part, the promise of Rousseau’s contribution to Western political and moral philosophy), one
must account for its reversion to the trope of Crusoe “in the midst of the world.”
THE AUTHOR OF SOLITUDE: THE TUTOR
At least two options for reconciling Emile’s sociality and isolation present themselves.
The first is that there is no contradiction, and that Emile’s isolation constitutes, in fact, isolation.
Arguments from the social contract tradition do allow, to some extent, for the framing of social
engagement in such a way that Emile’s solitude might be taken at face value. The second is that
isolation, as Emile’s tutor understands it, approximates the kind of autonomy suggested by the
“general will.” This second suggestion is at least in keeping with the sort of moral and rational
agency developed by Kant, whose categorical imperative, entailing total self-sufficiency and
total universalism, derives in part from the general will. This section will examine both of these
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options, explaining further why each falls short of a satisfying account of Emile’s Crusoian
duality.
While the rationale that motivates it is highly problematic, a logic for accepting the
“solitude” of Emile, first of all, is conceivable. The tradition of social contract theory offers
grounds for taking Emile’s isolation at face value by defining community in ways that exclude
children. Hobbes, for example, precludes children from any meaningful engagement in the
commonwealth because they, along with “Fooles, and Mad-men…have no use of Reason” and
thus “can be no Authors…of any action,” including the making of covenants, “done by them”
(113). Similarly, Locke equates “lunatics and idiots” with children “never set free from the
government of their parents,” arguing that these individuals are excluded from law, “for nobody
can be under a law which is not promulgated to him; and this law being promulgated or made
known by reason only, he that is not come to the use of his reason cannot be said to be under this
law” (125, 123). Community is conceived in each case such that children cannot participate;
perhaps Rousseau’s insistence on social isolation in Emile is in keeping with this conception.
After all, the tutor is certainly a “moral” being, even while Emile continues to be “merely
physical.” In what sense is a relationship, companionship, or community between a moral being
and a merely physical being possible? What is the status of the “merely physical” individual and
his “moral” counterpart on their shared island?
This reading seems plausible, and it corroborates Rousseau’s further insistence, in his
critique of Locke’s treatise on education, that children cannot be reasoned with.28 But while it
credibly sustains Emile’s status as a purely physical being, it negates his tutor’s as a social and
28

Rousseau critiques Locke’s “great maxim” of reasoning with children as a backwards attempt
“to make the product the instrument,” since “[i]f children understood reason, they would not
need to be raised” (Emile: 89) – a gesture that draws lines clearly akin to those upon which
Hobbes’s arguments depend.
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moral one – a status defined, again, by knowledge of “the moral relations of man to man,” which
the tutor’s function clearly presupposes. Taking seriously the novel’s “island” isolation would
entail the unlikely concession that the tutor realizes his promise as a moral being (since his
function as a teacher is the manifestation of his moral relationality, his own iteration of the telos
towards which Emile himself is being led) in a context, one of only things (human and
nonhuman), in which moral relationality and epistemology are impossible.
If the tutor and his pupil are isolated, it is precisely because Emile’s existence is purely
physical. Such a relationship, however, especially insofar as it represents the choice and
deliberation of the tutor, would seem to privilege natural over civil liberty. This would have a
certain but limited appeal for Rousseau (and he is sometimes accused of precisely such
privileging). It would remove some of the daunting improbabilities that his moral relationality
functions to resolve, for example, including any possibility of amour-propre. The tutor becomes
immune to opinion and interpersonal judgment even as he embodies “the moral relations of man
to man,” thus maintaining his integrity (and, it follows, his authority as a teacher, as a moral
being) by reducing Emile to a means to that end. Clarence, of Belinda, seeks a similar kind of
relationship, striving to become a beneficiary of association with his innocent and “natural”
Rachel/Virginia despite his diamonds, pierced ears, and worldliness. By associating with the
totally isolated innocent (or by becoming an object of desire for an individual whose desires are
purely natural), he attempts to negate his own worldly values and influences. Because that
isolation and innocence are constructed, she is made a means to that end; and yet, if
Rachel/Virginia is, like Emile, “purely physical” – and not a moral counterpart, an object of
reciprocity or moral respect – this means-to-end process does not pose a moral problem or
contradiction to Clarence, so his moral authority remains uncompromised.
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In other words, by maintaining a shared existence with a purely physical being, the tutor
in this reading discovers some continuity between the possibilities of reciprocity (the social
condition of moral life) and perfect isolation, or rational autonomy (the moral condition of social
life). While promising, this continuity empties the defining content of moral relationality, a
compromise made legible in the conspicuously contrived nature of isolation in the text. After all,
if the premise of isolation reconciles recipriocity and autonomy, it does so by creating another
continuity between natural and civil freedom (the former conditioning Emile’s existence, the
latter conditioning the tutor’s, even though it is in each case a shared existence). This unintended
consequence would be fatal to Rousseau’s broader political project, one that clearly distinguishes
natural freedom from civil liberty, emphatically privileging the latter. Taking the text’s claims
about isolation at face value, then, does not resolve the tensions it creates.
The second possibility for resolving the contradictions of Emile’s isolation is to associate
his education with the general will (The Social Contract will receive fuller treatment below).
Most interpretations of Rousseau treat the general will as an elaboration of moral and practical
autonomy, and specifically as a reformulation of natural law.29 While equating the general will
and natural law directly would be a mistake (given Rousseau’s radical reformulations of nature
itself, for example, such as the emphatic distinctions he makes between natural liberty and civil
liberty, or between instinct and reason),30 there is a great extent to which the general will
functions, like natural law, exactly because it is not bound to the contingency of historical
particulars. Individuals in a legitimate association interact and engage in social life and
29

See J. B. Schneewind, The Invention of Autonomy: A History of Modern Moral Philosophy.
His analysis of Rousseau is found in chapter 21, “Religion, morality, and reform,” (457 – 482).
On natural law, see especially chapter 2, “Natural law: From intellectualism to voluntarism,” (17
– 36).
30
“What makes the free will distinctively human, according to Rousseau, is man’s ability to
employ his will to resist instinct” (James Miller 169, emphasis his).
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commerce without subordinating one will, or some wills, to any others. Any individual within
the community has equal access to, and participation in, the general will, and no special status or
specialized knowledge is required. Moreover, private interests, when they conflict with the
general will, are suppressed (in theory, they do not even occur); the general will thus stifles the
cultivation of amour-propre and ensures that, when an individual acts, he or she promotes the
general interest while remaining wholly free. One obeys only one’s own will, a perfect sense of
autonomy that is preserved in the social association because, at the moment of contract, the total
alienation (of self and of rights) is perfectly reciprocal.
Similarly, Emile’s isolation can be understood as the premise according to which he does
not obey the will or the precepts (there are none) of his tutor. Instead, he at first regards only
“things,” the course of natural necessity. The problem with this claim is that “natural necessity,”
as a privileged site for the necessary development of autonomy, is in fact carefully organized and
arranged in the text. It is neither natural nor necessary. What Emile takes to be the course of
nature is in fact the product of his tutor’s mediation and manipulation. Readers are left
wondering if “isolation” in Emile, and by extension the autonomy that political legitimacy
requires in Rousseau’s broader philosophical project, is after all a misrecognized dependence –
or, worse, as I will suggest below, the means by which dependence is in fact created and
suppressed.
Indeed, critics have generally acknowledged the manipulative dynamic in Emile’s and his
tutor’s relationship, but the ways in which this dynamic is bound to the book’s organizing
premises about solitude have remained underdeveloped. Moreover, responsibility for the failures
of Emile, when they are acknowledged at all, is persistently assigned to Emile, to Paris, or even
to human nature, finally and necessarily unhappy outside the classical fatherland, but almost
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never directly to the tutor, his ideals, or his project.31 If his methods are off-putting, his principles
are sound. As Stephen Ellenburg puts it, by being exposed to and formed by the tutor’s
manipulations, Emile is merely “required by circumstances to become a sincerely virtuous
citizen” (287). Joseph R. Reisert generally concurs, arguing in fact that the preceptor’s deception
and manipulation during the early parts of Emile’s education are not only benign but consistent
with friendship. “Although Jean-Jacques surely manipulates his young charge,” Reisert writes,
“it is clear that he does so only for Emile’s benefit,” adding that the nature of friendship “proves
vital to the success of the educational project being undertaken” (104, 81). Reisert thus takes the
“success” of the tutor’s project, despite and even because of its problematic methods, for
granted. Other readings, like those of Marshall Berman and Josué V. Harari, stress the success of
the tutor’s ends (rather than the manipulation that constitutes his means), foregrounding the
restorative nature of the education, according to which the tutor knows and is able to enforce the
natural order that is normally subverted as early as when the infant’s cries move from expressing
needs to expressing demands.32
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There are notable exceptions, however, including conservative and libertarian interpretations
of Rousseau. See David Gauthier for example: “Emile acknowledges that he is not the true
natural man,” Gauthier writes, “raised to a condition of self-sufficiency, but the permanent
dependent of the tutor” (44), adding, “[f]or Rousseau, it is the very project of individual
liberation through control that proves fundamentally flawed,” arguing that the transfer of
“enslaving dependence” to “an allegedly liberating power” constitutes a defining pattern “in
cults, in psychoanalysis, and in communism” (50). This reading only works, however, if one
grants, first, that a transference of dependence is the product – rather than a byproduct, for
example, or evidence of failure – of the preceptor’s methods; and, second, that there is no
significant qualitative difference between the authority of opinion and the authority of virtue
(which the preceptor, Wolmar, and the Great Legislator at least attempt to embody) and nature
(whose interests they attempt to represent).
32
“But putting the child back in his place is not an easy operation; it requires an elaborate
subterfuge, an artifice that is at the very heart of Rousseauian pedagogy: a system that artificially
creates the necessary and sufficient conditions to produce the child – and later the man – who
will remain in place through all displacements.” (Harari 108 – 109).
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But emphasizing friendship and benign restoration obscures a more basic problem with
the text. Even if friendship can support manipulation, for example, it does not follow that
manipulation can support the “benefit” or “success” of the tutor’s moral project. Granting that
the ends justify the means – the position to which many of these readings can be reduced –
neglects the specificity of the tutor’s manipulation and deception. It is not that the tutor
manipulates Emile that is significant, but rather what his manipulation produces: not friendship,
benefit, or success (these come later, if they come at all, when Emile shifts from a “purely
physical” to a “moral” epistemology), but an illusion of autonomy. In effect, these readings
rationalize the exigency, without examining the full implications, of Emile’s “solitude.”
Generally, therefore, the tutor’s task is excused or even admired as a positive iteration of
Rousseau’s broader investigation of authority and freedom. Judith N. Shklar argues that the tutor,
along with the Great Legislator of The Social Contract and Wolmar of Julie, represents the
almost superhuman figure of absolute, paternal authority that Rousseau ambivalently seeks: his
“authority is indeed immense,” Shklar argues, “but so are the evils he must forestall” (149).
Emile is “trained,” she acknowledges, “to say the least,” even to the brink of oppression, and yet
ultimately the promise of his education is achieved: Emile’s happiness depends upon neither the
opinion of others nor the impossible “isolation of natural man” (58). Having stoically reconciled
his inclinations and emotional content with external necessity through the program established
and endorsed by the tutor, he experiences the condition of natural, presocial humanity, “an
absence of mental pain and a feeling of perfect independence” (60).
While this second way of reading Emile’s solitude thus has the advantage of reinforcing
the continuity of Rousseau’s mid-career texts (aligning the tutor, the Lawgiver, and Wolmar), it
also therefore reproduces some of the unresolved problems that have dogged those texts –
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especially those regarding the status, nature, and origins of authority in The Social Contract. And
as helpful as aligning these texts can be, doing so ignores the simple fact that they offer varying
degrees of conceptual and narrative treatments. To collapse the tutor into the position of the
Lawgiver is to ignore his narrative status as a literary character. But that status is not a secondary
or incidental quality of the text. Indeed, I argue that an analysis of his status as a literary
character, immersed in the narrative textures of novelistic realism, is precisely what is needed if
one is to understand Emile’s place within Rousseau’s political philosophy. The pseudoomniscience of the tutor (and of Julie’s Wolmar) does bear some obvious resemblance to that of
the Great Legislator in The Social Contract,33 but his authority, being figured as a product of
narrative realism and empirically plausible cause and effect, lends itself to a different order of
analysis.34 After all, unlike the Legislator who has “no affinity with our nature,”35 Rousseau
insists that the tutor “will not be an angel,” and he reminds us that, “before daring to undertake
the formation of a man, one must have made oneself a man”36 (il faut s’être fait home soi-même).

33

For Shklar, this authority is best embodied by Wolmar (she associates the preceptor with St.
Preux after he has been reformed, though she includes him with the other “images of authority”)
who is not only “like God,” but “better than God” (151). Similarly, Harari equates the
preceptor’s interventions to providence in Robinson Crusoe, “except that…the master pedagogue
Rousseau wishes to go even further by taking onto himself the power and omniscience of God,
and thus supplant the divinity in its providential role” (123), and David Gauthier writes that the
preceptor is “one of Rousseau’s redemptive artificers” who “seem to possess, the power to lift
their fellows from their fallen condition” and who “are not human insofar as their power and
their existence is not explained within the framework of Rousseau’s history of humankind” (31 –
32).
34
Many scholars have all but dismissed, not only the text’s novelistic and narrative status, but
even any practical implications and applications of the text, as if it were every bit as abstract as
The Social Contract. Stephen Ellenburg, for one, argues that “the society of Emile is a miniature
republic of lawgiver and citizen,” although he also describes the Lawgiver in more practical
registers than most (275). In any case, to accept the implausible status of the tutor as that of the
Lawgiver is to read his character as Emile does, as if of a different order, which, as we have
seen, constitutes a coerced misreading.
35
Social Contract: 84.
36
Emile: 94 – 95.
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Reading Emile as a narrative of two individuals, rather than or in addition to a theoretical
articulation of the development of the virtuous will obeying only the commands of natural
necessity, opens onto the questions that have, in fact, motivated this chapter. Who is the tutor?
Why do we get Emile’s story instead of his? What is the nature of his authority, and what are its
broader implications? Raising these questions, making the narrative features of the text
conspicuous, provides crucial insight into the claims of isolation that organize Emile’s formation.
NIGHT GAMES, PROPERTY, AND AUTONOMY: SOURCES OF LEGITIMACY

The first thing one is likely to notice upon reading the text as a novel is that the tutor’s
narrative is conspicuously absent. That his backstory is suppressed has both narrative and
conceptual implications, drawing attention to the conditions of legitimacy and its emergence in
social and empirical contexts, and providing leverage for the analysis of Rousseau’s broader
philosophical project. Moreover, in those moments when readers are provided scraps of the
tutor’s backstory, the terms, basis, development, and emergence of his authority become
available for closer scrutiny.
At one point, for example, the narrator recommends “[m]any night games,” advice that
“is more important than it seems” (134). Fear of the dark, he writes, “has a natural cause”
grounded in the “stronger” voice of instinct. Further, he associates fear of the dark with isolation,
and in describing it he puts feverish, almost paranoid stress on the first-person singular. In the
dark, he writes, “I no longer see anything…I may very well know that I am secure in the place I
am; I never know it as well as if I actually saw it. I am therefore always subject to a fear that I do
not have in daylight. True, I know that a foreign body can hardly act on mine” etc. Representing
the limitations of instinct and of the isolation of a merely physical existence, this fear must be
overcome, and doing so entails a turn to a more social and rational disposition. “Everything that
ought to reassure me exists only in my reason,” he writes, adding that helping children overcome
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this fear requires that “one brings together many good-humored children in the evening, that at
first they be sent out not separately but several together, [and] that no chance be taken with a
single child all alone” (136 – 137). To illustrate the importance and effect of “night games,” the
narrator provides a personal example, juxtaposing the image of his young self venturing alone
into the dark to retrieve a Bible with the calm “company” in a lighted house nearby.
In brief, Rousseau is “in the country boarding with a minister named M. Lambercier,”
Mademoiselle Lambercier, his cousin, and some others, when M. Lambercier, “bored with
[Rousseau’s] boasting” and deciding “to put [his] courage to the test” (136), sends the young
narrator to retrieve a Bible from the pulpit of a darkened temple. He writes: “In perceiving the
profound darkness which reigned in this vast place, I was seized by a terror which made my hair
stand on end. I moved back; I went out; I took flight, trembling all over.” He tries again, bringing
a dog this time, but again falls “into a state of inexpressible consternation,” leaving in terror.
Having failed twice, he approaches the house where, he writes: “I made out M. Lambercier’s
voice bursting with laughter. I immediately supposed it to be directed at me; and embarrassed at
seeing myself exposed, I hesitated to open the door.” He hears the party suggest that “M.
Lambercier…come and look for me escorted by my intrepid cousin, to whom afterward they
would without fail have given all the honor resulting from the expedition.” On hearing this,
Rousseau instantly recovers, flies to the temple, recovers the Bible, and bursts with his prize into
the room, beaming “with joy at having been ahead of the help intended for me.” While the
narrator acknowledges that this story is not “a model to follow and as an example of the gaiety”
appropriate for night games, he also insists, “I give it as proof that nothing is more reassuring to
someone frightened of shadows in the night than to hear company, assembled in a neighboring
room, laughing and chatting calmly” (136).
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Clearly, this episode does not constitute the “proof” the narrator claims it does. The
young Rousseau obviously does not find reassurance in his company, nor is he reacting to the
comforting pleasure of calm laughter and chatting. Rather, like St. Preux unable or unwilling to
expose himself to the shame of excusing himself from the brothel,37 young Rousseau is
motivated explicitly by fear of derision. Worse, this moment of shame and indulgence is treated
as a moment of strength, and the biting social pressure of mockery and triumph over another’s
weakness is presented as the gentle, affirming comfort of pleasurable company. A weakness,
according to which the narrator is motivated by others’ opinions of him (a moment of inflamed
amour-propre), plays the part of self-mastery and independence, which is exactly the kind of
error Emile’s education is meant to preclude.
The tutor obviously misreads his own anecdote; whether he does so willfully is unclear.
Either way, the misreading invites doubt, not only about the great extent to which Rousseau
intervenes in the “natural” course of his ward’s development, but also about the quality and
nature of those interventions. If, as critics suggest, the preceptor approximates the superhuman
wisdom of “one of Rousseau’s redemptive artificers” (Gauthier 31), then misreading his own
anecdote undermines that wisdom and its possibility – an undermining that is heightened, I
argue, by the phantom solitude that effectively conceals the preceptor’s agency and, therefore,
his responsibility. But if the fleeting presence of the tutor’s narrative gives readers insight into
the troubling nature of his authority, its absence is even more revealing.
The centrality of property in social contract theory and the modern individualism that it
supports (see, for example, C. B. Macpherson’s seminal work on possessive individualism, to
which I return in chapter two) culminates in what many critics believe to be Emile’s most
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See Part Two, letter XXVI, and the next, Julie’s reply. (Julie: 240 – 250).
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important lesson. Judith N. Shklar states that Emile’s lesson on property gives him a “sense of
obligation, of right and duty, of justice in sum,” writing that for Rousseau, as for Locke, “there
could be no liberty and no true security of obligations without the sacred rights of property” (49).
Without the concept of property or its attending sense of true justice – independent of the hazards
of amour-propre and the defiling confinements of opinion – Emile will fail to meet the stated
goal of his education, of being useful both to himself and to others, and thus the very possibility
of such a subject fades. It is therefore no less essential that Emile acquire a sense of property
than that he acquire it, as it were, “naturally,” in solitude, in a manner directly opposed to that of
a traditional, bourgeois education.
Indeed, Emile’s lesson on property follows neatly from the conceptual priorities and
exigencies that the text, and its place within the social contract tradition, works to address. The
status of property and the transfer of its principles through education hold up to the basic
conditions of property: Emile is uniquely positioned by his supposed solitude to grasp the
interdependent principles that one has property in one’s person (conferring the sense of liberal
justice that he must learn) and that it comes about through labor – an essential feature of property
that Locke’s bourgeois education neglects. But that conceptual neatness does not hold up to a
consideration of the narrative frame through which his education is presented. From a narrative
perspective, after all, there are only a limited number of ways that one can come to know these
basic and essential principles of property. I will look at three in the remainder of this section,
examining how each contradicts either the philosophical or the narrative mandates of the text.
The first option for learning about the principles of property, which accords with Rousseau’s
emphasis on natural consequences, entails their discovery by chance. Importantly, from his own
perspective, this is precisely how Emile learns them. He happens to plant his beans in a plot
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already in use by another, Robert the gardener. The possibility that his chosen garden location is
already in use does not occur to him until his beans are destroyed. As he is initially offended, his
sense of justice is aroused, and through confronting Robert and learning the truth, his indignation
is revised and appropriately re-applied, inaugurating his respect for Robert’s property and labor,
and, by extension, for property in general.
Of course, however, Emile cannot be said to have discovered the principles of property by
chance. Education, after all, is labor-intensive, highly organized, and, most of all, predictable.
The narrator must know that Emile’s experiment with the beans, under specific, known
conditions, will result in specific kinds of internal and interpersonal conflict, which can then be
productively redirected toward a new and essential concept of property. Chance here would be
counterproductive. Rather than a natural, “merely physical” being stumbling by chance upon
these conflicts in the course of exploring its island, Emile’s education requires an organized
intervention directed toward a specific goal, which, of course, is precisely what this section
dramatizes. Emile is clearly meant to understand himself as having discovered these principles
by chance in that “merely physical” sense, and Rousseau clearly privileges exactly the narrative
under which Emile (mistakenly) operates, but there is no place for chance in Emile’s education.
The second possible way to learn about property is by coming to realize its principles despite
a destructive, bourgeois education. This alternative assumes that the errors imparted by socially
privileged forms of education can be overcome: an assumption buried in the position Rousseau
takes relative to his readers. His reader, after all, as the narrator likely imagines her, is herself a
product of a bourgeois education. If she were the product of a natural, chance-based education,
she would not need Emile to explain its principles or how they can be acquired. Since she
evidently does need Emile, whether for self-application or as a pedagogical guide, then she is
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apparently capable of learning from it, assuming a position from which legitimately to dispense
and apply the “natural” principles of property. Otherwise, the book is of no use, and of course
Rousseau puts a high priority on the usefulness of his works.38
At this point, the significance of the tutor’s suppressed narrative begins to emerge. Either of
these two alternatives might represent the tutor’s own education about property. If the tutor
learned about the principles of property as a merely physical being stumbling upon them by
chance, then his praxis, arranging and organizing a similar but conspicuously false “chance”
encounter for Emile, is dangerously corrupt – I will return to this claim below. Alternatively, we
can assume that the tutor, like his reader, must have disabused himself of the concept of property
as it was mediated by a bourgeois education. If so, then he constitutes strong evidence that,
perhaps, such an education is not so bad, and that it can somehow (but how?) be mitigated and its
errors removed. There is also a third alternative, which is that the tutor was educated by a tutor
like himself, and that he came to discover the principles of property through a process very much
like Emile’s. This third alternative raises the highly problematic possibility of an ostensibly
“natural” concept endlessly mediated from person to person, certainly a problematic possibility
given that mediation is precisely what so much of his philosophy functions to resolve.39 If the
tutor was tutored then he, it seems, like Emile, must have acquired his knowledge of this
essential concept from a position of error, projecting a framework of “natural” and physical
discovery onto a process that was heavily mediated and organized. And even if that error is
38

See Joseph R. Reisert (13).
On the crucial problem of mediation for Rousseau, see Jean Starobinsky. Much of his book is
devoted to this topic, but see especially chapter 6 (122 – 179), in which: The problem of
interpreting signs is worth pausing over. If communication is truly immediate, there is no need to
interpret signs; and interpretation is an interposition, an act of mediation. The ideal of
immediacy demands that the meaning of the sign be identical in the object and in my perception”
(155). In Emile’s education, I argue, and possibly in that of the preceptor, the meaning and the
object (property) are demonstrably distinct.
39
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ultimately benign, then the privileged mode of imparting the correct principles of property – the
privileged mode, that is, of instantiating moral relationality – is locked in a closed circuit of
implausibly isolated wards tutored into instructing implausibly isolated wards, etc.
In any case, whatever the tutor’s means of discovering the true principles of property, his
narrative must ultimately be much more valuable than Emile’s. Taking the second alternative, for
example, if the tutor was at some point capable of disabusing himself of the errors of a concept
as mediated by a polite education in such a way that he gains access to the concept as supplied
by an authentically “natural” and socially isolated education, readers would certainly find the
tutor’s narrative far more valuable and useful than Emile’s. After all, it is precisely such a
process that we, his readers, must undergo ourselves if we are to make good use of Emile – and
certainly not that of the book’s titular character. It is the tutor’s narrative, and not his ward’s
(who has everything neatly laid out for him; who naively, mistakenly, stumbles upon them as if
by chance, and who projects natural necessity onto carefully organized and manipulated
phenomena), that would contain the promise of Emile’s knowledge and natural status, but
without binding this promise to the hopelessly improbable social arrangement the text narrates.
In short, the experiences that legitimize and motivate the narrator’s authority are more relevant to
readers than Emile’s, but they are never given narrative substance.
There is an even bigger problem, however, than the relative usefulness of one or another
character’s narrative. The text is written such that it both invites and frustrates speculation about
the tutor’s backstory. But I do not think Rousseau’s silence about this backstory is a
careless oversight, reckless evasion, or winking sleight of hand. Rather, it is possible that the
suppressed narrative of the tutor is a deliberate manifestation of a more basic failure,
symptomatic of social contract theory in general, to formulate the conditions of legitimate
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authority. In this reading, the power of Rousseau’s contribution to the social contract tradition –
his conceptual interventions regarding the origins and exercise of moral and rational autonomy,
for example – derives at least in part from his investment in narrative realism. Because Emile is
the focal point of attention, the nature of the tutor’s agency and interventions recedes. If one
focuses on Emile as an object of natural necessity, the conceptual urgencies of justice through
property and property through labor are ratified. But if one focuses on the narrative elements of
the lesson, as a drama of two characters in social negotiation, then a major problem with social
contract theory begins to take shape.
In fact, there is a fourth alternative for teaching the principles of property, which is the worst
possible education for inaugurating the transparency and natural knowledge so prized by
Rousseau. The principles of property can be taught by knowingly and explicitly gutting them of
their defining value and content – indeed, this is precisely what these pages actually dramatize.
The tutor knows that Emile must learn what property is, and that Emile must fundamentally
respect the property of others as, in Locke’s formulation, an extension of their person. A
violation of property is thus profoundly unjust, and learning this, and respecting it, is vital to the
kind of subject Emile must become.40 He also knows, however, that Emile’s bean plot constitutes
exactly such a violation. Without telling him about property abstractly, or allowing him to read
about it, the tutor knows that Emile must experience it – discover it – firsthand, naturally. That
40

Reisert is right to recognize “the Rousseauian man of virtue” as one who “steadfastly respects
the rights of others, even at great cost to himself,” though in asserting that such a man is
presented in Emile he understates the contradictions explored in these pages. Discussing the
inauguration of contracts and moral relationships, for example, Reisert insists that “[w]hen Emile
is still a boy, Robert…promises to respect Emile’s rights over a small piece of land in exchange
for Emile’s promise to respect Robert’s rights over his land. With that act, each recognizes the
other as a valid source of claims against himself.” If Robert is indeed a “valid source” of such
claims, however, then what makes this lesson – which requires a violation of those very claims –
possible in the first place? Is the status of those “claims” itself compromised, or only Robert as a
source of them? Either way, the system falls apart (8, 54).
82

is, Emile must violate the property of another. While he does so innocently and unknowingly, of
course, his tutor, who facilitates and arranges this violation, must do so knowingly. And while
41

Emile’s relationship with the tutor is unsettling, the tutor’s relationship with Robert the gardener
is irredeemable. “I encourage” Emile’s desire to garden, he writes. “I share his taste. I work with
him, not for his pleasure, but for mine” (emphasis added). The tutor becomes “his helper,”
increasing Emile’s joy “by saying to him: ‘This belongs to you,’” and then by “explaining to him
this term ‘belong.’” This possession, he insists (making a startlingly revealing comparison), “is
more sacred and more respectable than that taken of South America when Núñez Balboa in the
name of the King of Spain planted his standard on the shore of the South Sea” (98).
Not only does the tutor put Emile into a position of an unconscious aggressor – thus
becoming, himself, a conscious one – but, in this system, he must do so. Without relying on
chance or precepts, the principles of property do sustain their conceptual integrity: “In this model
of the way of inculcating the primary notions in children one sees how the idea of property
naturally goes back to the right of the first occupant by labor,” he writes. But teaching property
rights without chance or precepts also requires their violation, the negation of property. That
“right…by labor” cannot subsist, cannot condition the idea of property, and must be uprooted
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It has also been suggested that Robert the gardener, like the magician, is the preceptor’s
accomplice. See for example Timothy O’Hagan, pg 67. This reading is credible, and potentially
supported by the preceptor’s insistence that “[y]ou will not be the child’s master if you are not
the master of all that surrounds him” (95), as well as by key moments in the (very similar) early
education of the children in Julie, in which, for example, Julie’s eldest son acquires a taste for
reading by growing weary of depending on servants who are, by careful arrangement, too busy to
read, or to finish reading, amusing stories from the Bible (see pages 476 – 477). If this is so,
however, it is never explicitly disclosed (Rousseau adds a note to a subsequent edition admitting
that the magician is an accomplice, leaving room to suppose that Robert is as well), nor does it
solve any of our problems. After all, if Robert is indeed an accomplice, then what these pages
dramatize is not a violation of his property rights at all, but the deliberate use of his property
rights by consent, and Emile has learned nothing – or, perhaps worse, he believes himself to have
learned something from events that, in fact, directly contradict his experiences.
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from the outset in order to be taught at all. At best, Emile’s education negates itself. He learns of
the existence of something that, in being learned, either reveals itself as illusory, or that must be
destroyed. It is a right that, when looked at, sinks back like Eurydice into nothing. If one is to
take the rights of property seriously, and natural education alone provides “the true relation of
things,” then property can and must never be taught. Or, at worst, the right of property, and the
sense of justice it unfolds, is illusory, subject to the arbitrary interests of those most qualified to
teach it: but then they teach nothing and, in their capacity as teachers, become nothing.
MORAL RELATIONALITY AND THE SOCIAL CONTRACT: CAUSES AND EFFECTS

According to Rousseau, social contract requires a gesture of absolute sociality. This in
itself is not surprising. But this gesture is conditioned, as Emile helps to show, by a pretense of
absolute solitude – a pretense that, perhaps paradoxically, does not negate but in fact legitimizes
that absolute sociality, substantiating social contract. In fact it is precisely in its negation, in
emptying it of sociality, that social contract is legitimized at all. “Finally,” he writes in The
Social Contract, “since each man gives himself to all, he gives himself to no one” (61). Although
the goal here is community – ‘legitimate’ forms of social organization and regulation – one finds
at its foundation, not merely an independent subordinating himself to nobody, but a sort of
isolate, relating himself (insofar as giving of one’s self and receiving of others’ is the constitutive
form of relating to others in this moment of contract) to nobody. In a word, in examining
Rousseau’s account of absolute and primary community, of the grounds for the legitimization of
all community, we find ourselves confronted with solitude in the midst of the world: not, he
insists, a problem to be solved, but the solution to a problem. By looking to Rousseau’s more
explicit political philosophy, and especially at the social contractor and the Lawgiver, we can see
that the pretense of isolation within his conceptualization of collective identification is no less
central – but no less stable – than that which becomes conspicuous in the narrative of Emile.
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In other words, as I am arguing that Emile uses narrative to make problems with social
contract conspicuous, it is worth rereading for those parallels, and for the manifestations of those
problems, in The Social Contract. Parallels between the two texts are easy to find, after all.
Stephen Ellenburg calls Emile “the Social Contract writ small,” arguing that “Rousseau’s
education…duplicates on a more manageable, temporally more extended scale the foundation of
a true republic by a lawgiver in the Social Contract” (271). Each text, in its way, is organized
around a claim about engaging with “no one.” While this claim usefully sustains constituents of
community in their rational autonomy, it also begs several important questions relating to the
epistemology of legitimate association. What, for example, does the individual at the decisive
moment of social contract know? How does he understand the relationship between the “all” and
the “no one”? Does the contractor, like Emile, engage in a social relationship (relating to all)
only while – or even because – he believes himself, or imagines himself, to be a sort of isolate,
giving “himself to no one?”
The difficulty of these epistemological questions is compounded by the recollection that
the contractor has none of the moral and relational capacities that they would seem to
presuppose. Just like Emile entering adolescence, the individual entering into social contract,
Rousseau writes, exchanges his “physical and independent existence” with a “moral and
communal existence” (85). After all, the chapter on social contract (Book I, Chapter 6) clearly
sets out to describe, not all contracts, but an original social contract through which “the primitive
condition” of “a state of nature” is exchanged for civil association (59). Such a primitive man
must clearly lack the resources – reason, moral relationality – to anticipate any extent to which
the act of “unconditional” and “total alienation…of himself” to all can sustain autonomous selfmastery (60). It seems impossible that he would engage in a social exchange that consists of
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giving of himself entirely, without rational access to the mechanisms by which this engagement
will preserve his liberty – unless all that he knows, or thinks that he knows (like Emile), is that
he gives himself to no one.
The role of the Lawgiver provides the easiest and most obvious way around the question
of what the social contractor knows, but not, of course, without generating new questions. The
purely instinctual epistemology of natural man is crucial to why “the Lawgiver can…employ
neither force nor argument” and “must have recourse to an authority of another order, one which
can compel without violence and persuade without convincing” (87). During social contract,
“[e]ach one of us puts into the community his person and all his powers under the supreme
direction of the general will.” While Rousseau writes of a will that “studies…the common
interest,” and that can distinguish duty, it is a will that is shaped less by principles than by a
vague sense of necessity or chance, reflecting not axioms but the foundations of character and
custom fashioned by the Lawgiver (72).42 The question of legitimacy and social contract
becomes a question of narrative. Does the Lawgiver’s “sublime reasoning” impart the ideas of
community and sociality (i.e., moral relationality), or does it only arrange for the first act of
social contract, from which those ideas are derived? Which is primary and which derivative? In
other words, does the contract produce the moral individual, or does the moral individual
produce the contract? In fact, both answers must be true.
Again, Emile does not develop the idea of the principles of property and then act
according to those principles: the principles must be derived from praxis. If the Lawgiver and the
42

For a discussion on the will in Rousseau and the extent to which it is either determined by, or
productive of the means of, knowledge, see James Miller, 167 – 172. Will, Miller argues, “is an
intrinsically enigmatic phenomenon” which “first appears before the mind as an inescapable
feeling, not a clear idea” – a “sentiment” which “seems self-evident” (167 – 168). At the same
time, Miller points to the Savoyard Vicar, who conflates the “causes” that determine both the
will and judgment as one and the same (170).
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preceptor play analogous roles in these developmental narratives, then the contractor can only
derive the principles of social contract from its practice, and not the other way around.
Otherwise, he does not enter into the contract as a merely physical being responding to strict
natural necessity, which is to say that he does not obey only his own will. Without recognizing
this impasse, it is difficult to appreciate the nature of Rousseau’s contribution to social contract
theory. It is usually taken for granted, for example, that the individual at the moment of social
contract understands the principles and the objective of total surrender and total liberty, and that
he is even motivated by this knowledge. But this cannot be.
John B. Noone, Jr, for example, argues that “legitimate alienation presupposes an
already-existent general will” (22), and that, since some common and agreed-upon standards
must precede the social contract, “some degree of socialization precedes the contract” (75). Thus,
“the contract does not so much create a people as it certifies its antecedent existence and gives it
a new dimension, a legitimate political existence” (76 – 77). Noone thus attempts to solve the
problem of the social contract by reducing it to “a purely formal procedure” that follows an
anterior, already-established general will, practically distinct from the particular will. Moreover,
this reading posits the particular will as an obstacle to the realization of the general will, making
the moment of social contract itself all but impossible without prior deliberation. In other words,
the social contract in Noone’s reading presupposes the kind of moral relationality that can only
be produced by the social contract.
To demonstrate the differences between particular and general wills, Noone gives the
example of bachelors within a community considering a proposal to raise taxes in order to
subsidize education to the level necessary, according to the general will, for the common good. If
these bachelors “consult only their particular will,” he argues, “they will find no reason to burden
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themselves” (73). Subordinating their particular will to the general will can only happen by first
constructing, and thus understanding, the general will. And yet, in his argument, the social
contract itself consists of just such an act of subordination – an act that presupposes the kind of
moral relationality that, according to Rousseau, is not awakened except by the social contract.
If one applies the assumptions Noone makes about the bachelors’ general and particular
wills to the epistemological question I identified above (can knowledge of the principles of
sociality precede social contract?), it would seem that sociality is somehow primary, social
contract is derivative, and that individuals enter the social contract from a position of, and in
order to secure, a pre-understood gesture of autonomous sociality. But Noone’s argument that
“contract does not so much create a people” does not address the very objection to Grotius (Book
1, Chapter 5) that motivates Rousseau’s discussion of social contract in the first place:
Therefore, according to Grotius a people is a people even before the gift to the king is
made. The gift itself is a civil act; it presupposes public deliberation. Hence, before
considering the act by which a people submits to a king, we ought to scrutinize the act by
which people become a people, for that act, being necessarily antecedent to the other, is
the real foundation of society. (59, emphasis Rousseau’s)
Like Grotius, Noone “presupposes public deliberation,” failing to show how a community
entering into a social contract is not already “a people.” And by reducing social contract to a
“purely formal procedure,” he presents pictures of the general and particular wills that make any
moment of “an original covenant” overwhelmingly improbable, simply begging the question.
One need not accept that, without deliberation prior to the social contract, “the general
will becomes some sort of mystical entity, free floating and unanchored in anything that
resembles human volition” (Noone 76). Again, Kantian moral theory and the categorical

88

imperative adapts Rousseau’s general will – with important qualifications43 – to address this kind
of objection directly, suggesting, for example, that it is likely, even necessary, that even the
bachelors will find “reason to burden themselves” with additional taxes in order to improve
education sufficient to the common good. If part of the problem of understanding the social
contract is confronting a moment during which man’s presocial nature (or merely physical
nature, to use Rousseau’s vocabulary) is exchanged for a social (or moral) nature, Noone’s
suggestion is simply to posit something like presocial sociality. But perhaps a better answer rests
in the contrary movements of collective identification, the extent to which isolation extends
itself, or can be imagined to extend itself, into key social moments, preserving an imagined sense
of asociality at a moment of practically objective socialization.
There are important differences, however, in how each text treats these contrary
movements. For Emile, solitude is the position under which he operates and according to which
the imprint of the tutor’s agency and authority is concealed: it is the constitutive error that
organizes his early development. For the individual in contract, on the contrary, it is the only
position according to which his own agency and authority is recovered. It is the only justification
for this exchange, properly understood (even if it is a post hoc justification). And yet, it still does
not follow that, because the pretense of isolation seems to benefit the contractor by facilitating
the establishment of his moral autonomy, it is not also an error. In Emile, solitude functions to
conceal social asymmetry; in The Social Contract, it unfolds perfect social symmetry to view. In
either case, it is imagined.
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Small communities are a hallmark of Rousseau’s ideal society and, as James Miller reminds
us, “[t]here are as many general wills as there are genuine communities,” and “the general will is
no innate endowment of every individual as a member of species” being “neither universal nor
inborn,” revealing the very unKantian scope of Rousseau’s general will (62).
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It is not enough to account for these differences by suggesting that Emile and The Social
Contract simply provide different forms of collective identification, developed to address
categorically different needs. Rather, I argue that these differences point to a failure to identify
collectively at all. These two works provide representations of interactions that are clearly and
crucially intersubjective, but that – just as crucially – suppress everything that substantially
distinguishes intersubjectivity from isolation. They suppress any recognition of the content and
of the effects of relationality,44 even though relationality is, not only present, but is absolutely
constitutive. In other words, ‘student’ and ‘social contractor’ are irreducibly collective identities,
possible only in relation to others, and yet their very fulfillment of those identities requires –
indeed, consists of – the suppression of exactly that relationality.
The isolation of Emile and the social contractor is a distant echo of a prior one that is
fundamentally linked to the very possibility of imagining (legitimate) community in the first
place, since imagining community (as an association, not an aggregate, which is not truly a
community) is precisely the work, originally, of the Lawgiver: an individual who is so radically
isolated, “entirely complete and solitary,” that he shares neither our passions nor our nature, and
“whose happiness was independent of ours” (84).
The implications of the Lawgiver’s status, and the change in human nature of which he is
the author, are unsettling: legitimate forms of social formation (like nations, for example) cannot
be derived from prior social formations (like families), but must be the product of an isolate who
cannot, by definition, share in its promise or responsibility. Moreover, the very mechanisms by
which communal reciprocity, discourse, progress, exchange, trust, and intimacy become
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That Emile’s knowledge is mutually constructed, that his island is “shared,” or that the
contractor, in a state of purely physical, instinctual, pre-rational existence, alienates himself and
all of his rights entirely to all.
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operative are foreign to and imposed upon the bodies that appropriate them – the bodies, indeed,
that come to understand and recognize themselves (entirely, both as “a people” and as
constituent-members) precisely and exclusively with reference to them. The narrative that
privileges the radically isolate as the kernel of community does not belong to Rousseau alone; it
can be found in other conceptualizations of post-classical, communal self-rule. Machiavelli
points to a similar paradox in chapter nine of The Discourses, for example, writing about the
establishment of a form of government that, ideally, contains some element of republican selfrule:
it rarely or never happens that a republic or kingdom is well organized from the
beginning, or completely reformed, with no respect for its ancient institutions, unless it is
done by one man alone; moreover, it is necessary that one man provide the means and be
the only one from whose mind any such organization originates…(200, emphasis added).
While Machiavelli’s founder differs from Rousseau’s in at least two crucial points (Machiavelli’s
position proceeds from his assumption that humans are naturally inclined to evil, and his solitary
founder is clearly an authority figure), both figures embody the impossibility of a community
legitimized, or established, through its own autonomous deliberations and actions – even as both
writers insist that community sustain itself autonomously (through the general will, for example).
The problem is that both theorists emphatically privilege community as the only context
in which true freedom and human morality is possible.45 And yet the mechanisms and
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This position finds its clearest expression in The Social Contract, where Rousseau argues that,
despite the “advantages” of the state of nature, “in civil society [man’s]…faculties are so
exercised and developed, his mind so enlarged, his sentiments so ennobled, and his whole spirit
so elevated that…he should constantly bless the happy hour that lifted him for ever from the state
of nature and from a stupid, limited animal made a creature of intelligence and a man” (64 – 65).
Steven G. Affeldt demonstrates the centrality of this “happy hour” to Rousseau’s political
philosophy, and emphasizes his influence on subsequent philosophers, writing that “social forms
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foundations of community are so entirely contrary to the nature of collectivity as to require a
perfect isolate to dream them up in the first place. Its origins and foundations, thus, do not
emerge from (and thus they cannot be said to reflect) the privileged context of community and its
priorities of moral freedom. They are not the products of moral freedom (of a morally free
individual or constituent or group), but of an exception, for whom, it follows, such privileged
forms of moral freedom are forever and necessarily foreign. Despite the important distinctions
between the Lawgiver’s role and the citizens’ role, the legitimization (establishment) of
community, the sustaining (regulation) of community, and the experience of community all come
down to imagining community. And yet, in all these imaginings (indeed, not despite but because
of these imaginings), an irreconcilable conceptual distance between the individual and the social
body only reasserts itself. In effect, comparing the Lawgiver to Emile and the social contractor,
we are left with, on the one hand, a radical isolate who imagines community, and, on the other,
community-constituents who imagine isolation.
CRUSOE’S ISLAND AND JULIE’S GARDEN

I turn finally to Julie: or the New Heloise, which of all of Rousseau’s works embraces
most fully the narrative and novelistic enterprises. Julie lays out explicitly some of the problems
of both imagined community and imagined isolation, and it develops claims, articulated in Emile,
about simultaneous intervention and independence. Perhaps the most concrete representation of
these contrary claims can be found in Julie’s garden. Others have pointed out the similarities
between Emile’s education and Julie’s garden, both of which require concealing the actor’s

and institutions, broadly conceived, are understood as central to and as having a certain priority
in the constitution of the subject as a moral and political being. It is through socialization into
specific social forms and participation in specific social institutions that the individual transcends
the particularity of his or her natural being and comes to be, and to understand himself or herself
as, a moral political being” (300). My point here is to emphasize that the Lawgiver does not
share in this “happy hour” or the psychological reorganization it performs.
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agency under the illusion of natural necessity. Josué V. Harari further ties this theme to the
preceptor’s use of Robinson Crusoe, writing that “[l]ike desert and island gardening, pedagogy
reaches perfection when the tutor manages to erase his own traces,” arguing ultimately that
Robinson Crusoe shows “the role and place of Providence in Defoe [that] coincides exactly with
that of the tutor as master of knowledge in Rousseau’s pedagogical theater” (121, 123).
Providence is useful here because it is suggestive of the contrary movements of
intervention and isolation that legitimize Emile’s education. In the opening paragraphs of Emile,
Rousseau argues that “[p]lants are shaped by cultivation, and men by education,” urging the
“tender and foresighted mother” to keep “the nascent shrub away from the highway and securing
it from the impact of human opinions! Cultivate and water the young plant before it dies. Its
fruits will one day be your delights. Form an enclosure around your child’s soul at an early date”
(Emile 37 – 38). The complete passivity of the shrub (an asymmetry so complete in this
metaphor that the child and the mother are of a different nature) deserves some attention here, as
well as the investment of the mother, or cultivator, who foresees delighting in the “fruits” of the
education. “Cultivation” in this sense is a useful key word for tracking the problems of
Rousseau’s conceptualization of autonomy in community, problems dramatized in both Emile
and Julie: or the New Heloise. St Preux finds himself in Julie’s “Elysium,” a garden that is
highly constructed, but such as to erase any trace of human intervention. The effect is an illusion
of perfect solitude. “I thought I was looking at the wildest, most solitary place in nature,” St
Preux writes, “and it seemed to me I was the first mortal who ever had set foot in this
wilderness.” Finding “the ends of the earth” in this deserted garden, Julie disabuses St Preux:
“Many people find them here as you do” (Julie 387). This specific and complete sense of total
isolation is very much a shared experience: “many people” find themselves “the first mortal” in
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this strange place which, stranger still, is precisely the goal. “This place is enchanting, it is true,
but rustic and wild,” St Preux wonders. “I see no human labor here. You closed the gate; water
came along I know not how; nature alone did the rest and you yourself could never have
managed to do as well.” Julie replies, echoing the words of the tutor in Emile, “It is true…that
nature did it all, but under my direction, and there is nothing here that I have not designed”
(388).
Evoking Crusoe more explicitly, St Preux expresses confusion
that a place so different from what it was could have become what it is only through
cultivation and upkeep; yet nowhere do I see the slightest trace of cultivation. Everything
is verdant, fresh, vigorous, and the gardener’s hand is not to be seen: nothing belies the
idea of a desert Island which came to my mind as I entered, and I see no human
footprints.
Wolmar attributes this to “trickery,” of which he is sometimes a “witness” and sometimes an
“accomplice”: “we have taken great care to erase” the footprints, he says (393). But this benign
trickery by which privileged forms (the “verdant, fresh, vigorous” scene, evocative, again, of the
robust citizen-student) are achieved is soon revealed to be something rather darker: Nature
“seems to want to veil from men’s eyes her true attractions,” Julie says, “she flees much
frequented places; it is on the tops of mountains, deep in the forests, on desert Islands that she
deploys her most stirring charms.” Those of us “who love her and cannot go so far to find her,”
she insists, “are reduced to doing her violence, forcing her in a way to come and live with them,
and all this cannot be done without a modicum of illusion” (394). The trickery, which clearly
rhymes with that of Emile’s tutor, constitutes a violence both to nature and to the agent, who

94

after all has been “reduced” to his or her constitutive form of agency in this exchange. The price
of the privileged illusion of rustic isolation is high, and the value of its produce remains unclear.
The garden represents an extension of the kind of agency Wolmar exercises over St Preux
and his household, shaping him into a proper companion for his wife and, more importantly, a fit
tutor for his children. The community sustained at Clarens, like the garden, is highly constructed,
the product of extreme but unseen intervention. St Preux’s experience of this community,
consequently, is disconnected from his actual position within it. Just as he feels himself “the first
mortal,” but is in reality one of “many people” in the garden, in Clarens he regards his gradual
subjection and subordination to the interests of Wolmar as a return to virtue – the realization of a
moral sense, in other words, that is ostensibly operative prior to and independent of
circumstances (i.e., objective) and, certainly, social subordination. After Wolmar returns from
leaving the nervous St Preux and his beloved Julie alone, St Preux declares that Wolmar is now
his “friend”: “I no longer hesitate to give him such a dear name and one whose full value you
have made me appreciate so well,” he writes to Milord Edward, continuing that “[i]t is the least
title I owe to anyone who is helping to restore me to virtue…I am beginning to see myself here
without misgivings, and live here as if at home; and if I do not adopt entirely the authority of a
master, I take even more pleasure in regarding myself as the child of the house” (432). Likewise,
after St Preux successfully prevents Milord Edward’s disadvantageous marriage (all according to
Wolmar’s design, of course), Edward insists to Wolmar that St Preux “was more attached to
virtue than to his former inclinations. I can therefore bring him back to you in complete
confidence; yes, Wolmar, he is worthy of raising men, and moreover, of living in your house”
(537).
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Julie herself relishes the legitimate community that she now perceives at Clarens,
doubting that the pleasure “to love each other, to feel it, to congratulate oneself for it, to spend
our days together in fraternal intimacy and in the peace of innocence, to be occupied with each
other, think about each other without remorse, speak of each other without blushing,” could be
truly possible otherwise, granting at the same time the debt she and St Preux owe to Wolmar,
whose “kindnesses…impose on us no new duties, [but rather] merely make dearer to us those we
already held so sacred…He has done enough for us and for himself if he has restored us to
ourselves” (546). This claim about self-restoration only reinforces the implication of autonomous
moral agency suggested by the “duties” they “already held so sacred,” thus acknowledging a
debt to Wolmar while, at the same time, erasing his “footprint” from the full expression and
realization of their developed selves. She re-presents cultivation by a separate (and at least
potentially interested) agent as self-development according to natural necessity. He has played a
role, Julie acknowledges, but the virtues that have been cultivated follow from, and are fully
consistent with, our own natures and priorities alone.
And yet Wolmar’s footprint is there, and hard to ignore. While it is easy to see that
Wolmar plays a strong role in facilitating the privileged “fraternal intimacy” of Julie and St
Preux, it must also be recalled that much of what St Preux admires in Clarens is the domestic
economy in general and, in particular, the control Wolmar exercises over his servants and
laborers. St Preux clearly considers himself, at least at times, a legitimate participant in the
society of Clarens, even as something of an equal. Much has been said about the English
breakfast, for example,46 during which “we were all three [Julie, Wolmar, and St Preux] caught
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See, for example, Jean Starobinsky, 152 – 153: “The description of the morning presents the
ideal of the expansive moment. The soul expands by means of signs rather than words, hence its
range is greater and its influence more pure.”
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up in the same emotion,” indicative for many as an ideal expression of perfect, unmediated
community (457). This scene suggests a kind of equal participation that is in keeping with the
belief that Wolmar merely brings St Preux to himself, or to the realization of only those virtues
consistent with natural necessity. And yet – though he does not see it – given Wolmar’s role and
work as cultivator, as well as St Preux’s status within the household, St Preux belongs as much
(if not more) to the community of the servants and farm laborers as to that of Julie and Wolmar.
While none of these minor characters is fully developed, or seen to engage in anything like
unmediated emotional communication with St Preux, they are, just like him (the “child of the
house”), best to understand themselves as filial subordinates: “Am I wrong, Milord, to compare
masters so cherished to fathers, and their domestics to their children? You see that that is what
they consider themselves” (368). Also like St Preux, the domestics must be shaped and
controlled in a potentially volatile sexual economy:
To forestall a dangerous intimacy between the two sexes, they are not constrained here by
explicit laws which they would be tempted to break secretly; but without any apparent
intention, customs are instituted that are more powerful even than authority. They are not
forbidden to see each other, but it happens by design that they have neither the
opportunity nor the will to do so. This is achieved by assigning to them entirely different
occupations, habits, tastes, pleasures. (370)
Clearly the methods by which Wolmar controls the domestics differs from those by which he
controls St Preux, but in each case the labors – and the interests – of the cultivator are not
difficult to see.
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Indeed, Wolmar himself writes that St Preux “is fiery, but weak and easy to tame,”
writing to Madame d’Orbe that the society he encourages between Julie and St Preux rests on
less romantic foundations than St Preux estimates:
In the place of his mistress I force him to see always the spouse of an honorable man and
the mother of my children: I overlay one tableau with another, and cover the past with the
present. One leads a skittish Steed up to the object that frightens it, so he will no longer
be frightened. This is the way one must treat those young people whose imagination yet
burns when their hearts have already grown cold, and makes them see monsters in the
distance which disappear as they are approached. (419)
While the servants cannot (or are made not to wish to) fraternize with the opposite sex, St Preux
is encouraged to speak with absolute transparency with Julie, both alone with her and in front of
Wolmar. The effect, however, differs little in substance: although unmediated communication is
ostensibly privileged, St Preux comes to see in Julie a “spouse” and a “mother of [Wolmar’s]
children”; or, in other words, Julie’s position relative to her husband. Relating to Julie comes to
relating with Wolmar, understanding more fully his interests and priorities in a highly ordered
and tightly controlled domestic economy. Tellingly, moreover, Wolmar understands his role in
the cultivation of St Preux as that of merely correcting the errors and excesses of the
imagination. The end of this cultivation in his view is, at least ostensibly, to restore exactly the
kind of rational autonomy that Julie and St Preux associate with mere self-restoration and the
return to previously held virtues; yet “restoration,” “return,” and “correction” are gestures at
odds not only with the “force” Wolmar applies but to the exchange of tableaux, a metaphor
which only seems to acknowledge that the imagination is still essential to St Preux’s place
within, and experience of, community. Wolmar does not so much cool St Preux’s imagination as
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cultivate it, which requires, however, that he lead St Preux to believe it has been extinguished or
tamed.
Although St Preux’s position in this society is highly problematic, it is important to note
that he is identifying collectively. So of what does that identification consist? As we have seen,
the terms and conditions of the social body with which he identifies are emphatically out of sync
with his imagined position within them – this disconnect is even what makes the identification
conceivable and sustainable in the first place. Nevertheless, it is the fullest realization of
collective identification provided in the novel, and perhaps in all of Rousseau’s major works, as
commentary on the English breakfast suggests. St Preux’s position in Clarens contrasts sharply
with his position in Paris, which he recognizes (imagines) as an explicit solitude in the midst of
the world: “I enter with a secret horror into this vast desert of the world,” he writes to Julie.
“This chaos presents me with nothing but horrible solitude, wherein reigns a dull silence. My
beleaguered soul seeks for expansion, and everywhere finds itself hemmed in. I am never less
alone than when I am alone, said an Ancient, I on the other hand am alone only in the crowd,
where I can be neither with you nor with the others” (190). And yet, as we have seen, being
“with” Julie is (eventually) not that simple, and while St Preux fails to see that Wolmar
“overlay[s] one tableau with another” in his relationship with Julie, he does see that, in Paris,
“being in a gathering is about like standing before a moving tableau, where the detached
Spectator is the only creature moving under his own power,” since “the men to whom you are
speaking are not the ones with whom you converse; their sentiments do not emanate from the
heart, their perceptions are not in their minds, their words do not represent their thoughts, all you
see of them is their shape” (193).
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St Preux employs a kind of critical agency in Paris that acknowledges the subjective
nature of identifying (or refusing to identify) collectively. Imagining community becomes an
entirely subjective performance. Indeed, not only does he insist that he is isolated in the crowds
of Paris, but when he finds himself alone in Paris he insists that he is in good company:
I find…that lovers have a thousand ways to allay the sentiment of absence… Sometimes
they even see each other more often than when they used to see each other every day; for
as soon as one of the two is alone, instantly they are both together… I keep to myself; I
am surrounded by traces of you, and could not possibly rest my eyes on the objects
around me without seeing you everywhere. (194)
While, as I have been arguing in this chapter, insisting on solitude while in Paris allows St Preux
to isolate himself from – and thus critique – the values which organize and distinguish Parisian
society (although, unlike the characters from the examples in the beginning of this chapter, St
Preux does this intentionally at this point), this isolation also ultimately gets him into trouble. A
stranger to the social codes of fashionable Parisian society, he finds himself naively drawn by
Swiss soldiers (who ‘mock’ St Preux for failing to assimilate by “retaining in Paris the simplicity
of ancient Helvetic manners”) into a brothel (241). Julie knows his principle failing in this
adventure. Lacking the intimacy and openness with the soldiers that he ostensibly shares with
Julie, he does indeed allow himself to be duped into drunkenness and infidelity – however, and
much worse, he has let his fear of shame and mockery subordinate his fear of moral
transgression. “Speak more frankly with her who can read what is in your heart,” she writes,
evoking a degree of openness and true community that he rejected with the soldiers but that,
ironically, might also have saved him, “it was shame that held you back. You feared they would
mock you on your way out; a moment’s jeers frightened you, and you preferred exposing
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yourself to remorse rather than to derision.” That is, his imagined isolation from the participants
in Parisian society has insulated him from the social codes that may have made the brothel
recognizable (and repulsive) to him in the first place, but it has not guaranteed his detachment
from the affective investments of amour-propre that may have motivated him to leave or to
protest openly.
In both cases – his refusal to identify with Parisian society and his identification with
Clarens – his position consists of a failed struggle to reconcile what he does or does not know of
social structures with his imagined place within those structures. His place in (rather, outside)
Parisian society seems to allow him to critique its follies, but it also, at the same time, prevents
him from recognizing how fully immersed he is within those follies, or from engaging directly
with that critique in any practical, productive way. Because he is isolated from Parisian mores,
he is able to dissociate himself from its moral shortcomings, but, for the same reason, he does not
always recognize its snares – he cannot reject them or change them, such that the dissociation
ultimately amounts to nothing, and he participates in those follies (the very moral shortcomings
he has dissociated himself from) in spite of himself. In Clarens, his imagined community seems
much more idyllic. Perhaps in some ways it is. This chapter is not the place to argue that Paris is
more than, less than, or equal to Clarens in any qualitative sense. The content of community in
Clarens is privileged, and that is clearly the point, but the mechanisms by which community is
imagined and legitimized in each case differ little. It is a subjective performance by which power
relations are suppressed and interests and priorities are potentially appropriated asymmetrically,
which seems contrary to so much of what Rousseau’s political philosophy seeks to accomplish.
CONCLUSION

It is important to remember that although one does not see the footprint or feel that one is
being taught, it is not a problem for Rousseau that they are there unseen, unfelt. There can be no
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doubt that the imagination plays a strong role in true community for Rousseau, or that it is
directly linked to the sense of independence and autonomy under which the true citizen operates.
There can also be no doubt that, contrary to this perceived independence and autonomy, the
imagination is being acted upon by another. This is clear in the examples considered above, and
can be traced back to the origins of society even in Rousseau’s most practical political writings.
Moses, for example, among the three great lawgivers considered in Considerations on the
Government of Poland, “gave [his people] morals and practices…overburdened it with
distinctive rites, ceremonies; he constrained it in a thousand ways in order to keep it ceaselessly
in suspense,” etc. (172). His practical writings on Poland and Corsica, like Emile, are full of
precepts about how you must make your people feel X, see Y, or believe N. Moral freedom in
the fatherland consists in imagining one’s self free, but also in the assumption that, in so doing,
one actually is free. In principle, absolute reciprocity and equality assure us of this (“[t]he
fundamental law of your foundation ought to be equality. Everything ought to be related to it,
even authority itself which is established only to defend it. All ought to be equal by right of
birth” [130]), but insofar as the proper object and practical labor of the association’s members is
to sustain the autonomy of Robinson Crusoe (to sense that one obeys only one’s own will), the
extent to which one imagines, and to which one’s imagination is acted upon, are lost. But is this
necessarily the case? After all, Rousseau provides no hint that the preceptor and Wolmar, for
example, operate under the same errors. We simply do not know, and the suppression of their
narratives keeps us from knowing: indeed, it helps to ensure that the important work of
imagining community proceeds unfalteringly.
Above, I have suggested that imagining Emile as a sort of isolate draws attention away
from some potentially damning implications of his relationship with his preceptor, and therefore
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with a representation of a nearly ideal Rousseauian community. Specifically, I have been
interested in speculating about the preceptor’s suppressed narrative. Doing this, as I have started
to do in these pages, follows directly from rejecting the solitude he attributes to his ward, and it
provides the opportunity to appreciate more fully some otherwise lost implications of the
narrative’s structural asymmetry. By foregrounding the narrator, his past – which must to some
extent authorize his role in Emile – becomes more conspicuous, or more conspicuously absent,
leaving one with important questions about the emergence and conditions of legitimacy. Does
the tutor represent the promise of Emile’s education, for example? Presumably, yes. He has all
the knowledge he wishes to impart to Emile. He knows it better and (unless he is a product of a
similar education) knows it more authentically. Yet we cannot know if Emile or his tutor more
fully realizes the promise of this knowledge, or if it is even possible to realize it, since we know
nothing of how the preceptor came about it: nothing about a narrative, as I suggest above, likely
to be far more useful than that of Emile. And yet it is Emile’s story; he is given as the product of
a cultivation, an experiment: the making of a man useful to both himself and to society. So what
is the essential difference between Emile and his preceptor that makes this knowledge liberating
to the pupil but unusable to the teacher?
Perhaps it is presumptuous to assume that the preceptor knows what Emile must know,
has the same relationship to the world that Emile must have, but has these in some more
authentic way. Perhaps he is, rather, just like his readers, the bourgeoisie creeping through a
world in which “fatherland” and “citizens” no longer exist, but who was somehow capable of
making Emile fundamentally unlike both himself and his readers. If so, where does this agency
come from? One assumes that the tutor knows what Emile must do and be and, further, that he
therefore must do and be it himself. Otherwise, he chooses not to do or to be that which he insists
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Emile must, which raises troubling doubts either about the tutor himself or about the natural
status and knowledge he clearly otherwise privileges. Like the lawgiver, he appears all potential
energy, spontaneously and mysteriously – mystically – appearing in order only to disappear into
his pupil and his now irreversibly problematic book. Unlike the lawgiver, however, as we have
seen, he shares Emile’s nature, so his status and his provenance are accomplices in the
suppression of his cultivation of Emile.
I wonder: can Emile read Emile? Rousseau famously cautions against letting his student
read, of course, especially in his youth. Yet to his readers, Emile ostensibly serves the same
purpose as Robinson Crusoe, a story about self-sufficiency and following only the dictates of
natural necessity. It seems that there is some implicit, essential difference between Emile and his
reader that, above all, makes his narrative useful to us but dangerous to him, and that makes
Robinson Crusoe sufficient for him but not for us (I imagine Emile being a one-page pamphlet:
“go read Robinson Crusoe”). Emile believes himself to be discovering knowledge (such as the
nature and principles of property) naturally and as a “natural man,” but we of course do not.
Emile is demonstrably wrong, and yet his education is privileged over ours as readers. As his
lesson on property shows, Emile, the product of a privileged education, cannot see what we (at
least in his narrative) can: he cannot distinguish the knowledge of natural necessity from
socially-mediated and -conditioned knowledge. And if Emile cannot, can anybody? Perhaps we
don’t get the preceptor’s story precisely because it is impossible, with the best of educations in
the most ideal circumstances, to make this most basic and crucial distinction: the very distinction
according to which Emile’s education (and his subsequent status) is privileged in the first place.
That is, the preceptor’s narrative must be suppressed because he cannot account for how he came
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to learn what is most important – what Emile himself fails to learn: how autonomy so perfect as
to be analogous with isolation can in fact be consistent with a socially organized world.
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2: Traumatic Familiarity: “Some Man,” the Savage, and the Main Character of Legitimacy

For writers before Rousseau, the startling nature of social contract is rather easy to unfold by
considering the peculiar narrative position of the individual just before the moment of contract.
She exists in a state of nature, wandering through the wilderness and sustaining herself on its
produce, perhaps she has a few apples or skins with her, when she happens upon a cluster (an
“aggregate,” approaching Rousseau’s terminology) of others. Social contract theory is organized
around two possible ways of imagining this cluster of individuals, each of which is deeply rooted
in the phenomena of social experience.
In the first, she is afraid: these others constitute a threat to the protagonist and her meager
possessions. Her fear is a necessary feature of narratives of social contract, arising for two
reasons. First, the individual in the state of nature is relatively weak. A common narrative trope
in the eighteenth century, the premise of innate human weakness finds one of its best known
expressions in the Yahoos of Jonathan Swift’s Gulliver’s Travels: humans, unique among
animals, are “utterly uncapable of doing much Mischief,” Gulliver’s master Houyhnhnm
declares, naively believing that Yahoo wars must be rather bloodless affairs, “For your Mouths
lying flat with your Faces, you can hardly bite each other to any Purpose, unless by Consent” –
or, in other words, by contract (214). Swift echoes contract theorist Samuel Pufendorf, for whom
the weakness of human beings is crucially important. Men, “unlike the beasts,” he writes, “are
not formidable for teeth or hooves or horns,” and, “man now seems to be in a worse condition
than the beasts in that scarcely any other animal is attended from birth with such weakness.”
Describing “the internal structure of states,” he writes more coolly that “man’s power is of
limited extent” (135), which poses a problem in the context of natural right – the second reason
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the cluster of individuals constitutes a threat – according to which, Hobbes notes, “every man has
a Right to every thing; even to one anothers body” (91).
This fear is important specifically because it supplies the need for social contract. It
provides the incentive, at a level of experience consistent with purely physical, pre-social, and
wholly natural existence, to enter into social obligations. Since, speaking practically, all
individuals are subject to equal limitations in the state of nature, “there can be no security to any
man” where natural right authorizes brutality as a matter of sustenance (Hobbes 91). Even
Locke, who works to bridge the gap between natural law and natural right (ostensibly mitigating
some of the notorious hostility of Hobbes’s state of nature),47 insists that, without any appeal to
law, “I may kill [a thief] when he sets on me to rob me but of my horse or coat” (108).48 In all
cases, because the individual lacks sufficient defensive strength, and because natural law alone
(even Pufendorf’s most generous interpretation of it) does not preclude the possibility of
violence, we can imagine that, upon experiencing other individuals, our protagonist is distressed
and afraid. For the natural isolate, as well as for all the other individuals who make up this
aggregate, this encounter must be a moment of profound anxiety: confronted with other people,
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As many critics point out, the difference between Hobbes and Locke in this respect is much
less pronounced than he claims it is; nevertheless, Locke attempts to reconfigure the relationship
between right and law. See Kirstie M. McClure, for example, who shows the “complementarity”
between the two, at least in principle. See also Brian Tierney’s The Idea of Natural Rights,
Natural Law, and Church Law 1150 – 1625, which has also been important in pointing to
continuity between natural rights and natural law.
48
This specific claim does not fully disappear, even with Rousseau. Although Rousseau makes
himself an exception by associating natural individuals with such strength that bears and lions
leave them alone (unless provoked with desperate hunger), it is clear that equality among people
makes this strength practically useless in interpersonal encounters. In this sense, Rousseau’s
position differs from Pufendor’s less than one might expect – Pufendorf argues, after all, that
“the physical strength of adult men is nearly equal to the extent that even a relatively weak man
can kill a stronger man by taking him by surprise or by use of cunning and skill in arms,” such
that one’s “superiority does not give him license to inflict injuries on others” (61), and such that
physical strength is not much of a reliable advantage.
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the individual and her possessions are not secure, and it is precisely this fact, and its attendant
anxiety, that makes social contract necessary in the first place.
By sharp contrast, the other way to imagine this cluster of individuals is as a locus of
personal security. We can see this by revisiting Pufendorf’s claim in its context: “In the first
place it is clear that the individual finds in other men a more useful and effective defense against
the evils that human depravity threatens to inflict on him than in fortifications, weapons or dumb
animals; and since a man’s power is of limited extent, it was necessary for him to combine with
other men to achieve that end” (135). Social contract can be characterized, in part, by this
paradoxical position: the individual in a state of nature finds it “necessary” to “combine with
other men” in order to secure herself from the “depravity” of other men. The gathering of natural
men and women with which we began presents to our natural isolate two, it would seem,
mutually exclusive ideas: the threat of human contact, violence, and violation on the one hand
(“No animal is fiercer than man, none more savage and prone to more vices disruptive of the
peace of society” [Pufendorf 133]); useful security against exactly such threats on the other. To
these conflicting ideas correspond two mutually exclusive social experiences – the crowd evokes
distress; the same crowd, under the same conditions, evokes the comfort of security. This
affective impasse should seem especially troubling since both of these reactions, by most
accounts, are necessary preconditions for the inauguration and effectiveness of social contract.
The former reveals to the individual why social contract is necessary, the latter attests to its
realization. Any complete understanding of social contract must make reference to these two
ways of imagining others. But how can both of these conflicting representations emerge, with
equal narrative force and conceptual necessity, under the same conditions? How are we to
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understand the relationship between the one and the other, or the relationship between each and
legitimate social organization?
THE MAIN CHARACTER OF POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY
Much has been made about the narrative framework of social contract theory – it is something
that transpires or is purchased in historical time, something that separates a supposed “state of
nature” from civilized society in chronological terms, rather than something that is innate or
naturally given. Hobbes writes about the conditions that give rise to the social contract, for
example, in explicitly temporal terms, writing that “during the time men live without a common
Power to keep them all in awe, they are in that condition which is called Warre; and such a
warre, as if of every man, against every man,” adding that “WARRE, consisteth not in Battell
onely, or in the act of fighting; but in the tract of time, wherein the Will to contend by Battell is
sufficiently known” (88). The empirical and temporal immersion of the individual gives rise to
“the known disposition” to war that motivates the contract (88 – 89), as well as to the conditions
under which that disposition is neutralized through contract. “Whensoever a man Transferreth
his Right, or Renounceth it,” he writes, referring to the unconditional right to self preservation,
“it is either in consideration of some Right reciprocally transferred to himselfe; or for some other
good he hopeth for thereby” (93). Such a “mutuall transferring of Right,” performed by
individuals reacting to and consciously shaping events in historical time, “is that which men call
CONTRACT” (94).
As I argued above, Samuel Pufendorf’s theory of social contract presupposes individuals
with similar historical and empirical investments. This presupposition is embedded, moreover,
within a broader and more conventionally historical narrative, since the “union of wills and
forces” by which “a multitude of men [is] brought to life as a corporate body” is premised on a

109

further, narrative distinction. (This union entails “two agreements” – the original contract to
“become fellow citizens” followed by a second on the “form of government to be introduced” –
as well as a “decree,” by which “the man or men are appointed on whom the government of the
infant state is conferred” [136 – 137].) The will to consent that gives rise to civil society is of a
different order than the prior and natural one, which, by the time civil society emerges, has
already formed family households. “We cannot,” Pufendorf writes, “infer directly from man’s
sociality that his nature tends precisely to civil society” (132), since natural sociality is
ontologically different from – and chronologically anterior to – civil society.
The narrative registers of Locke’s social contract theory are even more conspicuous. Not
unlike Pufendorf, Locke argues that the “first society was between man and wife, which gave
beginning to that between parents and children; to which, in time, that between master and
servant came to be added.” The gradual formation of increasingly complex social bodies is
distinctly historical, and yet, Locke adds, such bodies “came short of political society” (133).
While the family resembles “a little commonwealth,” it remains “very far from it” (136), since
not only are conjugal and political authorities distinct, but conjugal authority does nothing to
address the weakness, instability, and vulnerability that I associated above with the state of
nature. Political society is produced by a contract that responds to the liabilities of property and
personal security in the state of nature. The contract is an event, a fixed action in a historical
narrative: “there only is political society, where every one of the members hath quitted this
natural power, resigned it up into the hands of the community in all cases that exclude him not
from appealing for protection to the law established by it” (136 – 137). To the extent that the
contract is an expression, not of arbitrary contingency but of legitimate, deliberate, selfgoverning rationalism, it consciously addresses itself both to its troubled prehistory and to its

110

aspirational future. Locke, like Hobbes and Pufendorf, develops a narrative of social contract that
necessarily presupposes a historically prior state of nature.
Nevertheless, modern critics and contract theorists alike insist that any serious analysis of
social contract must ignore or dismiss, as merely hypothetical, this very narrative premise.49
Hobbes, for example, famously grants that it is impossible to know what the state of nature was
like, or if it ever existed at all (89). Pufendorf takes a similar position, approaching more closely
an outright rejection, writing that “it is obvious that the whole human race was never at once and
the same time in the natural state” (116), and Locke skirts the issue, or at least its historical
status, arguing only that contemporary leaders of nations exist in such a state relative to one
another today (106). Readers are thus left grasping for some insight into the nature of society
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Almost all literature about the social contract insists at some point that these “histories” are
theoretical, hypothetical, mythical, and so forth. Critics of Hobbes have argued for example that
the state of nature is “not historical but analytical,” and that “[i]t is really a picture of man as he
is perhaps never, certainly seldom, found…analogous to the scientific description of a body as
continuing in a state or rest or of uniform motion in a straight line unless influenced by outside
forces,” adding that “[a]ctually there is no such body” (Lamprecht 23, 24); another, lingering on
Hobbes’s analogy in De Cive, notes the “prototype of a materialist physiology so indifferent to
sex that Hobbes populates his hypothetical state of nature with mushrooms” (Thompson 74).
Jean Starobinski writes that the state of nature in Rousseau is “a theoretical hypothesis that takes
on almost concrete reality thanks to a style capable of making imaginary things seem real,” a
convincing effect of the philosopher’s strategy of “making up an objective history of an Age of
Transparency” that he himself, Starobinski argues, wanted to accept objectively (294, 15).
Similarly, Judith Shklar writes that “The life-history of our species, in Rousseau’s view, begins
not with any known, but with a hypothetical man, the man of pure sensation, a being shorn of
every attribute that might conceivably be social in its origin” (36). Frederick Neuhouser straddles
the ambiguity by calling Rousseau’s state of nature “‘true’ (but fictitious)” (36). There are recent
and important exceptions to this rule, however, especially as claims about the state of nature
relate to pre-colonial societies and international relations. See for example the work of J. G. A.
Pocock and Quentin Skinner (174 – 177), whose analysis of the state of nature is informed by
Hobbes’s and Locke’s association of the state of nature with America – an association, of course
(it must be noted), that is not any less mythical and instrumental than any association of the state
of nature with the deep, European past. For a more sustained analysis of the state of nature in
pre-colonial contexts, see Charles W. Mills (whom I will return to briefly), who writes that “the
literal state of nature is reserved for nonwhites; for whites the state of nature is hypothetical.”
(66).
111

couched in a narrative of the origins of society, the latter of which, we are told, must in the end
be put aside.
The problem, I argue, is at least twofold: first, these texts create a tension of competing
truth values in both narrative and theoretical accounts. Second, following directly from this, they
create a tension in the representations of individual bodies and social bodies. Hobbes, Pufendorf,
and Locke ultimately make the case for social contract – its need and its power for legitimizing
social bodies – with reference to the individual, the centerpiece after all for the liberal social
theory that social contract evolves to accommodate. In part (and Rousseau’s centralization of this
fact was crucial to his transformation of the concept) this is because social contract must be
justified for the individual; and when the contract is realized, its power and effectiveness must
play out in ways that are empirically recognizable to the individual. In other words, there must be
some relationship between the legitimacy of the social contract and the individual’s experiences
– and since social contract transforms the terms and conditions of social organization (from an
“aggregate” to an “association,” to use Rousseau’s terms), the possibility for and the legitimate
realization of social contract should make themselves legible in social experience.
For the most part, people are represented in contract theories in the third-person plural, as
“men” in general, or as a kind of archetype, such as the father in Locke’s Second Treatise whose
“command over his children is but temporary, and reaches not their life or property” (127). This
father stands more properly as a relational position, emblematic of categorical functions more
akin to a legal category than an individual strictly speaking. But since justification in the context
of early enlightenment thought presupposes a rationally autonomous individual – and,
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emphatically, not a type – a particularized individual is strongly implied as well,50 both as the
intended reader of the pages of political philosophy and as a kind of literary character within
them, a figure that occasionally (if rarely) actually appears in order to make the otherwise
abstract implications and justifications of social contract theory more explicit. It is thus that
Locke, in one of his best-known passages, slips into narrative, offering an account of a single
individual for whom the conditions of legitimate social organization become available through
his experience of another. First offering a strictly theoretical account of illegitimate social
contact (“force, or a declared design of force, upon the person of another, where there is no
common superior on earth to appeal to for relief, is the state of war: and it is the want of such an
appeal gives a man the right of war even against an aggressor, though he be in society, and a
fellow subject”), he follows with a narrative account of the social experience that makes these
terms available to the singular, rational subject of empirical experience (“Thus a thief, whom I
cannot harm, but by appeal to the law, for having stolen all that I am worth, I may kill, when he
sets on me to rob me but of my horse or coat” [108]). Social contract is conceptualized around
the representational and epistemological demands of both individuals and types, or (borrowing
form literary parlance) what we might think of as round and flat characters.
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For Helen Thompson, it is precisely this feature that defines the modernity of the contract
theorists’ political thought. Thompson locates Locke’s rejection of Filmer’s patriarchy in
individuals consenting to authority only to the extent to which they find, after reflection, that
doing so is reasonable and desirable. I should also note that, as I do here, Thompson draws upon
novelistic representations in order to identify contradictions in social contract theories (namely
the arbitrary subjection of women that does not seem authorized by the ultimately inclusive,
internalized, and mechanized conceptualization of the contractarian subject), but her argument
overstates the particular individualism of Hobbes’s and Locke’s texts, arguing that “neither
Hobbes nor Locke represents his model citizen as the disembodied, universalizing, necessarily
masculine figure who serves as the individual’s contemporary referent” available in
“contemporary critical visions of a public sphere populated, sometimes with surprising
literalness, by abstractions” (5). My argument begins with the claim that, in fact, both individuals
and abstractions appear in these texts.
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Ideally, as a major premise of contract theory insists, these two movements and types of
demands – the round and the flat; the particular and the categorical – are easily reconciled, and
could in fact be considered interchangeably, since the particularized individual becomes a
legitimate citizen precisely when he or she achieves or maintains, through the exercise of reason,
the status of the abstract, rights-determined subject.51 In practice, however, as feminist critics of
social contract have pointed out, the particular and categorical demands of contract theory are
not always so neatly reconciled.52 Indeed, I argue that when the single individual, the rounded
character, becomes an object of representation in such theories, a number of otherwise
submerged tensions between collective organization and individual autonomy become
conspicuous. What happens, for example, when a father, more roundly and particularly
considered, believes himself to have a degree or quality of command over his children that his
type does not authorize? Does legitimacy reside in the “objective” relational category from
which his command ostensibly proceeds, or from his particularity, as a rational, affective subject,
which ostensibly grants him the agency to recognize, interpret, doubt, or even ignore such “flat,”
categorical commands? On which does consent depend, and to which does it appeal, both in
relation to other “flat” categories of social identity and to his particular sons and daughters?
The particularized individual in the theories of Hobbes, Pufendorf, and Locke is closely
related to – and its emergence is nearly contemporaneous with – another major round, particular
individual around which narratives are organized: the protagonist of novelistic realism. Recent
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Contract theory reaches maturity in the moral philosophy of Kant, after all, whose “categorical
imperative” describes the promise of the individual in terms universal.
52
For some critics, the abstract archetype of the free subject necessarily excludes women,
complicating the supposed universalism of freedom that contract theory (and the definition of
full humanness its promulgation and realization relies upon) requires. See especially Carole
Pateman, The Sexual Contract, and, for an analysis of later texts, Joan Wallach Scott on the
“abstract individual” (6 – 7).
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critics have turned more earnestly not just to the historical coincidence of seventeenth- and
eighteenth-century philosophical and literary representation but also to the circuits that link them
in practice. Karen Bloom Gevirtz writes, for example, that early novelists, while “not
philosophers,” “were very interested in the philosophical questions swirling around them” (4),
echoing recent statements about the philosophical engagement of literary writers by critics like
Helen Thompson, Jonathan Kramnick, E. Derek Taylor, and others. In addition to the extent to
which, as these critics argue, novelists from at least as early as Aphra Behn and Mary Davys
developed characters immersed in the epistemological and political conditions of Hobbesian or
Lockean individualism, they also frequently referenced social and political concepts from
philosophy explicitly. Edward Kimber’s trans-Atlantic History of the Life and Adventures of Mr.
Anderson (1754), for example, contains a scene in which the concept of individual liberty and
obligation is explained to the protagonist, Tom Anderson (a child abducted and sold into
indentured servitude), culminating in “Tom explaining a passage in Locke to his mistress, with
her arm gentry reclined upon his shoulder” (68). In Millenium Hall ([sic] 1762), Sarah Scott
censures the fashionable world outside her utopian community, arguing that “It might more
properly be compared to that state of war, which Hobbes supposes the first condition of
mankind” (61). For their part, novelists often saw themselves as participants in conversations
about society and the individual, and saw by extension the importance of foregrounding narrative
representations of individuals negotiating legitimizing conditions of social and political
organization.
Indeed, by the time Frances Burney writes her last novel, The Wanderer (1814), the
significance of narrative contributions to abstract, philosophical formulations is fully developed.
Her protagonist criticizes philosophers “born and bred in a capital; who first revel in its
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dissipations and vanities, next, sicken of its tumults and disappointments, write or exclaim for
ever, how happy is the country peasant’s lot” (700). The Wanderer recognizes that “theoretical”
accounts reflect the prepossessions of their authors, and that narrative provides an important
supplement to theory, balancing its conclusions by resolving its distance from the lived
experiences of individuals – individuals, indeed, including women, laborers, and colonized
subjects, who are dispossessed by such theoretical accounts. Authors of theory “reflect not,” she
continues, that to promote their idealizations of country life “the peasant must be so much more
philosophic than the rest of mankind, as to see and feel only his advantages, while he is blind and
insensible to his hardships.” Theoretical or philosophical discourses, she argues, ultimately
reflect and promote the needs of its privileged developers, those who enjoy the material
advantages of education and leisure. Their concepts are thus of little use (or, at least, are of less
use than those of fictional narrative) to real people.
While, despite such examples, novelists’ contributions to political philosophy have been
largely ignored, it is precisely the intersection of empirical plausibility (realism) and character
“roundness” that substantiates both literary characters and social contractors. Ironically, Burney
seems to address her critique to the one political philosopher in the social contract tradition who,
as I argued in the first chapter, truly embraced the power of narrative representation. While I will
conclude below with a gesture toward the implications for Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s
revolutionary approach to social contract theory, and while I wish to focus the present chapter on
his predecessors (in whose work narrative and theoretical formulations of individual and social
bodies exposes a problem that, I argue, is symptomatic of modern expressions of legitimacy), it
is worth recalling that Rousseau’s state of nature is more developed, in historical and narrative
terms, than any that came before, and that the middle, prescriptive period of his career in the
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1760s produced two novels whose importance would be hard to overstate: Emile and Julie: ou la
nouvelle Héloïse. The power of Rousseau’s reimagining of the social contract proceeds at least in
part from his insistence on allowing its protagonist the depth of roundness and plausibility that
fictional narrative affords – even as that “depth,” as Susan Buck-Morss and Charles W. Mills
point out, problematically reduces roundness to a patriarchal, Eurocentric universal.
Approximating philosophical and literary protagonists reveals how potentially disparate
the interests of – as well as the entailments of legitimacy for – the individual and the social body
are. By definition, the protagonist is a figure who finds himself or herself in negotiation with
less-delineated others, a single social surface (or multiple social surfaces) of “flat”
characterization, the mere potential for intersubjectivity enclosed in a narrative structure similar
to what Alex Woloch details in The One vs. the Many. This is made explicit, for example, in
Joseph Andrews by Henry Fielding (a self-avowed pioneer of the novel genre), a novel which is
structured according to its narrator by contact between a small handful of round, foregrounded
characters and, “not Men, but Manners; not an Individual, but a Species,” such as the “Lawyer”
that is not particular but a figure embodying “these 4000 Years” of archetypal representation
(148). Likewise, when a protagonist appears in social contract theory, its authors stir up the
specter of the individual’s affective and rational postures against, not within, the “objectively”
present social body – his (and he is always male)53 anxiety about controlling the nature and
conditions of his contact with that surface as an external and perhaps even suspect object, in
addition to and sometimes rather than the conditions according to which he recognizes himself
as a constituent of it.

53

The best work on gender in the social contract is still Carole Pateman’s classic The Sexual
Contract.
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After all, Woloch argues not only that novels contain flat characters and round characters,
but that protagonists, competing with other characters for narrative space and readers’ attention,
facilitate and engender the flattening of other characters. Joseph Andrews is not only a round
character in contradistinction to the archetypical lawyer, but by virtue of the lawyer’s flattening:
his particularity is purchased at the expense of the minor characters that serve as his backdrop –
minor characters that, being strictly categorical, embodying their functions in the same way that
Locke’s “father” figure embodies his, facilitate his emergence from and transcendence of the
very flatness that confines them. Framed in this way, we see an epistemological conflict at the
heart of social contract theory, at least in its persistent narrative claims. The demands and
experiences of the autonomous, rational individual are not only separate from, but potentially
opposed to those of the social body that, through the contract, entails them. Appealing to the
interests and experiences of the protagonist not only subordinates but also potentially distorts the
interests and experiences of the social body. By assuming, however, that these two movements
are interchangeable, contract theorists oversimplify and even ignore the relationship (and
conflicts) between the individual and the social body, a relationship that remains undertheorized. A better understanding of social and political organization must acknowledge that
representations of individual and social bodies presuppose different features, operate in different
epistemological frameworks, and occupy, therefore, fundamentally different positions relative to
legitimacy. For my present purposes, this means that, even before addressing the problem of
reconciling liberty and social organization – through, for example, Rousseau’s “general will” –
we must see if it is possible for the individual to recognize liberty and its violations in the first
place (and, as I have been arguing, this must be recognized in social experience). In other words,
it must first be established that legitimacy can be experienced at all (as empirical phenomena, by
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a rational body within a social body) before any political forms can be said to be legitimate.
What is needed is a metaphysics of legitimacy, and it is by looking more closely at – and not by
ignoring – the narrative premises of contract theory that a fuller articulation of this need and its
implications can be achieved.
NARRATIVE FRAMES FOR SOCIAL CONTRACT
By dismissing the narrative aspects of social contract theory, critics privilege one claim (the
historical account of social contract is hypothetical) over another (social contract is a historical
product). Moreover, the priority of the first claim is typically justified primarily or even
exclusively by reference to the latter: a move that, while not exactly arbitrary, needs a more
rigorous defense. To be clear, I am not arguing that narratives of social contract are intended to
be read as straight history, or that these two claims hold equal rhetorical or truth value. But our
understanding of social contract ought not to leave the historical premise out entirely. After all,
these theorists include and even foreground historical narrative in their accounts. Recall
Rousseau’s objection to Grotius, for example, in which he famously argued for the need to
discover the means by which a people become “a people” in the first place (14). The persistence
of historical narrative, even as it was obsessively qualified by its developers, was clearly thought
to be more useful than distracting or confusing.
Nevertheless, a more explicitly historical or narrative account of social contract is not
easily determined, as the conflictedness of the simultaneously comforted and terrified individual
in the state of nature shows. It is tempting to consider a narrative of social contract in its simplest
terms as, say, the problem of getting from point A (imagining others as a source of violence and
violation) to point B (imagining them as a source of comfort and security). Indeed, most critical
dismissals of the narrative aspects of contract assume just such terms, or something very like
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them. But of course this framing only begs the question: while it acknowledges the explicit
historical framework that is both part of and contrary to early modern contract theories, it
neglects the important fact that, as we have seen above, imagining others as a potential source of
security is a necessary precondition for entertaining social contract in the first place. The
individual, even in her natural isolation, “finds” this security “in other men,” or (in a formulation
closer to Locke’s) in the common law and authority established by the consent that one expects
to find in “the hands of the community” (137). In other words, this simple A-to-B framing does
not make clear why, for these writers, social contract is still necessary once the natural individual
finds herself capable of imagining others as a source of security – or, to put it another way, why
contract is not in such cases already realized, since the anxiety of interpersonal contact has
already been neutralized. Any contract narrative must account for the operative assumption,
generally taken for granted by contract theorists before Rousseau, that social contract is not
required for, nor does it consist in, merely imagining others as a source of security. It is possible
for the individual in the state of nature to imagine others as representing the depravity of human
nature and, at the same time, security from that depravity, and this does not present a
contradiction. More importantly, this possibility does not undermine the force of social contract,
even though (as the dramatization above suggests) social contract seems to be authorized in large
part by that very distinction.
As I have been arguing, attempting to narrate social contract in a way that accounts for
social experience (and these two ways of imagining others, fear and comfort, A and B) is crucial,
but doing so threatens not to resolve but to problematize the relationship between legitimacy and
the individual in the course of anticipating, negotiating, and realizing the social contract. To
resolve this problem, it appears that whatever the relationship between A and B is, it must be
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found in our protagonist, the isolate, as she relates to, or imagines, herself in an interpersonal
context. The orthodox answer to the problem of an isolate (pre-contract) recognizing both
depravity and security in others is that the change effected by contract is interior, and not – at
least not primarily – interpersonal. For Hobbes, for example, social contract consists of
surrendering one’s own natural right to all things and means: “To lay downe a mans Right to any
thing, is to devest himselfe of the Liberty, of hindering another of the benefit of his own Right to
the same.” In its first moments, social contract consists of the “diminution of impediments” to
others’ enjoyment of their “Right originall,” following only from the recognition, by the
individual, that she is herself such an impediment (92). In other words, “diminution” and selfdivestment come to the same, primarily self-referential, thing. Thus, while the individual in a
state of nature has no concept of justice or injustice, being “none of the Faculties neither of the
Body, nor Mind” (Hobbes 90), these “Faculties” arise introspectively and retrospectively: “when
a man hath in either manner abandoned, or granted away his Right; then is he said to be
OBLIGED, or BOUND, not to hinder those, to whom such Right is granted…it is his DUTY, not
to make voyd that voluntary act of his own: and that such hindrance is INJUSTICE” (92 – 93).
Locke’s formulation is more succinct (though no less complex): the individual “divests himself
of his natural liberty, and puts on the bonds of civil society” (142). The individual in a state of
nature does not move from imagining depravity to imagining security in others at all, but,
recognizing both of these possibilities, moves from a position of isolation conditioned by natural
right to one (variously described as free and subjected) conditioned by the surrender of that right.
But this answer is not satisfying either, and precisely because of the conflict between the
theoretical and the narrative articulations of its construction. Understanding the social contract as
a catalyst principally for interior transformation of this sort would require representing (would
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require, specifically, narrating) its solution and power in a radically different way than they
generally do. Social contract currently conceives of the isolate perceiving an aggregate of
individuals as a locus of personal security against the depravity of others, not as perceiving them
as an insulation from, or force against, her own depravity. After all, if Locke has protagonists, as
we have seen, they are possessors – of produce, of a horse or a coat, or of land which, mixed
with their labor, is removed from what is common and must be secured against others’ depravity.
Depravity is almost always embodied, when it is embodied at all, by minor “characters,” flat,
general, and emphatically other: the generalized potential for threat rather than embodied and
rounded individuals whose perceived depravity can be narrated, and thus plausibly accounted
for. The suggestion of the horse-thief in Locke’s account falls far short of Daniel Defoe’s
protagonists, Moll Flanders or Roxana, or of Frances Burney’s Macartney, or of hundreds of
other apparently depraved characters of novelistic realism who for whatever specific reasons and
under whatever specific conditions – often in fact hunger or desperation – find themselves
seriously contemplating robbery, theft, prostitution, etc.54 Even Hobbes, whose theory of social
contract is organized entirely around a claim that human nature is relentlessly depraved, urges
his readers to consider, not their own thievish desires, but the vulnerabilities of rightful
possession and understandable paranoia:
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Frances Burney’s titular protagonist, Evelina, becomes unpopular with her peers precisely for
refusing to dismiss the mysterious and brooding Macartney, an “unfortunate North Briton” who
contemplates turning to robbery, as a mere type (the poor Northern lodger, undeserving of any
substantial attention), literally bringing him from the background of the small front room, asking
him to speak, insisting upon his right to vote, gathering his backstory, and circulating to her ward
his account of the desperate conditions under which he found himself contemplating robbery.
Defoe’s novels, Moll Flanders and Roxana, tell the stories of two women who, abandoned and
forced to rely upon their own resources in a world they find generally hostile, turn to
lawlessness, theft, prostitution, and even, it is suggested in Roxana, murder.
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It may seem strange to some man, that has not well weighed these things; that Nature
should thus dissociate, and render men apt to invade, and destroy one another…Let him
therefore consider with himselfe, when taking a journey, he armes himselfe, and seeks to
go well accompanied; when going to sleep, he locks his dores; when even in his house he
locks his chests…what opinion he has of his fellow subjects, when he rides armed, of his
fellow Citizens, when he locks his dores; and of his children, and servants, when he locks
his chests. (89)
Hobbes’s “some man” is not the depraved thief that one might reasonably expect from an
account such as his, and especially since “some man” appears precisely where the text seems to
promise a demonstration of the naturally destructive inclinations of every man. His protagonist’s
experience (and habitual negotiation) of a shared, political space reveals something about human
nature, Hobbes suggests, and yet the protagonist himself stands contrary to that pattern, not only
by not destroying, but by actively avoiding, others. Hobbes offers “some man’s” social
experiences (his feelings about others as revealed in the course of negotiating shared spaces) as
clear and valid proof about human nature, yet he is silent on what the protagonist’s own benign,
if paranoid, existence reveals. Moreover, the protagonist’s social attitudes make a claim that is
ostensibly familiar (we are meant to recognize them in ourselves), but that therefore, being at
least to that extent universally valid, would seem to negate itself: if everybody is a protagonist,
organized by our paranoia about the depravity of others, there are no others left to substantiate
that paranoia. “Some man” is an exception dressed up to demonstrate the rule.
RECONCILING CONCEPTUAL AND NARRATIVE CLAIMS
Some of the problems I am discussing here, such as the seemingly residual, state-of-nature
anxiety of an otherwise civilized “some man,” have been taken up before. C. B. Macpherson’s
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analysis of property and the possessor, for example, has become a major and enduring account of
the sources of liberalism in early modern political thought. Significantly, however, his argument
so completely disregards the narrative premises of contract theory that he effectively ignores its
operative distinction between “presocial” and “social.” In his now standard reading, Hobbes’s
state of nature presupposes some degree of civilization since, he argues, there is no logical
transition from the purely mechanical nature of human motivations to the depravity of human
nature without the introduction of some elements of civilization: “some man,” he writes, as well
as the ostensibly civilized tendencies that appear in Hobbes’s state of nature, are both suggestive
of a “state of nature [that] is a logical abstraction drawn from the behavior of men in civilized
society.” He argues that “the assumption that the power of every man is opposed to the power of
every other man,” so crucial to Hobbes’s state of nature, “appears to be a social, not a
physiological, postulate,” and that “the opposition of individual’s power is…not contained in
the…propositions about man as a self-moving mechanism seeking to maintain or enhance his
motion” (40, 36). Macpherson’s claim is based ultimately on the premise that Hobbes “moves
from the neutral definition of power to the desire of every man for ever more power over other
men” (35), but there is no reason to believe that, for an individual in a state of nature (for whom,
as I have shown above, justice and its distinctions do not exist), such a move has occurred at all.
To her, each power is equally “neutral,” since all means, including the lives of others, are equally
at her disposal, and carry no such moral imperative.
It is also important to note, for our purposes especially, that Macpherson’s claim does not
account for a long tradition of readers who give no indication that Hobbes does anything less
than position his state of nature (conceptually, if not historically) opposite even rudimentary
forms of civilization. Most authors in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries write about
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Hobbes’s state of nature as exactly that, and while others may approximate unsatisfactory forms
of civilization with Hobbes’s state of nature (such as Sarah Scott’s previously noted comparison
of polite society with the “state of war”), this kind of hyperbole does not strictly collapse but in
fact reinforces the absolute distinction between each state (it is “the first condition,” after all).
Charles W. Mills reminds us, moreover, that Hobbes may have drawn his picture of the state of
nature from explorers’ representations of the Americas, for whom literal subhumanness in the
Natives was generally taken for granted. Macpherson’s argument, while a compelling and useful
contribution to the history of liberalism in most respects, neglects the sense in which the state of
nature was largely understood, as well as the contradiction that “some man’s” experience
exposes. He still does not account, in other words, for why, in his useful and otherwise
compelling account of possessive individualism, “some man” is at once an exception to the rule
and a valid index to that rule. He is silent on the role and significance of the protagonist’s social
experience.
There may also be grounds for objecting that the social experiences of Hobbes’s
protagonist do not necessarily contradict the theory it is meant to expound, despite the fact, as I
have argued, that his fear of the depravity of (generalized) others occupies the place where his
fear of his own (particularized) depravity ought to reside. After all, in Hobbes’s account fear is
one of human nature’s constitutive affects, and it cannot be (nor should it be) fully subdued,
since it is the basis from which anxiety about other savages can become transformed into
productive awe for the sovereign: “For by this Authoritie, given him by every particular man in
the Common-Wealth, he hath the use of so much Power and Strength conferred on him, that by
terror therof, he is inabled to [con]forme the wills of them all, to Peace at home, and mutuall ayd
against their enemies abroad” (120 – 121, emphasis added). Even so, it must be asked whether
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“some man’s” anxiety is mistaken: it apparently reveals that the depravity of human nature is
still accessible through his experiences in organized, social spaces. His anxiety says something
true about human nature by indexing its depravity, but it also explicitly excludes him from that
nature, distinguishing him from the thieves, robbers, and rogues that are apparently the norm.
Another way of thinking about this problem is to notice the similarities between Hobbes’s
protagonist and the natural isolate I began with. In both accounts – an account of the state of
nature and an account that seventeenth-century readers are meant to identify with – an individual
encounters a group of others (or their potential) in a shared space and then has social experiences
associated with competing claims about the nature and status of social contact, as well as his or
her role within it: depravity, fellowship; anxiety, security. Each protagonist has social
experiences that characterize both the state of nature and civil society. For “some man,” what is
the depravity of human nature, or its trace, doing in the shared space of commonwealth – a space
whose civilizing force can be detected in “some man’s” own total lack of depravity? Since some
allowance must be made for the deficiency and imperfection of “some man’s” social and
political context, the far more difficult question relates to our pre-social isolate: in what sense
does the comfort of social organization make itself recognizable to her? It seems in either case
that social experience, from a narrative perspective presupposing a protagonist (which
necessitates and which must determine the success of contract for that protagonist), is not a
reliable indicator about whether contract is legitimate or not. Narratives of the individual, and
their emphasis on social experiences in particular, are necessary: in principle, they provide the
incentive for social contract for the savage and justify it for “some man.” In practice, however,
they point to a glaring problem that comes from collapsing the many into the one.
THE TRAUMA OF FAMILIARITY IN ROBINSON CRUSOE
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In Daniel Deronda, the protagonist’s peculiar and inexplicable draw to Mordecai, a
Jewish visionary and advocate for Jewish nationalism, is an index to the affective, pre-cognitive,
non-rational magnetism of community (legible for example in Benedict Anderson’s notion of
fraternity) that comes to dominate collective forms by the nineteenth century. When he
encounters Mordecai, after all, he knows nothing of his own Jewish ancestry, and thus has no
conscious or rational grounds to substantiate the irresistible draw that he feels. Deronda is able to
overcome the empirical impasse of “some man,” since his experience of Mordecai is an
experience of legitimacy (of his own ‘real’ place in the Jewish community), some form of which
discloses itself in the face-to-face encounter that, although its participants are ostensibly
strangers, approximates familiarity. For this reason, the familiarity is comforting, reassuring
readers that the community is a real thing, empirically knowable (it has, to return to Charles
Taylor’s argument, a prior, “ontic” component), and that it entails its constituents whether they
know themselves to be such or not. The community, of which the constituent is knowingly or
unknowingly a part, is intact, and on some level this can be sensed. At the same time, any
interventions, manipulations, or withholdings (by Deronda’s mother, for example, who lies to the
protagonist about his ancestry – interventions that are intended to sever the constituent from his
or her community by disturbing the rationally traceable discursive lines from self to community)
cannot undermine the community as it “actually” exists. Its “actual” existence is not therefore a
discursive or rational construct, following from contract or consent, for example, but even
anterior to constituent individuals conscious of some known and organized relation to one
another. Eliot distinguishes the discursive community from the community as it ‘actually’ and
‘legitimately’ exists. The precariousness of enlightenment legitimacy (the subjective aspect that
“Crusoe in the midst of the world” reifies) has been largely mitigated.
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In enlightenment discourses, where the distinction Eliot makes is not available, social
experiences like familiarity play a very different role in the determination of legitimacy. Indeed,
familiarity itself, a concept with comforting and restorative suggestions, comes rather to signal
the troubled relationship (and, in fact, to trouble the relationship) between community and
constituent. In popular usage, even leaving aside the extraordinary magnetism of Deronda’s
experience, familiarity is generally taken to be a stabilizing force. Etymologically, it suggests
intimacy (sometimes, indeed, an excess of intimacy), evoking the family (the familiar, the
familia, the household). It also suggests a depth of knowledge, since (except in cases of “vague
familiarity”) to become “familiar” with something or someone is to know it or him thoroughly.
In the case of the family, where both usages come to bear, the experience of one’s familiars
stabilizes his or her understanding of the community (of whom it consists, how it is organized
and regulated, how it is sustained, how it has continued to be – and how it will continue to be –
one more or less recognizably cohesive thing over generational time) even as it stabilizes one’s
understanding of self. Familiarity is thus significant first for its epistemological role in social life
and then, therefore, for the groundwork it lays for social legitimacy which, I have argued, must
not only be known but known through social experience. It gives the individual more stable
epistemological access to his identity – to his sense of self as an individual functioning within,
and regarded with reference to, a relational body – as well as to the social body within which that
relationality is constructed, understood, and consented to.
But one frequently encounters a different kind of familiarity in eighteenth-century novels.
Indeed, familiarity in eighteenth-century fiction is frequently destructive, associated not with
stability or comfort but with terror and error, drawn upon to punctuate moments of encounter that
culminate in a counterintuitive shock so dramatic and extreme that it approaches trauma. I will
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look at a number of such moments in detail in the next chapter, but I would like first to establish
the implications, for philosophical projects concerned with the legitimacy of social and political
organization, of reframing familiarity in this way. By looking at the relationship between
episodes of traumatic familiarity and the problems with legitimacy that philosophical texts leave
unresolved (by downplaying elements of narrative and character, for example), the extent to
which legitimacy is an epistemological question begins to emerge. How is legitimacy determined
in enlightenment thought, where a “sense” of connection, as in Deronda, is largely suppressed?
What is the function of social experience in that determination? What other resources are
available to constituents of a community where its historical legitimacy is submerged in broader
questions of conceptual legitimacy, where it is contained in some obscure but rationally available
“ontic” component? In other words, what, in the field of the fully developed, wholly particular
protagonist, is the relationship between social experiences and social legitimacy?
To begin to answer this question I return to Robinson Crusoe. Robinson Crusoe is an
obvious first choice for my purposes: he provides insight into how legitimacy might present itself
to a fleshed-out version of the very individual presupposed by social contract theories. He is
rational, of course, committed to the enlightenment priorities of self-making, material
appropriation, and “improvement”; but he is also, as Mills and Pateman remind us, white, male,55
Christian, European, and capitalist, embodying the landowning protestant many contract
theorists took for granted as the default liberal subject. Moreover, critics have recently noted how
Defoe’s formation of protagonists challenges more conventional and general representations, as I
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Crusoe’s reproductivity, however, is neglected by Defoe (though often foregrounded by
critics), so his relation to the sexual contract is complicated. DeeAnn DeLuna reads Crusoe as
the “commercial paragon” of “early modern commerce’s highest roles,” in part because he
represents the “male sexual neuters who suffer no distractions of fornication or the marriage bed”
(70).
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am arguing that literary protagonists do in the context of political philosophy, in a variety of
other discursive contexts. Lisa Zunshine, for example, writes that Moll Flanders “had to foster
the readers’ emotional involvement with its title heroine, which meant giving the practice of
abandonment of bastard children by their mothers a human face and psychological motivation,”
an aspect largely missing in infanticide-prevention campaigns of the period (41), and Sharon
Alker relates the trauma of the footprint scene in particular to an argument about how Defoe’s
innovative use of the protagonist in Memoirs of a Cavalier makes the “psychological
experiences” of a particularized soldier available, challenging the conventions of a genre that
typically put “the focus…on the battle as a whole, not on the actions of a single soldier” (68, 49).
Defoe recognized that one could learn something new from the actions and content of a
single, fully-developed person, and that this content was not neatly enclosed within or
presupposed by any general representations of the type or the “whole” – even when that “whole”
would appear to be precisely what authorizes and organizes the individual’s identity in the first
place. To this extent, one might think of Defoe’s protagonist and his negotiations with the terms
of legitimacy as an early contribution (one of many, as I will show in the next chapter) to
narrative developments associated, for Michael McKeon, with a growing tension between
“individual life” and “overarching pattern.”56 In the context of this growing tension, Crusoe the
isolate standardizes a canon of empirical and affective experiences that will become tropic for
the centrality of social experience in the determination of social legitimacy. However, I am
pointing here to something more than Crusoe “in the midst of the world,” the ways in which
authors use a pretense of isolation in order to control and suppress social dependence and to
support the illusion of autonomy. Rather, I will be suggesting that Robinson Crusoe’s terrible
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See especially chapter three, “Histories of the Individual,” 90 – 128.
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encounter of the footprint on the beach establishes a category of experience (one that I will call
traumatic familiarity) that makes conspicuous the limitations in the ways in which the empirical,
autonomous individual has been related to social and political legitimacy. This limitation is
damning, and, as I hope to show in the remainder of this section, traumatic familiarity operates
less as a comment upon the exorbitant challenge of determining legitimacy through social
experience than a critique of any such concept of legitimacy in the first place.
Although iconic for its portrayal of an individual negotiating the sober distress of chronic
isolation, one of the most acutely distressing experiences in the novel is actually social in nature.
After over a decade alone on his island, Crusoe discovers a single footprint, confronting the
possibility for the first time that he is not alone. Although very well known, I quote the passage
in full in order to spell out its investments in characteristics of social experience:
It happen’d one Day, about Noon going towards my Boat, I was exceedingly surpriz’d
with the Print of a Man’s naked Foot on the Shore, which was very plain to be seen in the
Sand: I stood like one Thunderstruck, or as if I had seen an Apparition; I listen’d, I look’d
round me, I could hear nothing, nor see any Thing; I went up to a rising Ground to look
farther; I went up the Shore and down the Shore, but it was all one, I could see no other
Impression but that one, I went to it again to see if there were any more, and to observe it
if might not be my Fancy; but there was no Room for that, for there was exactly the very
Print of a Foot, Toes, Heel, and every Part of a Foot; how it came thither, I knew not, nor
could in the least imagine. But after innumerable fluttering Thoughts, like a Man
perfectly confus’d and out of my self, I came Home to my Fortification, not feeling, as
we say, the Ground I went on, but terrify’d to the last Degree, looking behind me at every
two or three steps, mistaking every Bush and Tree, and fancying every Stump at a
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Distance to be a Man; nor is it possible to describe how many various Shapes affrighted
Imagination represented Things to me in, how many wild Ideas were found every
Moment in my Fancy, and what strange unaccountable Whimsies came into my Thoughts
by the Way.
Crusoe continues, writing that he “fled into” his “Castle” “like one pursued,” insisting that
“never frighted Hare fled to Cover, or Fox to Earth, with more Terror of Mind that [he] to this
Retreat,” so terrified ultimately that he must convince himself in calmer moments that the print
was not that of the Devil.
The predominant theme in Crusoe’s encounter is terror. It is important to remember, first
of all, that Crusoe is not associated exclusively with an individual in the state of nature, and that
his terror of the footprint is not therefore the Hobbesian terror of the natural other. Neither
solitude nor existing in a natural environment is strictly interchangeable with the state of nature,
and Crusoe is nothing if not worldly. Indeed, he occasionally presents himself as something of a
natural isolate, looking “upon the World as a Thing remote, which [he] had nothing to do with,
no Expectation from, and indeed no Desires about,” even approximating Locke’s isolate: “There
were no Rivals. I had no Competitor, none to dispute Sovereignty or Command with me” (93 –
94). Moreover, his sovereignty resonates with Derrida’s claims about the radical isolation of both
beasts and sovereigns, further emphasizing the conceptual implications of Crusoe’s actual
solitude. But he can never surrender the moral and epistemological relational framework of
sociality, according to which (he has already admitted) claims about complete acceptance of and
desire for social isolation are hypocritical.57 He puts a great deal of faith in mediation, for
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“How canst thou be such a Hypocrite, (said I, even audibly) to pretend to be thankful for a
Condition, which however thou may’st endeavor to be contented with, thou would’st rather pray
heartily to be deliver’d from” (83).
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example (writing in his journal and taking money, which he knows to be useless, from the ship’s
wreckage), and he feels accountable to others, calculating his moral and technological failures
with reference not only to God but to his father and to his distant fellows (merchants, potters,
bakers, shipbuilders). So attributing his trauma on seeing the footprint to the anxiety of the
natural isolate encountering an other would be a mistake. Crusoe’s trauma should be understood
within a framework consistent with the worldly socialite that he is.
At the same time, it is obvious that his experience inaugurates nothing like what we
might call community or collective identity. That his space is now, or always was, a shared space
obviously does not automatically mean that its occupants recognize fellowship in one another, or
anything like contractual organization in their contact. Nor is the opportunity to take seriously
his newfound social existence, the possibility of community on the island or of his own status as
a social being, given any consideration. Legitimacy, in other words, becomes a sort of broken
hammer, a wholly open question, conspicuously obscure, but whose mechanisms cannot be taken
for granted.
Obviously, nothing of Andersonian fraternity or the romantic familiarity of Mordecai is
recognizable in the footprint scene; and yet it is important to note that familiarity, in a most basic
sense, is at the heart of Defoe’s concern in this important scene. Despite common misreadings,
he is not, when he first encounters the footprint, struck with the danger of potential cannibals or
competitors for the island’s natural resources. His terror has nothing explicit and immediately to
do with personal safety, but it is associated rather with his laboring to process precisely the very
familiarity of the footprint, “exactly the very Print of a Foot, Toes, Heel, and every Part of a
Foot.” Kant realizes the centrality of familiarity in this footprint scene when, reimagining it in
The Critique of Judgment, he replaces the footprint with “a geometrical figure”:
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If someone were to perceive a geometrical figure, for instance a regular hexagon, drawn
in the sand in an apparently uninhabited land, his reflection, working with a concept of it,
would become aware of the unity of the principle of its generation by a means of reason,
even if only obscurely, and thus, in accordance with this, would not be able to judge as a
ground of the possibility of such a shape in the sand, the nearby sea, the wind, the
footprints of any known animal, or any other non-rational cause, because the contingency
of coinciding with such a concept, which is possible only in reason, would seem to him
so infinitely great that it would be just as good as if there were no natural law of nature,
consequently no cause in nature acting merely mechanically, and as if the concept of such
an object could be regarded as a concept that can be given only by reason and only by
reason compared with the object, thus as if only reason can contain the causality for such
an effect, consequently that this object must be thoroughly regarded as an end, but not a
natural end, i.e., as a product of art (vestigium hominis video). (242)
In other words, as Kant reimagines him, Crusoe observes in the sand a “trace of a human being,”
a bearer of will and reason, with whom he shares his nature, his resources, his fate. In re-tracing,
after some time has passed (even though it was “plain to be seen” the first time), “the very Print
of a Foot, Toes, Heel, and every Part of a Foot,” Crusoe marks a moment less of revelation and
surprise than of emphatic affirmation (recall Deronda’s emphasis: “then I am a Jew”).
It is precisely this familiarity that, rather than offering consolation, so “distracts” (in
eighteenth-century parlance, suggesting a lapse of self possession, even temporary insanity) and
terrifies him. His terror, moreover, is double: it points outside into the world and back into the
subject who failed to recognize and process that world fully and correctly. Crusoe’s struggle to
appropriate this mark of familiarity into a sign of comfort and stability (as, say, that of a possible
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companion, or of his own foot) brings him directly into contact, not only with the fact that his
space is now, and perhaps always was, a shared space, but with his own failure to sense this allimportant truth in the first place. There is something disturbing, haunting, about realizing that he
is not now, and perhaps never was, alone, as the print – staring back at him like an “Apparition”
– insists, and his framework for understanding his place in his little world is radically upended
(or is shown, perhaps, to have been radically wrong all along – he cannot be sure about this
either). In other words, in sharp contrast to Deronda, he is confronted with the fact that he did not
ever “sense,” nor even does he “sense” now, his true place in the world, or anything of the ontic
component of its social status (whether or not it is a social space, whether his entitlement to its
resources is legitimate, vulnerable to contest, etc). Familiarity here provides no comfort, not only
because it shows that what he knew of the world was wrong – although already, for one as
meticulously committed to cataloguing, understanding, and mastering the world as Crusoe, this
would be a deeply unsettling realization – nor because it shows that he was mistaken about what
he knew of himself as an inhabitant (and assumed sovereign) of that world – though this too is
deeply troubling and life altering. Rather, in addition to these, in the footprint he is made to
confront the failure of his own resources – his privileged enlightenment priorities of rationalism
and improvement, his ethic of material expansion and self-mastery, his empirical methodologies
– to generate and stabilize even the most basic and foundational knowledge about himself and
his surroundings. He has lost not only the content of his knowledge about his self and the world,
but his means of approaching, constructing, and distinguishing such content moving forward. His
encounter with the footprint, revealing all of this to him, is not profound or comforting; it is
devastating.
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Readers are made witness in this remarkable scene to a dramatization of the
interdependence of self-knowledge and social knowledge. It narrates Crusoe’s disturbing
struggle to account, with all of his resources (his understanding, labor, and resolve, for example),
for his place in the world, for his ability to provide such an account in the first place, and thus for
his sense of self as an autonomous subject. Crusoe’s struggle to reconcile the footprint’s
suggestive “new” truths with his failed epistemological certainty involves, first, renegotiating the
roles of the imagination and empirical knowledge. At first he is “Thunderstruck,” but, a goodish
subject of enlightenment empiricism, he attempts to conquer this initial shock by retreating to the
certainty of sense perception and experiential knowledge. This fails him: “I listn’d, I look’d
round me, I could hear nothing, nor see any Thing; I went up to a rising Ground to look farther,”
etc. As the passage progresses, his inability to rely on his senses increases, and to this failure
corresponds a violent crisis of identity: he runs to his castle “not feeling…the Ground I went on,”
and he describes himself, meanwhile, as one “perfectly confus’d and out of my Self,” unable
even to remember how he entered his cave (remarkably, frighteningly, unsure if he is passing for
the first time or for the thousandth time – or indeed at all – from a shared to a private space). At
the same time, his imagination attempts to claim greater and greater sovereignty. He first
wonders, or hopes, that the print “might not be my Fancy,” and when he flees he does so
“mistaking every Bush and Tree, and fancying every Stump” to be human, fretting over his
“affrighted Imagination,” the “wild Ideas” in his “Fancy,” and the “strange unaccountable
Whimsies” that pursue him home.
Distracted, “out of [his] self,” Crusoe can no more account for himself at this point than
for the footprint. Although this lapse seems fleeting, and Crusoe seems to recover something of
his self-mastery, it is a recovery that is only possible because the footprint is made a fixed source
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of instability that, remarkably, he extends to the human community of his readers and beyond.
“Life of Man” is a “strange Chequer-Work of Providence,” he writes, our “Affections hurry’d
about” by “secret differing Springs.” “To Day,” he continues, introducing his experience of the
footprint with statements from, about, and authorized by the first-person plural, “we love what to
Morrow we hate; to Day we seek what to Morrow we shun; do Day we desire what to Morrow
we fear.” Such truths about the human community become evident because in that capacity they
resolve the epistemological impasse that so terrified him. Although his only known, recognizable
and expressed affliction was his banishment “from human Society,” he “should now tremble at
the very Apprehensions of seeing a Man, and was ready to sink into the Ground at but the
Shadow or silent Appearance of a Man’s having set his Foot in the Island.”58
This passage traces a crisis of reflexive self-knowledge that, in its more stable
manifestations, Charles Taylor associates with Locke’s “punctual self.” Crusoe observes his own
unraveling as a separate object, as an index to the impossibility of knowing one’s stable identity
(at least as far as identity relates to or refers to others, which is entirely the case here), and thus
as a means to regarding a human problem, the “Life of Man.” A moment of individual instability
is resolved by becoming a stabilizing element, a truth about the human community (which,
ostensibly, one shares, and from which, therefore, one’s own stability can be recovered). But
such a radical revision, from instability to stability, from self to other, marks a fleeting breach of
– even as it then helps to secure – Crusoe’s organizing enlightenment commitments. In order to
sense something about the world at large, he suggests, and about the inhabitants with which he
must share it, he must first abandon the premise that empirical content, taken and internalized
from the outside world and then processed by the autonomous subject, can sufficiently determine
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the terms according to which the world, its inhabitants, and its shared nature constitute
legitimacy. Legitimacy is not resolved by, but problematized by, the particular and autonomous
individual. As with the isolate from the first pages of this chapter, our attention is drawn from the
footprint to the protagonist, who must renegotiate a self and its frameworks. The problem of
determining legitimacy in the state of nature is extended universally, to all civilized subjects.
FOOTPRINTS AND FACES
I would like to conclude this discussion of Crusoe’s terror by considering the specific
kinds of questions about legitimacy that the footprint scene in Robinson Crusoe poses. One sees
in Crusoe’s trauma more than a reflexive, epistemological crisis about one’s ability (or lack of
ability) to account for oneself and one’s place in the world, though this crisis is obviously
important to me. The footprint does more than to point to Crusoe’s inability to “sense” his place
in the world – given the novel’s devotion to the popular priorities of enlightenment rationalism
and hostility to suspicion, such a “sense” would not have occurred in any serious way. Any
reading that reduces Crusoe’s trauma to such a crisis threatens to undermine itself, potentially
both anachronistic and teleological (in the sense that is evaluates an enlightenment drama of
legitimacy through a lens of either nationalism or romantic and post-romantic understandings of
community).
Rather, I argue that the footprint is also significant because it puts Crusoe into a posture
of sociality, and that, in an important sense, his experience is a social experience. Indeed, I want
to suggest not only that Crusoe’s experience of the footprint is a social experience, but that, from
an important perspective, that is what social experience is. The footprint insists that Crusoe is not
alone, that he is in the presence of an other (or the possibility of an other, a distinction on which
we will elaborate below); it makes the demands upon Crusoe that sociality makes, beginning
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with the most critical demand that he surrender the unchecked sovereignty discussed above,
pushing him from one end of Derrida’s polarity, sovereign, all the way to the other, beast (hunted
fox, rabbit). It insists, in the surrender of his sovereignty, that he attend to it, that he recognize it
in both major and mutually implicit senses of the word: that he concede its presence, that is,
surveying it carefully, at least twice, reluctantly but emphatically acknowledging its humanness.
It forces him into an experience that is organized around a “new” shared reality, where such
possibilities (and responsibilities) as reciprocity and hierarchy are conceivable or even necessary,
but remain entirely underdetermined.59
Crusoe’s problems, central to any formulation reconciling individual particularity and
social organization (the problems, in my reading, that motivate Defoe and his implicit critique of
his philosophical forerunners) persist well beyond the eighteenth century. To a certain extent, for
example, my interpretation of the footprint is similar to a current theory of sociality first sketched
out by Emmanuel Levinas, a sketch that rhymes with Crusoe’s experience as I interpret it.
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Recent scholarship has attempted to reevaluate the relationship between persons and things in
the eighteenth century, looking at so-called “it narratives,” for example, arguing for a less-thanstable binary between person and thing and suggesting that understanding how persons were
conceptualized depends increasingly upon understanding how things were described; the
footprint is sometimes evoked in this context. Lynn Festa argues that “[i]n Robinson Crusoe,
subject and object are…mutually constituting, both in the material sense that persons and things
make one another, and in the formal literary sense that Crusoe, like his readers, must struggle to
work the heterogeneous elements of the novelistic world into a meaningful unity, making things
– shoes, skins, or even footprints – fit the person, or making the person fit the thing” (446). In the
case of the footprint, I make a much clearer distinction, at least such that a shoe or a pot is
obviously much more clearly a “thing” to Crusoe, an object of knowledge and potential
manipulation, than the footprint. While compelling, especially with respect to shoes and skins
(her other examples), Festa’s argument does not adequately account for Crusoe’s excessive
reaction to the footprint, suggesting at least that the footprint is not a “misfit” in the same sense
that a misshapen clay pot (and thus not exactly a pot), or an animal skin, might be. I am
suggesting here only that we take seriously that, initially, at the moment of trauma, it is precisely
its humanness that terrifies him – a humanness that is not immediately, explicitly, or obviously
(as most scholars believe, pointing to its nakedness for example) associated with cannibalism,
with a threat to his material accumulation, etc.: rather, humanness qua humanness.
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Levinas’s attempts to characterize the primary drives (often described as ethical drives, though
usually with some qualification) that emerge in the experience of another – the absence and
anonymity implied by a footprint would not seem to apply, at least not directly, especially since
Levinas writes about the other as an embodied subject whose face, whose proximity, expresses.
However, while the difference between another’s face, for example, and the mere trace of an
absent other seems to suggest no meaningful equivalency, it may be worth noting some of their
shared features, beginning with Levinas’s principle assertion that the experience of the other
“summons me, demands me, claims me” (145). Levinas is sketching what he calls “a
‘phenomenology’ of sociality, taking as [his] point of departure the face of the other,” which he
equates with “a voice that commands: an order addressed to me” (169). This is a useful
formulation, since its emphasis is on interruption and relationality, but a relationality that is (in a
sense familiar to Crusoe, who experiences the trace of an other but nothing of the shape or
conditions of this newly conspicuous relationality) prior to practical organization: “the
subservience of obedience precedes the hearing of the order” and appeals to the subject’s
“nonintentional consciousness” (151, 141). It is not passive, it hails the subject, but it does not
organize or determine his or her actions. Nevertheless, following from this, it is also true of both
accounts that, in the presence of this command (the face for Levinas, the print for Crusoe), there
is a subsequent “laying aside by the self of its sovereignty of self,” and a kind of subordination or
obeisance (147).
Put another way, Levinas, like Defoe, is interested in questions of social experience,
especially as it relates to the broader problem of individuality within and against sociality. While
he describes his project as an intervention against Heidegger and Husserl, I am particularly
interested here in his claims against the ways in which romantic and post-romantic philosophy
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subordinates the individual to the totality, already emerging in the first decades of the nineteenth
century (as, for example, in the “spirit” of Hegel’s historiography). He argues, for example, that
“it is impossible to form an idea of the human totality, for men have an inner life closed to him
who does, however, grasp the comprehensive movements of human groups,” positing, counter to
post-enlightenment, eschatological theories of metaphysics and history, that “[t]he real must not
only be determined in its historical objectivity, but also from interior intentions, from the secrecy
that interrupts the continuity of historical time,” arguing further that “[o]nly on the basis of this
secrecy is the pluralism of society possible” (Totality and Infinity 57 – 58). In addition to this
secrecy, through which Levinas deflates any notion of the real that comprehends the individual
only in his or her figuring into the totality (that is, as he will put it, only in his or her figuring into
the “survivors’” account of “history”), Levinas argues that the nudity of the other’s face itself
already constitutes a particularity that cannot be absorbed fully into generality. Things are
particular only when “they are not entirely absorbed in their form; they then stand out in
themselves, breaking through, rending their forms, are not resolved into the relations that link
them up to the totality.” Nudity, when perceived in the face, when it becomes particular, reveals
“the surplus of its being over its finality” (reveals, that is, the inadequacy of form, of the
generalizable, to absorb it in this instance), and the nudity of the face becomes singular,
analogous to “industrial cities” which, while “adapted to a goal of production…exist also for
themselves” (Totality and Infinity 74) in all of their Dickensian waste, smoke, and grief.
For my purposes, it is important to note that Levinas’s argument suggests that
reconciliation between the goal-inflected adaptations implied by a teleological totality and the
particularity of waste and smoke is not realized in history, as key shifts in some nineteenth-
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century philosophy (on the one hand) and nationalism (on the other) might suggest; and that,
indeed, what appears to be such a reconciliation is in fact a kind of violence:
Totalization is accomplished only in history – in the history of historiographers, that is,
among the survivors. It rests on the affirmation and the conviction that the chronological
order of the history of the historians outlines the plot of being in itself, analogous to
nature. The time of universal history remains as the ontological ground in which
particular existences are lost, are computed, and in which at least their essences are
recapitulated. Birth and death as punctual moments, and the interval that separates them,
are lodged in this universal time of the historian, who is a survivor. (Totality and Infinity
55)
Rather, he argues, the particular and the general can only be reconciled through social experience
– and, specifically, through the ways in which social experience encroaches upon one’s freedom.
Production, for Levinas, is the business of freedom: like the mechanistic savage of Hobbes, and
not unlike Crusoe, the free individual “finds in the world a site and a home…a medium” that
“affords means” (Totality and Infinity 37). “Everything is here” he writes, “everything belongs to
me; everything is caught up in advance with the primordial occupying of a site” (Totality and
Infinity 37 – 38). Ethics in this argument (as for Hobbes) requires first that the individual call that
freedom into question (85). This questioning occurs as an “awakening” that “comes from the
Other”: “The welcoming of the Other is ipso facto the consciousness of my own injustice – the
shame that freedom feels for itself” (86). Such is the summons of the face of the other – and such
are the conditions of the subject’s obeisance.
Of course, however, one can also already distinguish the subordination of Levinas’s
phenomenology from Crusoe’s fear in at least two ways, first by considering the extent to which
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Levinas describes an event that approximates the state of nature, since the self he describes is
absolutely primary. While the other becomes available in a way that, in both texts, may be
regarded as an interruption, for Levinas this interruption appeals not “to the abstraction of some
anonymous law, some juridical entity” or any other derivative, artificial institution of social
organization (144). Rather, its realm is “the depths of natural perseverance,” an experience that
“rises a responsibility for the other to whom I have therefore been dedicated before every vow,”
a “vow” that is “prior to deliberation” and thus pre-contractarian (149, 170). It is an experience
that still holds intact the sense of otherness, uniqueness, and difference that derivative culture
and artificial political institutions, with their gesture toward a lost Platonic unity, work to cover
over. Secondly, we can compare how both experiences become recognizable as fear, since
Levinas organizes his ethical content around “[a] fear that comes to me from the face of the other
person” (130). That it is a face that the speaker encounters is what gives some shape or content to
this fear, what gives it its ethical direction, arousing for Levinas the possibility of usurpation or
death that, in his reading, Pascal has in mind when he describes his “place in the sun.” Thus,
while I argue that Crusoe experiences the other (as it manifests itself on the island) as a
command or demand (it is its humanness that strikes him, remember, and that he repeatedly
confirms), the fear he experiences does not correspond and is not suggestive of substantial
concern for the other. It is shapeless, unlocatable, reflexive but underdetermined.
The other becomes conspicuous and present in its violation of Crusoe’s sovereignty and
solitude, yet it is not disclosed in any of its specificity. He must reply, but he has no indication
about what replying or reciprocating might entail or require. His is not the experience of the
other outside the mediation of jurisdiction. His is a social experience without the mediation of an
other. All the same, the footprint has and gives no history: it is all secrecy. Its anonymity and its
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singularity together ensure that no deduction or narrative is possible about where its author came
from, what he or she was doing, or where he or she went. Crusoe finds himself in a posture of
sociality, but the specific narrative according to which this posture is demanded and
substantiated (according to which it must be determined, now that Crusoe is a social subject) has
been suppressed: the question of legitimacy, then, must be purely conceptual, and can make no
reference to any narrative or historical account that might reveal anything about the conditions
by which this beach came to be, and must exist as, a shared space.
In attempting to imagine the possibility of something like conceptual – rather than
historical – legitimacy, Defoe puts his protagonist into contact with the impossible, a
contradiction in terms, a social experience that is, or approaches, the a priori. What would social
experience look like if conceptual legitimacy were one’s object? Is any such legitimacy possible
at all? How can you have conceptual legitimacy when the “concept” in question seems
inalienable from practical experiences, narrative, historical situation, encounter? Defoe seems to
suggest that, if we could isolate social experience from the content of sociality (from the
subjective baggage that organizes social contact and that might include custom, tradition,
politeness, mores – the popular objects of enlightenment in its negative manifestations), this is
what it would look like. But if this is so, should there not be some trace of this trauma in more
practical social negotiation as well? It would appear at least that conceptual legitimacy and
historical narrative must not contradict one another, must be able to be reconciled in the course
of collective identification. Otherwise, conceptual legitimacy, as Defoe attempts to imagine it,
amounts to very little, much less than a state of nature that may or may not have existed at all.
There must be a relationship between conceptual legitimacy and the narrative conditions that
otherwise appear to obviate it for its actors. As I will show in the following chapter, these very
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concerns help to explain some of Robinson Crusoe’s odd textual afterlife, and help novelists in
the enlightenment tradition to put relentless pressure on given claims about social experience and
social legitimacy.
In pursuing the role of social experience in collective identification, I have come up
against two very different and difficult problems: first, the narrative impulses of social contract
theory insist upon, but then problematize, the centrality of social experience in the
conceptualization, negotiation, and realization of legitimacy through social contract. I have found
the protagonist of social contract theory underdetermined, hovering in a dead and often
contradictory space between category and individual, existing among flat others, constituting a
flat other himself, making both categorical and particular demands (one or the other, as needed)
that render the pre-social protagonist and the social protagonist inconsistent with one another
(and, as often, with itself). This reveals a rift in the enlightenment insistence – central to social
contract theory – for the particular, autonomous individual, fully wrought and liberal: a rift in a
defining enlightenment insistence, in other words, for empirical continuity in the subject as it
approaches, negotiates, and evaluates the discursive and experiential conditions – such as those
of social contract – in which it operates. Novelists as early as Daniel Defoe (the first, some still
argue) provide an alternative protagonist – one that meets the needs of full-fleshed particularity
and empirical continuity – who puts renewed pressure on the conditions of social experience, and
who thus allows for a renewed investigation into the role of social experience in determining
legitimacy.
But here I have encountered a different problem. While the conceptual premises of social
contract theory must confront the need for determining the narrative (if not historical) conditions
of legitimacy, the narrative premises of realistic fiction must confront the difficulty of
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determining and supporting (another major premise of social contract theory) something like
conceptual legitimacy. Defoe’s critique of contractarian empiricism does not constitute a
satisfying alternative, namely because his protagonist finds nothing in his experience of the other
from which legitimacy can be derived, or upon which it can be based: nothing of the comfort of
familiarity, for example, that might situate him, give him (or his possessions) social meaning. In
one moment, a moment of terror, collectivity becomes necessary, but collective identity
impossible.
It will be objected that later novelists, immersed in a readership of ever-more
sophisticated generic evolution and sophistication, are better poised to reconcile these two
problems; or that, at any rate, later novels (even those still wedded to the enlightenment priorities
that define and limit Robinson Crusoe) invested in social individuals negotiating more explicitly
social relations (family relations, for example, among which the terms of collectivity and
legitimacy would seem to be more easily determined) are better able to isolate the relationship
between social experience and legitimacy we have sought here. However, as we shall see in what
follows, the surprising feature of such novels is the persistence of the footprint, legible even in
the most ostensibly straightforward questions of collective identification. On the contrary, the
problem of legitimacy that haunts Crusoe’s island, and the strangeness of familiarity that terrifies
its protagonist, is not resolved in novelistic representations featuring intra-class, intra-national, or
intra-familial encounters, but repeated and insisted upon.
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3: Learning the Lesson of Evelina’s Familiarity: Skepticism and The Footprint

THE RECURRING FOOTPRINT
The climax of Mary Davys’s brief novel of courtship and intrigue, The Reform’d Coquet (1724),
culminates in an odd encounter between one Lady Betty and her brother, Lord Alanthus, who
first appears to her in disguise. When Alanthus removes his false beard and becomes familiar to
his sister, Davys interjects to register the strangeness, not of a brother unmasking himself from
the guise of an elderly man, but of his sister’s reaction: she slips into distraction, shocked at the
sudden appearance of “her brother’s Form; but so far from running to him with the kind Caresses
of a Sister, that she shriek’d out, and fell in a swoon” (83). The hyperbolic “so far from” is
revealing. It suggests that narratives of family reconciliation are conventionalized, embedded
with a normative script of affective and performative customs that function to reaffirm filial
bonds; it situates The Reform’d Coquet within the narrative tradition from which such a script
emerges; and yet it signals how substantially this drama deviates from those conventions. The
concluding episode of Davys’s novel hinges upon a sister whose status as such, marked by a
reaction that is “so far from” sisterly, is at once confirmed and problematized. Conventionally,
the appearance of her brother ought to fortify the relationship that determines and binds these
actors – instead, it entirely estranges. For a moment, though she is among company that includes
a brother and a friend, “she thought herself in some inchanted Castle, and all about her Fiends
and Goblins” (83).
Far from incidental, I argue that the instability of Lady Betty’s experience is central to
understanding the conflict that organizes Mary Davys’s novel, a tale concerned explicitly with
the nature and conditions of legitimacy. While the question of what distinguishes legitimate from
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illegitimate social organization has ostensibly been settled at this point – the marriage plot has
already been resolved, after all, and the protagonist is no longer vulnerable to the base appetites
and deception of her rakish courters – Lady Betty’s unsisterly horror reanimates the specter of
illegitimate social relation in a new form. Foregrounding the content of her social experience,
this scene proceeds in roughly three stages. First, she thinks herself among a polite aggregate of
strangers, one that includes an elderly man. That she is mistaken about this most basic fact
already troubles the empirical premises according to which she understands the social group and
her position relative to it – it does not occur to her, for example, that she is a sister to anybody in
the room, a fact with fascinating and potentially disturbing implications. Second, after her
brother’s revelation (upon which the presumably true relations of the individuals to one another
are fully disclosed), she becomes distracted, momentarily believing herself among “Fiends and
Goblins.” Finally, necessarily, the scene’s tensions are resolved as Betty is “brought…to herself”
by “The whole Company quickly surround[ing] her.” Davys attributes Lady Betty’s recovery
primarily to her brother who, strikingly, must first convince Betty: “believe your self in the arms
of your unfeigned Brother, and among your real Friends” (emphasis added). Betty only then
“began to hear and believe all,” not only recovering her relational identity with respect to her
brother but also recovering and then reinforcing her relational identity with respect to the others
in the room: “when she had perfectly recover’d her surprize, she turn’d to Amoranda, and
said…how well I’m pleas’d with that Alliance I forsee will be betwixt us, my future Behaviour
shall shew” (83).
Surely the last of these three successive social experiences is taken for granted as the
objectively “real,” or objectively “correct” experience, both by readers and Lady Betty alike,
despite the fact that nothing explicit qualitatively distinguishes her “belief” that Alanthus is her
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brother from her “belief” that he was an old man or a Goblin. While the novel seemingly follows
many of its contemporaries in resolving tensions about sexual and social legitimation through the
closure of the marriage plot, its final scene contains three imagined communities (or, in Lady
Betty’s – dubious, as has just been proven – estimation, two imagined and one real) that
problematize such conventional closure: an aggregate of people including an old man, a group of
goblins, and an association of people including a friend and a brother. How is it that one of these
comes to be privileged over the others?
Answering this question requires a closer investigation of the odd fear Lady Betty
experiences when she first recognizes her brother. While at first this moment may seem
extraordinary, a similar terror of familiarity punctuates a surprising number of eighteenth-century
novels. Although expressed degrees of horror, distraction, and extenuating circumstances vary
widely, the abundance of traumatic familiarity features in literary representations of social and
political negotiation beginning with some of the earliest and best-known novels of the century. A
comprehensive catalogue of such texts is beyond the scope of the present project, but a cursory
survey of a handful of these moments (arranged more or less arbitrarily) will be useful before
exploring their implications more fully.
Consider for example Defoe’s Roxana and her maid Amy, driven to distraction when
they recognize the protagonist’s unwanted and abandoned daughter Suzan – a distraction that
echoes the nearly fatal trauma his protagonist in Moll Flanders shares with her mother and
brother-husband upon recognizing one another in their true relationships. While Roxana is
published the same year as The Reformed Coquet, and both texts shortly after Robinson Crusoe
and the footprint scene, the pattern of experience persists into the novel’s maturity. See for
example Ann Radcliffe’s The Mysteries of Udolpho, published in 1794, in which the protagonist,
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Emily, wanders pensively in her garden thinking about her beloved Valancourt and, suddenly
seeing him, becomes briefly distracted: “her eyes fixed on the place, whence he had vanished,
and her frame trembling so excessively, that she could scarcely support herself, remained, for
some moments…scarcely conscious of existence” (586). This moment is repeated when she next
sees him, “start[ing] from her chair, tremble[ing], and, sinking into it again, bec[oming]
insensible to all around her. A scream from [her former servant] Theresa now told, that she knew
Valancourt” as well (624, the scream as an index to familiarity is not an uncommon feature in
such moments). One can also find terror in familiarity in Maria Edgeworth’s Belinda (1801),
ranging from encounters of mild fear (“Why do you tremble, Helena! Is there any thing so very
terrible in the looks of your mother?” [170]), to more moderate shock (Virginia, on seeing her
father, experiences a “violent effervescence of…sensibility,” followed by a “stupid and
insensible” appearance [412]), and, in the denouement, a moment loosely recalling Moll
Flanders, of near-fatal terror (the same Virginia, encountering a second portrait of her idyllic
hero, captain Sunderland, “turned her eyes upon the picture – uttered a piercing shriek, and fell
senseless to the floor,” even, temporarily, losing her pulse [464]).
Some of these moments are generically linked. Traumatic familiarity seems to play an
important role in the almost oppressively repeated incest and near-incest plots in novels
throughout the long eighteenth century, for example. In this context, one can discern a relatively
consistent critique of the fundamental instability of society, especially with respect to the
imperative to reconcile the objectively knowable contours of a collective unit and one’s ability to
locate and regulate oneself within and according to those contours. Traumatic familiarity in
incest plots often indicates the extent to which taking-for-granted frequently attends – or, as
frequently, constitutes – belonging to a particular social or family unit. One suggestion is clearly
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that an individual must – but cannot – justify the collective and its legitimacy, not by taking it for
granted, but by constantly determining and verifying the interrelations that form the community
and situate the individual. Henry Fielding’s Joseph Andrews can be read in this tradition,
enclosing the repeated, climactic shocks of the nearly incestuous marriage revelation (Fanny
understandably “changed Colour” and “fainted away, Joseph turned pale” [255]) within, on the
one hand, claims about obvious social knowledge that prove untenable (Mr. Andrews rather
reasonably but incorrectly insists that he knows that “he had never lost a Daughter by Gypsies,
nor ever had any other Children than Joseph and Pamela” [263]) and, on the other, a social
context already obsessed with distinguishing knowable collective bodies from one another.
Recall the ungenerous parson, for example, who regards “his poor Parishioners…as not of the
same Species with himself” (135), a sentiment later repeated by Lady Booby, assuring her maid
Slipslop that “Thou art a low Creature, of the Andrews breed, a Reptile of a lower Order, a Weed
that grows in the common Garden of Creation.” This prompts Slipslop’s defensive observation,
“your Ladyship talks of Servants as if they were not born of the Christian Specious” (233) that,
missing the mark by a few vowels, nearly confirms the argument that, in its caricature form, it
seeks to refute: communion between these “species” is forced, conspicuously unnatural. (Joseph
Andrews is a novel, by the way, in which the protagonist encounters his father, hears his history,
and does not recognize him [nor is he recognized by him] or sense anything like familiarity.
Recognition comes much later, and is confirmed when Andrews’s true father regards Andrews’s
birthmark – an object like Odysseus’s scar that is both a part of his son and that can be read alone
as a sign – “with Wildness in his Looks” [265].)
In Tom Jones we find two moments of traumatic familiarity. The first occurs in the Man
of the Hill’s narrative. (It is worth digressing to note that, in the Man of the Hill, Fielding likely
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had Crusoe explicitly in mind: first, he represents the social-isolate Crusoe discussed in the first
chapter, telling Jones that in London “you have the advantage of solitude without its
disadvantage; since you may be alone and in company at the same time” [376]. Additionally, in
his actual isolation from society [neglecting, of course, the woman he lives with!], he has
adopted a very Crusoian ensemble, “cloathed with the skin of an ass, made something into the
form of a coat” and “boots on his legs, and a cap on his head, both composed of the skin of some
other animals” [364]. Joking references to outlandish or peculiar dress as evocative of Crusoe are
common throughout the eighteenth century.) In his history, while nursing a wounded victim of
robbery, he “began to recollect the features of [his] father,” and continues: “I did not lose my
being, as my father for a while did, my senses where, however, so overpowered with affright and
surprize, that I am a stranger to what passed during some minutes” (383). The second, another
instance of screaming recognition, occurs when, after a long absence, Sophia finally encounters
Jones at Lady Bellaston’s in London. She first sees him in the mirror and, turning around,
“perceived the reality of the vision: upon which she gave a violent scream, and scarce preserved
herself from fainting” (618).
It is my contention that these moments, of the terror of the other, of the trauma of
familiarity, all reflect, revisit, revise, and reimagine Robinson Crusoe’s encounter with the
footprint, and that they all take up similar questions about the nature of community. Crusoe is
confronted with the extent to which his existence on the island has always been a social
existence, and with his own unthinkable inability to recognize this basic fact. Returning to Kant’s
description of the geometrical figure in the sand, Crusoe is struck by the “trace of a human
being” – in other words, he is confronted with the fact that his isolation has been a mistakenly
imagined state, and with the opportunity to think of himself anew, as a social being on a shared
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space, living among shared resources. A community of other human beings, rational ends, does
not so much become available to him at this moment as it announces that it had been there all
along. He is laboring (and, in brief distraction, failing) to reconcile the increasingly privileged
program of empirical rationalism that signifies his practice of autonomous subjectivity with its
utter failure to disclose the terms that determine his place in the world60 – terms, in particular,
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I expect some will take issue with my casting Robinson Crusoe – a white, male, capitalist
Protestant, mired in the standard imperial ambitions of Defoe’s age and place – as the
centerpiece of the experience of legitimacy in enlightenment thought. My point, of course, is not
that political or social legitimacy in actual fact (whatever that means) primarily proceeds from,
or is ultimately realized within, such a figure, but that, by embodying the experience of social
and political legitimacy in such a way that subsequent writers continually rehearse, these writers
are identifying an important limitation in conceptualizing legitimacy and its experience in social
space. Indeed, one advantage that novelists have over seventeenth- and eighteenth-century
theorists of the social contract is the heterogeneous nature of their voices, representing different
classes, gender identities, races, and regions. Moreover, subsequent novelizations of traumatic
familiarity reveal that Crusoe is limited not only because he is white, male, protestant, capitalist
(which of course would not always have presented itself as a limitation to eighteenth-century
readers), but also because the exceptionalism he ostensibly embodies is not sufficient to resolve
or overcome the empirical problems attending the experience of legitimacy. Crusoe’s
epistemological privilege is clear: one can track for example how obligation in the novel arises in
different ways. For the Spaniards, obligation to Crusoe comes from promises and contracts; for
Friday, it comes from mutual but totally asymmetrical bonds of affection. Religious duty unfurls
for Crusoe (as, Locke insists, and as I discussed in the introduction, it must) in the due course of
rationalizing his existence and his place in the world. The same ideology that privileges Crusoe
as a rational isolate identifying legitimate religion – as opposed to the excess of enthusiasm he
experiences while ships are sinking or earthquakes strike – puts him for the same reasons in an
ideal position from which to deduce political legitimacy, since in both cases it ostensibly
proceeds from the autonomous figure of Cartesian insularity. Crusoe represents the
enlightenment ideal, and we see through him, through his negotiation with legitimacy, one small
but important failure of that ideal. At the same time, many critics like Susan Buck-Morss, Suvir
Kaul, Carole Pateman, Charles W. Mills, and many others acknowledge that the western
tradition of enlightenment thought and novelistic prose in the eighteenth century comes from and
tends to reinforce an ideology that is largely ethnically absolutist or essentialist, racially
exploitative, heteronormative, capitalist, and anti-feminist. To argue that Defoe establishes an
enduring pattern of experience in Robinson Crusoe’s footprint encounter is clearly not meant as
an endorsement of such (to state, I hope, the obvious), but is rather an observation wholly
consistent with long-known claims about an ideology that has since been, and must still be,
rigorously critiqued. I do not say that Defoe invented this experience, attitude, or orientation; and
even in saying that he articulated an early version of such that clearly resonated for subsequent
writers, I obviously do not endorse it. On the contrary, I spell it out more fully, locating it in such
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that these novelists associate with questions of collectivity and legitimacy (conspicuous, as we
have seen, in novels with incest plots). But these scenes offer much more than a negatively
constructed meditation on the difficulties of determining legitimacy. Rather, the recurring terror
of the footprint becomes a means for novelists to confront the elusive role that social experience
in particular plays in such questions, seeming to demand a more stable empirical curriculum of
political legitimacy, or what we might call a metaphysics of legitimacy, that can be codified,
stabilized, and cited as a more or less one-to-one correspondence with objective reality
(incorporating, as it were, social or political legitimacy – suspended in the embarrassing and
precarious ambivalence between myth and history in the pages of social contract theory – into
the rubric of novelistic realism).
In my discussion of the protagonist’s transition from a state of nature, the role of social
experience became problematic in part because it showed itself to be both necessary and severely
underspecified. The authors of the above scenes draw upon the footprint in order to interrogate
the stability of familiarity – or, more precisely, the role of social experience in the
epistemological pursuit of legitimacy – ultimately troubling the liberal, enlightenment premises
of contract requiring empirical continuity in the social individual (continuity, to use my previous
example, in an individual that is first motivated to join into social contract and that must then
verify and evaluate its effectiveness after having done so). Moreover, by upsetting the stabilizing
role of familiarity, and then in seemingly reintroducing social legitimacy despite having
undermined the authority of social experience to determine its terms, these novelists challenge
basic assumptions about a social legitimacy grounded in enlightenment practices, even while
privileging those very practices. The Crusoian exercise of empirical rationalism is
an obviously problematic figure as Crusoe in order to link him and a troubling ideology more
fully and more clearly.
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simultaneously undermined and upheld as a means to creating and determining social and
political legitimacy. How can this be?
It is not my contention that novelists like Burney, Davys, Edgeworth, Inchbald, Fielding,
Defoe, and Radcliffe provide answers to such questions, but that, in dramatizing scenes of
dubious or precarious legitimacy, they call into question the conventional premises according to
which the autonomous individual and the social body are thought to constitute one another,
especially in philosophical and political (that is, non-narrative) discourses. They dramatize the
limited extent to which the privileged agency that authorizes consent can disengage from its
grounding in empirical experience. To frame this narrative problem in terms of the social
contract, these novelists wonder if the agent’s consent to social contract – which ostensibly
sustains its legitimacy – can subordinate his or her inability to recognize its workings
empirically. This is significant because it is precisely such recognition that rational consent
presupposes in the first place. The community, despite the agency that gives it its legitimacy
(such as consent to, and grounded in, its “ontic” component), is, without a clearer understanding
of the role of social experience, imagined: a conclusion that does not accord with the
Enlightenment’s hostility to the imagined, or with the rational mandate of legitimacy.
This last and difficult set of questions about the function of social experience in creating,
recognizing, and sustaining social legitimacy, as well as the extent to which it is both
undermined and reaffirmed in those pursuits, provides an opportunity to pause and address more
explicitly the social experience upon which my reading is built, and in particular my calling it
“traumatic.” For some, this terminology will seem glibly anachronistic, and to be frank this is
partly (but only partly) so. By the eighteenth century, the word trauma was used principally in
medical discourses, usually to signify any kind of open wound. Traumatic, meanwhile, could
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also have meant ameliorative, corrective: something that soothes and heals such a “trauma.” The
contrariety suggested by these two terms neatly captures the contrariety of collective
identification I am describing here: the contrary movements of the social body and the individual
that have been my principle business (constituting one another, doing so by distinguishing each
from the other, etc). To think about familiarity as a “trauma,” then, is to evoke the cohesive
social body that familiarity is intended to evoke, as an objectively recognizable entity, one single
concrete body among others (as in a family among the other families of a neighborhood, or a
nation among other nations), even while insisting that such recognition constitutes a break or a
rupture to that body. “Traumatic” at once reifies the social body as a cohesive, recognizable
object while registering that such reification (entailing the autonomous, liberal individual who
must then extract herself from the social body in order to regard it as an object, as other) requires
acknowledging a rupture precisely to that cohesion.
But frankly I am also happy to allow the anachronistic sense of the word to contaminate
my argument. I invite the absence of the contemporary, popular and clinical meanings of
“traumatic” to become conspicuous, namely because I want the general absence of the
corresponding experience (terror, to put it in simple terms, that inaugurates long-term,
psychological distress) to be equally conspicuous. William James famously described the shock
of certain terrifying events as “‘psychic traumata,’ thorns in the spirit, so to speak” –
psychological “reminiscences” that cannot be easily shaken, and that endure and intrude into the
normal course of one’s daily life (qtd. in Richardson 336). James’s meaning does not appear
until well into the nineteenth century, and so its use in the context of this chapter usefully points
to an enduring sense of psychological disruption and terror in these moments of familiarity that
probably should, but for the most part does not, appear. Why isn’t Defoe “traumatized,” in the
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current sense of the word, by a specter that is so violently intrusive? Why aren’t Lady Betty,
Virginia, Emily, or Moll Flanders, all of whom are so aggressively struck with shock as to
become entirely distracted (shocked nearly to death) afflicted with “thorns” in their spirit? Or, to
pose the question more productively, why are these characters able to overcome, so quickly and
so fully, the unresolved problems that the shock of familiarity imposes upon them? Since it
would seem that answering this question might provide some insight into the role of legitimacy
in these passages, I will return to it below, but I want to return to the novelists first, and to read
more closely two examples of traumatic familiarity that I find especially edifying.
THE LESSON OF FAMILIARITY: ELIZABETH INCHBALD’S A SIMPLE STORY AND
FRANCES BURNEY’S EVELINA
The first of the two scenes I want to consider in occurs in Elizabeth Inchbald’s strange
novel, A Simple Story (1791). Inchbald is particularly illuminating for any analysis of the
protagonist and social experience, given the peculiarities of her characterization. Many critics,
for example, find the roundness of her characters unconvincing. Jo Alyson Parker writes that
“Matilda [the protagonist of the second half of A Simple Story] is less a character in her own
right than an index of features of contemporary fictional heroines” (262), and Dianne Osland
argues that “no character in this novel is able to demonstrate the clarity of motivation that
contributes so much to the comprehensibility and coherence of character in the realist novel”
(89). Nevertheless, Osland couches her discussion of characters’ motives (conscious and
unconscious) within broader questions of characters’ legibility and illegibility, explicitly raising
questions of empiricism and social experience that bring an awareness of Inchbald’s stagecraft to
bear. By the time Inchbald writes A Simple Story, her successful career as a dramatist has given
her an interest in characters whose inner lives are vitally inscribed on their expressive, gestural
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bodies, raising the possibility of interiorities that are either subordinated to (and thus murky and
elusive) or coextensive with (and thus entirely visible to others) whatever meets the reader’s, the
audience’s, or the other characters’ eyes. As Nora Nachumi puts it, addressing a related set of
concerns about interiority and exteriority, “In her plays, novels, and criticism, Inchbald
repeatedly demonstrates that bodies express emotions more authentically and more persuasively
than words alone,” insisting that “a widely recognized system of theatrical gesture manifests
itself in her criticism and fiction” (318).
Thus, Inchbald’s characters are often, like any successful protagonist, fully particular and
individual, but that particularity is theatrical: legible to an extent that easily facilitates social
experience. But what do those social experiences in their theatrical (and thus largely external)
legibility cumulatively signify? Do readers see in them a more “authentic” individuality and, by
extension, a more authentic social relationality? Or a flatness that belies the character’s
individuality, and that by extension poses an obstacle to accessing the terms of his or her social
relationality? Moreover, to the extent that one’s individuality and relationality are mutually
implied (as in “brother of X,” or “citizen of Y,” entailing in each case a rich but specific catalog
of privileges and responsibilities), can either one be determined where the other is not given,
given authentically, and given in such a way that its “authenticity” can be empirically
determined? The theatrical particularity of Inchabld’s characters thus foregrounds the
epistemological conditions under which “legitimacy” is produced and sustained.
Framing “legitimacy” as a dynamic of narrative and character development makes
conceptual difficulties conspicuous for both the subject and the object of social experience. Any
constituent for whom the legitimacy of a social body is an open question must gather from social
experiences the terms according to which legitimacy can be determined; he must also express,
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however, as legibly as possible (see chapter one on Rousseau and the significance of
transparency), contributing to the social experiences of others so that they will know whether he
is an elderly man, for example, or a goblin, or their brother. That the transparency of Inchbald’s
characters translates into flatness, especially in A Simple Story, might thus reflect either a murky
or inadequate interiority of character or the remoteness of a community of legible and
transparent constituents. The problem of Inchbald’s characterization can be reframed: are her
novels problematic because we read her characters as flat, or because, relying upon social
experience as an index to legitimacy, their roundness is premised on the relative legibility and
transparency of the other? Are they flat, or does their roundness consist precisely in the pursuit
of flattening others? One scene in particular lays bare the novel’s interest in consolidating
legitimacy, social experience, and characterization, and it does so in ways that, symptomatically,
resist neat differentiation between flat and round character.
Long after Miss Milner has died, her daughter, Matilda, is allowed to reside in the house
of her father, Lord Elmwood, provided that she never appear before him, never impose upon him
the memory of his beloved but unfaithful Miss Milner. Indeed, she must erase herself, not exist
to him at all. Volume III ends with a dramatic encounter between Matilda and her father (in fact,
as for Crusoe, it is initially a disembodied footstep that she encounters) on “the great staircase” –
Matilda hears “a footstep walking slowly up,” and she sees him:
She felt something like affright before she saw him – but her reason told her she had
nothing to fear, as he was far away. – But now the appearance of a stranger whom she
had never before seen; an air of authority in his looks as well as in the sound of his steps;
a resemblance to the portrait she had seen of him; a start of astonishment which he gave
on beholding her; but above all – her fears confirmed her it was him. – She gave a scream
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of terror – put out her trembling hands to catch the balustrades on the stairs for support –
missed them – and fell motionless into her father’s arms. (273 – 274 emphasis
Inchbald’s)
Again, the predominant theme in this encounter is terror, and again reflecting on this terror
brings our attention back to the problems of collective identification. Elmwood Castle is
paradoxical, a space of relational self-contradiction: it is above all a shared, a filial space,
rigorously regulated by the directives of a father and the obedience of a daughter; yet it is
sustained as such only by the complete suppression of every trace or implication of its being a
shared, filial space.61 Since the household’s organizing principle is Lord Elmwood’s command

61

The odd nature of Elmwood Castle’s society has been cited frequently, often with an eye
towards Inchbald’s allegedly artificial or awkward plotting. More direct critiques of the estate’s
social space tend to do more justice to Inchbald’s political objectives, evaluating, as Jo Alyson
Parker writes, the possibilities for “female power” in ‘unnatural’ spaces of excessive mediation:
“The Elmwood household functions as a perverse version of the family unit, for it relies upon
substitutes to maintain an intercourse among the various members…the convoluted lines of
communication reinforcing our sense of the unnatural.” For Parker, however, what is unnatural
are the “constraints” Elmwood imposes upon himself, as obstacles to the free expression and
realization of his suppressed fatherly fondness (263 – a reading, it is worth noting, which
contemporary readers largely shared: see for example Barbauld’s preface to A Simple Story in
The British Novels, quoted in Dianne Osland, 91, note 29). Parker thus takes for granted the
normative script of filial negotiation privileged by conventional eighteenth-century domestic
fiction (why is the use of “substitutes” necessarily “perverse” and “unnatural?”), but in doing so
she does not account for, first, how such a narrative comes to be privileged in the first place; or,
second, how Elmwood simultaneously feeds (by registering their “natural” gravity) and rejects
(by refusing to act upon his fondness) such conventions. By reading the space as a selfcontradiction, however, rather than merely problematic or poorly contrived, I emphasize the
conditions according to which legitimacy itself is founded and determined by agents in
enlightenment thought (Kant’s practical philosophy, for example, posits that an action is ethical,
and can become law [universally, objectively valid] only insofar as it does not contradict itself in
its extension from self-directed to universal). The difference in our readings is between one in
which a social context’s normative conventions naturally arise, as if objectively valid (but may
be ignored by unnatural agents), and one in which the emergence of such conventions is already
highly fraught. Conventional domestic fiction naturalizes the patriarchal command, after all, as
much as if not more than fatherly fondness, so the point for me is less how “unnatural” this space
is than how difficult it becomes to determine such ostensibly simple things as what qualifies as
“natural” in the first place.
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that he never see or hear any trace of his daughter’s existence, Matilda’s perfect and complete
consummation of daughterhood (a set of responsibilities and privileges bound to this specific
relational identity) corresponds directly to the perfect and complete suppression of daughterhood
(the very constituency or relationality that imposes these responsibilities in the first place); and
the command that organizes Elmwood’s patriarchal fatherhood resolves itself in dismantling the
very relationality from which that command proceeds. In chapter two, I used Locke’s example of
the father to question the extent to which social contract reconciles the demands of the type and
the individual; for Locke, such a reconciliation appears necessary. Inchbald complicates social
contract’s mandate for reconciling the particular and the type by putting duty and command in a
context of explicitly contradictory relationality. Her narrative provides a context in which the
type and the particular simultaneously authorize and cancel one another. Performing their
relational identities, each character severs any empirical trace of his or her operative relationality
(I will examine a similar example of contradictory relationality in Clarissa in the following
chapter).
The society of Elmwood Castle is bracketed by two narratives that help to explain its
contradictions. The first half of the novel relates Elmwood’s (called Dorriforth before inheriting
his title) relationship with his ward, Miss Milner, who resents his Catholic severity but who
gradually comes to love him. Eventually they marry, but while Elmwood attends to business in
the West Indies, she lapses into frivolity and sexual license, finally exiling herself in guilt from
the Castle on his return. Livid, he banishes innocent Matilda as well. The narrator cites this
banishment as central to a defining shift in Elmwood’s character: “the pious, the good, the tender
Dorriforth, is become a hard-hearted tyrant” (tyranny, of course, being the most recognizable
form of illegitimacy in early modern and enlightenment political theory, alongside the state of
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nature). Now an “example of implacable rigour and injustice” (194 – 195), the new-minted
tyrant’s first business is revenge, and he determines to duel with Milner’s lover, Frederick, who
“was called upon to answer for his conduct, and was left upon the spot where they met, so
maimed, and defaced with scars, as never again to endanger the honour of a husband” (198).
Ostensibly, a kind of justice is secured here. The social body’s stability is secured, specifically
since a threat to other imagined husbands is neutralized (“the honour of a husband” is a
speculative phrase that functions primarily to reaffirm the value of a categorical abstraction).
Moreover, like “father,” it is a categorical abstraction that Elmwood both does and does not
embody, since “the honour of a husband” is a notion that refers directly to him (to his wife’s
betrayal and the abuse of his honor that motivates this duel) while also excluding him (since, first
of all, he has already surrendered any claim to a share in his wife’s and daughter’s lives and,
second, the “danger” from which he protects honor cannot apply to his, already abused). Thus
Elmwood, confusing the individual with the category, confuses revenge with justice.62
The tyranny that defines him in the duel thus more or less corresponds to the
contradictory nature of his fatherhood: it is an abstraction, a flat characterization that he exploits,
mining it for its authority, but he also extracts himself from its ‘natural’ affective and categorical
imperatives. The approximation of tyrannical justice with half-borne fatherhood becomes clearer
when considering the narrative that resolves these contradictions. At the novel’s conclusion, after
Elmwood makes good on his dictate that Matilda must be banished from the house if she ever
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Contract theorists often associate revenge with the state of nature and justice with legitimate
civil society. Locke’s description of natural right and the state of war, for example, closely
approximates Elmwood’s motives: “every man, in the state of nature, has a power to kill a
murderer, both to deter others from doing the like injury…and also to secure men from the
attempts of a criminal” (chpt 2, § 11). This power is only removed when the appeal to a common
judge becomes possible – and law, common to all citizens, stripped of the arbitrary imperatives
that feed revenge, legitimizes the judge.
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appear before him, she is abducted by the rakish Lord Margrave who exploits her “unprotected”
state in exile. Informed of the abduction, Elmwood quickly sets out to rescue her and,
encountering her in Margrave’s apartment, immediately recovers his fatherly tenderness: “That
moment her father entered – and with the unrestrained fondness of a parent, folded her in his
arms” (328). Grammatically, this scene and the duel both evoke the individual and the
categorical, but in this reconciliation, rather than departing from “the honour of a husband,”
Elmwood fully embodies “the…fondness of a parent.” This final encounter, so strikingly
different in tone from their meeting on the stairs, signals the complete reformation of our tyrant,
which is then immediately confirmed when Margrave asks “if you have any demands on me,” to
which Elmwood (who is perhaps still embracing Matilda) replies: “Would you make me an
executioner? The law shall be your only antagonist” (329). He now fully embodies both of the
categorical abstractions from which he had departed, satisfying their respective terms of
fondness and justice.
The return to legitimacy – signaled by the effacement of arbitrary judicial tyranny and the
embodiment of normative, relational fatherhood – seems to correspond with the reconciliation of
the particular and the type (or perhaps, at least for Elmwood himself, a subordination of the
particular to the type). The invocation of law makes this reconciliation especially legible,
particularly given its contrast with Elmwood’s prior duel. But how does one account for this
legitimacy? What if anything differentiates confusing the particular and the type, as Elmwood the
tyrant does, from reconciling the particular and the type, as Elmwood the father does? Returning
to the vocabulary of The Reform’d Coquet from the opening of this chapter, does the difference
between these two subjectivities lie simply in Elmwood’s “beliefs?” If so, what conditions those
beliefs? In what sense does an individual’s belief about legitimacy become a part of the “ontic”
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component upon which legitimacy is calculated by others? How do these characters make
legitimacy legible in the social body for others to see and to recognize? Inchbald makes none of
this clear.
After all, interpreting Matilda’s rescue as the resolution of “unnatural” family
relationality, previously associated with tyranny and illegitimacy, only subordinates her own
experience to his, potentially reinforcing the arbitrary paternalism that has already given
troubling shape to their social contact. What does she experience of this new-found legitimacy?
When she sees her father rush into Margrave’s apartment, she is not much less conflicted than
when she meets him on the stairs: “Her extreme, her excess of joy…was still, in part, repressed
by his awful presence – The apprehensions to which she had been accustomed, kept her timid
and doubtful – she feared to speak, or clasp him in return for his embrace” (328). Even the next
day, when the immediate threat of assault is gone, and the narrator has shifted to a tone of
relative calm and resolution, Matilda’s experience of the filial bond with her father is qualified
with subordination, fear, and constraint: “When Matilda was ready to join her father in the next
room, she felt a tremor seize her, that made it almost impossible to appear before him…and she
knew not how to dare to speak, or look on him with that freedom her affection warranted.” Now,
“embarrassment at meeting on terms of easy intercourse” with one whom, we are told, she used
to fear, makes it difficult for her to adjust her behavior and affections to their newly legitimate
(“warranted”) relationship – and it makes, in particular, “freedom” difficult (330).63
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For discussions of freedom in the novel, see especially Terry Castle, Masquerade and
Civilization (290 – 330) and Patricia Meyer Spacks, Desire and Truth. See also Barbara Judson,
“The Psychology of Satan,” which compellingly reads in A Simple Story – depicting “in vivid
detail the process by which the psyche enslaves itself, a form of bondage [Inchbald] portrays as
the inability to love (602) – a reimagining of the problems of freedom engaged in Paradise Lost.
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Notwithstanding Matilda’s embarrassment, her apparent fear of her father remains
conspicuous. That her fears at this later meeting are wrong, that they signal a misjudgment of
social knowledge, is significant. In her father, like the public for Some Man, she senses the
specter of a tyrant; her own reluctance to approach him signifies a lack of freedom in which her
daughterly affections and behavior are still suspended. Her fear as a signal of misjudgment is
especially significant given that, in their meeting on the stairs, it is precisely her fears that
mediate social knowledge to her. For all the empirical evidence and rational deduction
catalogued on the staircase – his likeness to the portrait, his air of authority – it is “her fears
[that] confirmed her it was him.” Social knowledge, the contours of the objective social body
that he and she constitute, comes to Matilda through eminently subjective, affective channels.
Since the social knowledge her fear imparts is correct, the staircase scene seems to problematize
the relationship between subjective and objective, especially with respect to the “ontic
component” of collective identification. But that this scene is associated, moreover, with a state
of tyranny and illegitimacy – and that her fears will later misjudge the social body in a state of
legitimate filial sociality – does not stabilize but rather undermines entirely any empirical
program according to which different individuals can freely and rationally consent. Like Lady
Betty in The Reform’d Coquet, Matilda must now, in the state of legitimacy, come to “believe” –
despite her fears and tremors – that her father is not a tyrant, goblin, stranger, etc. But how?
What is the nature of this belief and how does it come to be privileged? What is the relationship
between the agency of “belief” and legitimacy, such as the agency of rational “consent?”
The second, final example of traumatic familiarity I would like to explore helps to
articulate precisely the relationship between belief and legitimacy, including consent. It comes
from a well-known passage in Frances Burney’s Evelina, following the protagonist’s appeal for
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recognition by her father, John Belmont, for the first time. As her father has refused to
acknowledge her as his offspring, her expressed objective in this meeting is precisely to establish
her legitimacy. For his part, Belmont mockingly insists to Evelina’s advocate, Mrs. Selwyn, that
he “just had the satisfaction of breakfasting with” his daughter, taking for granted (as any
perfectly reasonable individual would!) that he knows the members of which his family consists
– dismissing as absurd, that is, any suggestion that his faculties, his frameworks, his empirical
understanding of his position in a shared space (and therefore of that shared space itself), might
not sufficiently present to him the most basic facts that situate him and stabilize his social
identity (“father,” for example, of person X). It is with no trace of doubt, but with sheer – even
triumphant – confidence that he knows who he is and who his family members are, that he does
not object to meeting Evelina, and he allows her to be brought to him. Evelina narrates the
encounter, which I reproduce in full:
Then, taking my trembling hand, [Selwyn] led me forward. I would have withdrawn it,
and retreated, but as he advanced instantly towards me, I found myself already before
him.
What a moment for your Evelina! – an involuntary scream escaped me, and covering
my face with my hands, I sunk on the floor.
He had, however, seen me first; for in a voice scarce articulate, he exclaimed, “My
God! Does Caroline Evelyn64 still live!”
Mrs. Selwyn said something, but I could not listen to her; and, in a few minutes, he
added, “Lift up thy head, -- if my sight has not blasted thee, -- lift up thy head, thou
image of my long-lost Caroline!”
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Like Elmwood, Belmont sees the protagonist’s long-dead mother.
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Affected beyond measure, I half arose, and embraced his knees, while yet on my own.
“Yes, yes,” cried he, looking earnestly in my face, “I see, I see thou art her child! she
lives – she breathes – she is present to my view; --Oh God, that she indeed lived! – Go,
child, go” added he, wildly starting and pushing me from him, “take her away, Madam, -I cannot bear to look at her!” And then, breaking hastily from me, he rushed out of the
room.
John Belmont then, “with a violence almost frantic…ran up stairs.” This filial revelation (that is
only a revelation for one of the characters) constitutes the novel’s climax, and it ends with this
image of the retreat of a violently distracted father, a figure that bears a striking resemblance to
Robinson Crusoe, fleeing into his “Castle,” it bears repeating, “like one pursued”: “never
frighted Hare fled to Cover, or Fox to Earth, with more Terror of Mind than [Crusoe] to this
Retreat.” Evelina and her father both experience this trauma: the “involuntary scream” and the
sinking to floor are no less suggestive of Crusoe “out of himself” than the scarce articulate
ramblings and frantic agitation of her father. In a passage that is both impossibly distant from
and highly evocative of the footprint scene, we see once again the frenzied recourse to sense
perception (and the attending failure of sense perception: “I could not listen to her”), the demand
to look and to be looked at, and the collapsing of certainty through familiarity (he recognizes her
to be his daughter) with the uncertainty of the imagination: he recognizes her dead mother, a
footprint (which Crusoe calls an “Apparition”) that both familiarizes and estranges, stabilizes
and destabilizes.
This moment, like many of the others from this chapter, challenges two basic claims
about social and political legitimacy, one of which has long since lost its legs, but the other of
which still circulates. In the first, political legitimacy is derived from filial legitimacy, since the
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history of the state begins for many political theorists with a history of the family.65 The
affective, reproductive, rational, and self-/other-interested bonds that constitute the family in its
earliest historical stages are extended outward to nonfamily members as the population increases,
as more sophisticated networks of interest are drawn, and as more complex apparatus of stability
are required. The organization and legitimization of the family unit follows from the natural,
patriarchal and reproductive impulses of sex and child rearing, and any subsequent consolidation
of family units into increasingly large, organized social units follows more or less seamlessly.
Bolingbroke, for example, writes that “we are led” by “instinct,” “information,” “habit, and
finally by reason” to “civil through natural society, and are fitted to be members of one, by
having been members of the other” (45), arguing that “it cannot be doubted…that the first
societies of men were those of families formed by nature and governed by natural law, nor that
kingdoms and states were the second” (51). For Bolingbroke, people are – and have always been
– naturally social, since they have always been members of families, the primary state of human
life, and thus this primary sociality remains intact as an objectively available truth through social
and political collectivity. Similarly, Sir Thomas Craig writes “that the first Societies of men
began in Families, after that in the Union of more Families together, Nature alone being their
guide” (Book I, pg 14), and economic writer Thomas Mortimer argues that “The first societies,
and those which compose all others, are family societies. These are natural, and the better they
are regulated the more easily and the more surely will political societies, whose component parts
they are, be put and maintained under good regulations” (175). Elements of this argument
survive with Pufendorf, who writes that “[m]arriage may be called the first example of social life
and at the same time the seed-bed of the human race” (120), adding that “heads of households
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See Locke’s and Pufendorf’s arguments, for example, outlined in the previous chapter.
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before they entered into states had exercised in their homes a sort of princely authority” (126),
ultimately insisting, however, that “we must…investigate why men have not been content with
those first small associations [families, including their slaves], but have constituted large
associations which go by the name of states,” since “this is the basis from which we must derive
the justification of the duties which go with men’s civil state” (132).
Of course, the primarily filial picture of social organization does not resolve the problem
of political or social legitimacy, since it merely takes the legitimacy of the family unit – and the
means by which the individual is able to determine such legitimacy – for granted. Political or
social legitimacy, these theories suggest, being derived from a natural form, is an objectively real
thing. And being a real thing (grounded, no less, in familiarity), it can be determined, recognized,
and empirically verified (the claims that validate family trees, for example). But writers, and
particularly novelists such as Frances Burney, Henry Fielding, and Mary Davys, undermine
precisely these two assumptions. John Belmont, insisting that he had “breakfasted with” his
daughter previously, embodies the possibility – so frequently embodied in eighteenth-century
fiction – that one might be mistaken about whom one thinks is one’s daughter, father, or spouse.
What one thinks of as one’s natural family unit may in fact be an aggregate of stowaways and
bastards; those whom one recognizes as fathers and sisters may be the fathers and sisters of
friends or total strangers. Conversely, a total stranger, even one whom one has closely
scrutinized, may turn out to be one’s brother, mother, father, longtime sexual partner, etc. Filial
legitimacy is no more secure, natural, or objective than social or political legitimacy, so
determining legitimacy by arguing that the former is primary and the latter derivative simply
begs the question.
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But it is the novelists’ objection to the second claim about legitimacy that is more
interesting, since it is a claim that is still widely favored. Legitimacy, this claim goes, is derived
from consent. For Locke (who in rejecting Filmer argues precisely against the central premises
of the filial model of legitimacy), “when any number of men have, by the consent of every
individual, made a community, they have thereby made that community one body, with the
power to act as one body” (142). Indeed, that there can be no legitimacy without consent seems
fairly obvious. On its face, it is hard to argue with this claim. But, Burney and other novelists
seem to suggest, even if it is true that where there is legitimacy there must be consent, it does not
follow that where there is consent there must be legitimacy.
Fictional treatments of traumatic familiarity feature several distinctly problematic aspects
of consent. First, “consent” does not signal as clear and stable an expression in the eighteenth
century as one might hope. Indeed, novelistic fiction played a role in broader attempts both to
stabilize and to problematize various meanings and manifestations of consent. Toni Bowers
argues that seduction stories, for example, engaged with an attempt to establish a stable basis for
recognizing and expressing consent and resistance, arguing not only that “seduction tales…could
be used as ‘cover stories’ for otherwise dangerous or incendiary ideas,” and that “the central
preoccupation of seduction stories during the eighteenth century was less seduction per se than
the effort to define the relative agencies of persons in relations of power and subordination,” but
that, in this context, “courtship, seduction, and rape tended to overlap, like the consent,
complicity, and resistance that supposedly distinguished them.” That Evelina was signally
interested in the slippery nuance and uncertainty of consent is made clear by the abundance of
ambivalent, sometimes uneasy qualifications of consent that continually recur in its pages (“I
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was obliged to consent,” “I was obliged to submit” [36], “I have been almost compelled to
consent” [135], “Miss Branghton was obliged to yield” [159], etc).
The second problem of consent featured by passages of trauma, following closely from
the first, is that even in its more (ostensibly) straightforward occurrences, it provides no more
direct or authentic access to the “ontic component” of community than do “natural”
presumptions of family ties. Locke, contributing to a shift already present in Pufendorf, puts the
legitimacy of consent in explicit opposition to presumptions of filial legitimacy, writing that “the
society betwixt” family members and their slaves “is far different from a politic society” (135).
Jonathan Kramnick has spelled out specifically what consent entails for Locke, highlighting in
particular the marginality of expressed consent and the corresponding centrality of tacit consent.
Locke, he writes, “builds his model of political legitimacy on [a] notion of unspoken and implied
consent.” Kramnick points to some of the implications of this theory in Locke’s Second Treatise:
“By participating in a money economy, we consent to the capacity of money to express value;
and, once we consent to the value of money, we also consent to a society of unequal wealth and
power” (173). None of this is conscious, which enables Locke to solve the perennially difficult
question of individuals’ consent, even where it is never expressed, to governments that they are
born into. By extension, the legitimacy of such arrangements of material value and their
corresponding inequalities proceeds directly from (and exclusively from) tacit consent, which is
constantly performed in the living of daily life. Unlike the money itself (which is always at least
ostensibly a deferral of, or reference to, objective, quantifiable, material wealth), the actions that
signal consent do not refer to objective conditions of legitimacy but, rather, constitute these
conditions. “I act as if I consent,” Kramnick writes, “and that is sufficient” (175).
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It is immediately clear how novelists problematize Locke’s (otherwise compelling and
necessary) theory of tacit consent. For what better demonstrates both the performance of such
tacit consent, a la Locke, and its total failure to generate or index legitimacy, than a gentleman
breakfasting with (whom he thinks is) his daughter? Moreover, what, in Locke’s theory of
consent, authorizes Lady Betty to “believe” that the man before her is her brother, and not
(conclusions that also proceed from her “beliefs”) a goblin or an elderly man? What authorizes
her to distinguish the former belief from the latter two? Consent, the novelists suggest, is at best
merely an index, pointing (but never very clearly) to prior conditions of legitimacy external to
the closed system of pedestrian, intersubjective exchanges among familiars in a shared space.
Rather than constituting legitimacy, or enabling legitimacy, it can only indicate one’s “beliefs”
about legitimacy, and these beliefs may be entirely wrong.
Evelina makes all of this clear, providing along the way about as good a counterexample
to Daniel Deronda as any, exposing how central Deronda’s sense of attachment really is. John
Belmont’s “objective” notion of family – that most basic and “natural” form of social
organization – collapses before him, as does the authority of any “consent” he has ever
provided.66 Indeed, moreover, the now undermined “ontic” component of his community is the
same with which he purchased, understood, and performed his own identity. Mere statements of
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Critics who ignore this fact tend to misjudge Belmont’s character, and sometimes to overstate
his cruelty (evidenced less by his treatment of Evelina than of her late mother), in a way that
highlights the basic stakes of our arguments here. Virginia H. Cope, for example, rightly
foregrounds the economic implications of Evelina’s illegitimacy, drawing upon the role affect
plays in economic negotiations in Locke’s Second Treatise to argue that, “in the second meeting,
Evelina demands that Sir John Belmont participate in the affective economy” that will lead,
according to natural and then civil law, to the security of her inheritance. But this claim does not
register, first, the intensity of Belmont’s affective reaction to Evelina or, second, the possibility
that he has long been a participant in precisely such an economy, albeit with his (mistakenly)
presumed, rather than his actual daughter. The affective economy, thus, does not provide the
stability that Locke, Evelina, and perhaps Cope suggests that it does, partially because it
presumes a continuity between naturally and civically objective legitimacy (74).
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bare fact – I had breakfast with my daughter today – turn on their speaker such that he becomes
entirely alienated not only from the “objective” relational claims they carry (“my daughter” is a
claim that implicitly asserts one’s ability to recognize and distinguish one collective body as an
object “really” and knowably separate from others) but from himself: first, from the “I” that
understands itself in reference to those relational claims and, second, from the authority (no less
“objective”) from which claims about one’s self and the world are possible in the first place. In
other words, John Belmont, straddling the epistemological statuses of both the individual and the
type, taking for granted that they are the same, watches them both collapse beneath him: he is
alienated from himself once as a person determined by an objectively knowable relational type
among others and again as the kind of rational, autonomous agent who is therefore and to that
extent capable of distinguishing and understanding the world as constructed of such objectively
knowable, determining features.
How is legitimacy to be recovered in such a context? The contemporary meaning of
“trauma” can be brought more directly to bear here. For Belmont, Evelina’s familiarity is at once
the source of trauma that destabilizes his identity and, if more obscurely, the tantalizing
suggestion that some elusive foundation for “actual” legitimation (and thus stability) exists,
somewhere. After all (and this I find endlessly strange), he is satisfied! Even knowing that he is
capable of mistaking the most basic and fundamental principles of his social life and identity
does not, as one might expect, lead him to doubt that he might not encounter, at some point in the
future, a young woman more familiar than Evelina – more probably, we might say, his “actual”
daughter. John Belmont does not learn the lesson of Evelina’s familiarity. It reveals to him that
his place within his supposed family – and the family itself – was false (that even the most
objective, “natural,” and ostensibly basic categories of an organized world are open to
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unperceived manipulation and error), but it also reinforces the fiction that his true place and true
family can be recovered and recognized as really existent. But in what sense? His access to those
truths – as an autonomous agent, as a known and acknowledged head of family – has already
been (I would argue irreversibly) disturbed. For him, her familiarity seems to point in the
direction of an objectively real existence, of “real” social organization and collective identity,
even as it severs his access to any such reality by showing him how tenuous – how imaginary in
the sense enlightenment thought typically resists – its foundations must ultimately be. And, like
Belmont, most readers are satisfied that the question of legitimacy has been resolved. Villars’s
account seems satisfactory, and (as in A Simple Story) Evelina’s and her father’s fears seem to
“confirm” this account. But why?
Burney’s climactic encounter brings to mind another canonical struggle to stabilize one’s
identity in the face of uncertain and uneasy experiences, to which we turn now by way of
conclusion. In a key moment of the first book of A Treatise of Human Nature, Hume writes that
“In every judgment, which we can form concerning probability, as well as concerning
knowledge, we ought always to correct the first judgment, deriv’d from the nature of the object,
by another judgment, deriv’d from the nature of the understanding.” Following Hume’s logic,
Belmont ought upon seeing his probable daughter to have reflected more explicitly not only on
his changing relational identity, but on the faculties by which he – thus far inaccurately – creates,
understands, and performs them. “As demonstration,” Hume continues, “is subject to the control
of probability, so is probability liable to a new correction by a reflex act of the mind, wherein the
nature of our understanding, and our reasoning from the first probability becomes our objects.”
The problem, Hume concludes, is that when doubt occurs it becomes reflexive, such that doubt
of one’s doubt necessarily arises, challenging the initial judgment and eventually the very
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capacity to judge: “Having found in every probability, beside the original uncertainty inherent in
the subject, a new uncertainty deriv’d from the weakness of that faculty, which judges, and
having adjusted these two together, we are oblig’d by our reason to add a new doubt deriv’d
from the possibility of error in the estimation we make of the truth and fidelity of our faculties.”
Certainty, anything like the objective, becomes impossible here, to such an extent that, he
concludes, “When I reflect on the natural fallibility of my judgment, I have less confidence in my
opinions, than when I only consider those objects concerning which I reason; and when I proceed
still farther, to turn the scrutiny against every successive estimation I make of my faculties, all
the rules of logic require a continual diminution, and at last a total extinction of belief and
evidence” (1.4.1.5-6).67
Hume helps us to see the stakes of social experience in Evelina and its version of
traumatic familiarity; Evelina, meanwhile, provides a glimpse of an alternative to conceptual
(Cartesian, Platonic) legitimacy as sought by Crusoe and Some Man. But while this alternative
makes explicit the dangers of, as I put it above, learning the lesson of Evelina’s familiarity, it
does not do so by offering a more stable or objective foundation for collective identity,
legitimacy, or social experience.
AGAINST A METAPHYSICS OF LEGITIMACY
When one reaches the conclusion of the first book of Hume’s Treatise of Human Nature,
she finds herself on familiar territory, confronting once again the “forlorn solitude” of an
interlocutor “not being able to mingle and unite in society.” Hume explains that, like Robinson
Crusoe (a reference that Hume does not make explicitly), he “has been expell’d from all human
commerce, and left utterly abandon’d and disconsolate.” But Hume extends this solitude much
67

David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, ed. David Fate Norton and Mary J. Norton
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175

further. In contrast to Robinson Crusoe tracing the familiarity of a human footprint – confirming
precisely its humanness, at least twice, in terror – Hume traces, in himself, something deeply
inhuman, unfamiliar: “some strange uncouth monster” who “wou’d run into the crowd for shelter
and warmth; but cannot prevail with myself to mix with [to impose, we might say] such
deformity” (1.4.7.2). It is not simply that such “deformity” would impose discomfort or distress
onto others; nor is solitude, as he writes later, “the greatest punishment we can suffer” (2.2.5.15)
merely because it makes one miserable. Rather, Hume’s monstrous solitude is an indication that
he has left the “natural” commerce explicitly constitutive of human contact. He makes this clear
early, by conflating the psychological and physiological effects of sociability. In the
entertainment of others, he writes,
the mind…awakes, as it were, from a dream: The blood flows with a new tide: the heart
is elevated: And the whole man acquires a vigour, which he cannot command in his
solitary and calm moments. Hence company is naturally so rejoicing, as presenting the
liveliest of all objects, viz. a rational and thinking being like ourselves, who
communicates to us all the actions of his mind; makes us privy to his inmost sentiments
and affections; and lets us see, in the very instant of their production, all the emotions,
which are caus’d by an object. (2.2.4.4, emphasis added)
His narrative at this point obviously does not correspond to those that posit a transition from the
state of nature,68 yet we see how, for Hume, humanness (even in its most mechanistic, Hobbesian
formulations) is roughly interchangeable with sociability, such that solitude and unsociability –
monstrosity – confine one to a status of essential illegitimacy. Engagement with others, intimate
exchange, follows from and constitutes human nature. By evoking monstrosity, Hume argues
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For Hume’s narrative corresponding to these, see 3.2.2.
176

that he is able to recognize a set of conditions under which delegitimization (of claims about
collective identification that that are true and necessary, and that include oneself) necessarily
follows.
There two aspects of Hume’s isolation that I wish to emphasize here; the first relating to
the extent to which Hume represents the individual’s existence in the world as essentially
subjective, and the second to the extent of the world’s essential objectivity. In the first, Hume’s
critique of metaphysics leaves him in a position of advancing a strictly empiricist picture of
epistemology/morality that puts heavy stress on the single, fully-wrought individual with (and
with only, in an important sense) a richly elaborated inner life of affects and sense-perceptions.
Even in reflecting upon the most distant concepts, “the utmost limits of the universe,” he argues,
“we never really advance a step beyond ourselves” (1.2.6.8). In such a work, it seems, the very
archetypal character presupposed by the rationalist contract theorists is technically impossible;
Hume’s arguments about social organization can go no further than what can belong to any
particular, experiencing individual, i.e., the protagonist. Taken simply, such a position – in which
all knowledge and belief (and the complex ideas of which they consist) can be traced to primary
ideas of sense perceptions – threatens to reduce the protagonist to the subjective idealism of
George Berkeley. Hume’s resolution to this problem, as we shall see, is to further advance the
authority of such subjective, internal content. In other words, it is by advancing, and not
retreating from, subjective interiority that Hume rejects Berkeley’s radical skepticism and
reconciles the experiencing subject with collectivity: not a type (like “father”), but a “general
view.”
The second noteworthy aspect of Hume’s isolation is the extent to which his monstrosity
at the end of book one corresponds with a rejection of something like natural law, a concept
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typically understood, by definition, as one that is universally valid, and to that extent prior to
individual experience and therefore objective. “There is a general course of nature in human
actions,” he writes, including sociability, “as well as in the operations of the sun and the climate”
(2.3.1.10).69 This “general course of nature” entirely qualifies commonly understood notions of
liberty to such an extent that we can make no distinction between natural necessity as it
determines the material and the moral world (see 2.3.1. 15 – 17).70 That is, gravity and
sociability are necessary to an equal degree according to their respective sciences. The sort of
monstrosity he proposes, therefore, formally resembles those aspects of natural law theory,
especially pronounced in Locke, for whom self-preservation and the preservation of “the rest of
mankind”71 are dependent – not conflicting – dictates of natural law. And since our recognition
of natural law (for Locke) is what distinguishes us from the animals, to reject natural law is to
“trespass against the whole species,”72 to estrange one’s self from the human community, to
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Though I will turn shortly to Hume’s notion of “objectivity,” it seems worth noting here, in the
context of claims that collapse physical and psychological necessity, that Hume argues that he
does not “ascribe to matter, that intelligible quality, which is supposed to lie in matter” but rather
ascribes “to matter, that intelligible quality, call it necessity or not, which…must allow or belong
to the will.” He changes, “therefore, nothing in the receiv’d systems, with regard to the will, but
only with regard to material objects” (2.3.2.4). We will have more to say below about how Hume
understands the material world and its relationship to the subject.
70
For a thoughtful and thorough discussion of determinism in Hume, see Peter Millican,
“Hume’s Determinism.”
71
Locke, Second Treatise, (102: Chpt 2, P 6).
72
Locke, (103: chpt 2, p 8). Kirstie M. McClure locates this logic explicitly within the
framework by which Locke attempts to establish conceptual – as opposed to historical –
legitimacy (“order was preeminently conceived in moralistic rather than sociological or historical
terms” [5]), arguing that natural law was “defined by [God’s] purposes and expressive of his
will, but the uniqueness of the human place within this architecture required that the rules
prescribed to human agents differ in kind from all the rest,” such that rejecting this law
constitutes a rejection of that privileged human place (37). It is this argument, according to
Charles W. Mills, by which supposedly liberal theories of social contract are able to exclude
nonwhites as “subpersons,” “biologically destined never to penetrate the normative rights ceiling
established for them below white persons” (17). Mills is drawing roughly upon Carole Pateman,
who shows that a similar logic is at work in suspending women’s rights to enter certain (public)
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make of one’s self Locke’s equivalent of the above “strange uncouth monster.” (Indeed, as David
Collings argues, by the end of the eighteenth century analogies between plebeian
“counterpower” and the monstrous body by writers like Burke are intended precisely to
delegitimize or negate plebeian political claims by making “visible the potential violence once
deferred in early modern reciprocity” – a deferral upon which the functioning legitimacy of early
modern society depended [14].)
Hume breaks with Locke, however, by dissociating natural law (which is not quite a law
in the same sense anymore, and for precisely this reason) exclusively with reason:73 in fact,
unchecked reason for Hume leads us to uneasy, and thus unnatural, conclusions.74 Moreover,
while judgment as Locke understands it is representative and can therefore be mistaken, affect
has no representative content and can thus never be wrong (unless its exercise follows a mistaken
judgment of fact). Affect is thus not only more important for Hume than for Locke; rather, he
argues, “Reason is, and ought only to be the slave of the passions, and can never pretend to any
other office than to serve and obey them”75 (2.3.3.4; Hume argues that what Locke and others

contracts, even as their necessary consent to the (private) marriage contract qualifies this logic
(see especially chapter 3, “Contract, the Individual and Slavery,” 39 – 76).
73
Locke writes that “The state of nature has a law of nature to govern it, which obliges every
one: and reason, which is that law…” etc. chpt 2, p 6.
74
In this capacity he plays an important role in developing theories of moral sentiment and
economic sociability that reach maturity in the work of his friend, Adam Smith, according to
whom, in one of his best-known formulations, one contributes to social well-being unconsciously
by furthering one’s self-interests, linking the social and the personal in ways not immediately
recognizable to the reasoning mind (Hume treats this principle most explicitly in 3.2.2). Indeed,
Pack J. Spencer and Eric Schliesser argue recently that Smith is more “Humean” than Hume,
especially regarding the centrality of the passion of resentment in Smith’s account of justice.
75
This well-known and absolute statement has not gone unchallenged, however. For a recent
discussion of reason directing the passions in Hume see Nathan Brett and Katharina Paxman,
“Reason in Hume’s Passions.” Brett and Paxman undermine their otherwise compelling
argument by putting too much stress on Hume’s claim that a passion disappears once we realize
that its fulfillment is impossible. While this example may appear to show affect following
reason, it seems just as likely that the passion occurred only as a result of a reasoning that was
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typically attribute to cool reason, especially whatever is apparently self-evident, is actually the
product of calm passions: see 2.3.4.8). This reprioritization, of course, changes the experiencing
subject’s relationship with objective reality, and thus, for our purposes, his or her relationship
with those premises that authorize claims of real legitimacy.
At the heart of Hume’s social and moral philosophy is his “metaphysics” (his system of
empiricism, actually, which in rejecting claims about things-in-themselves is ultimately unmetaphysical), which are validated ultimately by his meticulously tracing the most basic
assumptions people associate with complex experiences back to a need to stabilize a subjectivity
that otherwise finds itself in constant anxiety, fear, or even what we might call “trauma.” We
create a “fiction of a continu’d existence” (1.4.2.36), for example, that we assign to objects (or to
the objects that, in a related fiction, correspond externally to those of our sense perceptions) even
when we look away from them because to do otherwise would be to exist in a state, not of
irrationalism, but of anxiety.76 In fact, he argues, continued, external existence is inconsistent
with our understanding, according to which each glimpse of the sun is a new “object,” and these
objects cannot be assumed to be identical. By analogy, the epistemological exigence that such
assumptions address is more closely related to Crusoe’s panic about the footprint than to his
methodical determination to supply his need for chairs or boats or pottery. “Nothing is more
certain from experience,” Hume writes,
than that any contradiction either to the sentiments or passions gives a sensible
uneasiness, whether it proceeds from without or from within; from the opposition of
mistaken in the first place (that is, that X is possible): a circumstance, as we have just seen, that
Hume allows, consistent with his theory.
76
If I appear to be using some of these terms interchangeably, I follow Hume on the direct
passions, as related to the determination of desire and the will, where he writes that “Terror,
consternation, astonishment, anxiety, and other passions of that kind, are nothing but different
species and degrees of fear” 2.3.10.31).
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external objects, or from the combat of internal principles… Now there being here an
opposition betwixt the notion of the identity of resembling perceptions, and the
interruption of their appearance, the mind must be uneasy in that situation, and will
naturally seek relief from that uneasiness. (1.4.2.37)
In some ways, the image of Hume’s imagined interlocutor and the image of Crusoe
thunderstruck on the beach collate neatly: each offers a figure hovering in anxiety over a truly
unaccountable mark, a footprint entirely suggestive but entirely silent, a gesture – but a
frustratingly static one – toward nothing at all and toward something ostensibly external, real,
utterly basic. Moreover, Hume grounds his point about uneasiness and the fictions of external
objectivity in narrative, describing in a famous passage how, while seated “in [his] chamber with
[his] face to the fire,” an individual (“I,” a protagonist) hears the “sudden noise of a door turning
upon its hinges” and turns to see his porter enter. The continued, independent existence of the
door and the porter (and everything else) is a vulgar conclusion, Hume argues, “directly contrary
to those, which are confirm’d by philosophy” (1.4.2.13 – 14). It is only imagined, he concludes,
and imagined specifically in order to avoid, not unreason, but the kind of anxiety or displeasure
that, for him, ultimately motivates all human thought and action: “In order to free ourselves from
this difficulty, we disguise, as much as possible, the interruption, or rather remove it entirely, by
supposing that these interrupted perceptions are connected by a real existence, of which we are
sensible” (1.4.2.24). Thus, as we saw above, attributing identity to such continued existences
becomes necessary because “uneasiness arises from the opposition of” constant identity and
“resembling impressions,” and the mind “must look for relief” (1.4.2.37).
Indeed, there is a proliferation of uneasiness throughout Hume’s philosophy, accounting
for the crucial importance of the role of custom, for example, in mitigating the distress of the
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epistemological crises that his interlocutor must negotiate. Our ideas of even the most basic
relationships among objects (cause and effect) is imagined, but appears objectively valid only
because we are accustomed to seeing one thing follow from another. Custom reinforces and
eventually naturalizes such relationships (“custom operates before we have time for reflection”
[1.3.8.13]), terminating (recall lady Betty and her brother) in belief. If his readers still have any
doubt about the role of affect in such knowledge, Hume concludes “that belief is more properly
an act of the sensitive, than of the cogitative part of our natures” (1.4.1.8); it “is something felt
by the mind, which distinguishes the ideas of judgment from the fictions of the imagination”
(1.3.7.7), and it is, moreover, the “vivacity” or intensity of such feeling alone that constitutes
belief, distinguishing it from other mental impressions. Reasonable conclusions such as total
skepticism, while rationally sound (while recognizable, we could say, in the due course of
reason), are problematic because they are strange, distressing – and that distress is more than
something symptomatic of, say, error in judgment. It follows from his view of human nature:
Where the mind reaches not its objects with easiness and facility, the same principles
have not the same effect as in a more natural conception of the ideas; nor does the
imagination feel a sensation, which holds any proportion with that which arises from its
common judgments and opinions. The attention is on the stretch: The posture of the mind
is uneasy; and the spirits being diverted from their natural course, are not govern’d in
their movements by the same laws, at last not to the same degree, as when they flow in
their usual channel. (1.4.1.10)
Were John Belmont to learn the lesson of Evelina’s familiarity, as explained above, such
would be the posture, from Hume’s perspective, of his mind. Like skepticism, Belmont’s doubt,
if left unrepressed, would constitute a kind of parasitism (we see how appropriate an analogy
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drawn from nature is), seeking “shelter under [the] protection” of reason’s sovereignty in order
to die, bringing reason along with it: “it gradually diminishes the force of that governing power,
and its own at the same time; till at last they both vanish away into nothing” (1.4.1.12). It is thus
not reason but nature that Belmont obeys; the mind’s “uneasy” and thus unnatural “posture” is
conclusive in determining the proper object of reality. Belmont’s acceptance of his daughter, his
compliance to the natural postures of sentiment/belief, signals a qualified rejection of reason
which sits, like Crusoe on his island, “in possession of the throne, prescribing laws, and
imposing maxims, with an absolute sway and authority” (1.4.2.12). It signals a rejection of a
kind of autonomy77 that for Hume is monstrous, strictly reasonable and thus unsociable. It
signals the abandonment of a notion of legitimacy that proceeds from and encloses the individual
presupposed by the social contract theories discussed above.
But serious problems remain. What, after all, does such “compliance” mean? What does
it look like in practice? What I am tracking here is how Hume advances a notion of collectivity
that we might recognize as “objective.” By looking at Hume’s monstrosity, we see that part of
the problem he relates is that following one’s reason to its unsettling conclusions (I had almost
written “natural conclusions”) does not estrange any particular notion of collectivity, does not
destabilize any of its characteristics or mechanisms (the conditions under which it makes itself
known, by which it sustains itself, according to which individuals do or do not count as proper
constituents), but rather estranges the self, disturbs the self’s stability. One becomes illegitimate
with respect to a stable collective body, not the other way around. Hume does this not only by
aligning the objectivity of the human community with nature, but by then putting nature, in an
77

On this he is explicit: “We have command over our mind to a certain degree, but beyond that
lose all empire over it: And ‘tis evidently impossible to fix any pricese bounds to our authority,
where we consult not experience. In short, the actions of the mind are, in this respect, the same
with those of matter.” (1.3.14.12)
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important sense, out of reach. “Most fortunately it happens,” he writes, and I emphasize his use
of fortune, “that since reason is incapable of dispelling these clouds, nature herself suffices to
that purpose, and cures me of this philosophical melancholy and delirium, either by relaxing this
bent of mind, or by some avocation,” etc. (1.4.7.9). Nature does not make the contours and
conditions of this objectivity available (as “objectivity” itself, to the enlightenment rationalists,
implies) but insists upon them silently, asking us to take them for granted just as John Belmont
does – and just as he had always done.
This is significant because, while the question Hume asks seems to be self-directed
(whether he will make of himself a familiar, legitimate constituent or an uncouth monster, rather
than whether collectivity contains and might reveal the conditions of its legitimacy or not), his
answer lies in a “nature” that is other and external – within a system, moreover, that begins by
insisting on the impossibility of truly accessing anything that is other and external.78
Nevertheless, like John Belmont, he departs from a position of trauma and arrives at one of
satisfaction: “Here then I find myself absolutely and necessarily determin’d to live,” he writes,
relieved to find that nature has intervened, has exercised its agency upon his passive, stranded,
monstrous self, “and talk, and act like other people in the common affairs of life” (1.4.7.10). He
is satisfied to know that he has found himself – and that he has done so according to nature, even
though nature does not make itself or the terms of its intervention conspicuous. He feels it; that is
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Accordingly, it may seem strange that while he insists that “my intention never was to
penetrate into the nature of bodies, or explain the secret causes of their operations [since] such an
enterprize is beyond the reach of human understanding” (1.2.5.26), he continually takes for
granted what his presumed reader thinks and believes, even at least once in her own voice:
“what! the efficacy of causes lie in the determination of the mind!” (1.3.14.26). Similar
observations have been made before; this attitude, in fact, seems to have been symptomatic of
British empiricism, as John W. Yolton suggests: “Hume accepted Locke’s skepticism concerning
man’s inability to know the ‘true, internal constitution of things,’ but both men contrived to
make firm claims about the workings of the human mind” (62).
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sufficient. But what does it mean to “act like other people?” Why is this necessary? Why these
people and not others?
Clearly, we can better understand the implications of this problem in Hume through a
critique of his relatively idiosyncratic use of the word “nature.” Since extensive critiques of this
sort are available, it should suffice here to point to a handful of key passages that relate directly
to my object. Hume himself argues that “the definition of the word, nature” is “ambiguous and
equivocal,” suggesting first that if anything is “natural” in the imprecise sense of ordinary (in
opposition to what is “rare and unusual”), the moral sentiments are, since “there never was any
nation of the world, nor any single person in any nation, who was utterly depriv’d of
them…These sentiments are so rooted in our constitution and temper, that without entirely
confounding the human mind by disease or madness, ‘tis impossible to extirpate and destroy
them” (3.1.2.8). More significantly, however, as we have already seen, Hume proceeds to
complicate the natural-artificial binary that was so operative for Hobbes and so central to
theories of social contract. He argues that “the designs, and projects, and views of men are
principles as necessary in their operation as heat and cold, moist and dry: But taking them to be
free and entirely our own, ’tis usual for us to set them in opposition to the other principles of
nature” (3.1.2.9). Of the “laws of nature,” which we have mentioned above, Hume argues that
there are three (“of the stability of possession, of its transference by consent, and of the
performance of promises” [3.2.6.1]), yet he writes that “men invented the three fundamental laws
of nature, when they observ’d the necessity of society to their mutual subsistence, and found, that
’twas impossible to maintain any correspondence together, without some restraint on their
natural appetites” (3.2.8.5). The two seemingly mutually exclusive uses of “nature” and “natural”
in the previous sentence are revealing: “nature” as it appears in “natural appetites” can be
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directly opposed to and subordinated by “nature” as it appears in the laws of nature, which
moreover, while invented, are necessary according to human nature/sociability (in addition to the
moral sentiments “so rooted in our constitution,” Hume also writes that the “very first state and
situation” of humans “may justly be esteem’d social” [3.2.2.14]). Ultimately, the laws of nature
depend in part upon such artificial virtues as justice, which, in turn, depend upon self-interest (a
“natural appetite”) and morality. These latter create together the proper conditions under which
we can associate our instinctual pleasure with artificial – but necessary – institutions.79
It is easy to see the link here between Hume and those that, following him, strive to
valorize (not natural but normative) notions of national pride and civil institutions by associating
them with time immemorial, such as Edmund Burke and Adam Smith. By naturalizing civil
institutions and the mechanisms of collectivity – associating them with time out of mind and thus
collapsing consent with traditionalism – the question of legitimacy needs no, and can have no,
obvious or direct resolution. The implications are troubling, since it allows Hume to attribute to
nature such “moral” qualities as “an esteem for any person” with “power and riches” and “a
contempt” for one with “poverty and meanness” (2.2.5.1). In their clearest expression, these
implications are most unsettling: “The skin, pores, muscles, and nerves of a day-labourer are
different from those of a man of quality: So are his sentiments, actions, and manners. The
different stations of life influence the whole fabric, external and internal; and these different
stations arise necessarily, because uniformly, from the necessary and uniform principles of
human nature.” From this description, the necessity in human affairs, which Hume associates
with nature, is laid out in full: “Men cannot live without society, and cannot be associated
without government. Government makes a distinction of property, and establishes the different
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see 3.2.7.11
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ranks of men. This produces industry, traffic, manufactures, law-suits, war, leaves, alliances,
voyages, travels, cities, fleets, ports, and all those other actions and objects, which cause such
diversity, and at the same time maintain such uniformity in human life” (2.3.1.9).80
What, returning to my earlier question, does “compliance” with such “natural” postures
of the mind mean? Hume’s theory seems to allow for an extended sense of subjectivity that does
not, on its face, disqualify something like objectivity. The two movements of imagining
community appear possible to reconcile. He appears, in other words, to offer a solution to the
problems that traumatic familiarity in novels makes so explicit. Belmont can recover his sense of
self, his sense of family, and the comfortable extent to which these two are mutually constitutive.
But it is clear that what Hume presumes to be necessary is only so within a social or political
framework whose legitimacy is either deferred or entirely taken for granted. Under Hume,
legitimacy is evoked by social experiences that comply with moral sentiments, but no account
that explains that evocation or compliance is possible. Evelina is Belmont’s daughter because he
feels that it is so; Matilda “knows” her father because her fears confirm it; Alanthus is Lady
Betty’s brother because he insists that she believe it. Hume offers nothing to substantially
differentiate these feelings from those that facilitate our consent to collective identifications
based upon misjudgment and mistakes – or from those that, for that matter, “confirm” our
superiority or inferiority relative to others. A certain stability is purchased in either case, but only
by begging the question of its legitimacy.
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Hume’s particular reasoning, which supports such troubling conclusions about class
distinctions, also plays a role in his most notorious comment about race, found in the footnote to
his essay “Of National Characters,” in which he takes for granted – which is to say that he
“believes” – “negroes to be naturally inferior to whites,” such that rumors about “one negroe”
reputed “as a man of parts and learning...likely…is admired for slender accomplishments, like a
parrot who speaks a few words plainly” (360).
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4: An Embarrassment of Legitimacies: Collectives and Counter-Collectives in Samuel
Richardson’s Clarissa

In her first published work, Poems and Fancies (1653), Margaret Cavendish reveals some of the
skepticism that will feature centrally in her critique of empirical scientific research, including
much of that being conducted by members of the Royal Society. But whereas David Hume will
eventually submit paralyzing skepticism as the dead end of rationalism, Cavendish’s early poems
appear much more ambivalent, seeming to take a kind of pleasure in the uncertainty of
experience that, in the context of her later writings (particularly her criticism of Robert Hooke’s
Micrographia), appears somewhat uncharacteristic.81 While poems like “OF MANY WORLDS
IN THIS WORLD” implicitly challenge the scientific usefulness and stability of empirical
knowledge, they also clearly relish the possibilities that lie beyond the limits of sense experience.
“So in this World,” she writes in “OF MANY WORLDS,” “may many Worlds more be,”
continuing:
Thinner, and lesse, and lesse still by degree;
Although they are not subject to our Sense,
A World may be no bigger then two-pence.
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Cavendish’s philosophical positions have been notoriously difficult to pin down. While there
is little disagreement about her rationalism, anti-empiricism, and the relationship between her
epistemology and her royalist commitments, critics have disagreed about the coherence (in both
senses) of her philosophy, the terms (and sometimes the rigor) of her critique, the relationship
between her aesthetic and scientific productions, the relationship between her epistemology and
feminism, etc. This should be noted in any claim about the extent to which any elements of her
philosophy are “characteristic” or “uncharacteristic.” Eric Lewis provides a useful overview of
critical attitudes and assumptions about Cavendish in “The Legacy of Margaret Cavendish.” A
comprehensive overview of Cavendish’s philosophy is beyond the scope of this project, but I do
want to point to both the epistemological frustrations and the largely ignored imaginative
pleasures Cavendish draws out of the limits of empiricism – at least in this, her first publication.
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Nature is curious, and such worke may make,
That our dull Sense can never finde, but scape.
She shifts at this point from speculating about nature as a purely imaginative exercise to
accounting for these speculations in scientific terms, turning to the theory (that she briefly
endorsed but will shortly hereafter abandon)82 of atomism:
If foure Atomes a World can make, then see,
What severall Worlds might in an Eare-ring bee.
For Millions of these Atomes may bee in
The Head of one small, little, single Pin.
And if thus small, then Ladies well may weare
A World of Worlds, as Pendents in each Eare.
These “worlds” are peculiar for any number of reasons, not the least of which is the extent to
which they are at once radically unfamiliar and yet embedded into the structures (in this case
earrings) of the wholly familiar. In “A WORLD IN AN EARE-RING,” she expands this
paradoxical juxtaposition by populating her strange, four-atom worlds, not with the alien bearmen and fly-men of her New Blazing World, but with entirely familiar “Mountains vast,”
“Meadowes,” “Pastures fresh, and greene,” “Night, and Day, and Heat, and Cold,” where “Life,
and Death, and Young, and Old, still grow.” There, she writes, “Cityes bee, and stately Houses
built…There Churches bee, and Priests to teach therein.” Completely familiar, these worlds are
in a sense already known, even as they are unknown and unknowable. These worlds have
“Winter cold,” she writes, “Yet never on the Ladies Eare [does this cold] take hold.” Birds
“sweetly sing” in these worlds, and yet “we heare them not in an Eare-ring.” The proximity of
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See Lewis, 353.
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these strange worlds to the everyday is no less striking than their impossible, fantastical distance
from it.
What appears to intrigue Cavendish most is not simply the possibility that her world –
“this world,” a comprehensive arrangement of social and material phenomena that might be
disclosed to those who know how to seek it – is not the only world (despite the universality
implied by the term), but that other worlds might pass unknown directly through our field of
experience. Indeed, they might feature regularly in our most intimate and quotidian experiences
while yet remaining wholly unseen, unfelt, unheard. In the poem’s arresting central image –
“Ladies” whose earrings harbor and conceal other worlds: ladies who intriguingly (because
mistakenly) take for granted the exhaustive familiarity of such ordinary objects – what passes for
comprehensive familiarity with the world reveals, paradoxically, only an underlying myopia, and
knowledge of the objective world terminates in ignorance and the mere imagining (but “mere” in
a sense that intrigues at least as much as it frustrates) about the world(s). In other words, the
“object-domain” that constitutes the world, and the methods that disclose it, are playfully
disassembled – much as the “object-domain” that constitutes the family is upset by Evelina’s
relative familiarity. Like the footprint of Crusoe’s island, the worlds in these earrings (even their
bare possibility) complicate the claims that one is able to make, even in the most everyday and
“familiar” context, about the nature of his or her existence: whether it is shared or not; when it is
and is not social; the relationship between the autonomous subject and the disclosure(s) of the
other, etc. The imagination, and perhaps eventually its logical extension, belief (as se saw in
Evelina), must – but, at the same time, cannot – mitigate the epistemological privation that
characterizes enlightenment community. How, in this case, given its epistemological similarities
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to Evelina and Robinson Crusoe, do the Ladies in Cavendish’s poems elude the trauma of
familiarity?
The ethical questions begged by the Ladies’ myopia do not occur in the poems, and in
fact, as we have seen, in “OF MANY WORLDS” the speculations seem to culminate in the
speaker’s delight in the ladies’ possibly possessing whole worlds in their cosmetic objects, as in
its concluding couplet:
And if thus small, then Ladies well may weare
A World of Worlds as Pendents in each Eare.
(Swift will ironize but will not stretch this idea too far when writing in Gulliver’s Travels that
“this whole Globe of Earth must be at least three Times gone round, before on of our better
female Yahoos could get her Breakfast, or a Cup to put it in” [219]). “A WORLD IN AN EARERING,” extending this couplet’s image, is indeed somewhat more suggestive, as it describes not
only “Governours” and “Kings” contained in these common objects, but also “Islands…where
Spices grow,” bustling “Markets,” “Christall Rocks,” and “Golden Mines.” In imagining her
relationship to these other worlds, Cavendish assumes an imperial posture of possession, and it is
possession that absorbs the terror of the (un)familiar, that takes the place (and obviates the
function) of empirical knowledge. Of course, the possession that ensues is of a rather different
kind than that of the liberal contract theorists, since possession in her poems is wholly divorced
from the possessor’s labor and rationale. Wholly oblivious about the worlds within worlds, there
is no direct sense in which her relationship to the worlds she possesses is authorized by
rationalism (a necessary feature of material exchange in markets, or, in contract theory, by
calculated manipulation and exploitation of natural resources). It therefore makes no pretense to
accountability, for example, in natural law, and the autonomy of the subject might thus appear
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somewhat compromised. And yet, to state the obvious, Cavendish’s is not a subject in the liberal
sense developed by Locke and Rousseau. Indeed, her royalist principles hold her Ladies
precisely to the standard of legitimacy that the liberal subject of Locke and Rousseau would
ostensibly reject, in which hierarchy supersedes rational foundations in accounting for
possession. Nevertheless, her poems help to identify an important problem with collectivity that
its enlightenment premises would struggle to resolve: a rationally based notion of legitimacy
must be accessible to, and achievable by, a large and diverse body (or a potential body) of people
who can then act (who can possess, fight, buy, sell, sue, enclose, organize, petition – in short,
who can then do all the things that their ostensibly recognizable and defensible “legitimacy”
sanctions), deferring to such a notion of legitimacy as the rationale for those actions.83 Indeed,
such a notion seems, in principle, so normative as to be essentially singular, even as the worlds to
which it applies – and the worlds that claim to be organized by it – are multiplying.
In other words, among the problems of identifying collectively in an enlightenment
context is the increasingly urgent one of doing so in a world that is more, more visibly, and more
radically plural. The eighteenth century sees an unprecedented rise, after all, in popular accounts
of global and transnational cultures. Travel writing, by some accounts “the most widespread and
popular literary genre” of the eighteenth century (Smethurst 5), was being produced and
consumed by an increasing and impressively diverse group of individuals pursuing an equally
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The concept of natural law, and its relationship to jus gentium, emerged in response to a
confusing and formidable plurality of differing local and idiosyncratic rules and procedures,
mostly custom-based, that frustrated imperial commercial activity in early Rome. See J. B.
Schneewind, The Invention of Autonomy (17). Mary Astell invokes a similar notion of legitimacy
in Some Reflections on Marriage, arguing that formal royal and paternal authority is legitimized
when it is rationally based, and, moreover, that it is undermined when it is not, since inferiors,
even in subjection, feel themselves superior to husbands whose authority requires or is based
upon mere ignorance or force. The implication is that the terms of legitimacy are available to all
parties (and agreeable to all parties, if not in interest then in principle) who must appeal to it, and
this is what I refer to as the singular, normative aspects of legitimacy.
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diverse range of objectives.84 Global travel features almost as heavily in some of the most
popular literary productions of the century, including those of Behn, Defoe, Swift, and Lennox.
English readers were confronted in these works not only with other cultures, but with the sense
that their own culture, hitherto submerged in the obscurities of habitus, was novel, strange, and
even potentially oppressive from the perspectives of others.85 Through representations that
alienated British readers from their cultural practices and assumptions (such as Gulliver’s earnest
appraisal of military strength and technology in Brobdingnag and Houyhnhnmland, which
parrots British patriotism but gives voice to the brutality that such patriotism otherwise functions
to suppress), the self-evidence (or the taking-for-granted, to return to the vocabulary I have been
using in the previous chapters) of the legitimacy of those practices and assumptions comes into
question. As such, ideas of foreignness figured more centrally and more concretely in the
associations and dissociations people used to stabilize and revise their concepts of legitimacy and
social organization, resulting in what Benjamin Colbert called a “home-foreign binary,
increasingly evoked in the name of nationalist party politics” in which “perceiving oneself and
one’s place in the nation involves reading the nation itself as a ‘foreign’ subject” (Colbert 70).
By the time Cavendish writes her Poems and Fancies, the English world and the Atlantic
world are already fully entangled, and national identities and the economic and cultural practices
that sustained them were inescapably shaped by the interdependencies and conflicts that
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See Elizabeth A. Bohls’s introduction to Travel Writing 1700 – 1830, an Anthology.
Roxann Wheeler writes about the “tendency” in European commentary on Africa and Africans
“to acknowledge what we now call cultural relativity in the eighteenth century – or at least an
ethnocentric form of it,” adding that these texts often noted that “English customs seemed as
outlandish to Africans as some African manners did to the British who traded with them. Britons
who came in contact with others frequently had the experience of seeing themselves through
others’ eyes – as unhygienic, bizarre, as gendered differently, especially in regard to the clothes
that they wore. Many Britons who experienced or who read about other people understood the
artificiality of their own preferences” (97).
85
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emerged. Britain and the British global presence were to be defined, as Linda Colley has argued,
as much by positive claims of self-identification (Protestantism, for example) as by negative
claims contrasting British and foreign identities (especially French and Spanish Catholicism, but
also Spanish colonial practices and priorities). As J. H. Elliott puts it, following the
misgovernment and decline of Spanish imperialism in the late seventeenth century, “Britain’s
empire was…to be a maritime and commercial empire,” and as such, “[c]ommercial enterprise,
Protestantism and liberty were now to be enshrined as the mutually reinforcing constituents of a
national ethos” (221). That ethos and its “constituents” had wide-ranging consequences, both
conceptual and material, providing new “contact zones” in which popular British collective
identification (through both association and dissociation, in the context of various and competing
religious, economic, and political interests) could play out.86 And these resulting contact zones
raised the stakes of defining the terms and the nature of (the legitimacy of) one’s collective
British, inter-European, and trans-Atlantic identities, even as they proportionately troubled the
methods available for doing so.
North America, for example, with its seemingly endless natural resources, new trading
opportunities, and native inhabitants (potential counterparts in a wide variety commercial and
military engagements), provided a backdrop for an overabundance of often contradictory claims
and activities that were thought to dramatize or stabilize British character and interests. Here,
enduring interest in British dissociation from the Native Americans in some contexts comes up
against the many important treaties and economic and military alliances they made with them in
86

I use the familiar definition, formulated by Mary Louise Pratt in “Arts of the Contact Zone”:
“social spaces where cultures meet, clash, and grapple with each other, often in contexts of
highly asymmetrical relations of power, such as colonialism, slavery, or their aftermaths as they
are lived out in many parts of the world today” (34). Pratt contrasts the frenetic business of
“contact zones” with the “utopian quality” inherent in “speech communities” that are evocative
of Benedict Anderson’s “imagined communities” (37).
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others – treaties and alliances that imply reciprocity, trust, and thus a measure of association. It is
clear for example that the subhuman savages that populate works such as George Walker’s 1799
anti-Jacobin novel, The Vagabond, endorses a shortsighted savage-civilized binary that clearly
functions to define British character (in the Burkean sense, as a definitive, ancient, selfgenerating, and intergenerational product that is distinctively British), yet its ensuing definition is
at odds with the well-known history of British-American relations and interdependencies that,
just as clearly, function to define British character.87 Both of these discourses, in other words, of
association and dissociation, make claims about British identity and about its legitimacy as it
manifests through contact with the other, and yet, since the operative claims that they produce
vary so widely, the attending gestures of self-identification are dangerously unstable. (This
instability has not always been obvious, even in retrospect. As Paul Gilroy and others have
shown, even the most intuitively “obvious” [especially to current-day readers] Atlantic and racial
identities were porous, suggesting that even the most stable British identities had to admit to a
degree of porosity as well.88)
The implications of imperial trade and the specifics of emergent nationalism in the
eighteenth century are of course important and incredibly rich topics. My objective in these
87

Alden T. Vaughan chronicles some of the many Americans who went to England on usually
very well known trips, noting that most of them “went voluntarily, conducted serious business
abroad, survived the exposure to deadly viruses, and, safely home, influenced their own people
and often the course of Indian-European relations in their region of North, Central, or South
America, thereby contributing from the western side of the ocean to an increasingly
international/multicultural Atlantic World” (xiv). Most of these individuals were, and were
treated as, emissaries. By contrast, in one of the more gruesome scenes of Walker’s novel, the
protagonists encounter “an Indian severely beating two women with a cane.” Begged for an
explanation, he answers “Because I choose it,” relating not only that the women are his wives
(who are beaten because they could not find plovers for his dinner) but that one is also his
daughter. He insists that he follows natural law, signaling the impossibility British-American
transaction that is not ordered by some measure of coercion (Walker 208 – 209).
88
Shifting rhetoric about and attitudes toward “Nabobs” and Creoles also illustrate this porosity,
each of which has grown into its own body of scholarship in the past decade.
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pages has not been to write the histories of these intersections (a vast and constantly growing
body of scholarship is devoted to these and related subjects), but to track the manifestations of
their respective conceptual pressures in discourses about collectivity and legitimacy. One of
these manifestations, as I have suggested, is the plurality of worlds Cavendish imagines folded
into the hidden dimensions of her earrings. Her royalist epistemology makes the question of
legitimacy in the contact between her “Ladies” and the plurality of worlds unnecessary. But from
the perspective of the Lockean or Rousseauian liberal subject, the Ladies’ possession of their
worlds is suggestive of the impulses of arbitrary rule that should appear antithetical to the
liberties of enlightened self-governance emerging in the parliamentary prerogatives of the 1689
Declaration of Rights, and soon to be sought in revolutionary France and America. Yet, as Susan
Buck-Morss, David Brion Davis, and others have shown, many of the most troubling effects of
her royalism survive the enlightenment retooling of legitimacy. The same enlightenment
discourses that hold liberty up as the essential humanizing basis of autonomy (and by extension
reason, consent, and legitimacy) help to produce and sustain social, economic, and political
infrastructures that either ignore or actively promote coercion, arbitrary social hierarchy, and
enslavement: a contradiction that is well documented in the context of American revolution and
independence. As Alan Gilbert has shown, “the words ‘independence’ or ‘sovereignty’ took on a
resonance among southern Patriots not of ‘no taxation without representation,’ but of the
preservation of bondage from the threat of emancipation,” adding that “[t]he prospect of an
emancipation promised by the colonial British administration was actually one of the factors that
drove white slave-owning colonists toward rebellion and independence” (6, since “the specter of
abolition seemed to be among the many impositions on the colonies, North and South alike, that
the movement for freedom and independence sought to redress” [5]). Gilbert analyzes the
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rhetoric of Patriots, including the “founding fathers,” in response to the Dunmore Proclomation
and the Somersett verdict, arguing that, “Patriot protests about British denials of law and liberty
were thus fundamentally compromised by persistent, despotic Patriot violence toward blacks”
(12). Clearly, at least in practice, the struggle for a more rational basis of legitimate social
organization bears something more than a trace of its royalist predecessor. But that struggle
nevertheless helps to make conspicuous the claims and counter-claims that ostensibly authorize
rationally legitimate collectivities, as well as the terms of “legitimate” membership within them.
The pursuit of a more rational, liberal account of collective identification in an increasingly
plural world tells us much – even, and perhaps especially, in its failures – not only about
sociality in general but about what it means to belong in one specific community at the exclusion
of others, especially when such “belonging” ostensibly presupposes a rejection of the arbitrary.
I turn now to a text that, while ostensibly distant from Atlantic and colonial concerns,
dramatizes similar negotiations for community that those concerns entail. Important for its place
within narratives about the history or “rise” of the novel, Samuel Richardson’s Clarissa is also
significant for the incredibly rich psychological depth in which moral and social negotiation is
couched. While Robinson Crusoe embodies a somatic embrace of even the most abusive (in its
commercial and imperial posturing) assumptions of the thinking, producing, and laboring
enlightenment subject, Clarissa (whose body suffers the impairments of sexual abuse, forced
seclusion, and patriarchal subjection) ostensibly foregrounds the ever rational but
uncompromisingly egalitarian mind as the prime resource for the autonomous determination and
assumption of legitimacy. What kinds of social relations can such a mind produce, reject,
endorse, or qualify? With what forms of legitimacy is such a mind complicit?
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CLARISSA, THE ONE GREAT FAMILY, AND ANTINOMIES OF COMMUNITY
The following section will develop some of the implications of a connection I laid out in the
previous chapters: that between the conceptualizations of family and state legitimacies. I have
already tried to show that reducing state legitimacy to a prior foundation of family legitimacy
begs the question, since it takes for granted that the family unit is a knowable entity, stable in the
disclosure of its interrelations at any given moment. As many eighteenth-century novelists insist,
such assumptions overstate the epistemological autonomy of the individual in any social context
(even the most “familiar”), even while they continue to insist on such empirical autonomy as the
locus from which legitimacy must proceed. In what follows, I will look at how the Harlowe
family negotiates its own claims about legitimacy, and how such claims manifest in the practical,
evolving interrelations of its constituents (I will then move on to the implications of the novel’s
multiple and competing legitimacies). Since the opening conflict of the novel reveals a young
woman who poses a threat to the stability of the family, I am particularly interested in how the
family maintains a sense of stable community, even while trying to neutralize the actions and
desires of one of its members, Clarissa. How, in a word, does “family” (the novel’s operative
relationality) at once authorize Clarissa as a moral and rational agent, and erase, negate, or
suspend her agency as such? How can these two movements, each of which is central to how
relationality is realized, performed, and recognized in the novel, be reconciled?
First-time readers of Samuel Richardson’s Clarissa are almost invariably impressed with
the exhausting and relentless oppression of its protagonist. By her family, Clarissa is mocked,
maligned, shunned, suspected, and belittled; by her rakish pursuer, she is manipulated, exploited,
abducted, imprisoned, and raped. The novel is uniquely taxing, demanding in its sheer length and
weight, and draining in the almost obscene glut of abuse to which its young heroine is subject.

198

But the persistence and proliferation of cruelty in Clarissa has had the effect of blunting some of
the density of its moral world. Many readers are apt to conflate Clarissa’s family and her
libertine abductor, for example, as foils to the protagonist (herself staunchly, selflessly, almost
implausibly virtuous), functioning similarly as registers of illegitimate authority against which
the superior moral content of Clarissa comes into focus.89
But there are differences between the tyranny of her family and the brutality of Lovelace
that get lost in this reading. Indeed, as these pages will argue, Clarissa’s virtue is substantiated as
much by the contrast between herself and her persecutors as by her refusal to see any moral
continuity between her family and Lovelace at all, a refusal that her dying regret, the “fatal error
which threw her out of [her family’s] protection,” registers (1371). I will approach Clarissa by,
at least initially, setting aside the compelling moral judgments that already presuppose the
conditions of legitimate and illegitimate practice, and by instead taking seriously the family’s
89

Peggy Thompson writes about Clarissa’s family as “torment[ing]” her, for example, with the
awful choice of either marrying Solmes or being disobedient, adding quickly that Lovelace
“exacerbates the pain of her ostracism” before moving on to an extended analysis and
historicization of Clarissa’s suffering (255). Alex Eric Hernandez follows, while qualifying, the
conclusion of other critics who “have pointed out, that Richardson likely drew on Hobbesian
thought for his representations of the Harlowes and Lovelace,” reading “violence in the
household” and the abuse of Lovelace as similar registers of the excesses of absolute and
tyrannical sovereignty. “Even before the rape,” Hernandez writes, linking the rape to the
dispossession of daughters in the context of early capitalism (as analyzed by Ruth Perry),
“Clarissa is figured as the one to whom violence is directed with relative impunity.” Alex Eric
Hernandez (619, 618). Similary, Terry Eagleton writes that Clarissa is the story is of a young,
virtuous woman “made to suffer under a violently oppressive family” and who is then abducted
and Raped by a “notorious sexual predator” (63 – 64); Eagleton proceeds to review “what critics
have made of this narrative” (a narrative about Clarissa’s suffering in two different contexts) by
focusing largely on interpretations of Clarissa’s rape, as if all of her experiences in these quite
different contexts of persecution can be adequately represented indifferently by a this single and
worst violation and abuse. Indeed, Eagleton’s own argument, ostensibly tracking Clarissa’s
negotiation with a choice between “bourgeois patriarchy and libertine aristocracy” (76), remains
closely invested throughout (as his title suggests) in the details of Clarissa’s rape and death,
leaving her conflicts with her father, uncles, brother, and mother to speak largely for themselves,
and taking for granted that Clarissa’s death constitutes a single and wholesale “indictment of
Lovelace and the Harlowes” (77).
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measures, however misguided, at face value: as sincere, legitimizing impulses.90 This chapter is
thus motivated by questions that standard readings of Clarissa, which collapse the protagonist’s
family and rapist into one comprehensive amalgam of abusive practice, tend to ignore. What
would it mean to read Clarissa’s treatment by her family as a licit exercise, as an instance of
legitimacy (anticipating, perhaps, Rousseau’s claim that an unwilling constituent of an
association can and must be “forced to be free” [64])? What would it mean to see the strategic
mobilization and confinement of Clarissa by her parents, siblings, aunts, and uncles as an attempt
by something like a general will to restore or to sustain its legitimacy?
Looking more closely at Clarissa’s family as a social body concerned not merely with
indulging its vanity and ambition but rather with preserving its legitimacy exposes connections
between family and state that animate a number of political and philosophical discourses.91
Indeed, its narrative is typical of the early novel’s intense interest in putting characters’
individuality in tension with their social embeddedness, an interest that develops, not only in
response to political modernity and liberalism, but alongside important changes to how family
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These claims do not amount to an argument that Clarissa’s family engages in “legitimate”
practices, or that their treatment of the protagonist is in any sense acceptable; I am aware of the
“truly reactionary nature of much deconstructionist ‘radicalism,’” as Terry Eagleton puts it, that
has led to readings that either validate Lovelace (for example) or vilify Clarissa (67). Rather, I
am advancing a critique of (a certain kind of) legitimacy itself – how it is constructed, how it
wins consent or confronts dissent, and especially how it sustains itself during those (theoretically
impossible) moments when its precarious nature becomes conspicuous – in the mid-eighteenth
century.
91
Robert Filmer develops one such theory, a theory that is often discussed in the context of
Richardson’s novels. E. Derek Taylor, for example, writes that the composition of Clarissa, a
process which was always guided by the certainty that Clarissa would die in the end, explains
how “a moralistic prude could create the most brilliantly iconoclastic, unrepentantly Faustian
villain of his age; how a rigidly Filmerian father could offer a devastating challenge to Filmer’s
patriarchal assumption in is portrayal of Clarissa’s battle with her family” (3).
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ties were thought.92 Critics have seen these changes as both causes and effects of egalitarian
social organization and “affective individualism,” emphasizing a gradual disengagement from
patrilineal models of family ties and an increased emphasis on individual agency – or, as Ruth
Perry puts it: “a movement from an axis of kinship based on consanguineal ties or blood lineage
to an axis based on conjugal and affinal ties of the married couple,” in which “the biologically
given family into which one was born was gradually becoming secondary to the chosen family
constructed by marriage” (2).93
This gradual shift in emphasis from patrilineal to conjugal arrangement makes the family
an appropriate site for conflicting claims about legitimate modes of obligation, authority, and
consent to play out. Accordingly, a wide range of models of social and political legitimacy are
projected onto the family, such as the conservative mainstay that social and political legitimacy
is derived from the “natural,” primary legitimacy of the family. Robert Filmer makes essentially
this case, adapted later by Bolingbroke when he claims that “we are led” by “instinct,”
“information,” “habit, and finally by reason” to “civil through natural society, and are fitted to be
members of one, by having been members of the other” (see chapter three). Hume had made a
similar claim, of course, arguing that society is possible only when its advantages are known,
adding that while individuals “in their wild uncultivated state” could never “attain this
knowledge,” they are gradually made “sensible” of them through the “custom and habit”
attending first reproductive, and then filial, ties (3.2.2, 312). As John P. Zomchick puts it, “[i]t is
in the family that the person in the state of nature first comes to realize the value of association”
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In addition to the works cited here, see also Keith Wrightson (1998) and Michael Anderson
(1980).
93
On egalitarianism and affective individualism, see Randolph Trumbauch (1978) and Lawrence
Stone (1977). Indeed, Terry Eagleton writes that “For Richardson, ideology is thicker than blood:
his ‘family’ is one constructed by literary practice, not genetically given,” constituting a “public
sphere” within which his writings are constructed. (The Rape of Clarissa, 13).
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(13). But such theories, as I argued in chapter three, ultimately beg the question. The
proliferation of characters in eighteenth-century novels (Moll Flanders, Joseph Andrews, and
Evelina’s father, to name just a few) who wrongly take for granted the stability and knowability
of their families and their places within them helps to puncture this Filmerian logic.
Meanwhile, the family is also being used to index political legitimacy in ways that either
attenuate or reframe its “natural” primacy. From Milton’s well-known advocacy for divorce,
including his translations of Martin Bucer, marriage could be considered (even if it rarely was in
his time) “a civil thing,” such that “men…may rightly contract, inviolably keep, and not without
extreme necessity dissolve marriage” according to principles “to be aquitted, aided, and
compelled by laws and judicature of the commonwealth” (240). John Witte identifies a parallel
emphasis in the writings of Locke, who argues “that marriages, like commonwealths, must be
formed, maintained, and dissolved in accordance with the contract negotiated by a man and
woman, who,” Witte adds, are “by nature are free and equal” (269). While Locke, like Hume,
indeed argues that “the first society was between man and wife,” and that it extended over time
to include children and servants, the family nevertheless “came short of political society” (133);
family organization is directed rather by the liberty and rationalism that are, as Witte observes,
innate to the individual men and women who constitute it. Rousseau goes further: individuals in
the state of nature, obeying “purely physical” or instinctual inclination, cannot form families, but
meet randomly and fleetingly to satisfy sexual appetites. Domestic organization is a (and perhaps
the, as Julie strongly suggests) product of “moral relationality,” such that the legitimacy of
political and family arrangements comes to one and the same thing, neither being a derivative of
the other.
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By tracing its origins back to “instinct” and the “wild uncultivated state,” writers like
Hume and Bolingbroke construct narratives of social legitimacy that elide some of the thorny
epistemological problems that dogged their contemporaries. They need not provide an account
(such as Rousseau’s) of how a “purely physical” state of nature becomes a “general will” of
“moral relationality,” for example, or of how a society premised on consent can be made up of
individuals who have never openly consented. And yet, as Ruth Perry’s formulation of shifting
family ties makes clear, eighteenth-century families carried “democratizing implications,” and
they “could be conceived of as constructed, even earned, rather than simply given at birth” (33).
Moreover, Naomi Tadmor reminds us that the term “family” referred to groups of dependents,
including servants, guests, and blood relations, living together in a household under the
“protection” and authority of a paternal “head of family,” so that the notion of “family relations”
extended to a wide variety of interpersonal relations that were actually “contractual” (as well as
“instrumental,” “occupational,” and “sentimental”) (27 – 30). In other words, the reciprocal and
consensual obligations to which the more rational, Lockean concept of legitimacy point already
exist in “family” units. Thus, as the eighteenth-century family was being deployed as an
appropriate analogue for both Humean and Lockean political models, these respective political
models became filters through which to inscribe the eighteenth-century family with competing
norms.
Clarissa’s role within her family seems at first to support the Filmerian assumptions that
conceive of the family as sustained by its ontological or natural givenness. Her father, brother,
and uncles often speak about the duties of a daughter, after all, as if such duties are inscribed
alongside the mandate for self-preservation in natural law. Her judgments about the legitimacy of
that role, however (especially as they invoke the subversive possibility of alternative and less
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oppressive roles), as well as the extraordinary energy her family expends in defending and
rationalizing their position, speak to the extent to which any social group is ultimately sustained
by free and rational consent. That is, Clarissa becomes subversive to the family not simply
because she deviates from its givenness in nature, but because she foregrounds its status as a
discursive construct – one social body among many, each in contest with the moral and
ontological priority of the others. Richardson dramatizes Lockean modes of consent by placing
Clarissa in the position of evaluating the relative merit of several competing “legitimacies.”
The novel opens by putting the implications of the protagonist’s roundness into question.
Anna Howe’s first letter expresses concern “for the disturbances that have happened in
[Clarissa’s] family,” noting that Clarissa has become “the subject of the public talk”: “it is
impossible but that whatever relates to a young lady, whose distinguished merits have made her
the public care, should engage everybody’s attention” (39). Clarissa, both a daughter and a
“young lady” representing “distinguished merits,” is at once deeply particular (the embodiment,
indeed, of novelistic realism’s promise of fully wrought particularity, roundness of character,
internal depth),94 and wholly abstract, a “type” in the spirit of Henry Fielding’s lawyer. “You
see,” Anna Howe writes to her, “what you draw upon yourself by excelling all your sex. Every
individual of it who knows you, or has heard of you, seems to think you answerable to her for
your conduct on points so very delicate and concerning. Every eye…is upon you with the
expectation of an example” (40).95 Clarissa’s status as a paragon of the dutiful daughter becomes
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In her introduction to the novel form, Patricia Meyer Spacks associates Clarissa with other
“novels of consciousness,” participating in a turn to “focusing more intensely on internal than on
external event,” according to which “the consciousness possessed and experienced by an
individual or individuals operating in relation to it became central to the novelistic action” (92).
95
See Henry Fielding on literary character: “I describe not Men, but Manners; not an Individual,
but a Species. Perhaps it will be answered, Are not all the Characters then taken from Life? To
which I answer in the Affirmative; nay, I believe I might aver, that I have writ little more than I
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a problem for the text to resolve, since it does not strictly reinforce but in fact entirely conflicts
with her status as an actual daughter. Indeed, her conduct, to the very extent that it represents a
filial ideal, constitutes a threat to the unity and stability of her own particular family. The natural
or ontological priority of Clarissa’s family, emerging as only one of many constituencies to
which she is accountable, comes into question. Its claims to legitimacy – claims that manifest
chiefly in a normative rhetoric of “duty” that demands reification in practice of what seems, from
its perspective, necessarily right, proper, and virtuous – are not so absolute or self-evident that
they are immune from contestation. What seems necessarily right, proper, and virtuous from her
family’s perspective, in other words, might be so only from that perspective.
If this is so, then her family’s “legitimacy” is idiosyncratic. Worse, it is potentially
arbitrary, extending a limited rationale that might demand practices and values that are not only
at odds with, or even destructive of, other communities in the novel (other families, for example,
or marriage markets, or commercial London), but contrary to a broader, more comprehensive,
and more universally stable rationale. Her family’s claims to legitimacy, in other words, not
satisfying something like Kantian maxims of categorical imperative, are potentially
unsustainable, contradictory, and thus self-defeating.
Clarissa, the object of competing claims of duty (narrowly filial and broadly social),
explicitly frames her moral obligations in terms of contrary legitimizing premises. Moreover, she
describes the context of the novel’s central conflict to Anna Howe in a way that makes
conspicuous the conceptual and material stakes of a plurality of legitimacies. Having very
have seen. The Lawyer is not only alive, but hath been so these 4000 years, and I hope G—will
indulge his Life as many yet to come” (148). Christine Roulston identifies this aspect of
Clarissa’s character as central to the “authentic” subjectivity advanced by sentimental fiction,
arguing that Clarissa, along with Pamela and Rousseau’s Julie, “all become examples of virtue
for both the intra- and extra-textual reader; they fulfill a role that parallels that of the ideal
woman of the conduct manual, becoming exemplary models of domestic virtue” (xvii).
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recently learned that her family (apprehensive of Clarissa’s suspected desire for Lovelace, a rival
to her brother and the subject of her sister’s secret jealousy) has proposed an alternative match
with the wealthy but loathsome Solmes, she is acquainted with the terms of a proposal that she
cannot, as a matter of legitimate principle, accept.96 Disgusted, she writes,
I hate him more than before. One great estate is already obtained at the expense of the
relations to it, though distant relations, my brother’s I mean, by his godmother; and this
has given the hope, however chimerical that hope, of procuring others, and that my own
at least may revert to the family. And yet, in my opinion, the world is but one great
family; originally it was so; what then is this narrow selfishness that reigns in us, but
relationship remembered against relationship forgot? (62)
These terms, the “reign” of a “narrow selfishness,” invoke the possible breach of rationalism and
freedom that is the foundation of enlightenment legitimacy. What Robinson Crusoe dramatizes
on his island, and what Kant will later express through his “motto” of the Enlightenment (sapere
aude!), is a principle that premises legitimate moral and political action and organization on
independent, rational thought, and especially on independent, rational thought that supersedes the
more narrow interests of crude material accumulation (which enlightenment autonomy mitigates
through rational principles of property) and affective indulgence (such as vengeance, which is
suppressed by an appeal to just, impartial law). “Relationship,” or social organization, should
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On this she is clear, if not always decisive. Writing to her uncle at one point, for example, she
insists that “it is not obstinacy I am governed by: it is aversion; an aversion I cannot overcome:
for, if I have but endeavored to reason with myself (out of regard to the duty I owe to my papa’s
will), my heart has recoiled, and I have been averse to myself for offering but to argue with
myself, in behalf of a man who, in the light he appears to me, has no one merit” (153). This
sentence is strange, since it insists both that she is unable to weigh the arguments for and against
Solmes from rational perspectives and that he has no “merit,” which is a conclusion drawn from
weighing the calculable arguments for and against him: arguments that she then proceeds
carefully to explain and rationalize.
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reflect universal – yet independently acquired – rational principles, a premise that suggests that
something like objective legitimacy, a metaphysics of legitimacy, exists and can be empirically
determined. By contrast, the more narrow “reign” indicated by Clarissa is premised on selective
recognition of “relationship,” in which one’s social entanglements, dependencies, and
obligations are not only partial, but emergent products of a compromised will and an undermined
self-governance. To employ the catchphrases of the Enlightenment, community in Clarissa (its
appraisal here, at least) is, at best, a muddled “aggregate” of interested corruption. At worst, it is
a tyranny of base appetites, petty ambitions, and passionate indulgences.
To be clear, Clarissa’s family does not think of itself in these terms. It rests on what it
believes to be a solid foundation of its own self-evident legitimacy, and it expects its constituents
to recognize that legitimacy, to consent to it (indeed, how can they do otherwise, precisely since
it is, upon disinterested reflection, self-evident?), and to act accordingly. The narrative creates
ambiguity regarding the status of that foundation, however. Clarissa’s moral authority, the
measure of legitimate practice in the novel, derives as much from the extent to which she
participates in this self-evident legitimacy as in the extent to which she rejects it. When she is
granted permission to visit Mrs. Howe, she writes to Anna that, despite (not until) some recent
“solemnity” occasioned by Lovelace’s persistence, “never was there a family more united in its
different branches than ours. Our uncles consider us as their own children, and declare that it is
for our sakes they live single. So they are advised with upon every article relating to, or that may
affect, us” (56).
This “unity,” and its recognition by Clarissa, is crucial. If some disagreement causes its
breach, for example, then the operative principles of its legitimacy have been punctured. What
had seemed a legitimate unit held together by what is, by reason, necessarily proper and virtuous,
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might be shown to have been an arbitrary assemblage, an aggregate (to return to Rousseau’s
vocabulary) of dupes held together by the whims and passions of a single, persuasive, and
coercive individual – namely, Clarissa’s brother James. After all, if Clarissa is right about
Solmes, about Lovelace, or (more subversively) about her brother, she has effectively called the
bluff, not so much destroying the unprecedented unity she boasts of as revealing it to have been
illusory all along. Such a revelation would thus undermine her own insistence upon the
unprecedented unity of her family. While her judgments about the unity of her family and about
its narrow reign are in direct conflict – that is, while these judgments negate one another – they
both equally substantiate Clarissa’s moral and epistemological priority. Determining legitimacy
thus entails a descent into contradiction, the kind of Humean skepticism I discussed in the
previous chapter, in which doubt is produced, attended subsequently by doubt of one’s doubt,
and so on, until the certainty of rational autonomy is undermined entirely.
Clarissa’s defiance thus presents a crisis of legitimacy at a foundational, conceptual level.
It is not just her innocence or virtue that is at stake (although both of these are clearly
implicated), but the basic epistemological premises that secure social stability and legitimize
interconnection. The consequences of her defiance will be the dissolution of the family’s
organizing logic as well as the relationality that that logic supplies. As her mother insists, “the
honour, as well as the benefit, of the family is concerned” in Clarissa’s inclinations for Lovelace
and against Solmes. “Be ingenuous,” she urges. “You used to be so, even against yourself. Who
at the long run must submit – all of us to you; or you to all of us? – If you intend to yield at last if
you find you cannot conquer, yield now and with a grace – for yield you must, or be none of our
child” (107). The language of necessity in this passage (she “must” yield, “must” submit)
reinforces the sense that the family’s logic, embodied in the implicit consent of the collective “all
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of us,” is rationally inevitable. If Clarissa would surrender the disingenuous attachment to
narrow interest, she would recognize and embrace this inevitability; if not, she departs from the
family, shedding her relational identity (since such an identity is constituted by the embrace of its
formative logic – she will “be none of our child”) – just as, in Locke, the individual who rejects
natural law trespasses against the species, shedding his or her human nature.97 Clarissa’s
goodness, filial piety, and preference by her relations (her grandfather, uncles, aunts, and mother
especially) are not enough to secure her place as a recognized member of the family, not enough
to constitute her ‘daughterhood.’ In her obstinacy, her mother insists, her uncles “will give [her]
up…if [her] papa does, and absolutely renounce” her (107, 108).
In part, Clarissa thus participates in the broader demand for more modern,
comprehensive, and rational logics of legitimacy, especially ones that abandon aristocratic
models of intuitive or naturalized value for more leveling models of value, empirically calculable
and quantifiable. Raymond Williams reads Clarissa as a site for negotiating precisely such shifts
in value. Taking stock of the gradual transition from post-feudal to agrarian capitalist
landownership, Clarissa, Williams argues, registers a range of complex reactions to social
relations ostensibly constructed in the service of tradition and obligation giving way to colder,
modernizing principles of calculated improvement. The novels of Fielding and Richardson
express a need for the “consolidated morality” of “a more maturely calculating society,” he
writes, according to which a more open critique of the cynically calculating landed aristocracy is
possible and in which “calculation, and cost, are given a wider scheme of reference.” In such a
wider scheme, “[l]ove, honour, physical pleasure,” and “loyalty…have to be brought into the
reckoning with incomes and acres” (63).
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The openly cynical scramble for land and for heiresses, which had been the predominant
tone of an earlier period, was succeeded, in the more settled process of the first half of the
eighteenth century, by just this wider, longer-sighted building of position. Humanity,
family interest, personal need, must now, if at all possible, be included in any rational and
improving settlement. If it was not possible, the main current of advantage took its way,
leaving its human casualties” (64).
Clarissa, Williams argues, is just such a casualty. He reads Clarissa’s marriage negotiations
within and against these two calculating modes, arguing that “Clarissa Harlowe’s proposed
marriage to Solmes is part of her family’s calculation in concentrating their estates and
increasing their rank,” and that “it is from this that she recoils to the destructive and cynical
world of the established landowning aristocrat, Lovelace” (61). Clarissa represents the antithesis
of “consolidated morality,” and with its emphasis on the preservation of virginity that cannot be
bargained but can only be taken with its protagonist’s life, it is “an important sign of that
separation of virtue from any practically available world…Though it engages with the current
acquisitiveness and ambition of the landowning families, it is in the end not a criticism of the
period or structure of society, but of what can be abstracted as ‘the world’” (65).
But the need to incorporate material calculation into a “wider scheme of reference”
suggests that the terms of such a scheme (claims about virtue and morality, for example) are
calculable at all. Indeed, such a “widening” of calculability is apparent in the very concept of
“legitimacy,” especially as it evolves from a description of biological bodies and their parentage
to one of social bodies and their governing principles (since the latter presumes that broad and
rational consent to such principles is possible and necessary). Rousseau’s formulation that one
who departs from the general will can and must be “forced” to be “free” reveals a similar
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widening of moral and political calculation, as it presupposes an improbable confidence in
people’s ability to arrive at a stable, broadly viable notion of freedom, as well as the means to
secure it (The Social Contract, 64). But it also reveals the extent to which the “general” will and
any attendant “scheme of reference” originates in and reinforces liberal individualism. In
aligning one’s self with self-evident (according to rational, disinterested reflection), governing
principles of virtue, material acquisition, and morality, one obeys only one’s own will, rather
than, to use Clarissa’s words, any “narrow selfishness that reigns in us” or in others.
Thus while Rousseau insists that, through contracting into the general will, “in place of
the individual person of each contracting party, this act of association creates an artificial and
corporate body” that is characterized by its “unity” (61), and while Clarissa and her mother
continually insist upon the inevitable and unprecedented “unity” of the Harlowe family, their
individuality as the necessary basis for that unity never disappears into (and thus never ceases to
pose problems for) the “artificial and corporate body.”98 After all, the narrative is largely
mediated to us through Clarissa’s singular voice, whose unyielding desire for and compelling
claims about the greater good are incredibly compelling largely because, as many critics have
suggested, they reflect and are influenced by liberal models of Lockean empiricism and
individualism. “Locke’s empirically inclined philosophy,” as E. Derek Taylor puts it, “provides
Richardson a ground on which to build realistic characters formed in the crucible of experience”
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The tensions between family and individuality, and the role that Clarissa’s superior virtue
plays in the production of those tensions, are given spatial representation as well, both in how the
house is regulated (to which I return below) and in the position of the dairy house. Karen
Lipsedge “argues that Richardson employs the dairy house’s removed location and the reason for
its construction to emphasize Clarissa’s independence, self-sufficiency, and command of space”
(30). It represents Clarissa’s late grandfather’s faith in her as the candidate best suited to carry
forward the family’s moral and material business – most representative of the Harlowe name, in
a sense – but it also positions that regulation at a remove from the family’s main estate.
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(35), and those experiences serve always to foreground the individual over the corporate.99 Even
writing to Lovelace, she (often convincingly) insists, is an act of self-sacrifice meant to preserve
the peace, security, and dignity of her family, even though doing so explicitly rejects the will that
ostensibly constitutes that family. In other words, the novel invites us, by providing persistent
and substantial contact with Clarissa’s superior “wider scheme of reference,” to doubt the
premises according to which the family’s renowned “unity” is preserved and reproduced – an
invitation that is in tension with its insistence on premising her superior “wider scheme of
reference” precisely on her concern for, her efforts to preserve, and her celebration of, that
“unity.”100 Clarissa’s collective identity culminates in a powerful and telling contradiction.
In letter 17 Clarissa recognizes that her complaints are not against her brother alone – that
her brother’s “fine scheme will walk alone without needing his leading-strings” – and that “it is
become my father’s will that I oppose, not my brother’s grasping views” (96). As Clarissa’s
exasperated mother advocates for Solmes (advocates, in her words, for Clarissa’s return to duty
“at a time an on an occasion that the highest instance of duty is expected from” her [96]), she
aligns herself with “the family view” and its promotion (97). Richardson encourages readers to
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Taylor provides a useful overview of critical claims about the influence of Locke on novelists,
and on Richardson in particular. Taylor complicates critical consensus about this influence,
however, suggesting that, rather than “unthinkingly” tripping over Lockean ideas, Richardson
might “have been aware that Locke provided unstable grounding for his ambitious second
novel,” and that Richardson “offers a critical examination of Locke’s philosophical, political,
religious, and epistemological positions” (38). See especially chapter one.
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Expressing this tension, Clarissa, presented with what passes for evidence of Lovelace’s
sordid character, argues that “great care should be taken by fathers and mothers, when they
would have their daughters of their minds in these particulars, not to say things that shall
necessitate the child, in honour and generosity, to take part with the man her friends are averse
to. But, waiving all this, as I have offered to renounce him forever, I see not why he should be
mentioned to me” (322), at once attributing the legitimacy – the moral and rational ‘necessity’ –
of her autonomous actions to her aligning herself with her parents’ will (renouncing Lovelace)
and to her rejecting that will (since, as it departs from the dictums of “honour and generosity,” it
“necessitates” her contempt for it).
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take Clarissa’s objections to such a view seriously by signaling some ambivalence on the part of
her mother, further undermining its stability. While Mrs. Harlowe reifies the “family view” by
constantly reproducing the “all of us” rhetoric of association by thoughtful consent, she also
weakens it by drawing suspicion to her own commitments to it (or, more precisely, to the extent
to which her use of the inclusive “all of us” rhetoric reflects only obedience to her own will). “It
would be wicked,” Clarissa writes to Howe, “to suppose my mamma capable of art – But she is
put upon it; and obliged to take methods her heart is naturally above stooping to.” In this same
letter, Clarissa insists that her own arguments might persuade her mother, “could she have been
permitted to judge for herself” (97). Indeed, she later writes, the arguments that constitute the
“family view” against Clarissa were “obtruded upon my mamma” (110); her mother struggles
“to hide under an anger she was compelled to assume” (111); her brother and sister are
“engaging my mamma, contrary to her own judgment, against me” (168); she complains about
“[h]ow willingly would my dear mamma show kindness to me, where she permitted” (187); and
Howe readily embraces this claim, writing that “your mamma has been thus drawn in against her
judgment” (212); etc. Clarissa subversively registers her mother’s departure from the supposedly
necessary unity of the family view, and she promotes that departure by supplying her own,
contrary, and ultimately more persuasive “scheme of reference.” Clarissa’s paradoxical
collective identity begins to come into view: she is victim of family unity; she is a valid (because
compelling) challenger of that family unity; and yet, since her virtue and character (which make
her voice compelling to readers, to her peers, and to her mother) are derived from it, she enlists
that family unity to be the very basis of the validity of her challenge.
Richardson thus attaches a sense of emergency and growing family anxiety to any social
interaction between Clarissa and her mother, indicating Clarissa’s threat to the stability of the

213

conceptual, intersubjective construct signified by the Harlowe name (a construct whose
professed legitimacy authorizes certain actions, and that gives meaning to its constituents’
engagements with the novel’s other worlds). The family, in order to preserve itself as an
unprecedented unity, begins to fracture. Clarissa’s mother is compelled to satisfy the obligations
attending motherhood precisely by suspending any activities associated with motherhood; the
same goes for Clarissa, whose daughterhood must be realized not despite but through isolation
from her parents. This is especially peculiar given that “mother” and “daughter” are relational
identities; social interaction is their necessary precondition. More than this: the “family view,”
the “unity” that is constituted by self-evident and rationally necessary relationality, supplies the
logic according to which relationality between some of its members must be suspended. The
family view becomes associated with a set of consensual, relational claims supported and
sustained by a suspension of consensual relationality. Relationality, then, in the context of the
Harlowes, takes on a logical contradiction; legitimacy, like Eurydice in the Orpheus myth, slips
away precisely when and where its verification is sought.

INFECTIOUS RATIONALISM
Mrs. Harlowe’s suspected ambivalence reveals how precarious the social construct, the “family
view,” actually is. But ultimately it is Clarissa’s virtue – her “more mature” calculation that both
derives from and persuasively contradicts the “family view” – that makes the family’s
illegitimacy (to which Mrs. Harlowe’s ambivalence nervously points) credible. Clarissa’s
function as the novel’s protagonist, as well as the novel’s commitment to realistic representation,
conspire to put relationality in the novel at odds with itself: Clarissa is a daughter to the extent
that she embodies the rationally necessary piety within and respect for the “family view”; she is
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an individual to the extent that she (independently and dispassionately) recognizes when the
family view’s claims to respect and notions of piety are invalid. The problem is not just that
these two movements in the novel are in conflict, but that filial and social “legitimacy,” in the
context of realistic fiction and enlightenment thought, premises the principles of the former on
the autonomy of the latter. A formal problem in the novel addresses itself to a conceptual
problem in philosophical configurations (especially those based on discursive contract and
rational consent) of legitimacy.
In Imagining the Penitentiary, John Bender describes novelistic realism as “a
constructive force” that, alongside new models and theories of the penitentiary, saturate the
subject’s actions with specific forms of narrative meaning and individualism, such that her place
within social structures becomes more visible and more broadly significant (5). Drawing upon
Foucault’s genealogical analysis of discipline, Bender advances novelistic realism as a
technology that provides and reinforces organizing principles of social order and stability.
Bender’s argument makes a couple of points that are relevant to social order and stability in
Clarissa: first, that “within the novelistic container as within the physical regime of the
penitentiary, the self is perceived through and by its narrative construction” (45); second, that
“‘total’ authority represented through physically enforced mental solitude – through a narratively
ordered, sequential control of the particulars of daily life – will make citizens of criminals” (77).
In other words, Bender argues that realistic narrative – and the order it supplies – legitimizes
individuals in the course of their daily lives:
…novelistic conventions of transparency, completeness, and representational
reliability…subsume an assent to regularized authority. This assent finds its cultural
counterpart in the societal consent whereby, according to Weber, our reliance on the
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consistency, orderliness, and rationality of bureaucratic institutions – our acceptance of
them as transparent and ethically neutral – validates the power of the state and indeed
enables us to conceive its existence. (73)
To a certain extent, the “consent” at which Bender finally arrives is not entirely distinct from the
“consent” upon which the general will of Rousseauian association is premised. After all, the fact
that all bodies surveil, even as they are surveilled, is crucial to the transformation of discipline
Bender describes, lending them an air of autonomy. They obey only their own wills in the sense
that they directly produce and reinforce the power relations that then regulate them. However,
the irreducible individuality of the bodies in Bender’s formulation is just as crucial: no general
will is possible because nothing can be fully or ultimately subsumed to a perfect generality.
In a similar way, Foucault describes the technologies of discipline, the “control and
transformation of behaviour,” as “accompanied – both as a condition and as a consequence – by
the development of a knowledge of the individuals.” In this way, “[t]he prison [as, for Bender,
the novel] functions…as an apparatus of knowledge” (125, 126). And yet this knowledge is
partial since, as in the Panopticon, “the inmate must never know whether he is being looked at at
any one moment; but he must be sure that he may always be so” (201). Discipline can only
function when the individual does not know when he or she is being observed; it is a system that
is empirical but anti-rational, at least if one equates rationalism with independence. For Foucault,
the role of discipline and the kind of “consent” it supplies makes conspicuous something of the
dubious nature of “consent”; the claustrophobic “legitimacy” of discipline is imposed onto, not
produced by, the rational mind.
Significantly, both Bender and Foucault turn to accounts of the plague to explain how
paradigms of discipline function on broad, social scales. For Foucault, “[t]he plague-stricken
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town, traversed throughout with hierarchy, surveillance, observation, writing; the town
immobilized by the functioning of an extensive power that bears in a distinct way over all
individual bodies – this is the utopia of the perfectly governed city” (198). For Bender, the new
technologies of individuation and surveillance that give the Panopticon its structural force are
powerfully dramatized in Daniel Defoe’s Journal of the Plague Year (1772): “In the old system,”
he writes, “one could talk of infected houses; H.F. [the novel’s narrator] would deal in infected
persons” (79). In the realistic, first-person account of the Journal, Bender argues, “we witness
the private self being constituted narratively through isolated reflection on its relation to
circumstance; individual personality appears as the internal restatement of external authority, as
a principle of order in face of chaos, comprehension in face of the arbitrary, representation in
face of endless disordered perception, a principle of life as opposed to death, reformation as
opposed to execution” (77).
A very similar constitution of “the private self” is unfolded in Clarissa, especially as its
protagonist, giving expression to a compelling counter-logic that persistently destabilizes the
family’s unity, is shut away like a contagious bearer of infection. Indeed, Clarissa’s isolation
from her family members is compounded when the contagious nature of her logic begins to
manifest in family dissolution: Mrs. Harlowe, showing some modest flexibility, “was only
treated as a too fond mother, who, from motives of a blameable indulgence, would encourage a
child to stand in opposition to a father’s will: she was charged…with dividing the family into
two parts” and was subsequently “told that she must be convinced of the fitness as well as
advantage to the whole…of carrying the contract with Mr Solmes, on which so many contracts
depended, into execution” (109). But to preserve itself from being “divided,” to preserve itself as
a “whole,” the family, in fact, divides itself. It prohibits Clarissa from encountering, and thus
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contaminating, her mother (as well, eventually, as her other relations and friends, gradually and
one person at a time), except as prescribed and supervised by her father, brother, and (eventually)
sister’s servant. And yet the sickness spreads. The family grows more unstable, and,
correspondingly, more resolved to preserve its stability. Clarissa’s maid, Hannah, acts as
mediator, conveying Clarissa’s unsolicited letters and pleas to her parents: she succumbs too.
“Late as it is,” Clarissa writes, “they are all shut together. Not a door opens; not a soul stirs.
Hannah, as she moves up and down, is shunned as a person infected” (116). Soon, Hannah is
banished, turned out of service; shortly thereafter Clarissa is cut off from her parents entirely,
and the cynically characterized “utopia” of perfect government, described by Foucault, prevails.
James Harlowe writes to his sister
expressly to forbid you to come into their presence, or into the garden when they are
there: nor when they are not there, but with Betty Barnes [their sister’s provocative maid]
to attend you, except by particular licence or command…In short, [you] are strictly to
confine yourself to your chamber, except now and then in Betty Barnes’s sight…you take
a morning and evening turn in the garden: and then you are to go directly, and without
stopping at any apartment in the way, up and down the back stairs, that the sight of so
perverse a young creature may not add to the pain you have given everybody. (121)
And Anna Howe, if more playfully, invokes the rhetoric of infection to explain Clarissa’s
condition, as well as the threat that she poses to her family’s regulation and preservation.
Suggesting that Clarissa indeed loves Lovelace (and acknowledging that, especially considering
Solmes’s character and morals, such a love might be justifiable), Howe writes that Clarissa has
become sick, as with a cold:
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When a person gets a cold, he or she puzzles and studies how it began; how he – she got
it: and when that is accounted for, down he – she sits contented and lets it have its course,
or takes a sweat or the like, to get rid of it, if it be very troublesome—So, my dear, before
the malady you wot of, yet wot not of, grows so importunate as that you must be obliged
to sweat it out, let me advise you to mind how it comes on.
Significantly, Howe continues to argue that the “indiscreet violence” of the Harlowes has
contributed, as much as the “insinuating address” of Lovelace, to Clarissa’s amorous “malady”
(173). It is a communicable disease, passed moreover from family to daughter and from daughter
to family in the very course of fulfilling and enforcing family prerogatives and relational
functions.
Thus, as the crisis unfolds and as Clarissa persists in defying Solmes’s proposals,
relational figures, acting with the authority and in the interests of preserving relationality,
suspend relationality. Are their identities in this case, to the great extent that their identities are
essentially relational (a “father’s will,” a “mamma,” a “sisterly” or “brotherly” sibling),
preserved? Negated? The precedent for this paradox can be found, again, in Defoe’s A Journal of
the Plague Year, where, H. F. writes,
Fathers and Mothers have gone about as if they had been well, and have believ’d
themselves to be so, till they have insensibly infected, and been the Destruction of their
whole Families: Which they would have been far from doing, if they had the least
Apprehensions of their being unsound and dangerous themselves. A Family, whose Story
I have heard, was thus infected by the Father, and the Distemper began to appear upon
some of them, even before he found it upon himself; but searching more narrowly, it
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appear’d he had been infected some Time, and as soon as he found that his Family had
been poison’d by himself, he went distracted…and in a few Days died.101
Such a man “had been a walking Destroyer,” killing his beloved relations “even perhaps in his
tender Kissing and Embracings of his own Children” (159). In the course of being a father,
performing the functions and duties organized and authorized by his family identity, he becomes
a “Destroyer,” eliminating the figures relative to whom his identity as father exists in the first
place. Clarissa’s isolation parallels that of family members who, shut off from one another,
cannot destroy one another. But what does a “family” of isolates signify? What is a collective
identity, like “daughter” or “Harlowe,” outside any of the interactivity or negotiation that
constitutes collectivity? Indeed, what does it mean when isolation becomes the very condition of
sustaining collective identity?
The Harlowes premise the legitimacy of their actions on principle, and they frame those
principles in contrast with those of other communities. Their legitimacy, they suggest, if not selfevident to Clarissa, should become evident when compared to the claims to legitimacy supplied
by the novel’s other worlds. What conceptual demands does her family actually make on her?
For one, she is taught to be suspicious of social legitimacy outside her family, but she is never
provided with the basis with which to substantiate this suspicion. By negotiating the claims of
both her family and Lovelace, she is presented with two contrary sets of duties, two
“associations” apart from the “one great family,” two competing claims to legitimacy. How is
she to decide?
It is not just that this novel contains two separate communities, each claiming the
individual’s recognition in different ways. There is a deeper problem at stake, one relating to
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social epistemology and legitimacy. The novel’s two communities become knowable (both as
social bodies and as distinct from one another) through an arrangement of claims and counterclaims that, on the one hand, both presuppose legitimacy and, on the other, necessarily put those
claims into conflict with one another. Without any certain empirical recourse to legitimizing
conditions, such as those ostensibly presupposed by the natural givennes of “family” or the
rationally necessary consent of “association,” it becomes at once necessary and impossible for
Clarissa to determine the conditions under which one community is to be (and has already been,
by others) privileged over the other. It does not always appear to her how her naturally necessary
obedience to her father is in conflict with her carefully reasoned rejections of both Lovelace and
Solmes; meanwhile her consent, appearing variously conditioned or qualified, is not recognized
as an extension of obedience to paternalism. In brief, Clarissa senses that these two communities
are in conflict with one another, and yet, unable to recognize the conditions according to which
each legitimizes itself, she feels special obligations to each. To her family, she owes her
obedience and subscription to its traditions and hierarchical structure (which it enforces with
increasing violence); to aristocratic England, she owes the discursive, rational engagement
according to which it can engage, absorb, and mobilize her (all of which it also does, eventually,
through violence).

POLITICAL STRUCTURES AND COUNTER-STRUCTURES IN CLARISSA
It might be argued that I overstate the premises of legitimacy in the case of Clarissa, and that her
father, brother, and uncles, far from grounding the organization and practices of their family on
anything like a rationale for legitimacy, merely selfishly indulge their vanity by pursuing their
social and material ambitions. Certainly Anna Howe takes this to be the case, and she
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occasionally mediates a few scraps of gossip from her friends and mother for corroboration.
Moreover, it might be said (and generally is, I think) that the “duties” demanded, and the norms
endorsed, by the Harlowes merely reproduce the very conventions of blind patriarchy, custom,
and tradition that discourses of rational legitimacy work to neutralize. Clarissa’s uncle Antony
especially appears to promote such a view, writing at one early point “that children should not
dispute their parents’ authority,” continuing that “[w]hen your grandfather left his estate to you,
though his three sons, and a grandson, and your elder sister were in being, we all acquiesced: and
why? Because it was our father’s doing. Do you imitate that example: if you will not, those who
set it you have the reason to hold you inexcusable” (157). Perhaps “legitimacy” in the
enlightenment sense that I outline above, in fact, precisely misses the point of Clarissa. Perhaps,
like Cavendish’s “Ladies” and the “worlds” in their earrings, the hierarchal structure of family
patriarchy sufficiently accounts for its pursuits and possessions, and that to look for any further
legitimizing rationale is to project onto it a business of “disenchantment” that it resists or
neglects – indeed, such a position would help to account for Mrs. Harlowe’s reluctant “consent.”
But this objection only begs the question: it takes a bad rationale – or an insufficient
rationale, or a backwards one, or an outdated one, etc. – for no rationale. It ignores that, for the
first third of the book, the patriarchal prerogative is being asserted and meticulously (if
sometimes speciously, a qualification that is possible but by no means necessary) defended.
Clarissa is asked to obey her father’s will, but she is asked to do so by recognizing and
acknowledging the validity of its substance – a substance that, moreover, explicitly echoes
elements from contemporary political discourse.102 Even Antony’s letter cited in the previous
paragraph supplies his commitment to paternal prerogatives with what passes for rational
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justification, defending the family’s authority to involve itself in the selection of Clarissa’s
husband on the basis of the estate which is all of theirs, and in which they all have an interest
(155), arguing moreover to Clarissa that she knows “very well that we have nothing but your
good at heart; consistently, indeed, with the good and honour of all of us. What must we think of
any one of it, who would not promote the good of the whole? and who would set one part of it
against another? – which God forbid, say I! – You see I am for the good of all.” He then
concludes by insisting that “I think I have all the argument on my side,” and that “I am sure, this,
by fair argument, is unanswerable” (158, emphasis added). The claim to possessing the
“unanswerable” argument even becomes something of a trope, repeated by Clarissa’s siblings
and parents.
The objection that “legitimacy” is a red herring also denies Clarissa’s struggle, which
makes up the bulk of the novel, to understand and to persuade, and it deflates the lesson that is
ostensibly learned at the novel’s conclusion. Indeed, as E. Derek Taylor argues, “[k]eeping this
fact of composition in mind [that Richardson knew how the novel was going to end throughout
its construction] helps to explain…how a rigidly Filmerian father could offer a devastating
challenge to Filmer’s patriarchal assumptions in his portrayal of Clarissa’s battle with her
family” (3), highlighting the role that discourses of politics and legitimacy play in the novel’s
composition. Morris Golden foregrounds precisely that role, reading Clarissa as a rich record of
Richardson’s time, juxtaposing its conflicts with contemporary, documented cases of spousal
abuse, dramatic deaths, family intrigues, and politics. Golden’s reading helps to account for the
novel’s hints of developing Jacobite intrigue leading into the rebellion of 1745, and of George II
and a royal family “plotted against, threatened continuously, and directly attacked by a
representative of an older legitimacy while the novel was in progress,” within which “were
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known divisions between the father and the eldest son, partly because of a dead grandfather’s
will…the elder son’s ambitions,” etc. (589).103
Others have attempted to complement Golden’s reading of the topical political content of
Richardson’s novel by developing the conceptual and theoretical frameworks through which it
was thought to operate. Rachel K. Carnell, for example, argues that Clarissa and the public
debates it inspired (sometimes with Richardson’s encouragement) provide a glimpse into “the
complex relationship between humanizing morality and political analysis that characterized the
eighteenth-century literary public sphere,” emphasizing not only the novel’s moral
preoccupations but its “highly politicized discourse” (271), and granting it some of the power of
rational discourse described by Jürgen Habermas’s Structural Transformation of the Public
Sphere. And Lauren Hinton puts Clarissa’s confidence in moral autonomy through natural law
up against seventeenth- and eighteenth-century natural law discourses that subordinate women to
men as property. But this reading takes for granted some of what it attempts to critique. On the
one hand, Hinton argues that “[i]t is as a member of the land-owning bourgeoisie that Clarissa
asserts her radical autonomy as a form of moral propriety” (296), and that “Clarissa strives for
this radical-rational autonomy which would later be described as a Kantian ideal” (299), citing
“Clarissa's belief in right reason and an internal, universal moral law” (295, a belief that, Hinton
shows, Richardson himself acknowledged). On the other hand, Hinton writes that “Clarissa
challenges and yet attempts to exist in harmony with the ‘natural’ patriarchal laws that undergird
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John Cardwell adds that Clarissa’s conflict “is related to the seventeenth-century
constitutional confrontation between king and people, which led to the overthrow of Charles I,
the dictatorship of Oliver Cromwell, and the exiled Stuarts’ attempts to recover the throne,”
writing that “Richardson’s reaction to the Jacobite rebellion of 1745 is reflected in the
association of the Harlowes with the Hanoverian Succession, Clarissa with the British political
nation, and Lovelace with the Young Pretender striving to impose absolutist rule,” some of
which I will take up in what follows (154).
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her bourgeois family as ‘natural’ extension of the state” (297), and that those patriarchal laws
manifest as “the use of graphic spatial enclosures that increasingly inhibit and encroach upon
Clarissa's physical liberty,” signalling “a morally decadent and unnatural universe” (298). The
result, for Clarissa, is a “subjectivity [that] is bound up in the sadomasochistic contradictions
between autonomy and dependency” (300).
And yet, even as Hinton uses the term “unnatural” to describe the novel’s patriarchal,
Filmerian prerogatives, she maintains that Clarissa’s “sadomasochism” proceeds from “the
ironies of natural law, which allows her to assert radical autonomy and social dependency at
once” (301). In other words, by explaining Clarissa’s fidelity to moral freedom and autonomy,
authorized by natural law, and by then projecting onto natural law the patriarchal, often
antithetical premises it was sometimes deployed to support or defend, Hinton pathologizes
Clarissa, nearly blaming her for naïve fidelity to what appears an innately contradictory system,
rather than blaming her family for making that system appear contradictory through faulty or
narrowly ambitious rationale. After all, Mary Astell – on whose work, Jocelyn Harris argues,
“Richardson modeled Clarissa’s character, education, and philosophical beliefs” – challenges the
arbitrary, oppressive, patriarchal practices (specifically in the institution of marriage) in a way
that directly deflates the very “ironies” of natural law identified by Hinton (Harris 445). For
Astell, it is the narrow love of power that goes against the moral autonomy of natural law, and
not the “Kantian ideal” it eventually becomes, that comes to associate oppressive family
practices with natural law. (Mary Wollstonecraft will later advance elements of Astell’s
argument, identifying social structures and institutions that, to use a later term, “naturalize”
inequalities and qualitative social assumptions.)
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The novel’s engagement with political structure is most apparent in the rhetoric through
which its various “worlds” are distinguished. Clarissa flirts with the possibility that Lovelace
represents not only a more attractive but a more legitimate authority than that of her parents early
in her close confinement, wondering, in a letter to Howe, if Lovelace would “confine me
prisoner to my chamber? Will he deny me the visits of my dearest friend, and forbid me to
correspond with her? …Will he set a servant over me, with licence to insult me? Will he, as he
has not a sister, permit his cousins Montague, or would either of those ladies accept of a position
to insult and tyrannize over me? – It cannot be. Why then, think I often, do you tempt me, oh my
cruel friends, to try the difference?” (183). The difference, as one between legitimacy and
tyranny, is reiterated and expanded later in this same letter: “I like him better than I ever thought
I should like him,” she writes, “[a]nd, I believe, it is possible for the persecution I labour under to
induce me to like him still more; especially while I can recollect to his advantage our last
interview, and as every day produces stronger instances of tyranny, I will call it, on the other
side.” Lovelace is compelling out of principle, not a tempter, or a source of dangerous, blind
seduction. She warms to him because she finds him to be, upon reflection, a better authority than
her parents – and than Solmes. Her inclinations in other words remain legitimate, since although
she likes him “better” than she expected she could, she insists that her love is no tyrant, “no such
mighty monarch, no such unconquerable power, as I have heard it represented” (185).
Clarissa’s parents, meanwhile, position themselves as legitimate authorities in terms that
would be familiar to English readers, graciously extending to Clarissa “an act of oblivion” (189),
suggesting that her confinement points, not to their arbitrary and excessive force, but to her own
trespasses against their rightful prerogative. (Much later, Lovelace will extend, betraying his own
abuse of authority, a remarkably similar gesture, writing to Clarissa that “I am but too sensible
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that this kind of treatment may appear to you with the face of an arbitrary and illegal
imposition.” He also blames Clarissa, begging that she “forgive this act of compulsion on the
score of the necessity you your dear self have laid me under to be guilty of it; and to permit the
solemnity of next Thursday to include an act of oblivion of all past offences” [953].) In letter
forty-one, the “undutiful” Clarissa is fully banished from seeing her father: consequences, Mrs.
Harlowe insists, of her daughter’s disobedience. Mrs. Harlowe then defends her refusal “[t]o love
a rebel, as well as if she were dutiful” (191). Solmes, too, accounts for his authority in terms that
would be familiar (and troubling) to most English readers: “fear and terror rather
than…complaisance and love” characterize a husband’s authority, he insists, claiming that “it
should be his care to perpetuate the occasion for that fear, if he could not think that he had the
love. And, for his part, he was of opinion that if LOVE and FEAR must be separated in
matrimony, the man who made himself feared fared the best” (238). Where the Harlowes
represent a precarious state of England (the fickleness, mobishness, and partisan plotting
suggested by Dryden’s “Absalom and Achitaphel”) following the English revolution, Solmes
explicitly invokes Machiavelli (the Machiavelli associated with The Prince, which resonates very
differently than his Discourses on Livy), a trope then as now for brutal and ambitious tyranny.
Despite such familiarly troubling and unstable registers, an alternative frame for
analyzing the Harlowe family as (faulty) practitioners – rather than negligent abusers – of
rational legitimacy can be found, not in the narrow calculation Raymond Williams associates
with “an openly cynical scramble for land,” but in the shifting attitudes about the role calculation
must play in the regulation of cultural practices and social institutions. Albert O. Hirschman
describes this shift in The Passions and the Interests, explaining how “commercial, banking, and
similar money-making pursuits become honorable at some point in the modern age after having
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stood condemned or despised as greed, love of lucre, and avarice for centuries past” (9). Closely
following the methodological turn that inaugurated revisionist historiography of the French
Revolution in the 1950s and 60s, Hirschman shows that assumptions about greed and luxury,
such as those that animate Williams’s argument, are sometimes misplaced: that an analysis such
as Williams’s projects onto (some of the characters in) Clarissa a frame of economic theory that
does not necessarily apply. Indeed, through such commercial and entrepreneurial frames, the
logic of aristocratic “paternalism” might have been reconciled, in some instances, to the effects
of a more egalitarian notion of reciprocal community bonds: Amanda Berry writes about
eighteenth-century voluntary hospitals, for example, which not only accepted such working poor
patients as had been sponsored by subscribers (whose “written recommendation” was meant to
confirm “that the sick person was a ‘suitable object’” of care, properly embodying the
community’s broader values and priorities [127]), but also as had been supplied with the
patronage of “commercial firms,” at once protecting their material labor interests and reinforcing
a “theory of paternalism [that] centres around the concept that property has its duties as well as
its rights” (134, 135). There is a perspective (and it becomes a dominant perspective) from which
the “scramble” Williams describes is not a lapse of moral calculation at all, but in fact the
business of a rationally necessary organizational paradigm, in which the calculation of durable
interests subordinates the often dubious, misleading, and in any case fleeting passions,
purchasing greater social, political, and indeed moral stability. In fact, Charles Taylor traces the
development of this paradigm alongside that of the novel, which as a literary form “further
entrenched the egalitarian affirmation of ordinary life” in precisely the ways Hirschman
describes (Sources of the self, 286).
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Of course, I am not arguing that the Harlowe family are not greedy: I take for granted that
they are, and that the institutions of marriage and inheritable property as represented by the
Harlowes’ arguments are – from any perspective informed by postcolonial theory, Marxian and
critical theory, queer and critical race theory, and centuries of feminist theory – antithetical to the
principles of liberty and right that any current readers (even those endorsing the most
conservative liberalisms) can accept. I am challenging the claim that their greed necessarily
negates their claims (however misguided or misogynistic their effects) to legitimate social
organization. There is no reason not to take Antony at his word, in other words, that he
ingenuously seeks the family’s greater good, and that he genuinely sees Clarissa’s interests and
the family’s interests as one and the same: that, to use Rousseau’s language, he and his family
are forcing her to be free. Taking Antony at his word deflates a false dichotomy of legitimacyillegitimacy – it shifts emphasis away from characterizing the oppressive overtones of her
family’s proposal and toward the operative definition of “freedom” that ostensibly defines its
telos, as well as the techniques (such as keeping her in confinement) that are thus understood,
unironically, as “liberating.”104 If achieving the promise of “unity” through legitimate
negotiation implies rational and moral freedom (obeying one’s own will by observing “duties”
that one understands to be rationally necessary from a disinterested perspective), then the
104

John P. Zomchick represents the central conflict of Clarissa in a way that, as I am arguing in
this section, reproduces some of the assumptions it attempts to critique, arguing that “Although
Clarissa’s ‘heart’ is no less an ideological sign than the men’s heads, it is a sign of resistance
rather than a means of oppression. If her heart represents a natural threat to the bourgeoisie’s rise
to power, then that heart must be put in harness by having it internalize the rational calculation of
the new juridical world,” adding that “the confinement that the family subjects her to is meant to
break the heart of its wild liberty and condition the woman to accept the harness that the laws put
into the hands of the husband” (75). Zomchick’s use of the term “harness” takes it as given that
the “heart” is freer than the “head,” and that rationalism and calculation are innately restricting,
and that sentiment is innately free and authentic, despite the course of enlightenment thought
(especially as it reaches its maturity in Rousseau and Kant) that arrives at precisely the opposite
formulation.
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questions of oppression and patriarchy in Clarissa must be reframed as a question of legitimacy
– of, in fact, multiple legitimacies – and how it is constructed, circulated, and examined. And
determining its construction, circulation, and examination, of course, brings our attention back to
the epistemological problems, central to this dissertation, of social experience. To return to our
previous question: in the context of competing claims to legitimacy, each of which warns her to
be skeptical of (other) claims to legitimacy, how is she to decide?
(It should also be pointed out that, in representing the novel’s central conflict – as many
critics do – as a that between Clarissa’s legitimacy and the family’s and Lovelace’s illegitimacy,
readers not only ignore the family’s notions of legitimacy and liberation that are couched in
patriarchal social structures, but they also take for granted or overstate the “legitimacy” in the
liberal sense Clarissa represents, as if it is not also oppressive. Thus, not only does the claim [as
one critic puts it] that “[t]he Harlowes subordinate everything to their material interests,
ruthlessly ignoring individual rights and needs” characterize the oppressive illegitimacy of the
Harlowe family in a way that obviates serious study of the concepts of “rights” and liberties their
ideology ostensibly advances [Zomchick 61], but it also overstates the ideological innocence of
the heroine’s motives in a way that, similarly, takes for granted [obviates the study of] the
legitimacy of its assumptions and implications. Readers are sympathetic to Clarissa’s rationale
[and on the whole, given the simple choice, I am as well], but sympathizing with Clarissa as a
simple foil to her family threatens to romanticize a dominant national ideology – Clarissa speaks
more than once of her rights as an “English subject” – that, otherwise, is troubling and
problematic, just as sympathizing with Locke’s notions of liberty and rationalism as a simple foil
to Cavendish’s royalism threatens to downplay the role Lockean rhetoric played, as the first
section of this chapter suggests, in coercive political and imperial structures.)
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This problem (how is she to decide?) is complicated by the fact that social knowledge,
and specifically knowledge of social legitimacy through its organization and practices, is
enclosed by self-knowledge. Knowing legitimacy begins with what Jacques Derrida has called
ipseity, the apparent precondition to democracy, the knowing of one’s self, and “of the one-self
that gives itself its own law.”105 Ipseity is in some ways a perfect “unity,” complicating the
autonomous subject’s status and durability in the context of the “unity” of the family (in what
ways can a perfect unity be thought of as a part of a greater unity? Can it be its own end as well
as an essential part of a greater social teleology? The following chapter will take up these and
related questions in detail). Translating the closed circle of the self-governing individual into the
social circle of democratic legitimacy poses obvious problems. But the reverse is also true, as I
have been arguing. Translating (often elusive) social phenomena into the perfect autonomy and
self-knowledge of ipseity is also at issue, since ipseity, one’s “island,” may in fact always already
be shared; since self-knowledge, as it is relational, is premised on social knowledge. Christine
Roulston describes the “challenge” of Clarissa as one of testing “whether the subject can remain
authentic when stripped of all her frames of reference…whether the subject can overcome
conditions of radical defamiliarization and remain internally and ethically coherent” (26). This
formulation makes only half the case, since, as I have argued in the previous section, Clarissa’s
‘internal and ethical coherence’ is precisely defined by, indicative of, and sustained by a kind of
radical familiarization, by total embeddeddness in “frames of reference.” Her desperate yearning
to observe her filial duty defines and confirms her virtue; her rejection of the validity of that
duty’s entailments validates and authenticates her virtue. Her legitimacy is a kind of quantum
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From Rogues: see a discussion of this passage and the text it comes from in the introduction.
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duality: virtue that is constituted simultaneously by both of these (apparently mutually exclusive)
properties.
What are the legitimacies with which she is presented? The family’s, the rake’s, the
Machiavel’s. Each constitutes its own sociality, organized by its own code that demands
something different from her (different forms of attachment, different obligations, different
notions of duty and virtue), that hails her in different ways, and that seeks to define her in a way
that, reciprocally, validates its distinct, idiosyncratic code. Legitimacy, of the individual body
and the social body, is reciprocal. Such is the context and the condition of the subject negotiating
a plurality of “worlds,” of the subject discovering that the relational nature of her ipseity – which
she had taken for granted as complete, as the self-sufficiency of the solitary Crusoe – has been
challenged and must now be rethought or reimagined. But to which “world” will she (her
disinterested rationalism, specifically: her ipseity) confer legitimacy? And which world will
validate (to her, to others, to other worlds) her ipseity as legitimate?106 Analyzing a similar set of
problems, Ronald Dworkin writes about “associative obligations,” essential but largely
interpretive “special responsibilities social practice attaches to membership in some biological or
social group,” which he distinguishes sharply from “the kinds of personal obligations we incur
through discrete promises and other deliberate acts” (196). The complexity of “membership” is
expressed, for Dworkin, by the two movements of associative obligations: they are
“interpretive,” suggesting that they are subject to the constituent’s rational, calculating mind (she
must determine for herself what obligations and duties logically follow from the sustaining of a
106

Describing the increasing emphasis on conjugal kinship identifications (which are chosen,
and which thus punctuate the individuality of its adherents and the discursive basis of social
legitimacy), Ruth Perry writes that “[i]n many areas of life, the state replaced family functioning
and appeared to insert itself in matters once handled by kin,” writing specifically about the state
drawing upon families’ incomes and male heirs to support colonial wars, “exchanging
nationalism for family loyalty” and creating “a substitute family in the militarized state” (35).
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particular social group, such as, in the case of Clarissa, its particular interpretations of
inheritance and the transfer of property), and yet they are largely latent: “Even associations we
consider mainly consensual, like friendship, are not formed in one act of deliberate contractual
commitment, the way one joins a club, but instead develop through a series of choices and events
that are never seen, one by one, as carrying a commitment of that kind” (197).
Samuel Scheffler expands upon Dworkin’s analysis, drawing particular attention to the
moral imperatives that come to be attached to, or that emerge from, various and competing
associations (48). Scheffler explains “associative duties” in a way that might be taken to
substantiate the Harlowe family’s perspective: “If…we attach great importance to our own
membership in a group of a certain kind, then not only are we apt to see ourselves as having
duties to the other members of the group, we may also be inclined to suppose that membership in
a group of this kind always gives rise to such duties, and we may disapprove of group members
who fail to acknowledge their duties as we see them” (51). As thus described, associative duties
imply a greater share of advantages and privileges among members than between non-members,
such that “I may sometimes be required to help my brother even if his need is less urgent than [a]
stranger’s” (52). The Harlowe family’s disapproval of Clarissa indicates the twofold nature of
their disappointment: she has failed to “acknowledge” the “duties” that are inherent to her family
membership (thus sustaining its claims to legitimacy), and she threatens to withhold from them a
material advantage that duty and family membership require.
But the principle of associative duty is complicated by a range of epistemological
difficulties. First, it assumes that one can determine whom one is associated with in the first
place, with a degree of certainty: in Mary Davys, as we have seen, “stranger” and “brother” are
completely unstable, and a single individual can occupy both identities simultaneously, or
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oscillate between them. Similarly, Eliza Haywood’s Fantomina can monogamously engage the
same sex partner continuously while each time taking on a new identity and assuming a whole
new range of associative duties (she is particularly adept at assuming the postures, and
demanding the addresses, appropriate to women, not just with different names and personalities,
but in very different socio-economic classes), such that her partner believes himself a faithless
(and widely desired) rake. And Clarissa compulsively redefines the nature of her relationships
with others, addressing and describing the same individuals variously as friends, relations,
usurpers, allies, antagonists, etc.
The second epistemological difficulty is the fact (that Scheffler does acknowledge) that,
once association is more fully disclosed, “the duties of the participants are often difficult to
delineate with precision” (53). But the principle of legitimacy should obviate this difficulty.
Indeed, explaining what he calls “the voluntarist objection” to the principle of associative duties,
Scheffler writes about those for whom “mere membership in a group or participation in a
relationship cannot by itself give rise to any duties at all,” adding that “we have such
responsibilities, according to this objection, only in so far as we have voluntarily incurred them”
(54). The crux of this objection is that associative duties are not properly duties at all, at least if
one accepts the Kantian definition of duty. As I have been suggesting, Kantian duty entails
acting voluntarily upon what one determines to be necessary according to universal law – and,
moreover, that only such actions are truly free. This is more or less the correspondence of “duty”
and “liberation” that Astell associates with proper obedience to king, father, and husband, and
that Rousseau associates with the general will: two formulations of “legitimacy” that I have been
referencing loosely throughout my analysis of Clarissa. From the perspective of such
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formulations, there would be no meaningful distinction between any given associative duty and
the voluntarist’s autonomy. In fact, each would be the necessary condition of the other.
Ultimately, Clarissa would not share Scheffler’s “doubts about the possibility of what
might be called wholesale monistic assimilation: that is, about the possibility of assimilating the
full range of perceived associative duties to any other single type of duty” (54). Her utopian
gesture to the “one great family” indicates her faith in a more Kantian notion of association. Her
position in the family – a daughter stripped of daughterhood; an infected, unconscious, “walking
destroyer” – dramatizes the implications of Kantian association in a pluralistic world. According
to Kant’s moral theory, one “was obligated only to act in accord with his own will, which,
however, in accordance with its natural end, is a universally legislative will” (50). In associating
with only one’s self, in preserving one’s autonomy and ipseity (as it is constructed in accordance
with what above I have been calling the self-evident), one associates with nobody in particular.
And in associating with nobody in particular, one associates with all subjects – at least with all
rational subjects. In this case, a daughter may indeed – in fact must – perform, or at least
conceive of, her daughterhood and its defining, associative duties in isolation. In a sense, her true
identity, even insofar as it is relational (and especially insofar as it is “legitimate”), depends upon
this isolation. In this way she may regard herself as the legitimate Kantian subject, “universally
legislative in regard to all laws to which [she] may be subject, because precisely this suitableness
of [her] maxims for the universal legislation designates [her] as an end in” herself (56). The
epistemological questions that complicate Scheffler’s description of associative duty do not arise
for Kant, given that “just as the fact that this dignity (prerogative) before all mere beings of
nature brings with it to have to take its maxims always from its own point of view but also at the
same time from that of every other rational being as a universally legislative being (which is why
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they are also called ‘persons’)” (Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals 56). The proper
perspective for considering moral action is supplied by the framework through which maxims
are developed, and cannot be seen as attached to one group (or the promotion of its interests) or
another. But is this how Clarissa is taught by her family to frame her skepticism of Lovelace’s
legitimacy, or by Lovelace to frame the skepticism of her family’s? Is this the ‘proper
perspective’ from which she enacts her own resistance, both to her family and, later, to
Lovelace? In fact, we see in Clarissa that the epistemological problems remain. How does one
know when one group’s interests are being promoted? How does one know when the promotion
of one group’s interests is in conflict with, consistent with, or even necessary to, the universal
good? How is Clarissa to know whether her imprisonment by her family really is, in some way
obscured by her own “narrow view,” the proper mitigation of her unconscious destructive
properties, her “infection?” How doe she know that, imprisoned by her family, forced to sustain
her daughterhood by suspending its relationality, she is not forced to be free, especially since she
is, almost literally, forced into identifying with others in isolation, by identifying with none of
them in particular?
A Kantian answer to these questions would mean invoking the kingdom of ends: an
organizing moral assumption according to which nobody may be treated solely as a means; each
individual is an end. But there is an interpretive quality to such an answer. Respect to other
individuals, after all, is owing to the fact that they too are universally legislative creatures (the
most significant sense in which they are not only ends, but also means). One accepts the other’s
maxims (so far as one believes that they are consistent with the kingdom of ends) as universal
law. What then is one to make of the increasing plurality of communities? Is this plurality
consistent with a universal law? Is it possible to have one’s own family, and rigorously to
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observe the dictates of filial duty to that family, and also to believe in “the one great family?”
Can, moreover, filial duty to one’s particular family, and the promotion of its interests (so long
as such promotion does not reduce non-family individuals to mere means) constitute the
observance of the categorical imperative, as Clarissa seems to think? If so, Clarissa’s question
about which community to join (and thus to legitimize) remains, at least in principle, unresolved.

CONCLUSION
Like the other novels this dissertation examines, Clarissa insists upon a more thorough
account of social experience, and of the kinds of knowledge (specifically of the nature and
conditions of legitimacy) such experience unfolds. While social experience is necessary to the
determination of the legitimacy of social organization, it is also the most stubborn obstacle to
such determination. Legitimacy – whether through consent or deferral to nature – presupposes
that others’ actions and motives can be made legible, and legibly linked to broader (and indeed
universal) social priorities. And yet the very concept and mechanisms of community,
subordinating the individual as a liberal, rational agent, resists any such legibility. The very
anxiety inaugurated by the search for and examination of legitimacy attests to the subordination
of the individual constituent, for it speaks to the extent to which his or her own sense of
supplying and constituting the group’s organizing logic is suspended at such moments (after all,
if I am anxious about my community’s legitimacy, even if I am confident that I have never
reduced others to mere means, I have ceased to premise its legitimacy upon my actions). While
determining the legitimacy of a particular family makes of that family an object of study – and of
the constituent a passive observer – the legitimizing agency of that constituent disappears.
Whether necessarily or by convenience, action in the novels I have been exploring seems only to
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be possible when the legitimacy that authorizes and organizes it is taken for granted. In a world
of multiple and competing communities, one either seeks legitimacy (like Clarissa, confined in
her room and shut off from her relations) or one acts (like Belmont breakfasting with his
“daughter”), but one cannot do both simultaneously.
And yet the relationship between action and rationalism in a context of multiple and
evolving worlds will soon come to define legitimacy in eighteenth-century thought. In part
because of the emphasis novelists placed on the individual – and in particular on the role of the
rational individual in the construction and recognition of social organization in an empirical
world – the conditions under which legitimacy can be conceived of as something that is both
known and done are reevaluated in critical and practical thought. The novelistic intervention in
political and philosophical discourses about legitimacy points to a failure to reframe the
individual as a subject and object of legitimacy. It reveals an individual for whom fantasizing
about unknown “worlds within worlds” (an unconscious beneficiary of the riches and resources
that are the products of unknown, generally unknowable, and distinctly foreign social
organization) undermines the deliberate labor and rational mind that otherwise constitutes
autonomy and confers legitimacy. It points to the extent to which the collective body does not
mitigate but reifies the potential excesses and abuses of the imagination – to the instability of
relationality as much as to the constructs for which stable relationality is essential (as in the
construction, recognition, and circulation of the “self-evident” in social organization, for
example). And it complicates the notion of liberty, a notion that in many ways defines legitimate
relationality but that, in turn, is overdetermined by the claims multiple “worlds” place upon or
project onto it. If this complication is the defining impasse that gives rise to the nation state in
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the nineteenth century, it is because it eventually puts a much heavier stress on the individual as
a locus for collective action.
In the next chapter, I will look more closely at the concept of action and labor in a
collective frame, juxtaposing this frame with the concept of progress or perfectibility usually
associated with the Scottish Enlightenment or Whig historiography. I conclude with two images
suggestive of the transition I have identified here. In many ways, discourses of modern
legitimacy begin with a description of parts and wholes, a nice alignment of social and organic
bodies. Thomas Hobbes writes that “by Art is created that great LEVIATHAN called a
COMMON-WEALTH, or STATE (in latine CIVITAS) which is but an Artificial Man; though of
greater stature and strength than the Naturall, for whose protection and defence it was intended;
and in which, the Soveraignty is an Artificial Soul, as giving life and motion to the whole body…
[and for whom] the Pacts and Covenants, by which the parts of this Body Politique were first
made, set together, and united, resemble that Fiat, or the Let us make Man, pronounced by God
in the Creation” (Leviathan 9 – 10). Hobbes created an image of the political body that is the
product of “art,” but that also subordinates the individual’s agency, since through a kind of
‘consensual’ deferral (see chapter two) he or she becomes the “author” of the sovereign’s
actions. By comparison, Mary Wollstonecraft describes the evolution of social and political
dynamics leading into the French Revolution with an image that clearly rhymes with, and as
clearly rejects, that of Hobbes’s artificial man: she describes the “atrocious debaucheries” of “the
reign of Louis XV,” a “ vile despotism, under the lash of which twenty-five millions of people
groaned; till, unable to endure the increasing weight of oppression, they rose like a vast elephant,
terrible in his anger, treading down with blind fury friends as well as foes” (An Historical and
Moral View, 301).
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Of interest, for me, is the contrast not just between Hobbes and Wollstonecraft (and the
shift in how legitimacy is described and derived), but between the individuals in France and
Clarissa, who negotiates with her family, Solmes, and Richardson, rational to a fault, to the awful
end. Of interest is the sense that Clarissa enacts, perhaps as much as is possible, the island
sensibility of the autonomous Crusoe, utilizing herself and her environs in isolation as resources
in the construction of legitimacy where, to her mind, it is wholly lacking. And of interest is her
failure to accomplish this essential end. By contrast, the “blind fury,” the “terrible” and explicitly
animalistic “anger” of the French translates, from Wollstonecraft’s perspective, to greater
legitimacy – or at least to a faltering step toward greater legitimacy, and in a way that ostensibly
reconciles multiple “worlds” into a universalizing historiography, one in which French actions,
English principles, Indian imagery, etc., are absorbed into a single and defining moment of
universally significant political progress.
In what way does Wollstonecraft’s terrible elephant embody legitimacy or its potential
more effectively than Hobbes’s artificial man? How do late eighteenth-century thinkers,
transitioning to romantic conceptualizations of ethical and political organization, respond to the
challenge novelists pose to rational, contractarian notions of social legitimacy? The final chapter
develops this set of questions in the same way that the first chapter raised them: by turning to an
author that was known for both philosophical and novelistic representation. While this
dissertation opened with a novelist/philosopher’s attempt to describe perfect isolation and
rational autonomy, it concludes in what follows with a later novelist/philosopher’s attempt to
formulate a more satisfying description of the relationship between individual and social bodies:
namely, Mary Wollstonecraft’s materialist descriptions of parts and wholes, operating in a
perfectible natural order organized by moral empirical laws.
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5: Clods, Rocks, Rude Masses, and Mighty Wholes: the Political Philosophy of Mary
Wollstonecraft

THE MIGHTY WHOLE: COMMUNITY AND MATERIALISM
The strange dualism of collective identification, as well as a shift in its priority at the end
of the eighteenth century, is given striking expression in Wollstonecraft’s first letter in A Short
Residence in Sweden, Norway, and Denmark (1796):
What are these imperious sympathies? How frequently has melancholy and even
misanthropy taken possession of me, when the world has disgusted me, and friends have
proved unkind. I have then considered myself as a particle broken off from the grand
mass of mankind; -- I was alone, till some involuntary sympathetic emotion, like the
attraction of adhesion, make me feel that I was still a part of a mighty whole, from which
I could not sever myself – not, perhaps, for the reflection has been carried very far, by
snapping the thread of an existence which loses its charms in proportion as the cruel
experience of life stops or poisons the current of the heart. (69 – 70)
Wollstonecraft’s collective identification – just like her misanthropy, its counterforce – is
involuntary, reinforcing the sense of objectivity, so secure as to be couched in the language of
scientific disinterest, attending the social object, the “mighty whole.” The collective exists, not
just because of her, a rational subject constructing and interpreting the claims that ostensibly
authorize and legitimize it, but even in spite of her. So far from a discursive object – the product
of rational negotiation, like a contract – collective identification in this passage tugs like gravity
at the involuntary preconscious, not only independent of but apparently antecedent to rational
autonomy. What qualities or requirements does such a formulation presuppose regarding its
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constituents? How is this “mighty whole” qualified or undermined by the “failed promise of
historical progress and the limits of human adaptability” apparent in the text’s broader historical
assumptions, apparent in an often ungenerous ethnographic narrative of Scandinavia that Scott
Juengel has called “a journey into the heart of whiteness?”107
In the opening pages of this same letter, after all, Wollstonecraft notes the “scarcely
human” appearance of “two old men,” and the lack of curiosity and imagination in the “men who
remain so near the brute creation, as only to exert themselves to find the food necessary to
sustain human life” (64, 65). It would appear, from these descriptions at least, that the pull she
feels toward the “grand mass of mankind” does not presuppose a pull toward these individuals,
whose relative sub-humanness becomes an emphatic expression of their distance from her. In
juxtaposing the brutish Scandinavians with her own psychological and physiological depth (her
‘exertions,’ as her Short Residence and its exigency insist, and as the “particle” passage takes for
granted, presumably transcend those “only…necessary to sustain human life”) while also
highlighting the pre-rational magnetism of sympathy, Wollstonecraft seems to sustain a state of
nature fantasy, in which ‘progress’ from brutishness to civility is necessary,108 even as she
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Scott Juengel, “Countenancing History” (900). For Juengel, Wollstonecraft endorses Samuel
Smith’s monogenetic theory (according to which all races of people descend from a common
species, and differ only as a result of geographic and climatic differences – for some this is a
degenerative interpretation of human history, but for others it suggests the possibility of
differences from one group to another being erased) and understands sympathy in particular as
evidence of this claim.
108
Daniel O’Neill locates Wollstonecraft’s use of this narrative within and against
historiographies of progress associated with the Scottish Enlightenment: “Like the Scots,
[Wollstonecraft] agreed that there was slow improvement in the human species’ condition, which
took the form of progressive ‘refinement’ over a series of stages, analogous to the individual’s
maturation process. Unlike them, however, Wollstonecraft did not believe that this improvement
derived from the refinement of instinctive impulses. Rather, it came from bringing reason to bear
on a given field of human endeavor and benefiting from its incremental accretion over vast
stretches of time.” We will return to my take on reason and instinct in Wollstonecraft in what
follows (121).
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diminishes the rational mechanisms by which the state of nature is ostensibly transcended. In
employing (though not unproblematically) what one critic has called a “fusion of sentimental and
Romantic discourses [that] is in turn fused with a discourse of reason embodying Enlightenment
humanism and its progressive values” (Özdemir 321), Wollstonecraft complicates the agency
entailed by collective identification standardized by enlightenment constructs like contract
theory. But in what ways, why, and how?
There are of course different ways to interpret Wollstonecraft’s broken particle,
including, for Saba Bahar, as an island. In describing herself as a particle separate from mankind,
Wollstonecraft “has become…an island,” responding “to an entire rhetorical and philosophical
convention which figures man as a sovereign self, an island entirely on its own. Such is the case,
for instance, of Rousseau” and Emile (162). At the same time, Bahar argues that Wollstonecraft
posits an alternative to Rousseau’s island, an “image of the island that is not really one” (163),
because Wollstonecraft after all
is not an island-lover. Unlike the desert island where man, cut off from all sides, is left to
rediscover and reorganise the world again in relation to himself and his centrality, the
heath – barren and isolated though it may be – ensures a passage between worlds. It
imposes a contract, a pact, a union between parts. Wollstonecraft moreover realises that
this ‘independence’ must be at the expence of something: she must contract, and reduce
her wants and not allow herself the endless territorial and imperial expansion that her
male counterparts promote…The connection with the main mass of mankind does indeed
involve a loss, but without this loss survival would be impossible. (163)
For Bahar, Wollstonecraft is confronting “[t]he tensions between the social and solitary self,”
evoking a corresponding “conflict between the positive and negative consequences of the
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individual’s excessive desires and feelings to the detriment of the more basic wants of an other”
(160). In diminishing any sense in which individuals, herself included, might be taken as mere
objects of passive, romantic sympathy, and in constructing a sense in which the individual must
be accountable to the claims of others in a shared, imagined community, Wollstonecraft
embodies the conflicted dualism of Crusoe in the midst of the world. Of course however, as we
have seen, Emile is also an “island that is not really one,” and the island trope can be used to
authorize or sanction a number of highly problematic identifications, suppressing social
dynamics under the purview of autonomy, moral social agency, etc. We shall see the extent to
which this description applies to Wollstonecraft as well.
But in the mean time there is another, I think more obvious way to understand this
passage, accounting more nearly for Wollstonecraft’s idiosyncratic approach to social and
political problems. Virginia Sapiro, calling her “a moral Newtonian” (57), notes that
“Wollstonecraft often used metaphors from physics” (62), recalling not only that moral and
scientific research often went hand-in-hand in the eighteenth century, but that Wollstonecraft’s
self-education and intellectual engagements were steeped in this tradition.109 In her review to
David Williams’s Lectures on Education (1789), Wollstonecraft writes that, in the “present
age…of experimental philosophy,” “the most ingenious conjectures have melted before
mechanical discoveries and mathematical conclusions…It is not necessary,” she continues,
to descant on the sublime pursuit, to which physical enquiries naturally lend the
contemplative mind, when it is not rendered so purblind by microscopic observations, as
to overlook a grand cause in minute effects. The utility of collecting a number of facts,
and prying into the properties of matter, cannot be contested. To see the harmony which
109

Sapiro writes, for example, that “Wollstonecraft’s friend Joseph Preistley provided a model of
the moral philosopher/physical scientist” (58).
244

subsists in the revolution of the heavenly bodies simply stated, and silently to mark how
light and darkness, subsiding as we proceed, enables us to view the fair form of things,
calms the mind by cultivating latent seeds of order and taste. We trace in this manner, the
footsteps of the Creator… (The Works of Mary Wollstonecraft 141)
From this perspective, Wollstonecraft draws upon notions of particle and force to construct a
metaphor from physics to indicate how both rational autonomy and sociability fit into a universe,
characterized by providential order and harmony, that is discernible through empirical
investigation. Wollstonecraft’s religious principles proceed, Sapiro writes, not from her fear of
God’s power or will but from respect of God’s “divine wisdom” (47), implying that the universe
is not ordered arbitrarily but according to laws accessible to the rational mind.110 Yet sociability,
as such a law, occupies a peculiar position: Wollstonecraft is somehow the author and the object
of this force. She produces it, feeling it in all of its intimacy and subsequently discerning its
gravity and calculating its claims autonomously in a designed, universal harmony; and yet it is
“imperious,” a force of “attraction” that is external to her, that drags her along in spite of herself
– even, she anxiously suggests, up to, against, or perhaps beyond the point of identification with
the “scarcely human.” What, then, is the nature of this force, from an objective, empirical
perspective? And what kinds of agency are possible in its sway?
The relationship between sociability and physical laws is suggestive: recall for example
that Defoe had used physical systems and empirically calculable forces to characterize the nature
110

Sapiro, 44 – 52. The “laws of the universe are discernible by human beings in the regluarities
and harmonies of the universe,” Sapiro writes, and “[a]ny act toward fulfilling God’s will,
including the ability to discern it, is good” (45). To a certain extent, Eileen Hunt Botting
challenges this claim, arguing that Sapiro’s comprehensive, “bird’s-eye” vindication of
Wollstonecraft’s political theory neglects the extent to which Wollstonecraft’s religious views
changed over time. Botting regards “Wollstonecraft as a traditional Trinitarian Anglican in her
early writings, a rationalist Socinian Christian Dissenter in her middle writings, and a Romantic
deist, skeptic, and possible atheist in her late writings” (134).
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and origins of legitimacy. Even though the natural/social relationship seems rarely to have been
so explicitly spelled out, the nature of eighteenth-century “science,” as we have just seen, was
such that moral and physical investigations were often mutually instructive. Hobbes, as we saw
in chapter two, begins his explanation of social and political organization with a description of a
purely physical and highly mechanized human being. Locke’s empirical philosophy drew heavily
upon the work of Robert Boyle, an important early scholar of corpuscular theory, according to
which all matter – and all perceived effects of matter – result from microscopic, indivisible
bodies called corpuscles, the structures (or “textures”) that they form, and their “primary
qualities” (their size, shape, and states of motion and rest). Complex matter is composed of
simple corpuscles, according to Boyle, much as any canon of complex literary works is entirely
composed of the same twenty-six letters; likewise, perceived effects of matter such as color and
heat are produced from corpuscles in much the same way that the powers and mechanisms of a
clock proceed from all of its components working together in certain arrangements.111 Thus, like
Hobbes and his mechanistic individuals, Locke’s political theory must ultimately be consistent
with the physical laws of corpuscular theory. Even Kant’s earliest philosophical work, his second
dissertation (some of the claims of which sound remarkably similar to Sapiro’s interpretation of
Wollstonecraft), posits “a systematic pattern of mutual relations,” characteristic of “a new
system” which he called “the system of the universal connection of substances,” and which
reflected the determination and harmony of providence (views, however, not entirely consistent
with those of the mature Kant).112
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For more on Boyle’s influence on Locke, see Peter Alexander, Ideas, Qualities, and
Corpuscles. On Boyle’s “primary qualities, see 77 – 78.
112
Quoted in Manfred Kuehn, Kant: A Biography, 101.
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For our present purposes, the role of materialism and its relationship to empirical
investigation (on the one hand) and moral autonomy (on the other) should be sought in the
mechanisms of collective identification. Wollstonecraft herself seems to have been a materialist,
after all (we will return to this below), so reading her work as a narrative of social identity – and
a prescription for social change – requires accounting for the properties of material systems,
empirical knowledge of material systems, and the exercise of free will within them: a project of
great and popular interest throughout the eighteenth century.
In one extensive and widely known public debate at the beginning of the eighteenth
century (1706 – 1708), for example, Samuel Clarke and Anthony Collins lay out some of the
most important and durable arguments about dualist and materialist explanations of the nature
and origins of consciousness.113 Clarke, a Newtonian and an ally to Robert Boyle, began the
debate by positing the immortality of the soul while responding to Henry Dodwell’s Epistolary
Discourse Proving…that the Soul is a Principle Naturally Mortal (a 1706 treatise on conditional
immortality). In the course of his refutation, Clarke argues that some qualities, and namely
consciousness, can only be a property or a “power” of an indivisible unit, and that since matter is
divisible, the soul is immaterial.114 The indivisibility of consciousness is what constitutes it (and
its bearer) as an individual, a conclusion that follows directly from the work of Descartes, who
wrote in his Meditations, “When I reflect on the mind…I certainly cannot distinguish any parts
in myself; instead I understand myself to be a completely unified and integral thing.” Although
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Many of the terms of this debate have remained relevant for contemporary scholars. See for
example Explaining Consciousness – The ‘Hard Problem,’ Ed. Jonathan Shear. For a recent
discussion of the “hard problem” of consciousness in an eighteenth-century perspective, see
Jonathan Kramnick, 2010.
114
William L. Uzgalis calls Clarke’s logic demonstrating the indivisibility of consciousness
through the immateriality of the soul “the Individual Being Condition” in his introduction to The
Correspondence of Samuel Clarke and Anthony Collins (24).
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for Descartes (and for Clarke) the body is divisible, if one loses a limb “I know that nothing is
thereby taken away from the mind. Nor can the faculties of willing, sensing, understanding, etc.,
be said to be parts of the mind, because it is one and the same mind that wills, senses and
understands” (67). Collins disagrees, seeing no reason that a material soul cannot be immortal, or
that consciousness, with a nudge from God, cannot be an emergent property of material
organization.
While their central concerns may seem peripheral to our present object,115 it is worth
pausing to consider the arguments that Clarke and Collins put forward to address the relationship
between part and whole, since this is the language Wollstonecraft uses to characterize the
tensions and “sympathies” between the solitary individual and the “grand mass of mankind.”
Indeed, Clarke’s first argument to Dodwell considers, precisely, ‘broken-off’ particles. Quoting
at length, Clarke argues that
matter being a divisible substance, consisting always of separable – nay of actually
separate and distinct parts – it is plain [that, disregarding some form of panpsychism] no
system of it in any possible composition or division can be an individual conscious being.
115

Despite this impression, in fact Wollstonecraft would likely have been aware of this debate
and its implications for social and moral philosophy. Her contemporaries Richard Price and
Joseph Priestley (whose influence in Wollstonecraft’s self-education is well known) conducted a
debate in published correspondence (1778), drawing heavily upon and sometimes directly citing
Clarke and Collins. Priestley writes in the introduction that Price “supposes that the powers of
perception and thought reside in an immaterial substance, but that the exercise of these powers is
made to depend on the organization of the body; whereas I suppose these powers to reside in the
organized body itself, and therefore must be suspended till the time when the organization shall
be restored” (xvi). Priestley associates the immateriality of the soul with other “oriental”
philosophies and “popish,” superstitious beliefs, representing the grossest excesses of
imagination, such as purgatory, “atonement for the sins of men,” and “the worship of Christ and
of dead men” (xvii). These beliefs parallel, in Robert Boyle’s corpuscular theory, the
subscription to “occult” practices and principles by some alchemists: phenomena that cannot be
explained (Alexander, 17 – 18). I look more closely in this chapter at Clarke and Collins than
Price and Priestley because the terms of the debate were established clearly in the former, while
the latter helps to establish that Wollsonecraft would have been exposed to these terms.
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For, suppose three or three hundred particles of matter at a mile, or any given distance,
one from another. Is it possible that all those separate parts should in that state be one
individual conscious being? Suppose then, all these particles brought together into one
system, so as to touch one another. Will they thereby, or by any motion or composition
whatsoever, become any whit less truly distinct beings than they were at the greatest
distance? How then can their being disposed in any possible system, make them one
individual conscious being? (47)
Collins, taking Clarke to mean that “it is only required that a thing be an individual being in
order to its being a proper subject of a power of thinking” (47), notes that these dispersed
particles technically qualify, suggesting further that, following Clarke’s logic, God has the power
to combine particles “in one system…incapable of any division or separation by natural causes,
and consequently…capable of thinking” (48). “If several particles of matter can be so united as
to touch one another, or closely to adhere,” he asks, “wherein does the distinctness or
individuality of the several particles consist?” Indeed, he argues, it is “lost” (48), subsumed by
the resulting mass, which itself now makes up a newly constituted individual (or, more precisely,
which thus dispenses with the condition of individuality – conceived as indivisibility –
altogether). A brain composed of unconscious corpuscles can therefore give rise to
consciousness, he argues, not unlike a rose, which “consists of several particles, which separately
and singly want a power to produce that agreeable sensation we experience in them when united”
(49).
Collins’s question – wherein does the individual consist? – becomes one of several
frequently referenced themes in the ensuing correspondence. Collins quickly suggests a social
analogy, arguing that powers or qualities can exist in groups of bodies that are more than the sum
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of their parts, and that “a particular power” can exist “to which several particular powers
contribute,” supposing for example “a power arising from matter without belonging to the parts
of which the whole consists,” such as (perhaps evoking Boyle’s famous analogy) “a whole [that]
is not the same with a piece of a clock,” or “as every man is a particular man, though various
powers are necessary to constitute him of the species” (71). Collins will develop this claim a bit
further much later in the correspondence. Discussing an apparently minor point about the
conventions of language, he writes, “what do we mean by a kind or sort, but several particulars
having a conformity to an abstract idea? So that if our abstract idea of roundness agrees to the
figure of any number of beings, we do as necessarily call them all round, and reckon their figures
a sort of figures, as we do a negro of the sort or species of man, though the term species or sort
may not perhaps be made use of in one case as it is in the other” (221).
His shift from describing the human species as an example of “a particular power” to that
of “an abstract idea” is an interesting one, and might seem to imply a shift from the objective
conditions of species to a set of subjective practices, presupposing things like interpretation,
judgment, and consent. Also of interest is his comparison of “roundness” and “man,” since
particle theories generally differentiate the kinds of “species” that each of these figures
constitutes. Peter Alexander writes that, for Locke, unlike our ideas of substances, “our ideas of
[geometrical figures] contain their whole essences because, Locke holds, they can be completely
determined by definitions” (265); circle or triangle thus designates the “real essence” of its
referent, whereas man or gold designates only a “nominal essence.” Nominal essences are
nevertheless important, Alexander writes, since “real essences are subject to change, a
consequence of their depending on inner constitutions of individuals” (269), thus rendering
nominal essences more durable. Locke “holds that when I am considered as an individual none
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of my present characteristics is essential: I might be a different shape or colour, lack rationality
or sense, or any combination of these,” and the “idea that any of these is essential to me occurs
only when I am classified as, and called, a member of the species man” (269). Alexander then
foregrounds the subjective primacy of nominal essences: “A species or kind cannot change
unless we change it. If we do not, the collection of individuals included in the kind may change
because a change in an individual may be sufficient to exclude it from that kind” (270). Collins’s
passing reference to the aspect of race thus helps to reveal the stakes of thinking about nominal
and real species: an aspect that gained a great deal of urgency and significance especially toward
the end of the eighteenth century as, in France, America, and the West Indies, ostensibly rational
but always contested questions of self-governance, human nature, and colonialism begin to
coalesce.116
Wollestonecraft’s broken particle metaphor, drawing explicitly upon rhetoric from the
natural sciences, signals an interest in the status of sociability and collective identification as
forces, playing a role in constructs that appear deliberate and constructed in one moment and
objective and involuntary in the next. Wherein does the individual consist? What are its
“particular powers?” Do they include both “involuntary” sympathies with others as well as
conscious dissociations from the “scarcely human?” And what about the counterforces,
misanthropy and melancholy, which, having “taken possession of” her, appear no less
involuntary, external, objective? (And, given this, why the notes of self-accusation?) If
Wollstonecraft is a particle that is, to use Clarke’s language, a mile distant, mired in
“melancholy” and “misanthropy,” what is the status of the “mighty whole?” What are its
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See, for example, the ever-changing status of mixed-race “mulattos” in revolutionary rhetoric
leading up to the Haitian Revolution in the wake of the French Revolution. C. L. R. James, The
Black Jacobins, especially 62 – 84.
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particular powers? How does she negotiate the facts from the acts of identifying collectively, the
imperious forces from the autonomous judgments and interpretations; and in the course of these
negotiations, how and where does she deploy – and contest – abstract ideas, confronting,
dispensing, recognizing, and authorizing presumptions of “nominal” and “real” essences? And
what do these deployments say about the “force” that sympathy, on the one hand, or the
presumed objectivity of the “mass” (or its implied “harmony” of the “heavenly bodies”) on the
other, constitutes?
Responding to Wollstonecraft’s well-known dread about the “Malthusian prophesies of
an over-cultivated and over-peopled world” (from letter eleven), Saba Bahar asks a version of
Collins’s question – wherein does the individual consist? – which has been an enduring question,
in one form or another, for a critics of A Short Residence. Specifically, Bahar wonders about “the
ambiguous identity of the hero of the story. For…we have to ask whom Wollstonecraft is talking
about: man the species (when she speaks of the state of man and the unfortunate creatures) or
man the individual (when she recounts how the singular hero of the tale will fend for himself
when faced with universal famine)” (155). By seeking the narrative’s “hero” in either the
individual or the species, Bahar is asking upon which, in the face of lack and crisis, resolution
depends. They are not – and their “particular powers” are not – mutually inclusive, even when
confronted with the same crisis in the same terms. Similarly, Thomas H. Ford argues that, for
Wollstonecraft, the limitations of women’s political agency are directly related to “cunning,”
which “hinders transformation…by individualizing political agency.” It is “a power drawn from
the specificity of an individual situation and always remains tethered to that personal pole,” such
that it “prevents the formation of a female generality, and the cunning woman negates collective
belonging” (197). Indeed in her biography of Mary Wollstonecraft, Janet Todd writes that, even
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from her earliest days reading about vagrancy and food riots in Beverley, “Mary did not care for
violence or mass action: she had a strong sense of the individual” (13). And Moira Ferguson
reads in Wollstonecraft’s work a dramatization of unaligned collective and individualistic
tensions, arguing that “Wollstonecraft subscribes to a concept of overall group identity” that “is
undercut, however, when she probes particulars because her sense of a personally wrought selfdetermination causes her to find women culpable of their vanity, their acceptance of an inferior
education, their emphasis on feeling,” ultimately locating “herself outside what she deems selfdemeaning behavior” (31).117 Although Wollstonecraft “accords all women, including herself, a
group identity, a political position from which they can start organizing and agitating,” the
“sense of group solidarity dissolves” (16) and she “separates herself from [white middle-class
women] as a mentor-censor” (17). Wollstonecraft imagines herself in community with white
middle-class women – and, if more distantly, with Atlantic slaves – but she finds these
communities unsatisfying and unsustainable. She finds their basic characteristics and entailments
to be a contradiction to her and her own nature. How does this qualify the
“involuntary…attraction of adhesion” her physics metaphor suggests? The rest of this chapter
will seek to answer some of these questions, paying particular attention to the “subjective” and
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Daniel I. O’Neill also registers how Wollstonecraft represented herself relative to
contemporary women, positing a reaction to formulations of gender roles emerging from the
Scottish Enlightenment according to which “the relationship between the advent of commercial
society and the place of women was paradoxical,” since “they believed that the rich web of
social relationships created by commercial society tamed, transformed, and refined the savage
(male) moral personality into one identified by softer, more polished, more polite manners” (92).
Women mitigated against the sovereignty of cold rationalism that threatened to undermine moral
sentiments, on which capitalism depended, by posing as “catalysts and managers of sensibility
within the private sphere,” a necessarily passive and submissive “bulwark against the erosion of
community and a powerful check on aggressive and self-interested male behavior in commercial
society” (94).
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“objective” (or “imagined” and “reasoned”) movements of collective identification at a moment
of transition from enlightenment to romantic thought.
Now, lest it be thought that my own reading of Short Residence is “rendered…purblind
by microscopic observations” and “minute effects,” let us step back from the particle passage to
look at how collective identification is constructed more comprehensively by the text as a whole.
2. HETEROGENEOUS MASSES: BURKE AND WOLLSTONECRAFT
The objective premises of community presupposed by the particle metaphor are
underscored by Wollstonecraft’s insistence elsewhere upon the countervailing subjective
movements of collective identification. Where, in one case, “involuntary” forces of “attraction”
and “adhesion” regulate and cohere the community, in the other, debates and documents do; and
while the first results in a “grand mass,” the other, embodied most explicitly by the constitution
(and thus bearing the literal mark of a given point in human progress), emphatically does not.
The contrast with the “mighty whole” is striking: in Vindication of the Rights of Men (1790), for
example, she writes that “[t]he imperfection of all modern governments must…in a great
measure have arisen from this simple circumstance, that the constitution, if such a heterogeneous
mass deserve that name, was settled in the dark days of ignorance, when the minds of men were
shackled by the grossest prejudices and most immoral superstition” (11, emphasis added).
Likewise, in An Historical and Moral View of the Origin and Progress of the French Revolution
(1794), she writes that “[w]hen society was first regulated, the laws could not be adjusted to take
in the future conduct of it’s members, because the faculties of man are unfolded and perfected by
the improvements made by society: consequently the regulations established as circumstances
required were very imperfect.” Rejecting veneration for the past as a proper model for social
regulation, she asks: “What then is to hinder man, at each epoch of civilization, from making a
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stand, and new modeling the materials, that have been hastily thrown into a rude mass, which
time alone has consolidated and rendered venerable?” (293, emphasis added). The image of the
“rude” and “heterogeneous mass” is revealing for its associations both with artificiality and with
the deep past. Reverence for the constitution, from this perspective, entails a fatal allegiance to
an explicitly unnatural, almost Frankensteinian composition of disjointed parts from a dead past.
Peculiarly, while involuntary sympathy works upon the passive subject to resolve social
disorder or disjointedness in Wollstonecraft’s first model of sociability (since, again, external
forces of attraction and adhesion work upon the subject, even in spite of herself), a very similar
posture promotes social disorder and disjointedness in the context of her second model of
sociability. In A Vindication of the Rights of Men, Wollstonecraft accuses Edmund Burke of
hypocrisy when he berates Richard Price for ignoring his natural reverence for royalty, even
though, she argues, Burke himself had already ignored precisely such reverence in the interests
of self-promotion. When, in the wake of George III’s declared insanity in 1788, the Prince of
Wales offered to promote Burke to the post of Paymaster-General, Burke worked hard, first, to
resist a Regency Bill limiting the Prince’s powers and, second, to discredit the king and dismiss
any possibility of his recovery. Wollstonecraft quotes Burke’s Reflections on the Revolution in
France (1790), citing his view of nature that, being “wisdom without reflection, and above it”
(25),118 entices subjects automatically – involuntarily – to respect the awe of sovereignty. Where,
she asks him about 1788, “was the infallibility of that extolled instinct which rises above reason?
was it warped by vanity, or hurled from its throne by self-interest? To your own heart answer
these questions in the sober hours of reflection – and, after reviewing this gust of passion, learn
118

Cf. Edmund Burke, Reflections on the Revolution in France, 119. He refers in the original to
“an inheritable crown; an inheritable peerage; and an house of commons and a people inheriting
privileges, franchises, and liberties, from a long line of ancestors” transferred to us “from Magna
Charta to the Declaration of Right.”
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to respect the sovereignty of reason” (26). Wollstonecraft quickly moves to an analysis of
Burke’s own chivalric prose, which cunningly exploits, in her view, “romantic” and superficially
fashionable readers. Citing his “sentimental jargon,” she writes that
[a] kind of mysterious instinct is supposed to reside in the soul, that instantaneously
discerns truth, without the tedious labour of ratiocination. This instinct, for I know not
what other name to give it, has been termed common sense, and more frequently
sensibility; and, by a kind of indefensible right, it has been supposed for rights of this
kind are not easily proved, to reign paramount over the other faculties of the mind, and to
be an authority from which there is no appeal. (29)
Using language remarkably similar to the “attraction of adhesion” in her particle metaphor,
Wollstonecraft then calls this “authority from which there is no appeal” a “subtle magnetic fluid,
that runs round the whole circle of society, [which] is not subject to any known rule…It dips, we
know not why, granting it to be an infallible instinct, and, though supposed always to point to
truth, its pole star, the point is always shifting, and seldom stands due north” (29 – 30).
Several parallels between Burke and Wollstonecraft should be noted. Each makes a claim
about nature and its function in social and political organization. Each posits the passivity of the
subject, which is required for the “attraction of adhesion” in one case, and the “authority without
appeal” in the other, to function properly. And yet, against this passivity, each relies upon
rigorous discursive practices since, for Wollstonecraft, “ratiocination” and rationalism remain
fundamentally important and, for Burke, a kind of calculus is ultimately essential: “There ought
to be a system of manners in every nation,” he writes, “which a well-formed mind would be
disposed to relish. To make us love our country, our country ought to be lovely” (172). While
several aspects of Burke’s claim deserve closer scrutiny than our present purposes will allow (the
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relationship between, and the agency behind, the “well-formed” mind and the “lovely” country,
to begin with), it is worth noting the normative, prescriptive premise that Burke attributes to both
subjects (those who relish beauty and make countries beautiful) and objects (beautiful countries
and systems of manners) of political organization.
Wollstonecraft targets this passage in her critique of Burke, and her reaction to this
specific claim reveals the materialist commitments of her own position.119 In A Vindication of the
Rights of Men, she writes of “the good natured man” that “[t]he amiable weakness of his mind is
a strong argument against its immateriality, and seems to prove that beauty relaxes the solids of
the soul as well as the body” (46, emphasis hers). It should be noted that she addresses this text
in its opening pages (as Burke addresses his Reflections to “a Gentleman in Paris”) to Edmund
Burke, distinguishing his “private” and “public” characters and, explicitly deploying corpuscular
terminology, calling “the very texture of [his] mind…amiable” (5). Following her logic, the
“beauty” that Burke associates with the loveliness of a country – to which his mind of course is
“well-formed” to be “disposed to relish” – has weakened the “solids” of his soul and body, and

119

I should note that, though I use the word “commitments,” these views reveal some potential
flux over time. By the time Wollstonecraft writes her Short Residence, for example, evidence of
both materialism and dualism can be found. In letter eight, she writes that “I cannot bear to think
of being no more – of losing myself – though existence is often but a painful consciousness of
misery; nay, it appears to me impossible that I should cease to exist, or that this active, restless
spirit, equally alive to joy and sorrow, should only be organized dust – ready to fly abroad the
moment the spring snaps, or the spark goes out, which kept it together. Surely something resides
in this heart that is not perishable – and life is more than a dream” (112). While this passage is
suggestively dualistic, it is not necessarily so – Collins’s main point, after all, is that materialism
does not preclude immortality. The commitments I refer to appear much more conspicuously in
her Vindications, as we shall see presently, despite claims to the contrary by other critics. Eileen
Hunt Botting, for example, writes that Wollstonecraft in her “middle” works (encompassing her
Vindications) “believed in human free agency and that the soul was an immortal, spiritual
substance distinct from the mortal body.” Botting argues that Wollstonecraft is influenced here
by Price and Priestley. Price and Priestley, meanwhile, drew heavily upon Clarke and Collins,
and Collins argued, again, that immortality does not presuppose a “spiritual substance.” We will
return to the Price / Priestley debate later (160).
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that the anti-rationalism of his politics and rhetoric proceeds from, reflects, and then reproduces
that weakness. In reference to his dealings with the regency crisis of 1788, she writes, “what but
the odious maxims of Machiavelian policy could have led you to have searched in the very dregs
of misery for forcible arguments to support your party? …where human weakness appears in its
most awful form to calculate the chances against the King’s recovery” (27). Wollstonecraft, in
other words, has drawn up a causal, materialist narrative: beauty begets weakness (a claim
featured heavily in her Vindication of the rights of Woman), weakness begets corruption
(specifically, a corrupt calculus that then organizes social arrangements and practices),
corruption privileges beauty, etc.
There are three basic components of political theory that I am tracing, both in
Wollstonecraft’s positive political theory and in her critique of Burke’s: involuntary association
with others, deliberate, rational dissociation from others (two movements which define and
complicate community in her political theory), and the forms of agency presupposed by political
and social organization in the context of these two movements. These movements coalesce
around commercial activity, as well as Wollstonecraft’s critique of commerce.
3. COMMERCE AND BRUTISHNESS
In the Scandinavian letters, Wollstonecraft counts commerce among the unnatural
counterforces to sympathy, approximating commerce and illegitimacy so nearly that she
associates it explicitly with the state of nature. This becomes clear especially toward the end of
the text, when she orients her impatience with Hamburg toward its commercial nature:
“Mushroom fortunes have started up during the war,” she writes, completing her allusion to the
famous passage in Hobbes by writing that “the men, indeed, seem of the species of the fungus;
and the insolent vulgarity which a sudden influx of wealth usually produces in common minds, is
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here very conspicuous” (191). In comparing men in the state of nature with mushrooms in De
Cive, Hobbes means to explain the origins of “the right of dominion” where the rational
capacities of the human mind are fully developed, laying the groundwork for various types of
social organization and political hierarchy (205). Social legitimacy necessarily presupposes, from
the perspective of contract liberalism he helps to develop, such a fully rational individual.120 By
comparing commercial Hamburger with the Hobbesian mushroom-men, Wollstonecraft
attributes their illegitimacy and decline to a free choice, rather than to the determinism of natural
forces, such as sympathy, magnetism, or gravity. Yet, at the same time, the ensuing interruption
to natural progress, although a product of free and autonomous will, irremediably damages the
rational capacities that constitute that will. Jealously “apprehensive of their sharing the golden
harvest of commerce” with “their Danish neighbors,” she insists that Hamburg is “governed in a
manner which…narrow[s] the minds of the rich,” such that “the character of the man is lost in
the Hamburger” (190). In acting and governing upon the apprehensions of a free and potentially
rational mind, the Hamburger suppress and destroy their humanizing capacities as free and
potentially rational minds. Their actions create a commercial culture and infrastructure, and that
culture and infrastructure consequently hold them back, since “Situation seems to be the mould
in which men’s characters are formed” (191). Being very explicit about the Hamburger’s stateof-nature, fungal illegitimacy, she writes that “greedy enjoyment of pleasure without sentiment,”
the result of such commerce, “embrutes them” (191).121
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We have already explored this concept at length, with particular interest in how Rousseau’s
social contract theory paradoxically insists upon a contract that both presupposes and produces
the rational, social individual. Hobbes’s mushroom-individual is the precursor to Rousseau’s
moral (as opposed to purely physical, presocial) individual. See chapter one.
121
This is a late eighteenth-century iteration of the logic found in Locke, discussed in chapter
two, wherein individuals who reject natural law (which is reason, and which encourages
sociability) quit human nature and “trespass against the species.”
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It seems important for Wollstonecraft to establish a causal narrative with respect to the
damaging effects of commerce for both philosophical and personal reasons: or, rather, the causal
narrative of social and political devolution has a poignant personal relevance for her, which she
chooses to dramatize alongside her political commentary.122 This is a text, after all, that has an
interest in linking the individual with the mass, so it stands to reason that the forces of
commercial corruption must play out in both national and personal dramas. Accordingly,
Wollstonecraft ends her twenty-second letter with a paragraph of famously personal admonition.
Weary from travel, frustrated with trying to find accommodations, and disappointed with them
when she does, she writes that
I scarcely know any thing that produces more disagreeable sensations, I mean to speak of
the passing cares, the recollection of which afterwards enlivens our enjoyments, than
those excited by little disasters of this kind. After a long journey, with our eyes directed
to some particular spot, to arrive and find nothing as it should be, is vexatious, and sinks
the agitated spirits. But I, who received the cruelest of disappointments, last spring, in
returning to my home, term such as these emphatically passing cares. Know you of what
materials some hearts are made? I play the child, and weep at the recollection – for the
grief is still fresh that stunned as well as wounded me – yet never did drops of anguish
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The personal, and some (beginning arguably with Godwin in his controversial biography)
argue sentimental, moments in the Short Residence have led many critics to exclude it from
serious consideration among Wollstonecraft’s political theory. This is a strange posture to take,
given the work’s direct and practical engagements with history, economics, and politics, all of
which ostensibly entangle the personal. On this nevertheless durable critical oversight, see
Anthony Pollock, “Aesthetic Economies of Immasculation,” in which he suggests that “ the
Letters expand the connections articulated in Wollstonecraft’s earlier works between aesthetics,
gender construction, and sociability by placing that constellation of issues in the global economic
context of mercantile capitalism,” arguing that “Wollstonecraft analyzes the dangers of taking
stereotypically masculine characteristics like calculation and instrumental rationality as the basis
for social and economic organization” (195).
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like these bedew the cheeks of infantine innocence – and why should they mine, that
never were stained by a blush of guilt? Innocent and credulous as a child, why have I not
the same happy thoughtlessness? (189)
The “cruelest of disappointments” is a reference of course to Imlay, to whom Wollstonecraft
addresses these letters, on whose behalf Wollstonecraft (with their daughter) takes this “long
journey,” and who had betrayed Wollstonecraft, requesting her return to London in 1795 even
though he was living with another woman at the time. This passage, especially given the
increasing despondency and increasingly personal tone of the letters overall, is clearly meant to
evoke Imlay’s sympathy. He is meant to regard the responsibilities he has to others in a shared
world, that his acts and feelings are meant to reconcile him to the “mighty whole” in which, by
nature, he belongs. The family, as Eileen Hunt Botting has shown, is an important part of that
whole and its nature. For all of Wollstonecraft’s disagreements with Burke and Rousseau,
Botting argues that “each highlights the crucial role of the family in cultivating the affectivity
necessary for human moral development and the formation of human social and civic identities”
(203). In appealing to his sympathy, Wollstonecraft attempts to reengage the affectivity on which
his proper functioning as a father, and thus as a human being in an ever-progressing world,
depends.
Yet, as she knows, she is likely to fail. Like the mushroom-men of Hamburg, Imlay has
shed his responsibilities willfully, calculating his personal commercial gains and consequently
‘embruting’ himself. Her admonition continues into letter twenty-three: “you will say that I am
growing bitter, pherhaps, personal. Ah! shall I whisper to you – that you – yourself, are strangely
altered, since you have entered deeply into commerce – more than you are aware of – never
allowing yourself to reflect, and keeping your mind, or rather your passions in a continual state
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of agitation – Nature has given you talents, which lie dormant, or are wasted in ignoble pursuits
– You will rouse yourself, and shake off the vile dust that obscures you, or my understanding, as
well as my heart, deceives me, egregiously – only tell me when? But to go farther a-field” (191).
Imlay’s ‘strange alteration’ (we can say that the “character of the man is lost” in him) is a
cyclical devolution, the result of his commercial entanglements which have so corrupted his
empirical and rational capacities that his distance from nature, though conspicuous to
Wollstonecraft, is “more than [he] is aware.” Nature provides him with talents that he chooses
through his free will to neglect. He ‘never allows himself’ to use them, so they “lie dormant,”
thus not only altering him but ensuring that he can no longer recognize nature, its magnetism, or
how far he has departed from it. He ‘embrutes’ himself and, being now “brutish,” has lost the
humanizing advantages of rationalism that legitimacy and social contract both presuppose and
require.
As such, Wollstonecraft’s contempt for these ‘brutes’ is not only excusable but necessary.
Brutishness in this case is not merely an unwelcome yet inevitable state for the undeveloped,
natural individual to transcend, but a deliberate, calculated subordination of human nature and
common good to the interests of personal wealth. In an earlier letter, she insists that she is not
“too severe on commerce; but from the manner it is at present carried on, little can be advanced
in favour of a pursuit that wears out the most sacred principles of humanity and rectitude.”
Speculation, she writes, is “a species of gambling, I might have said fraud,” carried out in the
interests of protecting, promoting, and expanding personal property (143), which she holds
accountable for the decline and corruption of the developed west. The results are devastating,
and Wollstonecraft concludes her critique of commerce with a new – and newly mechanized –
analogy for human morality: “Men are strange machines; and their whole system of morality is
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in general held together by one grand principle, which loses its force the moment they allow
themselves to break with impunity over the bounds which secured their self-respect.” A rejection
of self-respect, crucial to the sympathetic, social individual of Wollstonecraft’s social theory (as
her feminist disgust with the infantile concerns of her peers makes especially clear), becomes a
centrifugal force that corrupts more immediate, and then more distant, and then universally
human feelings and relations. Sociability and relationality fall away, and as the individual sinks
into the empty business of self-enrichment, so the society, of which she is a constituent, crumples
into a meaningless aggregation of broken particles. “A man who ceases to love humanity, and
then individuals, as he advances in the chase after wealth; as one clashes with his interest, the
other with his pleasures: to do business, as it is termed, every thing must give way; nay, is
sacrificed; and all the endearing charities of citizen, husband, father, brother, become empty
names” (191).
But this all helps to explain only some of the apparent contempt Wollstonecraft expresses
in the Scandinavian letters for the ‘brutish’ people she encounters. To the extent at least that it is
true, her critique of the Hamburger and Imlay appears consistent with her comprehensive moral
and political theories, and her dissociation from them – strong enough indeed to counter the
sympathies of “attraction and adhesion” – is of course inevitable. But commerce, in the
speculative gambling sense that exists for the sole purpose of expanding personal property, is not
the only form of “development” or “progress” that Wollstonecraft encounters – and builds
civilized/brutish binaries around – in the text. After all, the “scarcely human” individuals “so
near the brute creation” that Wollstonecraft encounters in her first Swedish letter are far from the
ostentatious “ghosts of greatness” (191) she perceives in Hamburg. While practitioners of
commerce are brutes by choice, Wollstonecraft also (and more frequently) registers the presence
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of “brutes” and “brutishness” in the more familiar sense of the term, found in social contract
theory. The “scarcely human” people from her first letter, failing to emerge and observe the
arrival of the author “where strangers, especially women, so seldom appeared,” embody both an
uncultivated status and the challenge of transcending that status, as they “have little or no
imagination to call forth the curiosity necessary to fructify the faint glimmerings of mind which
entitles them to rank as lords of the creation. – Had they either, they could not contentedly
remain rooted in the clods they so indolently cultivate” (65). They are not brutes by choice; they
have not surrendered – because they have not yet acquired or refined – their humanizing, rational
capacities. Their ‘indolence’ and their “clods” attest to and explain their brutishness, conjuring
not only the immense distance between the civilized (Wollstonecraft) and the uncivilized (the
Swedes), but also the immense difficulty of making progress. What after all can motivate the
“indolently” content to claim their curiosity, their imagination, and finally their entitled rank
within the grand mass?
The question of cultivation is crucial. The Swedes occupy the first five letters of
Wollstonecraft’s Residence, and much of what she concludes about them, beginning with her
observation about their “clods,” is drawn from her considerations of cultivation. (“Clod,” by the
way, if a brief digression will be permitted, is a useful image. Johnson’s dictionary defines it as a
“lump of earth or clay,” and the OED shows that it was widely used in and before
Wollstonecraft’s time to designate, not only “a blockhead,” aptly suggesting stupidity [in fact,
“clodpate” and “clodhead” were used as insults for stupid people in the seventeenth and
eighteenth centuries, appearing for example in Johnson’s dictionary’s entry for “numskulled”
(267)], but also “a lump of earth or clay adhering together.” I note two points of interest: First,
the word “clod” thus features regularly in descriptions, not of uncultivated nature, but of plowed
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and cultivated fields. The OED cites Conrad Heresbach’s Four Bookes of Husbandry (1577),
stating that “The Feelde is saide to be…broken vp when it is first plowed lying in great
Cloddes,” and Dryden’s translation of The Works of Virgil: Containing his Pastorals, Georgics,
and Æneis (1697), wherein “The Peasant…pounds with Rakes The crumbling Clods.” Second,
the “lump…adhering together” provides an image that contrasts sharply with the “mighty
whole,” being a much more haphazard and fortuitous arrangement of particles, not adhering to
any discernable principles of harmony or order.) Wollstonecraft sees evidence in the Swedes of
human progress and perfectibility, but mostly only insofar as they provide a contrast to other,
more developed cultures. Noting the absence of curiosity and imagination in the Swedes, and
then “recollecting the extreme fondness which the Parisians ever testify for novelty,” for
example, she is assured that “their very curiosity appeared to me a proof of the progress they had
made in refinement” (65).
In letter two Wollstonecraft fleshes out the implications of Swedish uncultivation by
observing that social life in Gothenburg centers not on conversations about “literature” or
“public amusements,” but on “the table,” “the bottle,” and “scandal,” since “politics” is
“seldom…a subject of continual discussion in a country town in any part of the world. The
politics of the place,” she continues, “being on a smaller scale, suits better with the size of their
faculties; for, generally speaking, the sphere of observation determines the extent of the mind”
(72). Such dinners, as well as the Swedes’ too frequent recourse to alcohol and tobacco, seem to
confirm for Wollstonecraft that small towns and small minds produce and restrain one another:
“Without the aid of the imagination all the pleasures of the senses must sink into grossness,” she
argues, “unless continual novelty serve as a substitute for the imagination, which [is] impossible”
(72 – 73). Remarkably, the clearest evidence Wollstonecraft offers of Swedish uncultivation is
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their hospitality. Without sustained interest in scientific and aesthetic pursuits, she argues, a
society cannot have reflection, and she “never met with much imagination amongst people who
had not acquired a habit of reflection” (73). Swedish hospitality, lacking any reference to
reflection and imagination, only reveals the hollowness of their uncultivated nature: “The
Swedes pique themselves on their politeness; but far from being the polish of a cultivated mind,
it consists merely of tiresome forms and ceremonies” (73). Such hospitality is not an indication,
as some travelers mistakenly believe, of “proof of goodness of heart,” but “is rather a criterion by
which you may form a tolerable estimate of the indolence or vacancy of a head” (73). Later, in
her nineteenth letter, she will return to this theme, arguing that “when visiting distant climes, a
momentary social sympathy should not be allowed to influence the conclusions of the
understanding; for hospitality too frequently leads travellers…to make a false estimate of the
virtues of a nation; which, I am now convinced, bear an exact proportion to their scientific
improvements” (173). Indeed, Wollstonecraft associates the Swedish brand of hospitality with a
state of perpetual illegitimacy, since it is an abuse to freedom, the first and most important
principle of legitimate social and political organization: “their over-acted civility is a continual
restraint on all your actions” (73).
Clearly, Wollstonecraft develops a notion of Swedish hospitality that securely dissociates
herself from them. It may seem that hospitality generates interest in the stranger and her comfort
and wellbeing, drawing the subject directly into recognizing and engaging with the other, her
needs, her condition, etc. Indeed, from this perspective, it is difficult to discern any substantial
difference between what Wollstonecraft calls hospitality and the kinds of natural forces, such as
sympathy, that also (ostensibly!) function to generate interest in the stranger. But Wollstonecraft
argues that hospitality, on the contrary, completely estranges; that, indeed, in the context of
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hospitality even the “momentary social sympathy” of the traveller must be suppressed. It seems
that Swedish hospitality is a form of engagement with the other that ultimately only nurtures
mediation, referencing not the other or her needs at all, but the “forms and ceremonies” that are
meant to organize interpersonal contact from a distant (and probably distantly past) perspective.
To that extent, she appears to be taking up those elements of Rousseau’s arguments that identify
the corrupting influence of mediation for the bourgeois, analyzed by Jean Starobinski. Because,
as Rousseau argues, mediation is not merely symptomatic but a problem in its own right,
notoriously difficult to overcome, any resolution to the problems Wollstonecraft associates with
hospitality (and that reinforces her dissociation from the Swedes) will be slow and arduous, and
must foreground cultivation. There are two (not always totally distinct) forms of cultivation that
appear in her Short Residence: cultivation of minds and cultivation of land.
4. CULTIVATION AND “ROCKS…PILED ON ROCKS”
It should be clear already, from the terms by which Wollstonecraft dissociates herself
from the Swedes, that cultivated and uncultivated minds are distinguished foremost by the
presence and activity of the imagination. Recall her comments on reflection, politics, and the
imagination at the Swedish table, for example, or her wonder at the poverty of curiosity and
imagination that contrasts the Swedes with the French. Even in Norwegians (of whom
Wollstonecraft’s representations are generally more sympathetic), there is a marked contrast in
the cultivation – and thus imagination – of minds: “As their minds were totally uncultivated,” she
writes, narrating “a sort of conversation of gestures” she has with women during a dinner, “I did
not lose much, perhaps gained, by not being able to understand them; for fancy probably filled
up, more to their advantage, the void in the picture” (114). She describes her relationship with
these women as one of asymmetrical interest: while they “excited [her] sympathy,” they merely
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took “pleasure” in “look[ing] at” her, since she “appeared so good-natured.” In this exchange, we
see a contrast between Wollstonecraft, enjoying the use of sympathy (humanizing her, as again it
reinforces her membership in the “mighty whole”)123 and profiting from an imagination that, she
believes, overestimates her conversers, and the women, who superficially and childishly relish
her appearance. (These women, it is worth noting, suffer some of the brutishness of the Swedes,
but have evidently progressed at least somewhat further. They are “a mixture of indolence and
vivacity” [113], she writes, and while she observes that this dinner “was conducted with great
hospitality,” their entertainment includes “several songs,” including “translations of some
patriotic French ones” [114]. The Norwegians, she believes, “are arriving at the epoch which
precedes the introduction of the arts and sciences” [103]).
It is likewise in Norway that Wollstonecraft comes to recognize the valuable link
between the cultivation of minds and land. “As the farmers cut away the wood, they clear the
ground,” she writes, arguing that the “gradual reduction, of their forests, will probably meliorate
their climate; and their manners will naturally improve in the same ratio as industry requires
ingenuity” (121). Wollstonecraft sees in Norway a graphic depiction of the familiar
enlightenment narratives of improvement and cultivation – a narrative that sees land (and often
people) as a natural resource to be transformed, through contact with the rational mind, from its
123

It does not necessarily thereby humanize her interlocutors. Wollstonecraft does not present
sympathy as a force that binds or connects separate people or their interests. Rather, she
represents it as a force that is deeply subjective: the spontaneous and involuntary feeling of
sympathy humanizes, not the rationally calculable interrelatedness that it then implies. It is
important to remember that the sympathy she describes in the broken particle passage occurs in
isolation, reconciling not individuals to other individuals, but a single individual to a mighty
whole. Thus, while Wollstonecraft’s sympathy at dinner might seem to imply a mutually
humanizing force between her and her companions, this conclusion does not follow the logic or
dynamic of sympathy as Wollstonecraft represents it. (This does not mean that, in my view,
Wollstonecraft’s one-sided sympathy with these women necessarily dehumanizes her
interlocutors, however. We will return to the lopsided dynamics of Wollstonecraft’s collective
identification / dissociation below.)
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savage state into ordered, fecund land. The cultivated land, in turn, acts upon the mind, first by
forcing it to confront the challenges of mass agriculture and, second, by freeing it to think about
supposedly higher order problems, lending minds and lands a symbiotic, mutually profitable
relationship to one another. Moreover, the relationship unfolds in a causal, material narrative of
perfectibility. “The world requires,” she writes, “the hand of man to perfect it; and as this task
naturally unfolds the faculties he exercises, it is physically impossible that he should have
remained in Rousseau’s golden age of stupidity” (121 – 122). By indicating the physical
impossibility of perpetual savagery in an agricultural context, Wollstonecraft signals the
empirical (as opposed to what Boyle might call occult) conditions of the course of human
perfectibility within the mighty whole of providential harmony. One can compare
Wollstonecraft’s arguments here to alternative arguments about progress and perfectibility that
celebrate the “occult,” or mystical, nature of human progress and history, advanced for example
in Anna Letitia Barbauld’s poem “Eighteen Hundred and Eleven” (1812):
There walks a Spirit o’er the peopled earth,
Secret his progress is, unknown his birth;
Moody and viewless as the changing wind,
No force arrests his foot, no chains can bind;
Where’er he turns, the human brute awakes,
And, roused to better life, his sordid hut forsakes:
He thinks, he reasons, glows with purer fires,
Feels finer wants, and burns with new desires:
Obedient Nature follows where he leads… (215 – 223)
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The spirit of progress in Barbauld’s alternative history is extrinsic and unknowable. It is not
produced by but rather spontaneously acts upon individuals and societies. While her narrative
agrees that “Obedient Nature” is cultivated and determined by human beings, the consciousness
and rationality that make this cultivation possible are imposed by a force external to both humans
and the empirical forces of nature. Barbauld’s account leaves little room for the kind of agency
and self-determination that Wollstonecraft, by associating the cultivation of lands directly with
the cultivation of minds in material, causal narratives, insists upon, subordinating possibilities for
radical social change to forces beyond human agency and empirical epistemology.
Given her claims about the empirical bases of perfectibility and social change, it is
important to note that while her Short Residence occasionally registers images of cultured,
productive lands perfected by “the hand of man,” she concentrates much more on wild,
uncultivated lands. With emphasis on the untamed wildness of northern landscapes, she advances
a theme increasingly familiar in late eighteenth-century and romantic thought about the
subordinate role of the far north in the context of human history. In his 1830 lectures on human
history, for example, Hegel writes about the importance of climate, arguing that “all
development involves a reflection of the spirit within itself in opposition to nature,” and that
“where nature is too powerful, [human] liberation becomes more difficult” (154). The promises
of enlightenment freedom and perfectibility can only be achieved in temperate, maritime
climates, since “[t]he frost which grips the inhabitants of Lappland and the fiery heat of Africa
are forces too powerful a nature for man to resist, or for the spirit to achieve free movement and
to reach that degree of richness which is the precondition and source of a fully developed
mastery of reality.” Echoing Wollstonecraft’s insistence that the Swedes only “exert themselves
to find the food necessary to sustain life,” Hegel argues that in the far north, “dire necessity can
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never be escaped or overcome; man is continually forced to direct his attention to nature”
(155).124 Likewise, in Rousseau’s Essay on the Origin of Languages (published posthumously),
the north is associated with inhibited progress in very similar terms, since, he argues, “where the
earth yields nothing except through toil, and where life seems to come more from the arms than
the heart, where men are ceaselessly busy providing for their subsistence, they hardly think of
pleasanter ties.” In such a place, he writes, “[e]verything is limited by physical motives.”125 The
liberty that makes legitimacy possible in enlightenment political theory is physically obviated by
the dominance of nature and natural needs in the far north.
For Wollstonecraft, since she visits during unexpectedly bright and refreshing summer
months, the clearest expression of the “too powerful” force of the wilderness, and the sharpest
contrast with tamed and productive fields, is not the far North’s ice and snow but its abundance
of rocks. Rocks in the summer embody the stagnation and hostilities of the harsh winters of the
place as, in a passage that notes the clouds and eagles “high amongst the rocks,” she observes
that “[t]he current of life seemed congealed at the source: all were not frozen; for it was summer,
you remember; but every thing appeared so dull, that I waited to see ice, in order to reconcile me
to the absence of gaiety” (88). The rocks of Wollstonecraft’s Scandinavia graphically display
Hegel’s observation about nature encumbering “free movement” in cold, northern climates. The
seemingly unqualified oppressiveness of this exposed and supposedly miserable climate is
unambiguously displayed in letter eleven, with a gothic analogy evoking the primitive miseries
and poverty of pre-revolutionary France. Exploring the coast of Norway, she writes that “It
124

A version of these arguments prove very durable, featuring heavily for example in Hannah
Arendt’s arguments about the distinctions between labor, which she associates with lifesustaining bodily processes and thus slavery (“To labor meant to be enslaved by necessity” [83])
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would be difficult to form an idea of the place, if you have never seen one of these rocky coasts,”
continuing that “we saw about two hundred houses crowded together, under a very high rock –
still higher appearing above. Talk not of bastilles! To be born here, was to be bastilled by nature
– shut out from all that opens the understanding, or enlarges the heart” (131). The gothic misery
and claustrophobia of the rocks intensifies as she goes for a walk, “mounting near two hundred
steps made round a rock,” where “[t]he ocean, and these tremendous bulwarks, enclosed me on
every side. I felt confinement, and wished for wings” (131). Feeling “her breath oppressed,” she
begins to reflect on the lives of the townspeople below, “shudder[ing] at the thought of receiving
existence, and remaining here, in the solitude of ignorance” where “the character of the
inhabitants is as uncultivated…as their abode” (131). In a land where only “traffic” is available,
she writes not only that “[n]othing genial…appears around this place, or within its circle of
rocks,” but that nothing is here “to humanise these beings,” who spend all their time shut up (she
describes her own stay in this town as a “confinement” spent tediously “looking at tiles,
overhung by rocks” [132]) with tobacco and brandy, spoiling their “breath, teeth, clothes, and
furniture” (131 – 132).
When she makes her return from Norway (about which, again, she is on the whole more
sympathetic) to Sweden, she again finds herself stuck “amongst the rocks,” too slowly advancing
along a calm sea. The captain, having no compass, assures her that he can steer their course
“with the rocks,” but as “he was half a fool,” she anxiously fears that they “were straying amidst
a labyrinth of rocks, without a clue.” Indeed, she writes, “we turned round one rock only to see
another, equally destitute of the tokens we were in search of to tell us where we were” (154 –
155). With this half-fool, and through these rocks, she is reintroduced to the “insensibility in the
very movements of” the Swedes – the “sluggish peasants” who conduct and house her with

272

“their share of cunning” (155) – at times exasperated with “the stupid obstinacy of some of these
half alive beings” (156). In the far north, characterized with a stifling and oppressive imagery of
“Rocks…piled on rocks” (67), the world is isolated from cultivation and perfectibility, and its
constrained inhabitants are deprived of opportunities to enrich and expand their imaginations.
But, at the same time, it is hard to ignore that the most inspired and imaginative prose of
the text is very often, precisely, Wollstonecraft’s meditations upon and reactions to all these
rocks. During the unequalled “beauty of the northern summer’s evening and night,” for example,
she “contemplated all nature at rest; the rocks even grown darker in their appearance, looked as
if they partook of the general repose, and reclined more heavily on their foundation” (69). And
while oppressed with the empty hospitality of the Swedish table, she imagines slipping away to
gather in the scenery and majesty of the rocks: “let me, my kind strangers, escape sometimes into
your fir groves, wander on the margin of your beautiful lakes, or climb your rocks to view still
others in endless perspective; which, piled by more than giant’s hand, scale the heavens to
intercept its rays, or to receive the parting tinge of lingering day – day that, scarcely softened into
twilight, allows the freshening breeze to wake, and the moon to burst forth in all her glory to
glide with solemn elegance through the azure expanse” (74 – 75). In these moments, some of the
most rewarding passages for readers of her Short Residence, Wollstonecraft slips into poetry,
drawing (like Wordsworth’s troubled speaker fumbling numbly through the woods until he
encounters the leech collector) suddenly more heavily on metaphorical and figurative language:
“The rocks,” she writes, “which tossed their fantastic heads so high were often covered with
pines and firs, varied in the most picturesque manner” (89). Indeed, in a later and very telling
moment, while riding beneath a midnight, Nordic moon, she writes in a particularly rich passage
that “it is not the queen of night alone [the moon] who reigns here in all her splendor, though the
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sun, loitering just below the horizon, decks her with a golden tinge from his car, illuminating the
cliffs that hide him; the heavens also, of a clear softened blue, throw her forward, and the
evening star appears a lesser moon to the naked eye. The huge shadows of the rocks, fringed
with firs, concentrating the views, without darkening them, exciting that tender melancholy
which, sublimating the imagination, exalts, rather than depresses the mind” (94).
It might seem that Wollstonecraft approaches the rocks with ambivalence, regarding them
at times as oppressive forces against the cultivation and perfectibility of the natural and narrow
mind, and at other times as sources of inspiration, expanding, exercising, and even improving the
mind. But in the next paragraph, Wollstonecraft clarifies this ambiguity by drawing up a
distinction between herself and her companions, and specifically by distinguishing how each
experiences and relates to this scenery of the moon and the rocks. For her companions, their
relationship to this beguiling midnight is emphatically somatic, and calls to mind the basic,
utilitarian needs of the laboring body: “My companions fell asleep: -- fortunately they did not
snore…” (94). For Wollstonecraft, she transcends the bodily demands that preoccupy her
companions, and registers the satisfaction and perhaps surprised relief that their organic, corporal
concerns – specifically their snores – do not harassingly interfere with her higher-order, more
imaginative reflections on the moon and midnight rocks: “…and I contemplated,” the sentence
continues, “fearless of idle questions, a night such as I had never before seen or felt to charm the
senses, and calm the heart…A vague pleasurable sentiment absorbed me, as I opened my bosom
to the embraces of nature; and my soul rose to its author, with the chirping of the solitary birds,
which began to feel, rather than see, advancing day.” Indeed, in stark contrast to her dozing
companions, Wollstonecraft experiences “a kind of expectation that made me almost afraid to
breathe, lest I should break the charm. I saw the sun – and sighed” (94).
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A troubling dynamic begins to emerge. For the Scandinavians, the profusion of rocks is a
constant and oppressive monument to the wild, untamed and untamable nature that, surrounding
them like a “bastille,” impedes the expansion and improvement of their minds, keeping them
from transcending a state of “half alive,” “scarcely human” brutishness. At the same time, it
facilitates Wollstonecraft’s own progress and perfectibility. By using the rocks as a recurring
trope to develop a narrative that reconciles poetry and ethnographic history, Wollstonecraft
embodies the very catalysts of progress that, in her observations about hospitality, the
Scandinavians lack: “the cultivation of the arts and sciences” (73). How can these same rocks
improve her mind (the subject of aesthetic and scientific production), and explain the
unimprovability of theirs (the dissociated, disinterested objects of such production)? How is this
not a contradiction? (The potential contradiction can be put in several different ways: one, the
same empirical phenomena, rocks for example, can expand one mind and inhibit another; two,
the same empirical phenomena makes the cultivation of one mind possible and makes the
cultivation of another impossible; etc.) Does it not problematize Wollstonecraft’s claims about
sympathy and the mighty whole?
Indeed, it gets worse. For Wollstonecraft insists throughout her career that all individuals
are equal (and should thus respond to the same phenomena under the same conditions in
essentially similar – and thus essentially humanizing – ways), but she acknowledges that material
conditions from region to region and from class to class can compromise the appearances of
equality. This results in people regarding and treating one another differently.126 Nobody, she
writes, is “stupid by nature,” and national characters hastily drawn up by travelers “do not
discriminate the natural [in which she includes climate] from the acquired difference” (92). In
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fact, such indiscriminate ‘national characters’ and presumptions of natural inequality have been
used to justify the most abhorrent of human practices, “because they did not consider that slaves,
having no object to stimulate industry, have not their faculties sharpened by the only thing that
can exercise them, self-interest. Others have been brought forward as brutes, having no aptitude
for the arts and sciences, only because the progress of improvement had not reached that stage
which produces them” (92 – 93). But it is not only that the uncultivated nature of Scandinavian
landscapes inspires Wollstonecraft while paradoxically explaining Scandinavian brutishness. As
Scandinavian cultivation (including industry, which ought to ‘sharpen’ their “faculties” and
eventually humanize them, drawing them away from the empty gestures of hospitality and into
the sympathies of the grand mass) tames and transforms nature, it compromises the wildness of
the landscape. It thus compromises a source of inspiration and perfectibility that Wollstonecraft,
as a writer and historian, comes to depend upon: in fact, surprisingly, she regularly resents
Scandinavian cultivation and industry.
In an early, visceral example, she approaches “a little village called Kvistram,” where she
“was particularly impressed by the beauty of the situation,” yet she notes that “[a]s we drew near,
the loveliest banks of wild flowers variegated the prospect, and promised to exhale odours to add
to the sweetness of the air, the purity of which you could almost see, alas! not smell, for the
putrifying herrings, which they use as manure, after the oil has been extracted, spread over the
patches of the earth, claimed by cultivation, destroyed every other” (86 – 87). Surveying
Sweden, Wollstonecraft begins to enter into historical and scientific meditations, believing that
“Sweden appeared to me the country in the world most proper to form the botanist and natural
historian,” since “every object seemed to remind me of the creation of things, of the first efforts
of sportive nature.” She even begins to think explicitly of the role of sociability in the
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perfectibility of human nature, but, she regrets, “[t]his train of reflections might have led me
further, in every sense of the word; but I could not escape from the detestable evaporation of the
herrings, which poisoned all my pleasure” (87). The offensive “herring effluvia” (90) marks only
one form of industry that, paralyzing the progress of her own mind and imagination,
Wollstonecraft regrets in the Residence. Later, approaching Christiana (now Oslo),
Wollstonecraft does indeed notice some cultivated fields, but they “graced a scene which still
retained so much of its native wildness, that the art which appeared, seemed so necessary, it was
scarcely perceived.” Cultivation is okay here, because it is not apparent. No so of its mines, for
“as we drove down the mountain, [the view] was almost spoilt by the depredations committed on
the rocks to make alum. I did not know the process. – I only saw that the rocks looked red after
they had been burnt; and regretted that the operation should leave a quantity of rubbish, to
introduce an image of human industry in the shape of destruction” (142). These rocks, bearing
the literal trace of human industry, do not reveal a moment of civilizing transition and the
progress of sharpened faculties, but a regrettable kind of devolution, from rocks to rubbish.
Later, taking in the scenery after leaving Christiana, she appreciates some agricultural
cultivation, but punctuates these observations by noting that “[t]he appearance of the river
[Glomma?] above and below the falls is very picturesque, the ruggedness of the scenery
disappearing as the torrent subsides into a peaceful stream. But I did not like to see a number of
saw-mills crowded together close to the cataracts; they destroyed the harmony of the prospect”
(153). Later, visiting Trollhättan, she writes that “I own that the first view of the cascade
disappointed me: and the sight of the works, as they advanced, though a grand proof of human
industry, was not calculated to warm the fancy,” adding that “[a]midst the awful roaring of the
impetuous torrents, the noise of human instruments, and the bustle of workmen, even the
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blowing up of the rocks, when grand masses trembled in the darkened air – only resembled the
insignificant sport of children” (159 – 160). By associating ‘grand proofs’ of Scandinavian
industry with halted scientific and historical observations, interruptions to aesthetic production,
and useless child’s play, Wollstonecraft associates the means of Scandinavian cultivation with
devolution and counter-progression, even as she continues to regret their brutish clods and empty
hospitality as evidence of their failure to progress.
We can see, in the context of Wollstonecraft’s double vision of Scandinavian cultivation,
how appropriate the image of her moonlight passage really is. Her corporeal processes are
suspended as her mind expands through space and time, touching on history, mythology, poetry,
and even the substance of providential harmony. Nature and “its author” absorb her as day
slowly, regrettably approaches. She is “afraid to breathe,” while her companions, in sharp
contrast, only breathe, their snores present even in their absence: the very possibility of their
snoring suggests itself to her, which like “idle questions” would certainly inhibit her reflections
and spoil her transcendent experience. It is only when day arrives and the enchanting experience
of the night ends that her own bodily processes resume: although “afraid to breathe” so as not to
“break the charm” of the night, she writes, “I saw the sun – and sighed.” And while the passage
clearly and emphatically privileges the transcendent charms of Wollstonecraft’s psychological
and spiritual experiences, it is with the return to corporeal concerns that error is corrected, and
that actual, practical, measurable progress is resumed: “One of my companions,” the next
sentence relates, “now awake, perceiving that the postilion had mistaken the road, began to
swear at him, and roused the other two, who reluctantly shook off sleep” (94). It does not escape
the reader’s notice that, had her companions been awake, they would not likely have become lost
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– nor does Wollstonecraft’s tone of annoyance at the swearing reluctance with which they
correct their course.
With this scene in mind, we can reevaluate Wollstonecraft’s claim that “[t]he world
requires, I see, the hand of man to perfect it,” and that “[i]t is very fortunate that men are, a long
time, but just above the brute creation…because it is the patient labour of men, who are only
seeking for a subsistence, which produces whatever embellishes existence, affording leisure for
the cultivation of the arts and sciences, that lift man so far above his first state” (121 – 122). The
humanizing promise of the improvability of the world, apparent both in Wollstonecraft’s
transcendent experience of the almost sacred night and in the natural forces of sympathy that
draw her into the harmony of the mighty whole, requires brutish people and their laboring
bodies, who are thus – if temporarily – excluded from (or, better, subordinated within) that
promise and that whole. To be sure, they are a part of the slow process and harmony of
perfectibility, but they are not conscious contributors to, calculators of, or enjoyers of that
harmony. They are not beneficiaries of the aesthetic and empirical effects of that harmony and its
phenomena. Their physical needs alone put into motion the machinery and the gravitation that
will only much later put them (or others, in the present) into touch with God and with each other
in truly legitimate, rationally sound, sympathetically mortared social arrangements – consistent
with and in harmony with the empirical principles wherein the association, the social individual,
consists. [pg 355 0f vindic texts]
Meanwhile, the experiences of the transcendent mind are at odds with the experiences of
the laboring body. This does not mean however that Wollstonecraft rejects or expels the laboring
body, as a mere animal for example, from the harmonizing logic of human community – her
relationship with them creates and suspends both collective identification that extends from her
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to her companions and dissociation that alienates her from them. A transcendent mind meditating
on the moon is of a different order than that of the dozing riders – only such a transcendent mind
can recognize the broader necessity of their “patient labour” (whose rational and empirical
meaning is otherwise lost in the immediacy of mere instinctual and physical satisfaction of
bodily needs) in the first place. Thus, a conflict. On the one hand, subordinates ought to be
treated as equals. “We must love our servants,” she writes, observing that providing servants
with “a different kind of food from their masters…appears to me a remnant of barbarism,”
adding that “I do not know a more agreeable sight than to see servants part of a family.” Since
“attendants [have] human feelings, as well as forms,” treating them as equals creates a symbiotic,
and mutually (if not symmetrically)127 humanizing relationship with them (76 – 77). Remember,
after all, that Wollstonecraft rejected polygenetic explanations of racial differences, and thus
refused to regard racial and cultural differences as naturally essential differences.128 On the other
hand, she acknowledges that although it is “delightful to love our fellow-creatures…I begin to
think that I should not like to live continually in the country, with people whose minds have such
a narrow range,” since her “heart would frequently be interested; but [her] mind would languish
for more companionable society” (84), adding later that “I am…half convinced, that I could not
live very comfortably exiled from the countries where mankind are so much further advanced in
knowledge, imperfect as it is, and unsatisfactory to the thinking mind.” Her thoughts, she adds,
“fly from this wilderness to the polished circles of the world,” though the “vices and follies”
(122) of that world are also disappointing.
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In effect, Wollstonecraft’s representation of the Scandinavians reflects a perspective
heavily informed by a broader understanding of, and pursuit of, universal human history. She
says as much, arguing first (as we have seen) that travellers “whose works have served as
materials for the compilers of universal histories” generally provide “a national character, which
is rarely just” (92), stating much later that “I do not pretend to sketch a national character; but
merely to note the present state of morals and manners, as I trace the progress of the world’s
improvement,” adding however that “my principle object has been to take such a dispassionate
view of men as will lead me to form a just idea of the nature of man” (172). In fact,
Wollstonecraft contradicts the former of these two assertions, insisting that, “I am persuaded that
I have formed a very just opinion of the character of the Norwegians, without being able to hold
converse with them” (113). (What, after all, constitutes a “just” national character? Are not
“acquired” differences, as much as “natural” differences [whatever those might be in the “mighty
whole” that constitutes humankind], significant in its execution? Would a just “national
character” not consist substantially of “acquired” differences?) More importantly, however,
Wollstonecraft situates herself, if not in the ranks of natural historians, then at least among
empirical observers whose data contributes to natural histories.
In other words, Wollstonecraft’s claims and contradictions pertaining to community with
(and dissociation from) other people must be understood in a context that, at least ostensibly,
foregrounds temporality. Her references to “universal histories” and “dispassionate” ethnography
reframe questions of social organization and political legitimacy as questions about objects that
are not only material but also temporal. The earlier troubled binary between the legitimate “some
man” and the illegitimate “savage” is complicated as temporality becomes an increasingly
important ingredient in questions of legitimacy and collectivity in romantic and post-romantic
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political thought: Hegel’s Phenomenology is an especially legible example of this shift. Short
Residence helps us to register some of the difficulties and contradictions inherent in universal
human history projects, and to get insight into how this project emerges as an alternative to
liberal theories of contractarian legitimacy. By the end of the eighteenth century, enlightenment
discourses about the objective conditions of legitimate social and political arrangements largely
transition to discourses of universal (and then national) human history, just as, at the end of the
seventeenth century, the discourse of embodied legitimacy (of princes, kings, and sons) shifted
into a discourse about institutional legitimacy. While shifting from discourses of embodied to
institutional legitimacy foregrounded the consent of the governed, the shift from discourses of
the objective to those of the temporal conditions of institutional legitimacy foregrounds the
possibility – and inevitability – of social and institutional change. The savage is no longer merely
the counterpoint of some man: he is also in some small (but measurable) degree enfranchised, at
least ostensibly, helping to put the forces of social change and perfectibility into motion. The
narrative of social and political legitimacy is not one of the savage disappearing into the
legitimate citizen, switching from a purely physical nature to a moral nature, at which point one
half of the binary erases the other, but one of progress that assigns rationally calculable necessity
and legitimacy to each. And so women, slaves, Inuit, servants, Swedes, etc, being all parts of the
mighty whole, collectively constitute the legitimacy of human community. We can put it like
this: some political philosophy, including Wollstonecraft’s, begins by the end of the eighteenth
century to take up more seriously the challenge that novelists had posed, incorporating narrative
and protagonists (apparent again in the slow progress of Geist) more substantially into its
formulations of social legitimacy – but it has also unwittingly taken up some of the novelists’
fatal flaws.

282

A fine line is drawn here. The necessity of brutes, “the patient labour of men, who are
only seeking for a subsistence, which produces whatever embellishes existence, affording leisure
for the cultivation of the arts and sciences, that lift man so far above his first state,” does not
seem to distinguish substantially enough between the need for brutes of the deep past (our own
ancestors) and brutes of today (the other), even as it clearly distinguishes the “patient” laborer
from the leisured aesthete. Wollstonecraft’s experience of the Nordic moon, to return to our
previous example, certainly “embellishes” her “existence,” seeming to “lift [her] so far above
[her] first state,” and this experience would not be possible, as we have seen, without the
brutishness of her companions. Less trivially, even though Wollstonecraft consistently derides
the exploitation of other people by repeatedly and explicitly deploying abolitionist rhetoric, there
is nothing in her narrative of progress (since human history’s progress, always containing both
civilized and savage people that determine one another as such, is not strictly linear) that
excludes the possibility of further exploitation. Wollstonecraft’s ostensible enfranchisement of
the Scandinavian brutes (acknowledging their human form and feelings), juxtaposed with her
dissociation from them (which both justifies and suppresses her level of dependence upon them
and their labor), goes a long way toward dramatizing how far her political philosophy has fallen
short of resolving what Susan Buck-Morss has called the “double vision” of enlightenment
thought, which stresses private property and liberty as essential preconditions to humanization
even as it suppresses the dependence of such institutions on slavery, or dehumanization. “British
liberty meant the protection of private property,” Buck-Morss writes, “and slaves were private
property” (28), adding that even Rousseau, a father of romantic thought and the French
Revolution, “declared all men equal and saw private property as the source of inequality, but he
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never put two and two together to discuss French slavery for economic profit as central to
arguments of both equality and property” (33).
A critique of Wollstonecraft’s political theory thus requires what Edward Said calls a
“contrapuntal reading,” reflecting the pursuit of “an understanding of what is involved when an
author shows, for instance, that a colonial sugar plantation is seen as important to the process of
maintaining a particular style of life in England.”129 To be fair, the “particular style of life”
Wollstonecraft upholds does indeed entail the leisure necessary for the cultivation of arts and
sciences while also therefore presupposing the necessity of (past and present) brutes – but it also
explicitly forbids slavery and diminishes the importance of private property overall. She is not
Adam Smith, after all, and her “attraction of adhesion” is no invisible hand. Understanding how
such a “style of life” is possible, or if it is possible at all, requires a closer examination of the
relationship between legitimacy and temporality.
5. REPRODUCTION, TEMPORALITY, AND LEGITIMACY
And yet only the most cursory of explorations of this vastly complex topic, the
relationship between temporality and legitimacy, will be possible here. Therefore, my objective
in this final section will not be to resolve the open questions of Wollstonecraft’s historiography
as it is complicated and reinforced by her Short Residence, but to lay out more clearly the nature
and the implications of those questions. Insofar as her theory of legitimacy constitutes an
alternative to rational theories of legitimacy that presuppose transcending an impossible-totranscend savage/some man binary (by bringing the savage and some man into the same mighty
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whole), how has she found temporality a useful mechanism? How does this temporally
conditioned legitimacy complicate her materialist premise of the all-inclusive, rationally
objective and necessary legitimacy of a mighty whole? Indeed, just how temporal is her
temporality?
We ought to note first of all that while there is something vaguely eschatological about
legitimacy as history and the perfectibility of human nature, the content and development of
historical experience is not erased by its realization. The notion of the “process” makes this clear,
evident not only in the turn to dialectic (Hegel famously argues that “The True is the whole. But
the whole is nothing other than the essence consummating itself through its development”)130 but
in the residual premise of objectivity that directs historical processes: Hannah Arendt notes the
“quality of permanence in the model or image” that organizes work, arguing that, as in the
making of material objects, “one eternal idea presid[es] over a multitude of perishable things” –
an idea that is derived from Platonic thought (142 – 143). Framed in this way, legitimacy is less
the product of time than the process of its own constructing: it is the making objective, or
external, or real, the always already presupposed objectivity, externality, and reality of proper
social organization. Indeed, some critics have detected something of this logic in Wollstonecraft,
and especially in her feminist writings, very often found in criticism focused upon the concept of
motherhood in her work.
Tilottama Rajan for example compares Wollstonecraft’s and Hegel’s conceptions of
historical reproduction and generation, noting that Hegel’s philosophy of nature posits
reproduction as “a bio-psychic economy that joins the body, culture, and the aesthetic to the
destiny of the species,” involving “a constant self-destruction and renewal of the body and the
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species through the sacrifice of parts to the whole” (218). Through reproduction, “[t]he
individual assimilates what is other (including the negative in experience), and ‘re-produces’
itself anew: across time the species takes in what is different, yet continues the same” (212). In a
“sacrificial logic [that] extends obviously enough to the social body,” Hegel argues that“[w]ithin
the body, the animal assimilates foreign matter as food, but also assimilates and reproduces
itself. For the body consists of members, each of which ‘draws on the others for its own needs,’”
even while maintaining mutual hostility (218).131 Reproduction in this sense is “the underlying
semiosis of a history that has as its goal society, not community” (218 – Rajan draws upon JeanLuc Nancy’s distinctions between these words, according to which community sustains a sense
of the individual and its “singularities” [214] whereas society, a la the Scottish Enlightenment,
subsumes her into the whole. Regarding the question of “whether reproduction respects
singularity,” Rajan argues that “[t]hough gender focuses this problem with particular intensity on
the bodies of women, the Jacobin novel generalizes it across the social body” [221]). Rajan,
seeing in Wollstonecraft’s work as well as in that of other radical novelists of her time a
“prevalence…of miscarriages, (symbolic) infanticides, and other forms of withdrawal from
domestic economy” (212), posits Wollstonecraft’s The Wrongs of Woman (1798) and its inherent
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Jacobin sympathies as part of a “de-jection of the semiosis of reproduction” (223). By rejecting
reproduction in her novels, she privileges community and its possibilities for social change over
the limiting paradigm of enlightenment civil society.132
At the same time, Thomas H. Ford writes about the conflicting meanings of motherhood
in feminist discourses, and about the extent to which Wollstonecraft as “foremother” of Englishspeaking feminism validates her place as a pioneer in its ranks even as it leaves her vulnerable to
criticism that paints her as a bourgeois agent of “feminist misogyny.” Reading the same Jacobin
novel, The Wrongs of Woman, Ford argues that the main character’s “use of language, writing or
speaking as a mother, effectively precludes her from becoming a feminist agent,” and that
“[p]aradoxically, her efforts to educate her daughter to a feminist future entrap Maria herself in a
repetition of her own past repression” (192). This ‘paradox’ of feminist anti-feminism represents
a near material embodiment of Hegel’s schema of reproduction, in which the different and the
same are appropriated and sustained by the same agency. And yet, Ford argues, the effect of this
paradoxical practice is still open to radical social change, since “through invoking [a] nonfamilial
audience, Maria’s critique of partiality [the partiality of western enlightenment civilization that
excludes women from participating] is liberated for a different collective political subject” (195).
This is possible, Ford writes, because, again, of a rejection of biological reproduction.
Specifically, Ford argues that Wollstonecraft casts her readers not as mothers but as midwives, a
practical occupation that offers “ways of gaining independence from immediate familial male
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to ‘melancholy reflections’ that acknowledges the sustenance sentimental literature provides to
women with limited freedoms” (Tegan 359).
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power” and which does so by introducing “the possibility of a new order [that] is not the mother
who gives birth, but the woman who assists” (197). According to Ford, “[r]eading…can be
understood as a kind of midwifery” since “[a] shift in textual apprehension makes different ways
of acting possible” (198) and because “[b]oth reading and midwifery bring forth new forms of
life, new ways of living and new conceptions of the lived” (199).133 Since, in motherhood,
“social reproduction is tied to sexual reproduction” and “offers comparatively limited potential
for social transformation” (199), casting her readers in the role as midwives entails “reading
history as the narrative of a collective subject” (200). Ford thus posits “the principle of
composition in A Vindication of the Rights of Woman [as] largely one of aggregation,” enacting
the binding logic of the grand mass (202). But midwifery purchases the possibility for less
“limited” social progress, by disengaging from biological reproduction and thus allowing for
collective agency and greater perfectibility through social progress, only by losing something
else. For what is left behind in exchanging the mother’s body for the midwife’s? The answer, of
course, is labor.
The midwife’s relationship to generation and reproduction is one that foregrounds, not
somatic processes only, but the narrative of arts and sciences that situate the body and its
processes as objects of knowledge and control (which then, in turn, become tropes for the control
over nature suggested by enlightenment thought – this is the point Sterne satirizes with his
famous man-midwife in Tristram Shandy, Dr. Slop). This is precisely what is entailed by its
being a discipline. Through the midwife, the construction of her discipline, and the priority it
places upon the narrative of arts and sciences (which makes the reproducing body its object), the
process of reproduction, sexual and then social, is alienated from the reproducing body. It is
133

On the importance of midwifery in the eighteenth century for both enlightenment thought and
British nationalism, see Lisa Forman Cody, Birthing the Nation.
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made objective by its codification within the scientific discipline in the same way that, as Hegel
argues, the processes and materials from the past are made objective by historiography, and then
given to its consumers as a present: “When we study the past and occupy ourselves with a
remote world, a present opens up before the mind, a present created out of the mind’s own
activity and bestowed upon it as a reward for its exertions. The events are various, but their
general significance, their inner quality and coherence, are one. This circumstance cancels out
the past and raises the event into the present” (Lectures on World History 20). The laboring body
(the mother, the bridge-builder, the miner) is the agent of reproduction – not through its own
labors (which smack of brutishness), but only insofar as it is recognized as such by the
enlightenment discipline (midwifery, historiography, poetic ethnography) that takes it up as its
object, therefore situating it within the narrative of the progress of the grand mass. But what kind
of subject results? What kind of object? What is their relation to one another? To ask this
question in a different way (a way that returns us to the epistemological problems underlying
social experience), what might familiarity between these two parties look like?
When identifying collectively with the Scandinavians, Wollstonecraft conceives of the
other as a familiar – as a complement to the humanizing forces of sympathy. The other is a
subject with which she is embedded in a mighty whole of social organization, with whom she
shares mutual responsibilities and benefits from the produce of self-determined agency,
especially as regards cultivation. This is one kind of history, a history of familiarity that points to
nature and the force it applies to human community, linking the nature of the individual to that of
the grand mass. But she also makes of the other an object of knowledge, another kind of history.
She dissociates from them, enacts a split, a break, a trauma: but it is a dissociation she can
account for. They become the means to the realization of her own self-determined agency, the
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fodder for her own enlightenment Bildung. They are like the rocks of the far north, uncultivated
and uncultivatable, recognizable as human and quasi-human forms (“their fantastic heads so high
were often covered with pines and firs”) only to the creative, creating, higher-order imagination,
giving that imagination its content and substance. By relating to them as objects of knowledge,
and thus as a disinterested observer among artifacts of nature that are hers to name and to
describe, she potentially enacts the troubling dynamics of enlightenment power relations
identified in its most basic critique, as for example in Max Horkheimer and Theodor W.
Adorno’s classic study: “Myth becomes enlightenment and nature mere objectivity. Human
beings purchase the increase in their power with estrangement from that over which it is exerted.
Enlightenment stands in the same relationship to things as the dictator to human beings.”134 But
she also overcomes the trauma of familiarity. The condition of their humanity, of their
familiarity, does not accost her but rather proceeds from her recognition. The footprint is an
object from nature, a brutishness that is not shared but that is other, an alterity from the deep past
that is made present by recognition and (ostensibly historical) narrative.
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Max Horkheimer and Theodor W. Adorno, Dialectic of Enlightenment, 6. For an important
counterpoint to this position, especially relevant to thinking about Wollstonecraft’s position
within enlightenment history, see Barbara Taylor’s brief essay, “Enlightenment and the Uses of
Woman,” which begins with an analysis of Adorno’s “strikingly misogynistic” correspondence
with Erich Fromm in 1937. Here, Adorno reproduces one of the most basic Enlightenment myths
(about women and luxury) by “suggesting an investigation into the ‘feminine character,’” which,
he argues, represents “‘infantile’ ‘bedazzlement’ by consumerism, the corruption
of…personalities by ‘economic fetishism’, [which] had made them into instruments of capitalist
hegemony” (79). Taylor sees the logic of Horkheimer and Adorno (the singularity, and thus the
singularly patriarchal hegemonic authority, of Enlightenment rationalism), and much of the
feminist criticism of Enlightenment that draws upon it, as reacting to a “caricature, that cannot
survive even a cursory glance at the noisily argumentative world of Enlightenment, with its
multiple renditions of reason and truth purveyed by lively minds of diverse sorts, from
Encyclopedists and philosophical theologians to bluestockings and Grub Street hacks of both
sexes,” ignoring, along the way, “the high visibility of women in enlightened thought, as over the
course of the eighteenth century longstanding assumptions about women’s place became the
focus of widespread discussion and debate” (80).
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Drawing on the critique of the novelists (which, being a novelist herself, is her critique as
well), the deep past becomes available and present in Wollstonecraft’s Short Residence through
the Scandinavians, as characters in her narrative, precisely as Hegel indicates. But the resulting
history is ineffective. The temporality that is not temporal (the brutish past that is right before
her) fails both to distinguish Wollstonecraft from and to cohere her with the Scandinavians. The
conditions of both their alterity and of their familiarity are unconvincing. Indeed, Ann Rigney,
writing about the “hybridity” of fictional and historical writing (beginning with an analysis of Sir
Walter Scott’s historical novels and their reception), argues that “a particular variant of the
sublime is produced by…the perceived resistance offered by the past to our attempts to represent
it with whatever information, concepts, and discursive models we have at our disposal,” using
the term “romantic historicism” to designate (among other things) “a radical awareness of the
alterity of the past and the historicity of experience [which] picked up on the Enlightenment
interest in culture and eighteenth-century antiquarianism and fed into emergent nationalism with
its ‘identity politics’ and interest in folk culture” (8). Sublime indeed, because the sublime
always points to limitations in the subject which nevertheless humanize and valorize her.
Sublime indeed: a perceived resistance to aesthetic appropriation, to appropriation into scientific
categories and “just national characters.” A perceived resistance that, like rocks piled on rocks,
troubles the progress of the historian-passenger but that, being sublime, still manages to speak to
the complexity and richness of the historian’s imagination, which through them touches history,
mythology, God. With temporality that is not temporal, and the ensuing construction of
brutishness that is thus familiarized, the legitimacy indexed by historical progress in
Wollstonecraft’s Short Residence still points, and still problematically, to Crusoe in the midst of
the world.

291

Works Cited
Primary:
Alves, Robert. Edinburgh, A Poem in Two Parts. Also, the Weeping Bard: a Poem, in Sixteen
Cantos. Edinburgh: Printed for the Author, 1789. Print.
Aristotle. Politics. Ed. R. F. Stalley. Trans. Ernest Barker. Oxford: Oxford UP, 2009. Print.
Astell, Mary. Some Reflections on Marriage, Occasion’d by the Duke and Dutchess of
Mazarine’s Case; Which is Also Consider’d. London: Printed for John Nutt, 1700.
Barbauld, Anna Letitia. Selected Prose and Poetry. Ed. William McCarthy and Elizabeth Kraft.
Peterborough: Broadview Press, 2002. Print.
Beattie, James. Dissertations Moral and Critical. Vol 2. Dublin, Printed for Mess. Exshaw,
1783. Print.
---. Essays on Poetry and Music, as they Affect the Mind. Edinburgh: Printed for William Creech,
1776. Print.
Bolingbroke, Henry St. John. The Philosophical Works of the Late Right Honourable Henry St.
John, Lord Viscount Bolingbroke. Vol 4, 1776. Print.
Burney, Frances. The Wanderer: or, Female Difficulties. Ed. Robert L. Mack and Peter Sabor.
Oxford: Oxford UP, 2001. Print.
---. Evelina, or, The History of a Young Lady’s Entrance into the World. Ed. Stewart J. Cooke.
New York: W. W. Norton, 1998. Print.
Burke, Edmund. Reflections on the Revolution in France. Ed. Conor Cruise O’Brien. New York:
Penguin Books, 2004. Print.
Cavendish, Margaret. Paper Bodies: A Margaret Cavendish Reader. Ed. Sylvia Bowerbank and
Sara Mendelson. Peterborough: Broadview Press, 2000. Print.
Clarke, Samuel and Anthony Collins. The Correspondence of Samuel Clarke and Anthony
Collins, 1707 – 08. Ed. William L. Uzgalis. Peterborough, Ontario: Broadview Press,
2011. Print.
Craig, Sir Thomas. The Right of Succession to the Kingdom of England, in Two Books. Published
posthumously.
Davys, Mary. The Reform’d Coquet, Familiar Letters Betwixt a Gentleman and a Lady, and The
Accomplished Rake. Ed. Martha F. Bowden. Lexington: University Press of Kentucky,
1999. Print.
Defoe, Daniel. Robinson Crusoe. Ed. Evan R. Davis. Peterborough: Broadview Editions, 2010.
Print.
---. Moll Flanders. Ed. Edward R. Kelly. New York: W. W. Norton, 1973. Print.
---. Roxana: the Fortunate Mistress. Ed. John Mullen. Oxford: Oxford UP, 1996. Print.
---. The Succession to the Crown of England, Considered. London: printer identified as John
Darby, 1701.
---. The Original Power of the Collective Body of the People of England Examined and Asserted.
Addressed to the King, Lords, and Commons. Necessary to be read at this alarming
crisis. London: Printed for J. Williams, at No. 38, Fleet-Street.
---. The True-Born Englishman. A Satyr. London, 1701. Print.
Descartes, René. Meditations and other Metaphysical Writings. Trans. Desmond M. Clarke. New
York: Penguin Books, 1998. Print.
Dryden, John. The Works of John Dryden. Ed. David Marriott. Denmark: Wordsworth Poetry
Library, 1995. Print.
Edgeworth, Maria. Belinda. Ed. Kathryn J. Kirkpatrick. Oxford: Oxford UP, 1994. Print.

292

Eliot, George. Felix Holt, the Radical. Chicago: Belford, Clarke & Co., 1884. Print.
---. Daniel Deronda. Ed. Carole Jones. Hertfordshire: Wordsworth Classics, 2003. Print.
Ferguson, Robert. “A Letter to a Person of Honour, Concerning the Black Box.” London, 1680.
Print.
Fielding, Henry. Joseph Andrews with Shamela and Related Writings. Ed. Homer Goldberg.
New York: W. W. Norton, 1987. Print.
---. The History of Tom Jones A Foundling. Ed. Claude Rawson. New York: Knopf, 1991. Print.
Filmer, Robert. Patriarcha and Other Writings. Ed. Jóhann P. Sommerville. Cambridge:
Cambridge UP, 1991. Print.
Genlis, Felicite. New Method of Instruction for Children from Five to Ten Years Old. Dublin:
Printed by William Porter, 1800. Print.
Grotius, Hugo. On the Law of War and Peace. Ed. Stephen C. Neff. Cambridge: Cambridge UP,
2012. Print.
Haywood, Eliza. Fantomina and Other Works. Ed. Alexander Pettit, Anna C. Patchias, and
Margaret Case Croskery. Toronto: Broadview Press, 2004. Print.
Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich. Lectures on the Philosophy of World History: Introduction.
Trans. H. B. Nisbet. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975. Print.
---. Phenomenology of Spirit. Trans. A. V. Miller. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977. Print.
Hume David. A Treatise of Human Nature. Ed. David Fate Norton and Mary J. Norton. Oxford:
Oxford UP, 2000. Print.
---. Selected Essays. Ed. Stephen Copley and Andrew Edgar. Oxford: Oxford UP, 2008. Print.
Hobbes, Thomas. Leviathan. Ed. Richard Tuck. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1996. Print.
---. Man and Citizen (De Homine and De Cive). Ed. Bernard Gert. Indianaoplis: Hackett
Publishing Company, 1991. Print.
Inchbald, Elizabeth. A Simple Story. Ed. J. M. S. Tompkins. Oxford: Oxford UP, 2009. Print.
Johnson, Samuel. Johnson’s Dictionary: A Modern Selection. New York: Dover Press, 2005.
Print.
Kant, Immanuel. Critique of the Power of Judgment. Trans. Peter Guyer. Cambridge: Cambridge
UP, 2000. Print.
---. Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals. Ed. Allen W. Wood. New Haven: Yale UP,
2002. Print.
Kimber, Edward. The History of the Life and Adventures of Mr. Anderson, Ed. Matthew Mason
and Nicholas Mason. Toronto: Broadview Editions, 2008. Print.
Locke, John. Two Treatises of Government and a Letter Concerning Toleration. Ed. Ian Shapiro:
New Haven: Yale UP, 2003. Print.
Machiavelli, Niccolò. “The Discourses.” The Portable Machiavelli. Trans. Peter Bondanella and
Mark Musa. New York: Penguin Books, 1979. Print.
---. The Prince. Trans. Tim Parks. New York: Penguin Books, 2009. Print.
Milton, John. “The Judgment of Martin Bucer, Touching Divorce,” ed. Thomas Birch, The
Works of John Milton, Historical, Political, and Miscellaneous. (1753). Print.
Mortimer, Thomas. The Elements of Commerce, Politics, and Finances in Three Treatises on
Those Important Subjects. Volume 5, 1774. Print.
Priestley, Joseph. A Free Discussion of the Doctrines of Materialism, and Philosophical
Necessity, In a Correspondence between Dr. Price, and Dr. Priestley. London: printed
for J. Johnson, 1778. I am using a facsimile reprint prepared by Millwood, N.Y.: Kraus
Reprint Co., 1977. Print.

293

Pufendorf, Samuel. On the Duty of Man and Citizen According to Natural Law. Ed. James Tully.
Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2006.
Radcliffe, Anne. The Mysteries of Udolpho. Ed. Bonamy Dobrée. Oxford: Oxford UP, 1998.
Print.
Richardson, Samuel. Clarissa, or The History of a Young Lady. Ed. Angus Ross. New York:
Penguin Books, 1985. Print.
Robespierre, Maximilien. Virtue and Terror. Ed. Jean Ducange and Slavoj Žižek. Trans. John
Howe. London: Verso, 2007. Print.
Rousseau, Jean-Jacques. Politics and the Arts: Letter to D’Alembert on the Theatre. Trans. Allan
Bloom. (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1960).
---. Emile: or, On Education. Trans. Allan Bloom. New York: Basic Books, 1979. Print.
---. Julie: or the New Heloise. Trans. Philip Stewart and Jean Vaché. Lebanon: Dartmouth
College Press, 1997. Print.
---. The Plan for Perpetual Peace, On the Government of Poland, and Other Writings on History
and Politics. Trans. Christopher Kelly and Judith Bush. Lebanon: Dartmouth College
Press, 2005. Print.
---. The Social Contract. Ed. Maurice Cranston. New York: Penguin Books, 1968. Print.
---. “Essay on the Origin of Languages which treats of Melody and Musical Imitation.” Trans.
John H. Moran. Two Essays on the Origin of Language. Ed. John H. Moran and
Alexander Gode. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1966. Print.
Sand, George. Nanon. Ed. Nicole Mozet. Meylan: Les Éditions de l’Aurore, 1987. Print.
Scott, Sarah. A Description of Millenium Hall. London: Virago, 1986. Print.
Sterne, Lawrence. The Life and Opinions of Tristram Shandy, Gentleman. Ed. Howard
Anderson. New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1980. Print.
Swift, Jonathan. Gulliver’s Travels. Ed. Robert A. Greenberg. New York: W. W. Norton, 1970.
Print.
Thomas, Percival. A Father’s Instructions. London: Printed for J. Johnson, 1777. Print.
Twain, Mark. A Connecticut Yankee in King Arthur’s Court. Ed. Bernard L. Stein. Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1979. Print.
Walker, George. The Vagabond: a Novel. Ed. W. M. Verhoeven. Peterborough: Broadview
Press, 2004. Print.
Wollstonecraft, Mary. An Historical and Moral View of the Origin and Progress of the French
Revolution, in A Vindication of the Rights of Woman and A Vindication of the Rights of
Men. Ed. Janet Todd. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993. Print.
---. A Short Reisdence in Sweden, Norway, and Denmark and Memoirs of the Author of ‘The
Rights of Woman.’ Ed. Richard Holmes. New York: Penguin Books, 1987. Print.
---. The Works of Mary Wollstonecraft, Vol. 7, On Poetry, Contributions to the Analytical
Review 1788-1797. Ed. Janet Todd and Marilyn Butler. New York: New York University
Press, 1989. Print.
Secondary:
Affeldt, Steven G. “The Force of Freedom: Rousseau on Forcing to be Free.” Political Theory.
27.3 (1999): 299 – 333.
Albrecht, Thomas “‘The Balance of Separateness and Communication’: Cosmopolitan Ethics in
George Eliot’s Daniel Deronda.” ELH 79.2 (2012): 389 – 416. Print.

294

Alexander, Peter. Ideas, Qualities, and Corpuscles: Locke and Boyle on the External World.
London: Cambridge University Press, 1985. Print.
Alker, Sharon. “The Soldierly Imagination: Narrating Fear in Defoe’s Memoirs of a Cavalier.”
Eighteenth-Century Fiction. 19.1 (2006): 43 – 68. Print.
Andreson, Amanda. “George Eliot and the Jewish Question.” The Yale Journal of Criticism 10.1
(1997): 39 – 61. Print.
Anderson, Benedict. Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of
Nationalism. London: Verso, 1983. Print.
Andreson, Michael. Approaches to the History of the Western Family 1500 – 1914. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1980. Print.
Appiah, Kwame Anthony. Cosmopolitanism: Ethics in a World of Strangers. New York: W. W.
Norton & Company, 2006. Print.
Aravamudan, Srinivas. Enlightenment Orientalism: Resisting the Rise of the Novel. Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 2012. Print.
Arendt, Hannah. Lectures on Kant’s Political Philosophy. Ed. Ronald Beiner. Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1992. Print.
---. The Human Condition. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1958. Print.
Bahar, Saba. Mary Wollstonecraft’s Social and Aesthetic Philosophy: An Eve to Please Me.
Gordonsville: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002. Print.
Bender, John. Imagining the Penitentiary: Fiction and the Architecture of Mind in EighteenthCentury England. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987. Print.
Berman, Marshall. The Politics of Authenticity: Radical Individualism and the Emergence of
Modern Society. London: Verso, 2009. Print.
Berry, Amanda. “Community Sponsorship and the Hospital Patient in Late Eighteenth-Century
England,” in The Locus of Care: Families, Communities, Institution and the Provision of
Welfare since Antiquity. Ed. Peregrine Horden and Richard Smith. London: Routledge ,
1998. 126 – 150. Print.
Blanchot, Maurice. The Unavowable Community. Trans. Pierre Joris. Barrytown: Station Hill,
1988. Print.
Bohl, Elizabeth. A. and Ian Duncan. Eds. Travel Writing 1700 – 1830. Oxford: Oxford UP,
2005. Print.
Botting, Eileen Hunt. Family Feuds: Wollstonecraft, Burke, and Rousseau on the
Transformation of the Family. Albany: State University of New York Press, 2006. Print.
Bowers, Toni. “Representing Resistance: British Seduction Stories, 1660 – 1800. A Companion
to the Eighteenth-Century English Novel and Culture. Ed. Paula R. Backsheider and
Catherine Ingrassia. New York: Wiley-Blackwell Publishing, 2009. 140 – 163. Print.
Bradshaw, Brendan and Peter Roberts, eds. British Consciousness and Identity: The Making of
Britain, 1533 – 1707. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2003. Print.
Brett, Nathan and Katharina Paxman. “Reason in Hume’s Passions.” Hume Studies 34.1 (2008):
43 – 59. Print.
Brown, Wendy. “Neo-Liberalism and the End of Liberal Democracy.” Theory and Event. 7.1
(2003). Print.
Buck-Morss, Susan. Hegel, Haiti, and Universal History. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh
Press, 2009. Print.
Cardwell, John. “The Rake as Military Strategist: Clarissa and Eighteenth-Century Warfare.”
Eighteenth Century Fiction 19.1&2 (2006): 153 – 180. Print.

295

Carnell, Rachel K. “Clarissa’s Treasonable Correspondence: Gender, Epistolary Politics, and the
Public Sphere.” Eighteenth Century Fiction. 10.3 (1998): 269 – 286. Print.
Castle, Terry. Masquerade and Civilization: The Carnivalesque in Eighteenth-Century English
Culture and Fiction. Stanford: Stanford UP, 1968. Print.
Cavell, Stanley. The Claim of Reason: Wittgenstein, Skepticism, Morality, and Tragedy. Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 1999. Print.
Cheah, Pheng. Spectral Nationality: Passages of Freedom from Kant to Postcolonial Literatures
of Liberation. New York: Columbia UP, 2003. Print.
Claydon, Tony and Ian McBride. Eds. Protestantism and National Identity: Britain and Ireland,
c. 1650 – 1850. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2007. Print.
Cody, Lisa Forman. Birthing the Nation: Sex, Science, and the Conception of EighteenthCentury Britons. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005. Print.
Colbert, Benjamin. “Britain through Foreign Eyes: Early Nineteenth-Century Home Tourism in
Translation.” Travel Writing and Tourism in Britain and Ireland. Ed. Benjamin Colbert.
New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012. 68 – 84. Print.
Colley, Linda. Britons: Forging the Nation 1707 – 1837. New Haven: Yale University Press,
1992. Print.
Collings, David. Monstrous Society: Reciprocity, Discipline, and the Political Uncanny.
Lewisburg: Bucknell UP, 2009. Print.
Cope, Virginia H. “Evelina’s Peculiar Circumstances and Tender Relations.” Eighteenth-Century
Fiction 16.1 (2003), 59 – 78. Print.
Davis, David Brion. The Problem of Slavery in the Age of Revolution. Oxford: Oxford UP, 1999.
Print.
DeLuna, DeeAnn. “Robinson Crusoe, Virginal Hero of the Commercial North,” EighteenthCentury Life. 28.1 (2004): 69 – 91. Print.
Derrida, Jacques. The Beast and the Sovereign, Volume I. Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
2009. Print.
---. Rogues: Two Essays on Reason. Trans. Pascale-Anne Brault and Michael Naas. Stanford:
Stanford University Press, 2005. Print.
Dworkin, Ronald. Law’s Empire. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1986. Print.
Eagleton, Terry. The Rape of Clarissa: Writing, Sexuality, and Class Struggle in Samuel
Richardson. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1982. Print.
Edelstein, Dan. The Enlightenment: A Geneology. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2010.
Print.
Ellenburg, Stephen. Rousseau’s Political Philosophy: An interpretation from Within. Ithaca:
Cornell UP, 1976. Print.
Ellion, J. H. Empires of the Atlantic World: Britain and Spain in America 1492 – 1830. New
Haven: Yale UP, 2006. Print.
Esposito, Roberto. Communitas: The Origin and Destiny of Community. Trans. Timothy
Campbell. Stanford: Stanford UP, 2010. Print.
Ferguson, Frances. “Romantic Social forms and the Case of Mary Shelley’s Frankenstein.”
Partial Answers: Journal of Literature and the History of Ideas. 8.1 (2010): 97 – 118.
Print.
---. Solitude and the Sublime: The Romantic Aesthetics of Individuation. New York: Routledge,
1992. Print.
Ferguson, Moira. Colonialism and Gender Relations from Mary Wollstonecraft to Jamaica

296

Kincaid: East Caribbean Connections. New York: Columbia University Press, 1993.
Print.
Festa, Lynn. “Crusoe’s Island of Misfit Things.” The Eighteenth Century. 52.3-4. (2011): 443 –
471. Print.
Ford, Thomas H. “Mary Wollstonecraft and the Motherhood of Feminism.” WSQ: Women’s
Studies Quarterly 37.3&4 (2009): 189 – 205. Print.
Foucault, Michel. Discipline and Punish: the Birth of the Prison. Trans. Alan Sheridan. New
York: Vintage Books, 1995. Print.
Freud, Sigmund. “The ‘Uncanny.’” The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works
of Sigmund Freud. Volume XVII. Trans. James Strachey. London: The Hogarth Press,
1955. Print.
Garcia, Humberto. Islam and the English Enlightenment, 1670 – 1840. Durham: Johns Hopkins
University Press, 2011. Print.
Gauthier, David. Rousseau: The Sentiment of Existence. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2006.
Geuss, Raymond. Politics and the Imagination. Princeton: Princeton UP, 2010. Print.
Gevirtz, Karen Bloom. Women, the Novel, and Natural Philosophy, 1660 – 1727. New York:
Palgrave Macmillan, 2014. Print.
Gilbert, Alan. Black Patriots: Fighting for Emancipation in the War for Independence. Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 2012. Print.
Gilroy, Paul. The Black Atlantic: Modernity and Double Consciousness. Cambridge: Harvard
UP, 1995. Print.
Golden, Morris. “Public Context and Imagining Self in Clarissa.” Studies in English Literature,
1500 – 1900, 25.3 (1985): 575 – 598. Print.
Harari, Josué V. Scenarios of the Imaginary: Theorizing the French Enlightenment. Ithaca:
Cornell UP, 1987. Print.
Harris, Jocelyn. “Philosophy and Sexual Politics in Mary Astell and Samuel Richardson.”
Intellectual History Review,.22.3 (2012): 445 – 463. Print.
Haskell, John. “Hugo Grotius in the Contemporary Memory of International Law: Secularism,
Liberalism, and the Politics of Restatement and Denial.” Emory International Law
Review. vol. 25 (2011). Print.
Hernandex, Alex Eric. “Tragedy and the Economics of Providence in Richardson’s Clarissa,”
Eighteenth-Century Fiction, 22.4 (2010): 599 – 630. Print.
Hinton, Lauren. “The Heroine’s Subjection: Clarissa, Sadomasochism, and Natural Law.”
Eighteenth-Century Studies. 32.3 (1999): 293 – 308. Print.
Hirschman, Albert O. The Passions and the Interests: Political Arguments for Capitalism before
its Triumph. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1977. Print.
Horkheimer, Max and Theodor W. Adorno. Dialectic of Enlightenment: Philosophical
Fragments. Trans. Edmund Jephcott. Stanford, Stanford University Press, 2002. Print.
James, C. L. R. The Black Jacobins: Toussaint L’Ouverture and the San Domingo Revolution.
New York: Vintage Books, 1989. Print.
Judson, Barbara. “The Psychology of Satan: Elizabeth Inchbald’s A Simple Story.” ELH 76.3
(2009): 599 – 624. Print.
Juengel, Scott. “Countenancing History: Marry Wollstonecraft, Samuel Stanhope Smith, and
Enlightenment Racial Science.” ELH 68.4 (2001): 897 – 927. Print.
Kaul, Suvir. Eighteenth-Century British Literature and Postcolonial Studies. Edinburgh:
Edinburgh UP, 2009. Print.

297

Kidd, Colin. British Identities Before Nationalism: Ethnicity and Nationhood in the Atlantic
World 1600 – 1800. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2006. Print.
Kramnick, Jonathan. Actions and Objects from Hobbes to Richardson. Stanford: Stanford UP,
2010. Print.
---. , “Recent Studies in the Restoration and the Eighteenth Century.” SEL 50, 3 (Summer 2010):
683 – 733. Print.
Kuehn, Manfred. Kant: A Biography. London: Cambridge University Press, 2001. Print.
Laclau, Ernesto. On Populist Reason. London: Verso, 2005. Print.
Lafleur, Greta L. “Precipitous Sensations: Herman Mann’s The Female Review (1797), Botanical
Sexuality, and the Challenge of Queer Historiography.” Early American Literature. 8.1
(2013): 93 – 123. Print.
Lamprecht, S. P. “Hobbes and Hobbism.” Thomas Hobbes: Critical Assessments. Ed. Preston
King. West Sussex: Burgess Hill, 2000. Print.
Levinas, Emmanuel. Totality and Infinity: An Essay on Exteriority. Trans. Alphonso Lingis,
Pittsburgh: Duquesne UP, 1969. Print.
---. Entre Nous: Thinking-of-the-Other. Trans. Michael B. Smith and Barbara Harshav. New
York: Columbia UP, 1998. Print.
Lewis, Eric. “The Legacy of Margaret Cavendish.” Perspectives on Science 9.3 (2001): 341 –
365. Print.
Lipsage, Karen. “‘I was also absent at my dairy-house’: The Representation and Symbolic
Function of the Dairy House in Samuel Richardson’s Clarissa.” Eighteenth-Century
Fiction 22.1 (2009). Print.
Macpherson, C. B. The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism: Hobbes to Locke. Oxford:
Oxford UP, 1964. Print.
May, Todd. Reconsidering Difference: Nancy, Derrida, Levinas, and Deleuze. University Park:
The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1997. Print.
McClure, Kristie M. Judging Rights: Lockean Politics and the Limits of Consent. Ithaca: Cornell
UP, 1996. Print.
McCoubrey, Hilaire. “Natural Law, Religion and the Development of International Law.”
Religion and International Law. Ed. Mark W. Janis and Carolyn Evans. The Hague:
Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1999: 177 – 191. Print.
McKeon, Michael. The Origins of the English Novel, 1660 – 1740. Baltimore: The Johns
Hopkins UP, 1987. Print.
Milican, Peter. “Hume’s Determinism.” Canadian Journal of Philosophy. 40.4 (2010): 611 –
642. Print.
Miller, James. Rousseau: Dreamer of Democracy. New Haven: Yale UP, 1984. Print.
Mills, Charles W. The Racial Contract. Ithaca: Cornell UP, 1997. Print.
Nachumi, Nora. “‘Those Simple Signs’: The Performance of Emotion in Elizabeth Inchbald’s A
Simple Story.” Eighteenth-Century Fiction 11.3 (1999): 317 – 338. Print.
Nancy, Jean-Luc. Being Singular Plural. Trans. Robert D. Richardson and Anne E. O’Byrne.
Stanford: Stanford UP, 2000. Print.
---. The Inoperative Community. Ed. Peter Connor. Trans. Peter Connor, et al. Minneapolis:
University of Minnesota Press, 1991. Print.
Neuhouser, Frederick. Rousseau’s Theodicy of Self-Love: Evil, Rationality, and the Drive for
Recognition. Oxford: Oxford UP, 2008. Print.
Noone, John B. Rousseau’s Social Contract: A Conceptual Analysis. Athens: U Georgia Press,

298

1980. Print.
Nozick, Robert. Anarchy, State, and Utopia. New York: Basic Books, 1974. Print.
O’Hagan, Timothy. Rousseau. London: Routledge, 1999. Print.
O’Neill, Daniel. The Burke-Wollstonecraft Debate: Savagery, Civilization, and Democracy.
University Park: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 2007. Print.
Osland, Dianne. “Heart-picking in A Simple Story.” Eighteenth-Century Fiction 16.1 (2003): 79
– 101. Print.
Özdemir, Eric. “Hidden Polemic in Wollstonecraft’s Letters from Norway: A Bakhtinian
Reading.” Studies in Romanticism. 47.3 (2008): 321 – 349. Print.
Parker, Jo Alyson. “Complicating A Simple Story: Inchbald’s Two Versions of Female Power.”
Eighteenth-Century Studies 30.3 (1997): 255 – 270. Print.
Pateman, Carole. The Sexual Contract. Stanford: Stanford UP, 1988. Print.
Perry, Ruth. Novel Relations: The Transformation of Kinship in English Literature and Culture
1748 – 1818. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004. Print.
Pocock, J. G. A. Barbarism and Religion: Narratives of Civil Government. Cambridge:
Cambridge UP, 1999. Print.
---. The Machiavellian Moment: Florentine Political Thought and the Atlantic Republican
Tradition. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975. Print.
Pollock, Anthony. , “Aesthetic Economies of Immasculation: Capitalism and Gender in
Wollstonecraft’s Letters from Sweden.” The Eighteenth Century: Theory and
Interpretaion. 52.2 (2011): 193 – 210. Print.
Pratt, Mary Louise. “Arts of the Contact Zone.” Profession (1991): 33 – 40. Print.
Rawls, John. A Theory of Justice. Cambridge: Harvard UP, 1999. Print.
Ragussis, Michael. Figures of Conversion: "The Jewish Question" and English National Identity.
Durham: Duke UP, 1995. Print.
Reisert, Joseph R. Jean-Jacques Rousseau: A Friend of Virtue. Ithaca: Cornell UP, 2003.
Richardson, Robert D. William James: In the Malestrom of American Modernism. New York:
Houghton Mifflin Books, 2006. Print.
Rigney, Ann. Imperfect Histories: The Elusive Past and the Legacy of Romantic Historicism.
Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2001. Print.
Rogers, Nicholas. Crowds, Culture, and Politics in Georgian Britain. Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 1998. Print.
Roulston, Christine. Virtue, Gender, and the Authentic Self in Eighteenth-Century Fiction:
Richardson, Rousseau, and Laclos. Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 1998. Print.
Rudé, George. The Crowd in History: A Study of Popular Disturbances in France and England,
1730 – 1848. London: Serif, 1999. Print.
Sapiro, Virginia. A Vindication of Political Virtue: The Political Theory of Mary Wollstonecraft.
Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1992. Print.
Said, Edward. Culture and Imperialism. New York: Vintage Books, 1993. Print.
Scheffler, Samuel. Boundaries and Allegiances: Problems of Justice and Responsibility in
Liberal Thought. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008. Print.
Schneewind, J. B. The Invention of Autonomy: A History of Modern Moral Philosophy.
Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1998. Print.
Scott, Joan Wallach. Only Paradoxes to Offer: French Feminists and the Rights of Man.
Cambridge: Harvard UP, 1996. Print.
Shear, Jonathan. Ed. Explaining Consciousness – The ‘Hard Problem,’ Cambridge: The MIT

299

Press, 1998. Print.
Shklar, Judith N. Men and Citizens: A Study of Rousseau’s Social Theory. Cambridge:
Cambridge UP, 1969. Print.
Siskin, Clifford and William Warner, eds. This Is Enlightenment. Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 2010. Print.
Skinner, Quentin. Hobbes and Republican Liberty. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2008. Print.
Smethurst, Paul. Travel Writing and the Natural World, 1768 – 1840. New York: Palgrave
Macmillan, 2012. Print.
Spacks, Patricia Meyer. Desire and Truth: Functions of Plot in Eighteenth-Century English
Novels. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990. Print.
---. Novel Beginnings: Experiments in Eighteenth-Century English Fiction. New Haven: Yale
University Press, 2006. Print.
Spencer, Pack J. and Eric Schliesser. “Smith’s Humean Criticism of Hume’s Account of the
origin of Justice.” Journal of the History of Philosophy 44.1 (2006), 47 – 63. Print.
Starobinsky, Jean. Jean Jacques Rousseau: Transparency and Obstruction. Trans. Arthur
Goldhammer. Chicago: U Chicago Press, 1988.
Stone, Lawrence. The Family, Sex, and Marriage in England 1500 – 1800. New York: Harper &
Row, 1977. Print.
Tadmore, Naomi. Family and Friends in Eighteenth-Century England: Household, Kinship, and
Patronage. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001. Print.
Taylor, Barbara. “Enlightenment and the Uses of Woman.” History Workshop Journal. 74
(2012): 79 – 87. Print.
Taylor, Charles. Modern Social Imaginaries. Durham: Duke UP, 2003. Print.
---. Sources of the Self: The Making of the Modern Identity. Cambridge: Harvard UP, 1989. Print.
Taylor, E. Derek. Reason and Religion in Clarissa: Samuel Richardson and ‘The Famous Mr.
Norris, or Bemerton. Burlington: Ashgate Publishing Company, 2009. Print.
Tegan, Mary Beth. “Mocking the Mothers of the Novel: Mary Wollstonecraft, Maternal
Metaphor, and the Reproduction of Sympathy.” Studies in the Novel. 4.4 (2010)
Thompson, E. P. Customs in Common: Studies in Traditional Popular Culture. New York: The
New Press, 1993. Print.
Thompson, Helen. Ingenuous Subjection: Compliance and Power in the Eighteenth-Century
Domestic Novel. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2005. Print.
Thompson, Peggy. “Abuse and Atonement: The Passion of Clarissa Harlowe.” EighteenthCentury Fiction. 11.3 (1999): 255 – 270. Print.
Tierney, Brian. The Idea of Natural Rights, Natural Law, and Church Law 1150 – 1625. Grand
Rapids: Emory UP, 1997. Print.
Todd, Janet. Mary Wollstonecraft: A Revolutionary Life. New York: Columbia University Press,
2000. Print.
Trumbauch, Randolph. The Rise of the Egalitarian Family: Aristocratic Kinship and Domestic
Relations in Eighteenth-Century England. New York: Academic Press, 1978. Print.
Uzgalis, William L. “Intrdoduction.” The Correspondence of Samuel Clarke and Anthony
Collins, 1707 – 08. Peterborough, Ontario: Broadview Press, 2011. Print.
Vaghan, Alden T. Transatlantic Encounters: American Indians in Britain, 1550 – 1777.
Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2006. Print.
Wheeler, Roxann. The Complexion of Race: Categories of Difference in Eighteenth-Century
British Culture. Philadelphia: University of Philadelphia Press, 2000. Print.

300

Williams, Raymond. The Country and the City. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1973. Print.
---. Keywords: A Vocabulary of Culture and Society. Oxford: Oxford UP, 1983. Print.
Witte, Jr., John. From Sacrament to Contract: Marriage, Religion, and Law in the Western
Tradition. Louisville: Westminster John Knox Press, 2012. Print.
Woloch, Alex. The One vs. the Many: Minor Characters and the Space of the Protagonist in the
Novel. Princeton: Princeton UP, 2003. Print.
Wrightson, Keith. “The Family in Early Modern England: Continuity and Change.”
Hanoverian Britain and Empire: Essays in Memory of Philip Lawson. Ed. Stephen
Taylor, Richard Connors, and Clyve Jones. Rochester: Boydell & Brewer, 1998. Print.
Yolton, John W. “The Concept of Experience in Locke and Hume.” Journal of the History of
Philosophy 1.1. (1963): 53 – 71. Print.
Yousef, Nancy. Romantic Intimacy. Stanford: Stanford UP, 2013. Print.
Zomchick, John P. Family and the Law in Eighteenth-Century Fiction: The Public Conscience in
the Private Sphere. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993. Print.
Zunshine, Lisa. Bastards and Foundlings: Illegitimacy in Eighteenth-Century England.
Columbus: The Ohio State UP, 2005.

301

